
Class uQ fcg. 
Book A£ 






ABSTRACT 



OF 



AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION 



BY 

HON. CHAS. E. HUGHES 

AND 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 



WITH 

SUBJECT INDEX AND REFERENCES TO HUGHES 

INVESTIGATION AND SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE 

INVESTIGATION HELD IN 1918 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1919 



//y 



o." of P» 

SEF 2 1919 



t^ll . 



A 4" 
GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 



[Figures following entries refer to volume and page numbers.] 

AIRPLANE COMPANIES: 

Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y — 
Advances and payments by Government — 

Four million dollars advanced by Government. (H 4, 338.) Buck. 

(See H 15, 371; T 1, 501, 502.) 
Ten million dollars advanced by Government. (H 7, 367. )> 

Potter. (See H 24, 447.) 
Four million dollars through Col. Montgomery. (H 5, 453.) 

Borglum. 
Statement of disposition of Government advances. (H 15, 544.) 

Moss. 
Contracts — 

Contract for 3,000 Spads ; 500 Caproni ; 1,400 JN 4 D's, September 

19, 1917. (H 3, 449.) Morgan. 
Contract for 2,000 Bristols, at $13,500,000, not started in April, 

1918. (H 5, 208.) Hall. 
Toying with contracts. (H 5, 409.) Borglum. 
Disloyalty and sabotage — 

Subtle influence to retard things. (H 7, 160.) Butts. 

Sabotage. (H 7, 182.) Butts. ( See H 10, 421 ; H 15, 12 ; H 17, 

697, 706; H 18, 415.) 
Disloyalty. (H 15, 44, 48.) West. (See H 16, 35, 36; H 17, 120, 

134, 141; H 17, 426.) 
Germans in plant cheered victories of Germany. (H 16, 371.) 

O'Connell. (See H 17, 247-311; H 17, 643-659.) 
Inefficiency — 

Fifty-five per cent efficient. (H 3, 47.) Miles. (See H 17, 108; 

H 17, 359.) 
Bristol delay due to engineer department mistakes. (H 5, 241.) 

Hall. (See T 1, 98-99.) 
Men asleep under desks. (H 15, 40.) West. (See H 16, 11-14.) 
Man did only three days' work in three months. (H 15, 41.) 

West. (See H 15, 720; H 16, 46-77 ; T 1, 149.) 
Defective workmanship. (H 15, 59-70.) Coburn. (See H 15, 

202; H 16, 33.) 
Sufficient material scrapped to build 550 planes. (H 15, 123.) 

Coburn. 
Stop order went no further than engineer department. (H 15, 

124. ) Coburn. 
Twenty men inspected a plane, yet there were four serious defects. 

(H 15, 150-155.) Rohlfs. (See H 17, 342.) 
Government paid for material three or four times. (H 15, 215.) 

Winterbottom. (See H 15, 248.) 
Excessive cancellations. (H 15, 410.) Moss. 
Inaccuracy caused Navy work to be charged to Army. (H 15, 

703.) Mulholland. 
No work but put in overtime. (H 15, 734.) Donovan. (See 

H 15, 735 ; H 15, 746 ; H 16, 38 ; H 16, 160 ; H 16, 495 ; H 16, 635.) 
Furnaces burned all day — nothing in them. (H 15, 734.) Dono- 
van. (See H 15, 740.) 

3 



4 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Airplane companies — Continued. 

Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y. — Continued. 
Inefficiency — Continued. 

Government inspects only 30 per cent of material. (H 16, 751.) 

Cole. (See H 17, 87; H 21, 562-563.) 
Forty-nine thousand seven hundred obsolete parts. (H 17, 154.) 

Weller. 
Statement by British expert as to unnecessary changes. (H 17, 

229-246.) Feberry. (See H 17, 358.) 
Built one plane as per S. C. drawings — would not go together. 

(H 17, 480.) Mueller. (See H 19, 50.) 
One continuous change down to cancellation. (H 17, 620.) 

Kepperley. 
Fifty per cent off on chemical analysis. (H 7, 691.) MacGregor. 

(See H 7, 695; H 20, 519, 521, 525, 527; H 21, 510.) 
S. C. directed production of machine for three months that should 

have been discarded. (H 15, 197.) Rohlfs. 
Production — 

No combat planes built up to March 1, 1918. (H 3, 612.) Morgan. 

(See T 1, 107.) 
Acreage and man power to turn out 565 planes a day. (H 5, 410.) 

Borglum. 
Production methods very bad. (H 13, 501.) Rose. 
Model received in August. Only 25 produced in next four months. 

(H 15, 59.) Coburn. 
Two thousand five hundred and fiftv-three training planes shipped 

up to June, 1918. (H 15, SO.) Coburn. (See H 15, 563.) 
Instead of 500 parts would make 5,000. (H 15, 126.) Coburn. 
Great many shop changes held up production. (H 15, 718.) 

Darget. 
Tried to keep busy on scrapped materials. (H 16, 98.) Harris. 
Plant instructed by Deeds to get out 25 Bristols regardless of 

cost and system. (H 16, 412.) Cole. 
Production superintendent not even engineer or mechanic. (H 

16, 718.) Dargert. 
Seventy-five per cent ahead on Navy schedule. (H 17, 43.) 

Sanderson. 
Bristol could have been made to carry Liberty within four weeks. 

(H 17, 585.) Mueller. 
Miscellaneous — 

Remarkable confusion. (H 3, 2.) Miles. (See H 7, 280; H 11, 

146.) 
First Bristol tried January, 1918; would not fly. (H 3, 5.) Miles. 
Blue prints incomplete; whittled out 25 Bristols. (H 3, 25.) 

Miles. 
Government would not use Curtiss machinery. (H 3, 48.) Miles. 
Building thousands of machines for British Government. (H 3, 

425. ) Kirkman. 
Plant for Government business cost $5,500,000. (H 3, 489.) 

Morgan. 
Bristol tested April 1, 1918; unsatisfactory. (H 3, 600.) Morgan. 
Had trouble getting metal parts because they did not meet bills. 

(H4, 232.) Bahr. (See H 11, 142 ; T 1, 147.) 
One million dollars monthly earnings. (H 6, 143.) Stagers. (See 

H 7, 367.) 
Bought material below grade. (H 7, 166.) Butts. (See H 7, 

168; H 17, 461). 
Demoralized condition. (H 15, 6.) West. (See H 15, 37; H 15, 

287; H 16, 57-74; H 17, 163-168.) 
Machines caught fire several times. (H 15, 70-75.) Coburn. 
Great number of falls in planes. (H 15, 99-100.) Coburn. 
Defective wood used because Government inspected and they not 

responsible. (H 15, 108.) Coburn. 
Not one good thing came out of Washington. (H 15, 191.) Rohlfs. 
Government obligated to amount of $2,500,000 on Bristol. (H 15, 

408. ) Moss. 
Financial statement. (H 15, 501.) Moss. ( See H 15, 552-556. ) 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 5 

Airplane companies — Continued. 

Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo. N. Y. — Continued. 
Miscellaneous — Continued. 

Bogey price on Bristol originally $6,750. (H 15, 507.) Moss. 

Navy pays profit of $1,625 per plane. (H 15, 566.) Moss. 

Navy rejections greater than Army. (H 15, 583.) Moss. 

Company exhibits. (H 15, 591-632.) Moss. 

Details of accounting system. (H 15, 659-670.) Daily. (See H 

15, 690 ; H 16, 720. ) 

Explains time-keeping system. (H 15, 726.) Anderson. 

Seemed to employees Government had lots of money it wanted to 

dispose of. (H 15, 756.) Donovan. (See H 16. 30.) 
Barbers, bartenders, etc., employed. (H 16, 50.) Harris. 
Employees made clock stands, jewelry boxes, etc. (H 16, 74.) 

96. ) " Harris. 
Employees sold passes for $1 apiece. (H 16, 88.) Harris. 
" Crime the way Government had it put over on them." (H 16, 

96) Harris. 
Load of 2 by 4s, 8 to 10 feet long, sold as scrap for 50 cents. H 16, 

104.) Harris. (See all the testimony of Chester A. Harris. 

H 16, 45. ) 
Requests by politicians to put men in plant though not needed. 

(H 16, 310.) Nutt. 
Reason cost of production unnecessarily high. (H 16, 316.) Reed. 
Method of approving vendors' invoices. (H 16, 438.) G. A. 

Thomas. 
Report of scrap disposed of or sold. (H 16, 600-615.) O'Connell. 
Pay roll for May, 1918, $1,031,000. Productive labor $50,000. (H 

16, 685-690.) Sparks. 

Salvage department run by plant, not Government. (H 16, 786.) 

Sessions. (See H 17, 26.) 
British captain had impression Bristol not intended to be success- 
ful. (H 17, 119.) Rogers. 
Demanded $75,000 for plans of JN 4. (H 18, 436.) Jordan. 
Charges a disposition to accommodate Curtiss Co. (H 19, 243.) 

Ryan. ( See H 19, 245. ) 
Col. Mixter does not recall whether he has Curtiss stock. (H 20, 

374.) Mixter. (See H 20, 375.) 
Used silver solder at expense of Government. (PI 21, 579.) 

Oakes. 
Dayton-Wright Airplane Co., Dayton, Ohio — 
Advances and payments by Government — 

One million dollars advanced by War Credits Board. (H. 1, 431.) 

Newman. (See H 9, 378.) 
Contracts — 

Four thousand battle planes at $12,000 each. (H 2, 309.) Borglum. 
Disloyalty and sabotage — 

Deharbor, secretary-treasurer, German spy, interned. (H 5, 430.) 

Borglum. 
No indication of disloyalty. (H 7, 527.) Mixter. (See T 1, 280.) 
Inefficiency — 

Seventy-five to 80 per cent efficient. (H 3, 46.) Miles. 
Utterly incompetent. (H 5, 411.) Borglum. (See H 20, 326.) 
Plane sent to France, but no one could fight with it. (H 10, 390.) 

Schoonmaker. 
Overhead — 

Government paid overhead. (H 1, 434.) Newman. 

Wanted Government to pay for tennis courts, baseball suits, etc. 

(H 8, 211.) Brown. 
Traveling expense of president paid by Government. (H 8, 493.) 

Newman. (See H 8, 498 ; H 9, 625 ; H 10, 56 ; H 10, 470.) 
Telephone service paid by Government. (H 8, 507.) Newman. 
Also welfare, garage, and general office expense. (H 8, 509-515.) 

Newman. ( See H 10, 62 ; H 10, 57. ) 
Experimental costs" charged to Government. (H 9, 597.) SmarL 

(See H 9, 624; H 10, 9.) 
Government paid for temporary buildings which eventually will be 

part of plant. (H 10, 32.) Howell. 



6 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Airplane companies — Continued. 

Dayton-Wright Airplane Co., Dayton, Ohio — Continued. 
Overhead — Continued., 

Forty-one thousand, eight hundred and eighty-three dollars paid 
by Government as depreciation up to June 1, 1918. (H 10, 48.) 
Howell. 

Everything to be paid by Government. (H 10. 63.) Howell. 

Two hundred and fifty-five thousand, two hundred and fifty-five 
dollar voucher paid by Government without audit. (H 10, 65.) 
Howell. 

Payroll padding. (H 10, 456.) Hiller. 

Chauffeurs, oil, gasolene on free list to company officials (H 10, 
457.) Hiller. 
Production — 

No shipments before January 1, 1918. (H 1, 437.) Newman. 

Splendid production basis. (H 3, 24.) Miles. 

Shipped 5 De Havilands a day March, 1918. (H 3, 28.) Miles. 

Capacity not utilized on April 1. 1918. (H 3, 74.) Colvin. 

Shipped planes overseas without flying them. (H 21, 609.) Ar- 
nold. 
Salaries — 

One hundred thousand dollars divided as salary between three 
officials. (H 1, 403.) Newman. 

Eighteen thousand dollars paid Orville Wright as salary. (H 1, 
411.) Newman. 

Salaries allowed through oversight. (H 8, 191.) Brown. 

Schedule of salaries. (H 8, 465.) Newman. 

Salary of $35,000 paid Kettering by company. (H 9, 145.) Smith. 
Miscellaneous- 
Company always given preference. (H 2, 322.) Borglum. 

Scrapped 90 per cent of spruce. (H 3, 25.) Miles. 

Deeds a stockholder. (H 3, 40.) Miles. 

Talbotts and Kettering real heads. (H 4, SO.) Miller. 

Longacre of approvals section refused admittance by Talbott, jr. 
(H 4, 104.) Miller. 

Barlow to inspect Liberty but unable to gain objective.. (H 4, 
501.) Barlow. 

Albert Barlow sold company cotton for linen. (H 5, 430.) Borg- 
lum. 

H. E. Talbott, jr., vice president, formerly Deed's secretary in 
Washington. (H 5, 459.) Borglum. 

Montgomery orders broad viewpoint in passing vouchers. (H 8, 
520. ) Newman. 

Contract excuses company from testing their product. (H 10, 
66. ) Howell. 

Government authorization came from Deeds. (H 10, 69.) Sherer. 

Telegrams. (H 10, S4-176.) 

Tried for six months to get information from Signal Corps to fin- 
ish drawings. (H 10, 358.) Schoonmaker. (See H 19, 33.) 

H. E. Talbott, sr., testifies in re organization of company. (H 10, 
^ 488. ) 

Charles F. Kettering testifies in re organization of company. (H 
10, 665.) 

H. E. Talbott, jr., testifies in re organization of company. (H 10, 
721.) 

Four million dollars profit on De Havilands and spares. (H 10, 
751.) 

Compelled to sign cross license agreement. (T 1, 291.) Ketter- 
ing (See T 1, 302.) 
Fisher Body Corporation, Detroit, Mich. — 
Advances and payments by Government — 

Paid $250,000 by Government. (H 1, 391.) Newman. 

Three million sixty thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight dollars 
in vouchers paid. (H 11, 221-22.) Holmes. (See H 11, 534.) 

Two million dollars advanced by Government. (H 11, 493.) Louis 
Mendelsohn. (See H 11, 539.) 

Three million twenty-three thousand four hundred and forty-nine 
dollars paid by Government. (H 11, 568.) Scott. 



GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 7 

Airplane companies — Continued. 

Fisher Body Corporation, Detroit, Mich. — Continued. 
Contracts — 

Contracts to Metal Products Co. influenced by Talbotts. (H 11, 

356-357.) Fred J. Fisher. 
Refused contract with British Government. (H 11, 412.) Fred 

J. Fisher. 
Three million two hundred thousand dollars paid by Government 
on contracts. (H 11, 529.) Westcoat. 
Disloyalty and sabotage — 

Fishers not Germans for several generations. (H 11, 47.) Heas- 
lett. (H 11, 537.) 
Inefficiency — 

Finest plant ever in. (H 11, 185.) Patterson. 
No one experienced in airplane production. (H 11, 473.) Simp- 
son. 
Overhead — 

Chart of depreciation. (H. 11, 567.) Scott. 
Production — 

Idle waiting for information. (H 11, 14.) Heaslett. (See 

H 11, 20; Hll, 420.) 
Three months behind Davton-Wright because information held up 
longer. (H 11, 30.) Heaslett. (See H 11, 42 ; T 1, 244; H 11, 
479.) 
Never promised to deliver 1,500 De Havilands by end of July, 

1918. (H 11, 437.) C. T. Fisher. 
Probably ship 25 planes in July instead of 250. (H 11, 447-448.) 
C. T. Fisher. 
Salaries — 

Statement of salaries. (H 11, 226-227.) Holmes. 
Miscellaneous — 

Bogy cost $630, too high. (H 7, 708.) Downey. (See H 11, 237.) 
Six Fisher brothers and five Mendelsohns in firm. (H 11, 290-291.) 

F. J. Fisher. 
Price of $6,500 for plane. (H 11, 300.) F. J. Fisher. 
Deeds and Waldon request Fisher place contract with Dayton- 
Wright. (H 11, 334.) F. J. Fisher. 
No control over National Cash Register situation. (H 11, 335.) 

F. J. Fisher. (See H 11, 364.) 
Talbotts in on all conferences with Deeds and Waldon in Wash- 
ington. (H 11, 344.) F. J. Fisher. 
Statement of corporation. (H 11, 515.) Aaron Mendelsohn. 
Eugene Meyer has an interest in firm. (H 20, 168.) Meyer, jr. 
Metz Co., Waltham, Mass. — 

Mr. Byng, German born, forman of sheet-metal department. (H. 4, 

525.) Lee Mason. (See H 4, 552.) 
Out of stock; no attempt to get more. (H 4, 527.) Lee Mason. 
Men sat around, smoked, read, and spent hours in toilet. (H 4, 528.) 

Lee Mason. 
Mason paid 30 cents per hour ; good Germans got 37, 371, or 40 cents. 

(H 4, 532.) Lee Mason. 
Only three American's in plant. (H 4, 532.) Lee Mason. 
Superintendent of plant German. (H 4, 533.) Lee Mason. 
Older Metz born in German. (H 4, 533.) Lee Mason. 
Blue prints laid around; anyone could take them. (H 4, 534.) Lee 

Mason. (See H 4, 556.) 
Three Signal Corps officers there. (H 4, 539.) Lee Mason. 
Production manager German. (H 4, 539.) Lee Mason. 
Pro-German put on Government work. (H 4, 555.) Luther Mason. 
Would close factory rather than produce munitions. (H 6, 149.) 
Stagers. 
Standard Aero Co., Elizabeth, N. J. — 

Built several machines for Japanese Government. (H 13, 292.) 

Mingle. 
Fifteen per cent profit, later 12 per cent. (H 13, 421.) Meenan, jr. 
Seventy-three thousand six hundred and forty-nine dollars profit on 
spares for J-l. (H 13, 423.) Meenan, jr. 



8 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Airplane companies — Continued. 

Standard Aero Co., Elizabeth, N. J. — Continued. 

Five thousand three hundred dollars fixed price for 100 J planes. 

(H 13, 428.) Meenan, jr. 
Material scrapped here which was passed at other plants. (H 13, 

444.) (H 13, 446^147.) Sullivan. 
Thirty per cent delay due to Government inspectors. (H 13, 476.) 

Waterhouse. 
Producing machine not tested with Liberty motor. (T 1, 351.) 

Mengle. 
Much material bought and then contract canceled. (T 1, 367-369.) 

Mengle. 
Navy negotiations satisfactory. (T 1, 381.) Mengle. 
Requisitions sent to jobbing concern. (H 20, 222.) L. H. MacLaughlin. 
(See H 20, 228.) 
Standard Aircraft Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J. — 
Advances and payment by Government — 

Government paid for idle employees. (H 3, 45.) Miles. 

Four million two hundred and sixty-two thousand nine hundred 

and one dollars paid by Government. (H 13, 279.) Mingle. 
Statement of cash from War Department. (H 13, 374.) Finkle- 

stein. 
Statement of money paid firm under contracts. (H 13, 588-589.) 
Conaty. 
Contracts — 

Order cut from $120,000 to $35,000. (H 3, 672.) Lewis.. 
Contract totals $9,000,000. (H 7, 555.) Mixter. 
Order received for 500 De Haviland 9s. (H 13, 16.) Day. 
Signal Corps used bad judgment in placing order for only 500 
planes. (H 13, 551.) Cookson. 
Disloyalty and sabotage — 

Graft on part of Government inspector. (H 4, 137.) Daych., 
Thought Government representatives pro-German. (H 13, 417.) 
Finklestein. 
Inefficiency — 

Haphazard; extremely disorganized (H 4, 110.) Daych. 
Signal Corps never gave valuable information. (H 13, 78.) Day. 

Defective material furnished by Dayton Metal Products Co. (H 

13, 488.) Dean., (See H 13, 518.) 
Plant does not justify larger order. (H 13, 125.) Rose. 
No two files of prints alike. (H 13, 533.) Cookson. 
Production — 

Five motors shipped Japan direct August 20, 1917. (H 4, 156.) 

Daych. (See H 4, 159; T 1, 347.) 
No production by late March, 1918, because of lack of drawings. 
(H 13, 26.) Day. (See H 13. 506 ; H 13, 547 ; T 1, 357-58 ; T'l, 
529.) 
Ten machines a day within five months if on De Haviland 4. (H 
13, 54) Day. 
Salaries — 

Mingle's salary, $62,000. (H 5, 460.) Borgium. (See H 6, 411; 

H 7, 295; T 1, 514-16.) 
Statement of salaries and amounts allowed. (H 13, 330.) Finkle- 
stein., 
Miscellaneous — • 

Great confusion. (H 3, 44.) Miles. (See H 7, 292; H 7, 553.) 
Manipulation by Mingle of Government finances. (H 4, 113.) 

Daych. 
Under control of Mitsui Co., agents of Japanese Government. (H 
4, 124.) Daych. ( See H 8, 203 ; H 13, 120 ; H 13, 135 ; T 1, 340.) 
Financial statement., (H. 4, 140.) Daych. 
Mengle general counsel for Mitsui Co. (H 4, 155.) Daych. 
Machine cost company $2,354; cost Government over $6,000. (H 

4, 157.) Daych. 
Coffin did not know planes were condemned. (H 7, 25.) Coffin. 
Mengle denied owning stock to Deeds. (H 7, 292.) Potter. 
Government furnished 53 accountants., (H 8, 200.) Brown. 
Succeeded Sloane & Co. (H 13, 3.) Day. 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. V 

Airplane companies — Continued. 

Standard Aircraft Corporation — Continued. 
Miscellaneous — Continued. 

Designed Standard J plane. (H 13, 6.) Day- 
Signal Corps made changes without consulting designers. (H 

13-14. ) Day. 
Discrimination in inspection as compared with Dayton Wright. 

(H 13, 35, 36.) Day. 
Told Navy work more important than Army work. ( H 13, 57. ) Day. 
Installing Liberty did away with superior qualities of Bristol. (H 

13, 88. ) Day. 
Capital increased to $10,000,000 Julv 24, 1918. (H 13, 135.) Mingle. 

(See H 4, 139.) 
Aero Corporation leases to Aircraft at big profit. (H 13, 139.) 

Mingle. 
Correspondence between company and Signal Corps. (H 13, 177- 

251.) (See H 13, 306.) 
Five hundred thousand feet of spruce purchased for orders which 

did not materialize. (H 13, 335.) Mingle. 
Difficulty because heads of company are not manufacturers. (H 

13, 507.) Rose. 
Wright-Martin Corporation, New Brunswick, N. J. : 
Advances and payments bv Government — 

Advanced $12,000,000. (H 4, 338.) Buck. 

No advances from Government. (H 14, 82.) Houston. 

Expect $7,500 000 through War Credits Board. ( H 14, 82. ) Houston. 

Seventy-five thousand dollars paid by Government for machinery 

on contract later canceled. (H 14, 136.) Houston. 
Statement showing amount paid by Government. (H 14, 322.) 

Benstead. 
Contracts — 

Cost-plus contract of 42 to 50 million dollars, 1917-18. (H 1, 806.) 

Byllesby. 
Col. Byllesby says contract " most extraordinary ever heard of." 

(H 1, 811.) 
Contract for 3,000 Hispano-Suiza motors explained. (H 14, 7.) 

Houston. 
Other contracts. (H 14, 1 ), 11, 12, 13, 15.) Houston. 
Four hundred and fifty motors for French Government. (H 14, 

75.) Houston. 
One hundred and twenty million dollars too small a contract on 

fixed price. (H 14, 123.) 
Paid $1,000 additional for planes in Los Angeles plant. (T 2, 718.) 

Jordan. (See T 2, 720.) 
Inefficiency — 

Thousands of dollars a month spent in expressage and messenger 

service. (H 14, 60.) Houston. 
Production — 

Produced Hispano-Suiza motors for foreign Governments. (H 3, 

59. ) Miles. 
Two thousand five hundred Hispano-Suiza motors made from July, 

1917, to July, 1918. (H 14, 84.) Houston. 
Discontinue Sunday work in heaviest production. (H 14, 370.) De 

Belleuse. 
Salaries, $150,000 a year for Goethals & Co.'s supervision. (H 14, 

143.) Houston. 
Miscellaneous — 

Col. W. B. Thompson, part owner. (H 6, 312.) Lockhart. 
Capitalization outlined. (H 14, 4.) Houston. 
Increase in wages adds $280 per motor. (H 14, 52.) Houston. 
Correspondence with Aircraft Board. (H 14, 61, 72.) Houston. 
Hispano-Suiza foremost motor in France. (H 14, 107.) Houston. 
Over $2,000,000 in profit on 2 contracts. (H 14, 142.) Houston. 
Correspondence with Signal Corps. (H 14, 160.) Houston. 
No interference by Government an advantage in building Hispano. 

(H 14, 258.) Crane. 
Signal Corps failed to send details. (T 1, 307.) Hand. (See T 

1, 320.) 



10 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Appropriation : 

Four million dollars left June 1 out of $750,000,000 for year 1917-18. 

(H 1, 2.) Wolff. (See T 2, 1152, 1155.) 
One billion one hundred and thirty-seven million dollars asked of Congress 

for 1918-19. (H 1, 4.) Wolff. 
Never over $2,500,000 up to end of fiscal year 1916. (H 1, 10.) Wolff. 
Presidential order No. 7 makes allotment of $750,000,000. (HI, 78.) Wolff. 
Twenty million dollars allotted March 14, 1918. (H 2, 23.) Edgar. 
Six hundred and forty million dollars, summer of 1917. (H 3, 370.) 

McConaughy. 
Statement showing distribution of appropriations. (H 18, 667.) Col. Jones. 
AVIATION FIELDS : 
Carlstrom field — - 

Cost $799,212. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. 
Dorr field — 

Cost $674,206. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. 
Langley field — 

Buildings 100 feet high and 150 long impossible to operate. (H 2, 35.) 

Edgar. 
Will cost $15,000,000. (H 2, 36.) Edgar. 
McCook field- 
Estimated cost, $1,059,052. (H 2, 104.) Bennington. 
Flooded. (T 2, 746.) Col. Arnold. 

Col. Vincent instrumental in getting this field. (H 22, 145.) Vincent. 
Col. Deeds directed Col. Edgar to acquire this field. (H 22, 382.) 

Edgar. 
Leased from Dayton Metal Products Co. (H 22, 464.) Edgar. (See 

H 22, 469.) 
Deeds and Kettering owned 120 acres of this field. ( H 22, 487. ) Deeds. 
Morrison field, Virginia — 

Estimated cost $1,892,000. (H 2, 36.) Edgar. 
Wilbur Wright field- 
Contract cost, $2,922,061. (H 2, 74.) Edgar. (See T 2, 748; 

H 22, 444. ) 
Extremely expensive. (H 0, 36.) Allen. 

Eighteen thousand dollars in unclaimed wages. (H 2, 107.) Ben- 
nington. 
Rumored Talbott identified with contract. (H 2, 232.) Grannis. 
Lumber put through several hands to raise price. (H 2, 469.) Sligh. 
Flood possibilities. (H 7, 196, 216.) Edgar. (See 22, 378.) 
Abandoned as flying school. (H 18, 246.) Col. Jones. 
No military need for over 2,000 acres. (H 20, 683.) Waldon. (H 20, 

679; H 22, 369.) 
Part of field swampy. (H 22, 447.) Edgar. 
Baker, Hon. Newton D. : 

Refused to furnish mechanics. (H 7, 78.) Coffin. 

Lengthy discussion on Council of National Defense. (H 21, 354.) 

Lengthy discussion on Aircraft Production Board. (H 21, 359.) 

Does not recall being told Deeds, Squire, or Montgomery were unfit. (H 21, 

383.) 
Letter to President in re production not referred to Baker. (H 21, 383.) 

Baker. 
Did not know Deeds was responsible for production. (H 21, 391.) (See 

H 21, 393, 395.) 
Never saw programs regarding production of planes. (H 21, 403, 404.) 

(See H 21, 407.) 
Baker personally approved voucher of $861,000 for General Vehicle Co., 
real estate. (H 24, 592.) Montgomery. 
Coffin, Howard E. : 

Selected civilian members of Aircraft Board. (H 6, 422.) Coffin. 
Selected Waldon, Deeds, and Montgomery. (H 6, 423.) Coffin. 
Contracts : 

Foreign contracts made by Gen. Foulois. (H 1, 4.) Wolff. 

Contract with French to equip 30 squadrons. (H 1, 5.) Wolff. 

Contract with British to assemble planes. (H 1, 5.) Wolff. 

Twelve million dollar contract for material let in September, 1917. 

(H 1, 7-8.) Wolff. 
Depreciation of plants element of cost in contracts. (H 1, 17.) Wolff. 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 11 

'Contracts — Continued. 

Cost determined after work was done. (H 1, 25.) Wolff. 

Contracts provided advancement of money for additions, raw material, etc. 

(HI, 100.) Wolff. 
No provision for damages in case of delays. (H 1, 106.) Wolff. 
No time limit. (H 1, 105.) Wolff. 

Confidential experimental work let at 12£ per cent profit. (H 1, 106.) 
Forty million dollar contract with concern having no buildings. (H 1, 191.) 

Jones. 
Depreciation covered cost of buildings. (H 1, 223.) Wolff. 
Ten million dollar contract with White Co. for construction of Langley 

Field. (HI, 814.) Jones. 
Col. Jones criticizes Langley Field contract. (H 1, 824.) Jones. 
Lowest bidder did not get contract. (H 1, 827.) Jones. 
Unauthorized contracts let at 10 per cent instead of 7 per cent. (H 2, 24.) 

Edgar. 
One million dollars for acetone. ( H 2, 26. ) Edgar. 
Always above estimate. (H 2, 47.) Edgar. 
No limit as to cost. (H 2, 47.) Edgar. 

Two million dollars paid for the Wilbur Wright Field. (H 2, 91.) Ben- 
nington. 
Eight dollars per acre for 1,200 acres of coral and swamp land in Florida. 

(H 2, 140.) Jones. 
Capt. Sloan made unauthorized contract at Langley Field. (H 2, 160.) 

Smith. 
Contracts let for castor oil though not used. (H 2, 186.) Edgar. 
List of castor-bean contractors by Col. Jones. (H 2, 211.) 
Four thousand battle planes at $12,000 by Dayton Wright Co. (H 2, 309.) 

Borglum. 
Bid of $3,000 by Lewis Co., but not allowed to bid if under $5,500. 

(H 2, 339.) Borglum. 
Contract by Col. Disque " huge joke." (H 2, 391.) Sligh. 
No contract let for propellers late in November, 1917. (H 2, 422.) Sligh. 

(See T 2, 829-839.) 
Grand Rapids Airplane Co. thought to get contract through congressional 

influence. (H 2, 595.) Fletcher. 
Firm bid 75 cents ; contract let for $1.05. (H 3, 92.) Colvin. 
Legal department, Signal Corps, originated cost-plus system. (H 6, 543.) 

Coffin. 
Could not obtain fixed-price contracts. (H 7, 96.) Coffin. 
Twenty-five per cent saving below bogey cost went to contractor. (H 7, 

101.) Coffin. 
Overhead included income tax, etc. (H 8, 323.) Brown. 
First contract let to firm without buildings. (H 11, 81.) Heaslet. 
Fowler with no factory received order. "Miraculous." (H 11, 164.) 

Patterson. (See H 11, 169a.) 
List of cost-plus contractors. (H 11, 219.) Holmes. 
Cross license : 

Lawyer Hill makes statement on cross license. (H 21, 1.) 

Manufacturers pooled their patent interests. (H 21, 6.) Hill. 

Four million dollars to be paid by Government contracts. (H 21, 8.) 

Hill. 
Government pays royalties on cost-plus contracts. (H 21, 10.) Hill. 
Inventors had to submit to this manufacturers' association. (H 21, 13.) 

Hill. (See H 21, 17-18.) 
Government will yet have to pay damages. (H 21, 24.) Hill. 
Maj. Downey fought cross license. (H 7, 717.) (See H 7, 718-734; 

T 2, 720-723-729.) 
Deeds, Col. E. A. : 

Disloyalty and irregularities — 

Admits being German and sympathies with Germany. (H 2, 532.) 

Borglum. 
Appointed many Germans. (H 2, 534.) Borglum. 

Directs no inspection of materials from his firm. (H 5, 398.) Borglum. 
Boasted ability to name 80 officers. (H 5, 412.) Borglum. 
Reference to "Deeds" for " Dietz." (H 5, 426.) Borglum. 
Thirty seaplanes built on verbal order of Deeds. (H 5, 427.) Borglum. 



12 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Deeds, Col. E. A. — Continued. 

Disloyalty and irregularities — Continued. 

" Deeds is a crook." (H 5, 431.) Borgluni. 

Blocked production of lenses. (H 5, 483.) Borglum. 

Protecting partners in their delay by holding other plants back. 

(H 5, 490.) Borglum. 
Arrangements for confidential telegrams to Talbot. (H 10, 596.) Tal- 
bot. (See H 23, 86.) 
Ford Co. profited through Deeds. (H 12, 224.) Wills. 
Influenced Waldon in contracting with Dayton-Wright. (H 20, 670 ) 

Waldon. (See H. 20, 679.) 
Certified voucher for $104,500 to Packard Co. (H 23, 97.) Deeds. 
Other interests — 

Interested in Dayton Metal Products Co. (H 2, 289.) Borglum. 
Delco system is Deeds's. (H 2, 542.) Borglum. (See H 22, 355.) 
Owner of McCook experimental field, Dayton. (H 5, 352.) Borglum 

(See H 22, 148; H 22, 365.) 
Part owner of buildings, Dayton-Wright Co. (H 5, 354.) Borglum. 

(See H 9, S3.) 
List of firms in which Deeds is stockholder. ( H 5, 379. ) Borglum. 
Delco system on Liberty is Deeds's work. (H 5, 394.) Borglum. 
Vaucain, associated with Deeds, should be investigated. Borglum. 
Owns 55 per cent of Bijou Electric Co.(H 5, 467.) Borglum. (See 

T 2, 875. ) 
Transfer of Deeds's stock. (H 9, 36, 79.) Smith. 
Record of stocks. (H 9, 273.) Smith. 

Connected with Talbot, of Dayton Lumber Co. (T 1, 37.) Edgar. 
Deeds owns south field individually. (H 22, 673.) Deeds. 
Heavy beneficiary in contracts, increases one. (H 5, 373.) Borglum. 
(See H 5, 399.) 
Miscellaneous — 

Authorized statement of February 21, 1918, in re production. (H S r 

348.) McConaughy. (See H 23, 137.) 
Informs Curtiss Co. they must cancel $30,000,000 Spad contract. (H 3, 

528. ) Morgan. 
Stated planes on way across February 10, 1918. (H 3. 637.) Sweetzer. 
Told Senator Hitchock $10,000 set aside for Martin. (H 4, 511.) Bar- 
low. 
Indicted; under sentence. (H 5, 359.) Borglum. 
Sought place on Aircraft Production Board. (H 5, 367.) Borglum. 
Tied up $320,000,000 available for plane production. (H. 5, 373.) Bor- 
glum. 
Borglum is investigated. (H 5, 426.) Borglum. 
Congressman Howard had interesting experience with Deeds. (H 5, 

439. ) Borglum. 
Statement in re Deeds's administration. (H 6, 508.) Coffin. 
Did nol have requisite information. (H 7, 248.) Potter. 
Responsible for delay in engineering decisions. (H 7, 513.) Mixter. 
Mr. King, president of Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co., cites 

business relations. (H 10, 612.) King. 
Albree-Piclgeon Co. refuses to deal with Deeds. (H 12, 34.) Albree. 
Brainiest man ever in contact with. (H 12, 36.) Albree. 
Waldon and Deeds strongly opposed to contracts on Pacific coast. 

(H. 18, 427.) Jordan. . (See H 18, 428.) 
Corrections 4n previous testimony. (H 24, 90.) Deeds. 
Squier did not authorize Deeds to certify $104,500 voucher. (H 24, 
328. ) Squier. 
Disque, Col. Brice P. : 

Impressed by Disque. (H 7, 469.) Howe. 
Contract officer on Pacific coast. (H 8, 244.) Ryan. 
Responsible for all moneys, etc. (T 1, 19.) Edgar. 
Expenditures — Domestic : 

Large amount spent in devolpment of plants. (H 1, 52.) Wolff. 
Overcontracted $11,000,000. (H 1, 96.) Wolff. 
Statement of advances to companies. (H 1, 103.) Wolff. 
Reimbursed Carl Fisher for unauthorized aviation field in Florida on au- 
thority of Col. Deeds. (H 1, 125.) Jones. (See T 1, 60 ; T 1, 50.) 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 13 

Expenditures — Domestic — Continued. 

Fisher not reimbursed to extent of $40,000. (H 1, 132.) Jones. 

Nine hundred and seven million dollars spent or obligated. (H 1, 171.) 

Jones. 
Two hundred and fifty thousand dollars paid Fisher Body Corporation. 

(H 1, 391.) Newman. 
Eighteen thousand dollars paid Orville Wright as salary, 1917-18. (H 1, 

411. ) Newman. 
One million dollars advanced Dayton-Wright Co., 1917-18. (H 1, 431.) 

Newman. 
Fifty thousand dollars paid Glen Martin for planes. 1917-18. (H 1, 455.) 

Barlow. 
One hundred and ninety-one million nine hundred and six thousand five 

hundred and eighty-four dollars beyond allotment. (H 1, 514.) Lehman. 
Ten million dollars for Langley field. (H 1, 814.) Jones. 
One million fifty-nine thousand and fifty-two dollars for McCook field. 

(H 2, 104.) Bennington. 
Two million dollars paid on Wilbur Wright field. (H 2, 91.) Bennington. 
One million eight hundred and seventy-three thousand three hundred and 

ninety-four dollars paid up to June 1, 1918, on Morrison field. (H 2, 36.) 

Edgar. 
Seven hundred and ninety-nine thousand two hundred and twelve dollars 

paid for Carlstrom field. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. 
Six hundred and seventy-four thousand two hundred and six dollars paid 

for Door field. (H. 2, 34.) Edgar. 
Eight hundred and four thousand two hundred and nine dollars at Pains- 

ville and West Point. (H 2, 26.) Edgar. 
Five million dollars for castor bean. (H 2, 31.) Jones. 
One hundred thousand dollars on Miami gunnery field. (H 2, 203.) Edgar. 
Paid bonus of $750,000, (H 2, 344.) Borglum. 
One million dollars spent on spruce plant. (H 2, 394.) Sligh. 
Unnecessary expenditure of money. (H, 4, 94.) Miller. 
Beautifying of grounds came under overhead. (H 4, 101.) Miller. 
One hundred and forty-five million dollars advanced for new companies. 

(H 4, 337.) Buck. 
Two million five hundred thousand dollars advanced Willys-Overland. 

(H 8, 151.) Sloan. 
Thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty dollars and fifty-three cents 

overhead salaries for November. (H 8, 348.) Haag. 
Statement of estimate of cost of all projects. (T 1, 19.) Edgar. (See 

T 1, 21, 22, 23.) 
Avoidable waste of money at all fields. (T 1, 28.) Edgar. 
One million dollars cost of acetone plants should have been $60,000. (T 1, 

51. ) Edgar. 
Four million five hundred thousand dollars in original cross-license agree- 
ment. (T 1, 475, 476.) Downey. 
One billion dollars expended, only small number of planes abroad. (T2, 

939.) Kenley. 
Record of expenses. (T 2, 1189.) Ryan. 
Forty thousand dollars on firm having $20,000 contract. (H 20, 447.) 

Landon. 
Eight million nine hundred and thirty-eight thousand eight hundred and 

twenty-five dollars to White Corporation for materials. (H 21, 463.) 

Chilson. 
Expenditures — Foreign : 

Appropriated $47,000,000 in 1917-18. (H 1, 5.) Wolff. 

Obligations, 1917-18, of $300,000,000. (H 1, 6.) Wolff. 

Obligations cabled by Pershing contradictory. (H 1, 76.) Wolff. 

Error of $38,000,000 in one cablegram. (H 1, 88.) Wolff. 

Commitments over appropriation 1917-18 of $173,307,012. (H 1, 89.) 

Wolff. 
One hundred million dollars beyond amount given by Congress, 1917-18. 

(H 1, 94.) Wolff. 
Fifteen million one hundred thousand dollars appropriated by Signal Corps 

for foreign contracts, 1917-18. (H 1, 533.) Lehman. 
Six hundred and forty-two thousand four hundred and ninety-one dollars 

for aviation fields in May, 1918. (H 2, 44.) Edgar. 



14 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Expenditures — Foreign — Continued. 

Twenty million dollars on overseas items to June 1, 1918. (H 2, 28 > 

Edgar. 
Nine million five hundred thousand dollar order on hand for field hangars 

(H2, 29.) Edgar. 
One hundred million dollars for aircraft. (H 4, 596.) Marmon. 
Statement of construction abroad. (T 1, 23.) Edgar. 
Expenditures — how controlled : 

Accounts audited in field, then scrutinized. (H 1, 11.) Wolff. 
Five hundred auditors; three traveling supervisors. (H 1, 11.) Wolff. 
Foreign service: 

Unsatisfactory results by cable. (H 1, 80.) Wolff. 

Request no accounting until end of war. (H 1, 271.) Wolff. 

Rolls-Royce the best engine. (H 4, 589.) Marmon. 

English planes made by women, no experience. (H 5, 101.) Owen Thomas. 

French to deliver 5,000 planes before July 1, 1918. (H 6, 4.) Addas. 

British to deliver 20 squadrons of machines. (H 6, 6.) Addas. 

French annul contract because raw material delayed from this country. 

(H 6, 31.) Addas. ( See H 8, 36 ; H 19, 158 ; H 20, 579 ; H 21, 415. ) 
Four hundred cadets without training planes. (H 6, 33.) Addas. (See 

T 1, 660; H 19, 160.) 
Lack of planes at training centers. (H 6, 39.) Addas. (See H 20, 

541 ; H 21, 432. ) 
Col. Boiling is superseded by Gen. Foulois. (H 6, 47.) Addas. 
Lack of cooperation from America. (H 6, 52.) 
Could purchase Fiat machines but did not. (H 6, 64.) Addas. 
Men at head of departments too young. (H 6, 88.) Addas. 
Resigns because of deplorable conditions. (H 6, 92.) Addas. 
British Government led to believe they would have thousands of planes. 

(H 6, 166.) Workman. 
American Handley-Paige one-third as efficient as British machine. (H 6, 

169.) Workman. (See T 2, 753; H 6, 243.) 
British erect building and furnish men, but no parts came. (H 6, 206, 

208.) Workman. (See H 7, 277.) 
Part of delay due to French methods. (H 6, 322.) Lockhart. (See 

H7, 81.) 
Secretary Baker refused to send mechanics. (H 7, 78.) Coffin. 
Bristol used extensively in England. (H 7, 273.) Potter. 
Foulois did not send specific list of requirements. (H 7, 584.) Mixter. 
No American planes in France in March, 1918. (H 8, 31.) Diffin. (See 

T 2, 750, 752. ) 
Plane destruction on front close to 100 per cent a month. (H 8, 35.) 

Diffin. 
Germany kept up with plane production. (H 8, 41.) Diffin. 
Hispano-Suiza foremost motor in France. (H 14, 107.) Houston. 
Difficulty in dealing with France. (H 18, 356.) Lieut. H. Emmons. 
Duties of Boiling Commission outlined. (H 18, 506.) Col. Clark. 
No De Haviland 4's received August 15, 1918. (H 18, 544.) Col. Clark. 
One million dollars' worth of material shipped abroad, but only 240 planes 

made. (H 19, 23.) Col. Horner. 
Conditions acute in October, 1917. (H 19, 161, 162.) Churchill. 
One thousand two hundred cadets awaited training for three months. 

(H 19, 208.) Hoffman. 
Submits copy of contract with French Government. (H 19, 386.) Kenley. 

Liberty engine just reached France June, 1918. (T 1, 609.) Douglas. 
Americans all equipped with British machines. (T 1, 617.) Rice. (See 

T 1, 647.) 
Americans had to use discarded French machines. (T 2, 862.) Jones. 
Exchange of information chaotic. (H 20, 655.) Waldon. 
Forestry : 

Only one mahogany plant furnished bond. (H 1, 294.) Otis. 

Embargo placed on battle-plane wood. (H 1, 299.) Otis. 

Mahogany men accused by Otis of trying to handle whole thing. (H 1, 303.) 

Two hundred and fifteen dollar offer for aeroplane lumber refused. (H 1, 

306.) Otis. 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 15 

Forestry — Continued. 

Walnut and mahogany not absolutely necessary. (H 2, 434.) Sligh. 

Paid $300 for walnut worth $160. (H 2, 434.) Sligh. 

Dayton-Wright Co. scrapped 90 per cent on spruce. (H 3, 25.) Miles. 

Lots of spruce should not have left the coast. (H 3, 81.) Colvin. 

Col. Disque let spruce contracts. (H 6, 325; H 7, 326.) Lockhart, jr. 

Mahogany contract price, $320. (H 6, 336.) 

Requirements balance of year, 21,000,000 feet. (H 6, 344.) Lockhart, jr. 

Federal Trade Commission not consulted in re prices. (H 6, 370; H 6, 

375.) Lockhart, jr. 
Endeavored to ascertain fair profit. (H 6, 389.) Lockhart, jr. 
Heard 60 per cent of spruce rejected. (H 7, 284.) Potter. 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul contract. (H 7, 298-319 ; H 7, 494.) Potter. 
Quantity of spruce so great not worth much. (H 7, 328.) Potter. 
Nine to twelve thousand military men at work. (H 7, 333.) Potter. 
Mahogany men formed association. (H 7, 399.) Williams. 
Thirteen per cent a thousand, profit of Otis Co. (H 7, 431.) Williams. 
Three million one hundred thousand feet from Africa. (H 7, 435.) Wil- 
liams. 
Twenty-six million seven hundred and three thousand total purchases 

up to June 27, 1918. (H 7, 446.) Williams. 
Williams will not state cause of Otis's discharge. (H 7, 462.) Williams. 
Cut-up plant advisable. (H 7, 472.) Howe. 
Large supply hinged on building railroad. (H 8, 240.) Ryan. 
No limitation on profit. (PI 8, 255.) Ryan. 
Contractors financed by Government. (H 8, 262.) Ryan. 
Little trees in Germany make plane material. (H 8, 268.) Ryan. 
Seventy-five miles additional railroads. (H 8, 269.) Ryan. 
Controversy in re African mahogany. (H, 19, 277-279-282; H 19, 321; 

H 19, 326; H 21, 349.) Ryerson, jr. 
Report covering all mahogany matters. (H 19, 511.) Ryerson, jr. 
Navy would not use African mahogany. (H 19, 344 ; H 19, 346 ; H 19, 352 ; 

H 19, 511.) Homer Hoyt. 
Three million four hundred and twenty-five thousand six hundred and 

twenty-five dollars cost of African mahogany. (H 19, 424; H 19, 451; 

H 19, 455. ) Lieut. Sack. 
Cuban mahogany only $160. (H 19, 466.) Weber. 
Wilcox was told he had no chance to sell outside "Big 11." (H 20, 252; 

H 20, 258-290.) Wilcox. 
Mr. Wickliffe receiving salary from other sources while on Government 

board. (H 23, 406.) Wickliffe. 
Mr. Siemms cites contract arrangement for spruce and railroad. (H 23, 

552; H 23, 689.) 
" Senator Chamberlain will cancel contract." (H 23, 654.) Siemms. 
Inefficiency : 

One thousand men at stations with no accommodations. (H 1, 143.) 

1917-18. Jones, 
Contracts with British and French confused. (H 1, 7.) Wolff. 
Squier and Deeds tried to block use of flying torpedo. (H 1, 563.) 

Barlow. 
Col. Edgar complains to Squier. (HI, 821.) Jones. 
Changed heads of Air Division 12 times. (H 1, 822.) Jones. 
Col. Wolff charged with irregular and unbusinesslike methods. (H 1, 824.) 
Also J. G. White Corporation. (H 1, 828.) Jones. 
Unauthorized construction work. (H 2, 18-19.) Edgar. 
Schools without tools. (H 2, 51.) Edgar. 

On order of 97 articles only 1 shipped in six weeks. (H 2, 53.) Edgar. 
No organization or discipline in divisions. (H 2, 55-57.) Edgar. 
Pay rolls at Wright field untrustworthy. (H 2, 120.) Bennington. 
Increased acreage after use of substitute for castor oil. (H 2, 129.) 

Jones. 
Terrible confusion and irregularity. (H 2, 308.) Borglum. (See Borg- 

lum.) 
Self-interest interfering with air program. (H 2, 313.) Borglum. 
Six to eight months' time wasted. (H 2, 327.) Borglum. 
Allen knew nothing about lumber, placed in charge of spruce. (H 2, 368.) 

Sligh. 



16 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Inefficiency — Continued. 

Men inspecting who never had a board rule in their hands. (H 2 439 ) 

Sligh. '' 

Machine fell and break struck at principle of its construction. (H 2, 505.) 

Borglum. 
Fifty per cent of delay due to changes. (H 2, 601.) Trego. 
Scrap 50 to 75 per cent in Trego plant. (H 2, 613.) Trego. 
Tremendous inefficiency. (H 3, 46.) Miles. 
Plane would not go together. (H 3, 78.) Colvin. (T-l-105.) 
Ill-advised inspection. (H 3, 82.) Colvin. 
Paid $415 for gauge that should cost $35. (H 3, 88.) Colvin. 
Not much else done for months except watching changes. (H 3, 715.) 

Taylor. 
Four hundred thousand dollars wasted on Handley-Page plane. (H 6, 

163. ) Workman. 
Knew parts were wrong, yet continued making them. (H 7, 157.) Butts. 
Lengthy discussion on Col. Clark's inefficiency. (H 7, 271-72.) Potter. 
Vigorous charge of wasted time. (H 7, 687.) MacGregor. 
Six months in furnishing information to Dayton-Wright Co. (H 10, 358.) 

Schoonmaker. 
Gun-sight information requested October 9 not given until February 13. 

(H 10, 387.) Schoonmaker. 
Three hundred and twenty-one changes on De Haviland plane in 12 days. 

(H 10, 652.) Schoonmaker. 
Fifteen drawings for same part, yet all different. (H 11, 160.) Patterson. 
Signal Corps made promises; no means to carry them out. (H 11, 442.) 

Fisher. 
Red tape in priorities cause long delays. (H 12, 192.) Wills. 
Never given information of value by Signal Corps. ( H 13, 78. ) Day. 
Government-inspected material found defective at Standard Co. (H 13, 

369). Day. 
Not one good thing came out of Washington. (H 15, 191.) Rohlfs. 
Signal Corps drawings not accurate. (H 16, 130.) Brooks. 
Three weeks before machine that would not fly is investigated. (H 3, 5.) 

Miles. 
Two thousand Bristols ordered January 11, but no go-ahead order till 

April, 1918. (H 3, 35.) Miles. 
Kellogg placed order for 1,300 radiators already condemned. (H 18, 10.) 

Budd Gray. 
Many firms charge Signal Corps failed to supply drawings. (H 18, 120.) 

Hughes. 
Padded pay roll involving thousands of dollars. (H 18. 227, 228.) Col. 

Jones. 
Many "rejected" tags found under "accepted" tag. (H 18, 267.) Col. 

Jones. 
Drawings not received from Signal Corps until after expiration of con- 
tract. (H 18, 434.) Jordan. 
Material condemned by chief chemist later accepted. (H 19. 128.) Car- 

dullu. 
No better off June 25, 1918, than six months prior. (T 1, 452.) Workman. 
Planes valued at $500,000 ruined for lack of care. (T 1, 569.) Parish. 
Six million dollars' loss on Hall-Scott motor. (T 2, 929.) Kenlay. 
Liberty motor : 

Rolls-Royce replaced by Liberty. (H 3, 55.) Miles. 

" Thoroughly splendid." (H 3, 55.) Miles. (See T 2, 11-94.) ' 

Bogey price $6,000. (H 3, 291.) Blackall. 

" Frightful risk " taken in attempt to develop motor. (H 3, 224.) Blackall. 

Deeds against magneto system on motor. (H 3, 231.) Curtiss. 

Motor more efficient with magneto system. (H 3, 232.) Curtiss. 

Not good for combat plane. (H 1, 495.) Barlow. 

Eight-cylinder obsolete. (H 3, 522.) Morgan. 

Delay because everything was tied up in Liberty motor. (H 3, 622.) 

Morgan. 
Spad contract canceled because it was not adapted to Liberty motor. (H 3, 

622. ) Morgan. 
Liberty 8 test not satisfactory. (H 4, 27.) Dickinson. 
Liberty 12 satisfactory. (H 4, 38.) Dickinson. 



GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 17 

Liberty motor — Continued. 

Possibly all right for bombing plane. (H 4, 77.) Holmes. 

Can not use magnetic system. (H 4, 271.) Martens. 

Perfect engine. (H 4, 274; H 8, 76.) Martens. 

Kettering one of three leading men in designing. (H 4, 376; H 4, 381.) 

Leland. 
One thousand changes between September 1 and February 15, 1918. (H 4, 

479. ) Leland. 
Change in design caused three months' delay. (H 4, 484.) Leland. 
Rolls-Royce or Sunbeam better engines. (H 4, 519.) Barlow. 
Sunbeam already through experimental stage. (H 4, 520.) Barlow. 
Absolutely good motor. (H 4, 621.) Marmon. 
Commander Briggs, of England, approves ignition system. (H 4, 631.) 

Marmon. 
Delay due to design not being complete. (H 5, 14.) * Joy. 
Main difference between Liberty and Mercedes is lubrication. (H 5, 82.) 

Owen Thomas. 
Perfecting motor should have been done in six months. (H 5, 145.) Hall. 
Shipped abroad in dangerous condition. (H 5, 171; H 14, 276.) Hall. 
Estimated cost, $2,400. (H 5, 177 ; H 7, 705 ; H 11, 282.) Hall. 
Overhead 200 per cent, entire cost would be $4,800. (H 5, 193.) Hall. 
Lowest consumption of gas and oil. (H 5, 313.) Hall. 
Foreign criticism. (H 6, 58.) Addas. 
Explanation of bogey cost. (H 7, 703.) Downey. 
No Liberties in England in March, 1918. (H 8, 33.) Diffin. 
Profit on cost, 33.6 per ceent. (H 8, 93, 94.) Smith. (See Exhibit H 8, 

101.) 
Profit on cost of La Rhone, 92.8 per cent. (H 8, 105.) Smith. (See Ex- 
hibit H 8, 105.) 
One hundred to one hundred and fifty hours' life of Liberty. (H 11, 107.) 

Heaslet. 
Question whether Hall and Vincent had control of motor. (H 11, 118.) 

Heaslet. 
Chief engineer Packard Co. gives reason for use of Delco. (H 12, 5.) 

Hunt. 
Actual cost, $3,960.43. (H 12, 68.) Robinson. 

Ford says " it is a very fine motor." Hard to make. (JEE 12, 275.) Ford. 
Progress as good as if foreign engine had been used. (H 12, 283.) Ford. 
Seven hundred pounds heavier than the Hispano Suiza. (H 13, 116.) 

Day. 
Best motor of its type in the world. (H 14, 282.) Crane. 
Too heavy for Bristol. (H 15, 56.) Coburn. 
Contracts for production before experiments are completed. (T 1, 196.) 

Jandron. 
Defective material in valves. (H 20, 494, 495.) Beans. 
Miscellaneous : 

Bond furnished by only one contractor. (H 1, 293.) Otis. 

Embargo placed on battle-plane wood. (H 1, 299.) Otis. 

One hundred thousand dollars divided between three officials of Dayton 

Wright Co. (H 1, 403.) Newman. 
Unauthorized construction. (H 2, 24.) Edgar. 
Miami, Fla., selected as gunnery school because girls and dancing were 

available. (H 2, 182.) Edgar. 
Want to abandon Miami field after spending $100,000. (H 2, 202.) Edgar. 
Receipts from material men, but goods not paid for. (H 2, 243.) Grannis. 
Not informed castor oil not used; increases acreage. (H 2, 259-270.) 

Carrington. 
Borglum refused data. (H 2, 289.) Borglum. 
Bristol success in Europe. (H 2, 329.) Borglum. 

Maj. Sligh's dismissal caused by lumber interests. (H 2, 373.) Sligh. 
Maj. Leadbetter tries to bribe Sligh. (H 2, 412.) Sligh. 
Lumber handled by several people to raise price. (H 2, 469.) Sligh. 
Discrimination between Curtiss and Dayton plants. (H 3, 34.) Miles. 
Signal Corps afraid of congressional investigation. (H 3, 496.) Morgan. 
Mr. Lewis is not aware his company was instructed to raise its bid $3,000. 

(H 3, 698-701.) Lewis. 

130687—19 2 



18 GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Miscellaneous — Continued. 

Not much else done for months except. to watch for changes. (H 3, 715.) 

Taylor. 
Automobile crowd seemed to decide things. (H 3, 741.) Thomas. 
Germans using all-steel planes. (H 4, 165. ) Greer. 
Fiat Co.'s facilities offered to Government. (H 4, 199.) Gormully. 
Borglum presents record of order of Delco system for 20,000 motors. (H 4, 

244. ) Borglum. 
Sunbeam engine most favorable in Europe. (H4. 304.) Homer. (H4, 312.) 
Russia standardizing Hall Scott. (H 5, 112.) Hall. 
Bureau of Standards inexperienced. (H 5, 152.) Hall. 
Lewis machine gun only a rifle. (H 5, 298.) Hall. 
Firm advised to raise their bid. (H 5, 456.) Borglum. 
Lieut. Lufkin too honest; dismissed. (H 5, 471.) Borglum. 
Military organization dropped initiative, due to investigations. (H 6, 505.) 

Coffin. 
Called for resignation of Green and Butts. (H 7, 361-363.) Potter. 
Cost per plane should not exceed $3,525. (H 8, 109.) Smith. 
Memorandum of fair cost of De Haviland 4. (H 8, 114-115-116.) Smith. 
One hundred and fifty dollar bonus paid, though contract not lived up to. 

(H 8, 146.) Sloan. 
President King, of Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co., asked to produce 

missing ledger pages. (H 10, 632.) 
Government paid subcontractor for Dayton-Wright. (H 11, 241.) Holmes. 
Crowell refers to " automobile gang." (H 12, 35.) Albree. 
Test of plane called unfair. (H 12, 59.) Albree. 
Wonderful preparations in Germany. (H 12, 468.) Leland. 
Kettering one of greatest mechanics in the world. (H 12, 475.) Leland. 
Men asleep under desks in daytime at Curtiss plant. (H 15, 40.) West. 
Mueller, engineer, Curtiss Co., appointed by Deeds, Potter & Coffin. (H 18, 

167.) Budd Gray. 
Talbott interested in Dayton Lumber & Engineering Co. (H 18, 229.) 

Col. Jones. 
Attempt to get contract described. (H 19, 175.) Loughead. (H 19, 196.) 
Cable in re African mahogany. (H 19, 271.) Ryerson, jr. 
Firms signed cross license almost under duress. (T 1, 477.) Downey. (T 

2, 818. ) 
Officers at field very incompetent. (T 1, 548.) Davis. 
Bad conditions at Gerstner Field. (T 1, 560.) Davis. 
Waldron exposes confidential contract to Curtiss Co. (T 2, 721.) Jordan. 

(T 2, 723.) 
Letter to President on aircraft production. (H 20, 460.) Stratton. (H 20, 

480; H20, 483.) 
Statement of General Vehicle Co. contract. (H 21, 39.) Col. Thompson. 

(H 21, 60 ; H 21, 179 ; H 21, 258.) 
Montgomery does not know why contract was not given Singer Co. (H 21, 

289.) Montgomery. (H 21, 400.) 
Gen. Saltzman cites cases where Signal Corps men had contract with manu- 
facturing concerns. (H 22, 305.) 
" Chaps in Signal Corps carrying on system of graft." (H 22, 390.) Wild. 
Signal Corps approved of Mengle Co. paying Wickliffe a salary. (H 24, 
518.) Hucldleson. 
MOTOR COMPANIES : 

Buick Co., Detroit, Mich. — 

Four hundred and sixteen thousand six hundred and sixty-nine dollars 
paid by Government up to July 6, 1918. (H 11, 277.) 
Cadillac Co., Detroit, Mich. — 

One million fifty-six thousand six hundred and ninety-six dollars paid 

by Government up to July 6, 1918. (H 11, 277.) Capt. Holmes. 
Owned by General Motors Co. (H 12, 370.) R.H.Collins. 
No advances. (H 12, 379.) R. H. Collins. 
Bogey price never over $5,000. (H 12, 382.) R. H. Collins. 
No charges for preliminary work. (H 12, 405.) Kinnee. 
Depreciation part of overhead. (H 12, 416.) Kinnee. 
Expended $2,521,782. (H 12, 421.) Kinnee. 
Total of $63,000 not allowed by Government. (H 12, 423.) Kinnee. 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 19 

Motor companies — Continued. 

Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Mich. — 

Advances and payments by Government — 

One million three hundred and twenty-five thousand and forty-three 
dollars paid by Government up to July 6, 1918. (H 11, 276.) 
Holmes. (H 12, 297.) 
Received no advances nor sought any. (H 12, 297.) Norlin. 
Contracts — 

Contract let in November ; not tooled up July 16, 1918. (H 11, 73.) 

Heaslet. (H 12, 159.) 
Details arranged in September ; contract let in November, 1917. 
(H 12, 163.) Lee. 
Dislovaltv and sabotage — . 

Reference to disloyalty. (H 12, 174.) Lee. (H 12, 178-179; 

H 12, 230-233 ; H 12, 304-308. ) 
Defective spark plugs from Champion Co. (H 12, 237.) Wills. 
District attorney would not act. (H 12, 239.) Wills. (H 12, 

303-311.) 
Military Intelligence Bureau takes no action. (H 12, 318.) 
Clemett. 
Production — 

Not producing latter part of March, 1918. (H 3, 64.) Colvin. 

(H 12, 164.) 
Produce tools for Liberty 8, but it was abandoned.. (H 5, 149.) 

Hall. 
Fell down badly on estimate. (H 11, 66.) Heaslet. (H 22, 112.) 
Could have advanced production two months except for changes. 
(H 12, 199.) Wills. 

Reference to salaries. (H 12, 212.) Wills. 

Government forbids charging salaries direct. (H 12, 254.) Leister. 

(H 12, 256-258.) 
No salaries allowed on experimental work. (H 12, 292.) Norlin. 
Miscellaneous — 

Three million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars profit on 5,000 

Liberties. (H 7, 127.) Coffin. (H 12, 222.) 
Fuel Administrator denies coal to crankshaft ueople. (H 12, 194.) 

Wills. (H 12, 195.) 
First 70 motors cost about $37,000 apiece. (H 12, 205. ) Wills. 
Company profited through Deeds. (H 12, 224.) Wills. 
One million dollars cost of machinerv loaned to aircraft work. (H 

12, 252.) Leister. 
Mr. Ford knew bogey price of $6,087 was high. (H 12, 271.) Ford. 
No trouble with Signal Corps in re decisions. (H 12, 282.) Ford. 
General Motors, Detroit, Mich. — 

Contracts total $14,000,000. (H 5, 216.) Hall. 
Contract for 2,000 Liberties. (H 12, 371.) R. H. Collins. 
Lincoln Motor Co.. Detroit, Mich. — 

Advances and payments by Government — 

Four million dollars paid by Government up to June 1, 1918. (H 4, 

389.) Lei and. (T 1, 526.) 
One payment of $4,000,000 by Government in December, 1917. (H 4 r 

402.) Leland. 
Eight million four hundred and twenty-three thousand nine hundred 
and sixtv-six dollars paid by Government. (H 4, 410.) Leland. 
(H 11, 276; H 12, 547.) 
Contracts- 
First contract calls for 6,000 motors. (H4, 392.) Leland. 
Cost-plus contract plus 15 per cent. (H 4, 408.) Leland. 
Only two contracts from Government. (H 4,408.) Leland. 
Coffin does not recall order for 6,000 parts at $5,950,000. (H 7, 120. ) 
Coffin. 
Overhead — 

Cost of testing plant allowed. (H 4, 396(b).) Leland. 
Fortv per cent depreciation provision. (H 12, 559.) Nash. (H 12 f 
563.) 



20 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Motor companies — Continued. 

Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich.— Continued. 
Production — 

Produced 1,000 engines, shipped 400 overseas bv January, 1918. 

(H 3, 56.) Miles. 
Production was 5 or 6 a day ; should be 70. (H 3. 67.) Colvin. 
Changes in Liberty caused three months' delay. (H 4, 484.) 

Leland. 
Evidence of production being retarded. (H 11, 45.) Heaslet. 

(Hll, 124-127.) 
Produced 763 motors up to July 15, 1918. (H 11, 91.) Heaslet. 
Delays because of changes. (H 12, 428-430 (b), 431. 432, 433 442.) 
Ellis. 
Salaries — 

Salary of officials. (H 4, 420.) Leland. (H 12, 554.) 

Mr. Leland and father each paid $25,000 salary bv Government. 

(H 4, 479.) Leland. 
No executive salary paid. (H 8, 372.) Haag. 

Executive salaries charged to Government back to July, 1917. II 12, 
570.) F. C. Thompson. 
Miscellaneous — 

Nine hundred and thirteen dollars and five cents profit on each 

motor. (H 4, 397.) Leland. 
Bogey cost $6,087. then $5,000. (H. 4, 398.) Leland. 
Total expenditures $6,200,000. (II 4, 401.) Leland. 
Delay in getting blue print. (H 4. 431.) Leland. (T 1, 231.) 
Five million dollars clear profit. (H 4, 478.) Leland. (117,120.) 
Expected to pay 80 per cent of profit in taxes. (114,491.) Leland. 
One hundred per cent on capital within a year. (H 7, 123.) Coffin. 
Enormous return on capital. (H 7, 382.) Potter. 
List of 89 shops producing tools. (H 12. 450.) Ellis. 
Ninety-one thousand eighty-seven special tools built. (H. 12, 464.) 

Ellis. 
Capital stock $1,500,000. (H 12, 508.) Henry M. Leland. 
Dayton Metal Products Co. owns $100,000 of stock. (H 12, 509.) 

Leland. 
Col. Montgomery advises $6,087 too high. (H 12, 517.) W. C. 

Leland. 
Financial record clean. (H 12, 574.) F. C. Thompson. 
Nordyke Marmon Co., Indianapolis — 

" Wonderfully fine factory." (H 3. 57.) Miles. 

Just coming into production July 15, 1918. (H 11. 95.) Heaslet. 

Contract for 3,000 Liberties dated August, 1917 ; 24 delivered August 15, 

1918. (H 18, 363.) Lieut. Emmons. 
Fixed-price contract of $2,366 an engine. (H 23. 496. ) Marmon. (H 23, 

553.) 
Contract for 3,000 Liberty motors September 28, 1917. (H 23, 531.) 

Marmon. 
One million dollars by Government for machinery in plant. (H 23, 547.) 

Marmon. 
Pay 5 per cent on $2,000,000 advanced by Government. (H 23, 594.) 

Marmon. 
Real estate included in depreciation. (H 23, 596.) Marmon. (H 23, 

601.) 
Chief Engineer Jeffers explains delays. (H 23, 636.) 
Packard Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich. — 

Advances and payments by Government — 

Secures advance of $2,500,000. (H 4, 397b.) Leland. 
Seven million four hundred and thirty-seven thousand six hundred 
and eightv-one dollars paid by Government up to July 6, 1918. 
(H 11, 274.) Holmes. (H 11, 639.) 
Overhead — 

Depreciation figures explained. (H 12, 77.) Robinson. 
Production — 

Two months' start on tools when called off. (H 11, 592.) 

Macauley. 
Schedule of shipments made. (H 11, 612.) Macauley. 
Could have produced Hispano quicker than Liberty. (H 11, 674.) 
Macauley. 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 21 

Motor companies — Continued. 

Packard Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich. — Continued. 
Salaries — 

Salaries in bogey cost. (H 7, 706.) Downey. 
Salary distribution in August; no contract until September. (H 
12, 143.) Williams. 
Miscellaneous — 

Lieut. Col. Joy largest holder of securities. (H 5, 2.) Joy. 
Liberty outgrowth of Packard Co. (H 5, 4.) Joy. (T 1, 162; 

T 1, 169.) 
Shipped some motors not up to standard to appease public demand. 

(H 5, 40.) Joy. 
Liberty motor "life-saver." (H 5, 180.) Hall. 
Five million four hundred thousand dollars' profit on 6,000 motors. 

(H 7, 113.) Coffin. (H 12, 103.) 
Substituted magneto for Delco system Liberty. (H 11, 578.) 

Macauley. 
Decided to offer their facilities to Government May, 1917. (H 11, 

588. ) Macauley. 
Agreed to sink their identity with Liberty. (H 11, 590.) Ma- 
cauley. 
One hundred and sixty-two Government men in plant at a time^ 

(H 11, 631.) Macauley. 
Montgomery & Deeds named bogey price of $6,087. (H 11, 643.)' 

Macauley. 
Capital of firm, $20,000,000. (H 11, 654.) Macauley. 
Eleven million eight hundred and eight thousand four hundred and 

four dollars devoted to aircraft. (H 11, 656.) Macauley. 
Hughes refers to vouchers. (H 12, 100; H 22, 325 and 334; H 24, 

159.) 
One engine billed to Government for $25,000. (H. 12, 127.) Robin- 
son. 
No information covering items under check for $104,500. (H 12, 

129.) Albree. 
Cost arrived at in a secretive way. (H 12, 149.) Williams. 
No record of contract involving $250,000. (H 24, 198.) Ewing. 
Willys-Overland Co., Elyria — 

Delivered 4,072 motors up to July 1, 1918. (H 8, 301.) Brown. 
One hundred and fifty dollars' bonus paid ; the contract not lived up to. 
(T 1, 471.) Downey. 
Pershing : 

Caused order of 4,000 geared motors to be placed. (H 14, 101.) Houston. 
Obligations cabled by Pershing contradictory. (H 1, 76.) Wolff. (T 2> 

945.) 
Cables- 
Cablegrams in re finance. (H 1, 83-87.) Wolff. 
Cables from Pershing landed in hands unfamiliar with subject. (H 18, 

192.) Budd Gray. 
Cable not to build 5,000 Gnome engines, October 12, 1918. (H 18, 

334.) Lieut. H. Emmons. 
Cable recommends no single seater be built. (H 18, 612.) Col. Clark. 

(H 18, 614; T 2, 936.) 
Cable in re training for pilots. (H 20, 50-54.) Harmon. 
Cable relating to propeller wood. (H 20, 235.) Parker. 
Cables increasing and decreasing production of Spad. (H 20, 607- 
609-614.) Waldon. 
Production : 

Four hundred and fifty thousand bombs under production May 31, 1918. 

(H 1, 551.) Barlow. 
No synchronizer in production May 31, 1918. (H 1, 792.) Barlow. 
Statement of planes shipped to embarkation points up to June 4, 1918. 

(H 2, 221.) Jones. 
One hundred and ten thousand acres castor beans. (H 2, 126-129.) Jones. 
No spruce purchased until August, 1918. (H 2, 352.) Sligh. 
Five De Havilands a day at Dayton-Wright, March, 1918. (H 3, 2,8.) 

Miles. 
Three thousand Spads ordered January 19, 1917, but called off. (H 3, 
35.) Miles. 



22 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Production — Continued. 

Five hundred bombing planes ordered September 19, 1917. (H 3, 36.) 

Miles. 
No battle planes built here before war. (H 3, 60.) Miles. 
Ford Co. not producing latter part of March, 1918. (H 3, 64.) Colvin. 
Production at Lincoln plant, 5 or 6 a day, should be 70. (H 3, 67.) 

Colvin. 
Delayed because of changes. (H 3, 73.) Colvin. 
Delayed because of unnecessary details. (H 3, 79-80.) Colvin. 
Planes on time had we used foreign model. (H 3, 221.) Blackall. 
Splitdorf Electric Co. main source of supplies for allies. (H 3, 227.) 

Curtis. 
Progress hampered by too many people butting in. (H 3, 285.) Mason. 
Two thousand sis hundred Spad drawings nearly complete, then canceled. 

(H 3, 532.) Morgan. 
No combat planes built by Curtiss plant up to March 1, 1918. (H 3, 612.) 

Morgan. 
Five thousand Sunbeam engines could have been completed in two months. 

(H 3, 734.) Thomas. 
Production held up because location of tack was changed one-eighth of an 

inch. (H 4, 131.) Daych. 
Production delayed because Signal Corps did not pay bills. (H 4, 231.) 

Bahr. 
Fngle Co. well up in production when order is canceled. (H 4, 290.) 

Baker. 
No bombing machines made in this country up to June 1, 1918, except ex- 
perimental work on Handley-Paige. (H 4, 515. )* Barlow. 
Five or six months to get Mercedes motor into production. (H 5, 68.) 

Owen Thomas. 
Planes could have been turned out last fall. (H 5, 84.) Owen Thomas. 
With breakdown test Ford and Packard could have produced 10 motors each 

daily in January. (H 5, 169.) Hall. 
Radical variance in production scale. (H 5, 272.) Hall. 
Oould have had machines on front in 90 days. (H 6, 165.) Workman. 
Does not believe Signal Corps wanted to produce Handley-Paige. (H 6, 

213, ) Workman. 
Workmen could have had 5,000 Handley-Paiges across now, June 20, 1918. 

(H 6, 256.) Workman. 
Submits number of planes delivered by each company. (H 6, 292.) Cham- 
berlain. 
No American scout planes on front. (H 7, 62.) Coffin. 
Fiat engine had best chance for production. (H 7, 70.) Coffin. 
First De Haviland shipped from factory late March, 191S. (H 7, 243.) 

Potter. (H 7, 244.) 
First training plane delivered October 1, 1918. (H 7, 518.) Mixter. 
Fifty Bristols may be scrapped. (H 7, 537.) Mixter. 
No reason for planes not being in production in 1917. (H 8, 49.) Diffin. 

(T 2, 910-912.) 
Foreign engines could have been produced. (H 8, 57.) Diffin. 
Possible to get into production on Liberty quicker than on foreign motor. 

(H 8, 79.) 
Ninety per cent of production at Dayton-Wright in November, 1917. (H 10, 

324. ) Schoonmaker. 
Chief engineer Dayton-Wright Co. cites reasons for delay. (H 10, 326-337.) 

Schoonmaker. 
No shipments abroad between February 4 and April 3, 1918. (H 10, 393.) 

Schoonmaker. 
First bona fide schedule from Signal Corps on April 9, 1918. (H 10, 395.) 

Schoonmaker. 
List of motors from date to date at Packard. (H 11, 58.) Heaslet. (H 

11,59.) 
Cadillac and Buick could have handled larger orders. ( H 11, 72. ) Heaslet. 
Two regiments of mechanics held idle in camp. (H 11, 83-85.) Heaslet. 
Seven hundred and fourteen motors produced out of 1,950 contemplated. 

(H 11, 100.) Heaslet. 
Only 1,625 engines instead of 4,620 estimated. (H 11, 134.) Heaslet. 



GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 23 

Production — Continued. 

Heaslet Exhibit 6, July 16, 1918, shows total production. (H 11, 137.) 
Earlier production by using existing motor. (H 12, 503. ) Henry M. Leland. 
If handled different, could have had all planes needed. (H 13, 76.) Day. 
Production impossible because of so many changes. ( T 1, 485-487. ) Adams. 
Sufficient material in United States to complete program in 12 months. (T 

1, 678.) Woodhouse. 
Purchases : 

Government bought General Vehicle Co.'s plant, Long Island City, leased to 

Wright-Martin Co. (H 1, 61.) Wolff. 
Paid Curtiss Co. $1,500,000 for machinery. (H 1, 239. ) Wolff. (H 3, 517.) 
Department of Justice requests New York Legislature pass bill so as to per- 
mit Government to acquire land. (H 3, 493.) Morgan. 
History of negotiations in purchase of General Vehicle Co. (H 24, 560.) 

Montgomery. (H 24, 575 ; H 24, 578.) 
Sales : 

Salvaged material sold to public. (H 1, 63.) 

One hundred and sixty-three million dollars expected from sale of material. 

(H 1, 90.) 
Eight hundred thousand dollars worth of material sold to Standard Co. 

(H 8, 197.) Brown. 
Signal Corps (organization) : 

Capt. Preston and Lieut. Small in charge of money advanced since February 

1,1918. (HI, 101.) Lieut. Col. Wolff. 
Advances passed by Finance Department and War Credits Board. (H 1, 

101.) Lieut. Col. Wolff. (H 4, 338.) 
Supervision of cost by officer at plant. (H 1, 106.) Lieut. Col. Wolff. 
Material section passes on requests for construction. (H 1, 113.) Lieut. 

Col. Jones. 
Chaotic conditions. (H 1, 124.) Lieut. Col. Jones. (T 2, 785.) Lieut. 

Col. Jones. 
Policy to start something and then drop it. (H 1, 133.) Lieut. Col. Jones. 
Bills from railroad audited by Supply Division. (H 1, 161.) Lieut. Col. 

Jones. 
Accounting controlled by Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. (H 1, 407.) 

Newman. 
Criticism of Squier or Deeds disastrous. (H 1, 456.) Barlow. 
Deeds German and in summer of 1917 admits sympathy with Germany. (H 

2, 532.) Borglum. 

Deeds appointed many Germans. (H 2, 534.) Borglum. 

Inspectors unintelligent, too rigorous. (H 3, 422.) Kirkman. (H 5, 202; 

H 5, 203 ; H 5, 212 ; H 7, 360 ; H 10, 415 ; T 1, 437-447 ; T 1, 630 ; T 2, 10-17. ) 
Letter from office of Chief Signal Officer says program is very thoroughly 

covered. (H 3, 428.) Kirkman. 
Names of those ordering changes would make long list. (H 3, 598.) = 

Morgan. 
Changes and specifications by Col. Clark. (H 3, 600.) Morgan. 
Incompetent, perhaps malicious intent. (H 4, 161.) Greer. 
Men of inaction, mathematical moles, not fitted to act. (H 4, 172.) Greer. 
Expediting section could not get information. (H 4, 235.) Bahr. 
Weak on engineering end. (H 5, 107.) Owen Thomas. (H 7, 154; H 7, 

260-262 ; H 7, 510 ; H 22, 136 ; T 2, 842. ) 
Nobody responsible for delays. (H, 5, 202.) Hall. 
Production Board purchased different design each day. (H 5, 241.) Hall. 

(T 2, 763.) 
Rulings Board passed on salaries. (H 6, 414.) Langnmir. 
Aircraft Production Board. (H 6, 440.) Coffin. (H 6, 470, 473, 474, 482, 

483, 540 ; H 21, 359 ; T 2, 761. ) 
Waldon, Deeds & Montgomery produced bogey cost of $6,087. (H 7, 97.) 

Coffin. 
No program.- (H 7, 224.) Potter. (H 7, 238-241.) 
Underorsranized, needed production man. (H 7, 491.) Howe. (H 20, 

195.) 
Opinion 99 out of 100 organizations will be failure under Kellogg. (H 7, 

580. ) Mixter. 
Col. Hall " star performer." (H 7, 606.) McClelland. 



24 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Signal Corps (organization) — Continued. 

Lengthy criticism on engineering department. (H 7, 612.) McClelland. 

Military supervision delayed program. (H 8, 44.) Diffin. 

Lack of knowledge and organization. (H 11, 623.) Macauley. (T 2, 

853, 859-860.) 
No criticism by Ford. (H 12, 281-282.) Ford. 
Not much trouble getting decisions from engineering department. (H 12, 

541.) Abbott. 
No knowledge of military equipment. (H 13, 20.) Day. 
British captain states high officers did not want information. (H 17, 108.) 

Rogers. 
Changes by Curtiss plant not gone over by Signal Corps. (H IT, 351.) 

Maj. Moore. (H 17, 478.) 
Had no efficient engineering organization. (H 18, 95.) Budd Gray. (H 

18, 98.) 

Serious situation, reflecting ou United States military administration. (H 

19, 161.) Churchill. 

Four agencies controlling production cause duplication. (T 1, 531.) 
Signal Corps ridiculed statement there was waterproof glue. (H 20, 362.) 

Mix. 
Improper influence on Advisory Board. (H 21, 68.) Col. Thompson. 
Chief signal officer advises tests not necessary. (H 21, 590.) Arnold. (H 

21, 600-602.) 
Squier : 

Advises Coffin to say very little before Senate investigating committee. 

(H 1, 488.) Barlow. 
Leased 1,200 acres unsuitable land in Florida. (H 2, 140.) Jones. 
States charges on Senate floor were German propaganda. (H 3, 396.) 

Pew. 
States ISO battle planes delivered in France in February, 1918. (H 3, 

405. ) Pew. 
States Sunbeam engine first ray of hope. (H 4. 308.) Horner. (All of 

308). 
Said if Germany was using Barlow aerial torpedoes they could wipe out 

London and Paris in one night. (H 4. 513.) Barlow. 
Estimates cost of campaign at $1,000,000,000. (H 4, 514.) Barlow. 
Made only one report to Borglum. (H 5, 4S8.) Borglum. 
Sent meD over with no provisions. (H 19, 171.) Churchill. 
Absolutely satisfied with Col. Deeds. (H 22, 302.) Salzman. 
Had no executive duties in Signal Corps. (H 24, 272.) Squier. 
'Did not give authority to anyone to disburse the $250,000. (H 24, 330.) 

Squier. (H 24, 635.) 
Did not know Vincent was Packard stockholder. (H 24, 333.) Squier. 
Does not recollect calling Senate charges German propaganda. (H 24, 

392.) Squier. 
White, J. G., Engineering Corporation : 

. Langley Field construction unsatisfactory. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. 
Cleaned out company twice; no graft. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. 
Went beyond estimate more than others. (H 2, 4S.) Edgar. 
Delay of raw materials fault of White Co. (H 6, 319.) Lockhart, jr. 
Contract satisfactorily filled. (H 7, 353.) Potter. 
This firm selected by Aircraft Production Board. (T 1, 36.) Edgar. 
Over 1,000.000 pounds of material at embarkation point 300 days. (H 21, 
' 457.) Chilson. 

$8,938,825 paid by the Government for material. (H 21. 463.) Chilson. 
Submits report on materials shipped by J. G. White Co. (H 24, 673-676.) 

Campbell. 



NAME INDEX. 



Volume. Page . 

Abbott, Paul W. , chief inspector Lincoln Motor Co H 12 541 

Addas, Charles M. , employee foreign air service H 6 3 

Albree, George, president Albree Pidgeon Co H 12 26 

Allen, Kenneth B . , civil engineer H 35 

Anderson, C . H. , assistant timekeeper Curtiss Co H 15 726 

Anderson, James H. , vice president Wright-Martin Co H 14 292 

Ansell, Brig, Gen. Samuel T., Office of Judge Advocate General H 22 430 

Arnold, Col. Henry E., assistant to chief Department Military Aero- 
nautics H 21 132 

H 21 588 

Atterby, Edward, investigator, Curtiss Co H 16 763' 

Bahr, Frederick C, finance division, Signal Corps H 4 218 

Baker, Harry E . , manufacturer, of Cleveland H 4 284 

Baker, Hon. Newton D., Secretary of War _ H 21 351 

Baldwin, Abraham T., manufacturer and contractor, Signal Corps H 20 80 

Baldwin, Mrs. Abraham T., vice president Precision Instruction Co. . H 20 136 

Barlow, Lester P., engineer H 1 447 

H 4 501 

H 22 418 

Beans, Dr. H. T., chemical laboratory, Signal Corps H 20 490 

Bennington, Maj. Harold, in charge of accounts. Construction Division. H 2 82 

Benstead, Horace M., accountant, Wright-Martin Co H 14 320 

Benton, Maj. C. S., in charge of traffic section, Supply Division H 1 194 

H 1 278 

Bettman, Alfred, Department of Justice H 24 191 

Blackall, Frederick S . , general manager Taft-Pierce Co H 3 195 

Borglum, Gutzon J. Del., sculptor from Stamford, Conn H 2 271 

H 4 244 

H 5 327 

Brooks, Frederick A., designing department, Curtiss Co H 16 120 

Brown, Maj . Hiram S . , finance department, Signal Corps H 8 185 

H 8 294 
Buck, Dr. Frederick W., airplane, torpedoes, and gasoline engine 

manufacturer H 4 329 

Butts, Edward P . , manager of engineering, Signal Corps H 7 137 

Byllesby, Lieut. Col. Henry M., Administrative Division, Signal 

Corps H 1 795 

Campbell, Douglas, lawyer H 24 672 

Cardullu, Forest E., test engineer, Curtiss Co H 19 116 

Carrington, John S., secretary and manager, San Antonio Chamber of 

Commerce H 2 250 

Cawthra, Ernest H., assistant to chief engineer, Curtiss Co H 17 1 

Chamberlain, Capt. Robert L., planning section, Signal Corps H 6 285 

Chilson, Edw. N., purchase manager, J. G. White Engine Co H 21 441 

Churchill, Col. Marborough, chief military intelligence H 19 152 

Churgay, Louis H., Hungarian-born employee, Curtiss Co H 17 148 

H 17 209 

Clark, third, Lieut. Edw. W., aid to Col. Wolff * H 6 297 

Clark, Lieut. Col. Virginius E H 18 488 

Clarke, Capt. Elmer J., lumber inspector H 18 644 

H 21 667 

Clemett, Edwin F., educational department, Ford Co H 12 315 

Coburn, Cyril R. , inspector, Curtiss Co H 15 52 

H 17 722 
25 



26 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Volume. Page. 

Coffin, Howard E., chairman Aircraft Production Board H 6 418 

H 7' 1 

Cole, John E., Government employee, Curtiss Co H 16 384 

H 16 720 

H 16 762 

Coleman, Maj . Earnest A. , accountant H 24 630 

Collins, George R. , stockholder, Giant Furniture Co H 3 436 

Collins, Richard H.', president and general manager Cadillac Motor Co. H 12 370 

Colvin, Fred H . , editor American Machinist : H 3 62 

Conaty, Walter J. , Government accountant H 13 587 

Cookson, Leighton A. , Government inspector H 13 526 

Craighead, Charles A., secretary Dayton- Wright Co H 10 177 

Crane, Henry M., vice president and chief engineer Wright-Martin Co. H 14 228 

Criqui, Charles A., president and general manager Sterling Engine Co. H 2 487 

Cummin, Edith P., law clerk and stenographer, Craighead-Dowden . . H 9 238 

Currier, Edw. P., formerly with City National Bank, Dayton, Ohio.. H 24 597 

Curtiss, Carlos W. , manager Splitdorf Electrical Co H 3 226 

Daily, Robert, factory accountant, Curtiss Co H 15 655 

Dargert, Henry, employee, Curtiss Co H 16 533 

H 16 703 

Darget, Wm. F., assistant foreman, sheet-metal department, Curtiss Co. H 15 717 

Davidson, Walter G., cashier City National Bank, Dayton, Ohio H ' 22 

Day, Charles H., vice president and general manager Standard Co H 13 1 

H 13 362 

Daych, Herman C. , assistant to Mr. Mingle. Standard Co H 4 110 

Dean, Fred E. . purchasing, agent Standard Co H 13 488 

DeBelleuSe. Albert J. C, Duesenberg Motor Co H 14 359 

Deeds, Col. E. A., chief, Equipment Division, Signal Corps H 22 471 

H 23 1 

H 24 90 

DeLaittre, Karl K., planning and suggestions. Shipping Board H 19 507 

DeLeeuw, Adolph L., mechanical engineer, Singer Manufacturing Co . ' H 19 547 

Devine, Mary E., bookkeeper and secretary to Mr. Talbott, sr H 9» 184 

H 9 245 

H 10 228 

Dibble, Fred L., dispatching department, Curtiss Co H 16 31 

Dickinson, Dr. H. C, physicist. Bureau of Standards H 4 1 

Diffin, Frank G. , assistant to Landon, Chief of Production H 8 23 

Disandro, Severino, employee, Curtiss Co H 17 696 

Donovan, Frank J., employee, Curtiss Col H 15 733 

Downey, Maj. A. C, Aircraft Production Board H 7 697 

Downey, Lieut. Col. A. C H 24 663 

Drexel, Maj . John A. , flyer, French Flying Corps H 18 673 

Durant, Dr. Wm. F., chairman National Advisory Committee, for 

Aeronautics H 20 294 

Edgar, Col. Clinton G., in charge of construction division H 2 1 

H 2 172 

H 7 196 

H 7 592 

H 22 359 

H 22 440 

Elliott, Maj. Howard, disbursing officer. Signal Corps H 24 158 

Ellis, Horace T. , tool superintendent, Lincoln Co H 12 424 

Emmons, Lieut. Harold H., United States Navy H 18 193 

H 18 290 

Ewing, Capt. Oscar R., contract secretary Bureau Aircraft Production. H 24 197 

Fable, Edward R. . chief veoman. Curtiss Co H 16 6 

Feberry, Thomas M., British expert H 17 229 

Finkbinder, Eber W., with Houghton Co H 20 228 

Finklestein, Max J., vice president Standard Co H 13 373 

Fisher, Charles T. . vice president Fisher Body Co H 11 443 

Fisher, Fred J., president and general manager Fisher Body Co. .... . H 11 290 



GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 27 

Volume. Page. 
Fletcher. John B., assistant to manager, Handley-Paige department, 

Standard Co H 2 550 

Flint, Albert H., manufacturer ' H 20 3 

Ford, Capt. yplement R., assistant to Col. Horner H 6 293 

Ford, Henry, president Ford Co H 12 269 

Fouhy, Charles E. , employment manager, Curtiss Co H 17 247 

George, Col. Edwin S. , procurement. Motor Transport H 4 325 

Gormully, Alfred R. , representing Fiat Co H 4 185 

Grannis, James K., superintendent of construction, Dayton, Ohio H 2 227 

Gray, Budd B\, former chief, inspection of raw material, Signal Corps. H 18 8 

Greer, M. W., mechanical engineer H 3 665 

H 4 161 

Haag, Capt. Francis E., Finance Division, Aircraft Production Board. H 8 342 
Hall, Lieut. Col. Elbert J., in charge engineering, Bristol and De Havi- 

land H 5 109 

Harmon, jr., Maj. Miller, overseas officer v . H 20 37 

Harris, Chester A., chief., company police, Curtiss Co H 16 45 

H 17 163 

Hart, DeMerle E., employee. Curtiss Co H 16 476 

Hawkins, Ensign Mason I., Curtiss Co H 16 617 

H 17 19 

Heaslet. Maj. James G., inspection service, Signal Corps H 11 1 

Hill, Thomas A., lawyer, New York City H 21 1 

Hiller, Augustus, plant accounting officer H 10 427 

Hoffman, Julius H.. German-born employee, Curtiss Co H 16 559 

Hoffman, Capt. W. Wickham, in Air Service. H 19 202 

Holden, Maj. James S., Construction Division, Signal Corps H 24 1 

Holmes, Charles W., Inspection Section. Signal Corps H 4 51 

Holmes, Capt. Hall B. , district accounting officer H 11 217 

Homer, Arthur P., naval architect and marine engineer H 4 302 

Horner. Lieut. Col. Leonard S., Ordnance and Instrument Section, 

Signal Corps H 19 1 

Houston, George H., president and general manager Wright Martin Co. H 14 1 

H 14 143 

Howe, Richard F.,. member, Aircraft Production Board H 7 468 

Howell, Harley M. , auditor, Dayton-Wright Co '. H 10 1 

Hoyt, Homer, economist, War Trade Board H 19 320 

Huddleson, Roderick S., president, Huddleston-Marsh Mahogany Co. H 24 479 

Hunt, Ormund E., chief engineer, Packard Co • H 12 1 

Ikirk, Burchell C, formerly with Aircraft Production Board H 19 579 

Isenberg, Hans O. C, assistant factory manager, Wright-Martin Co H 14 395 

Jandron, Francis L., assistant secretary, Packard Co H 12 134 

Jeffers, Clarence E., chief engineer, Nordyke-Marmon Co H 23 631 

Jennings, Herbert, general manager, United Eastern Aircraft Corpo- 
ration H 2 622 

Jones, Lieut. Col. E. Lester, assistant and executive to Col. Edgar H 1 112 

H 2 126 

H 2 207 

H 2 545 

H 18 223 

H 18 663 

Jordan, John A., general manager, Liberty Iron Works H 18 426 

Joy, Lieut. Col. Henry B., recruiting, Signal Corps H 5 1 

H 6 128 

Juergesen, Rudolph, German-born employee, Curtiss Co H 16 356 

Kenley, Maj. Gen. William B., Director Military Aeronautics H 19 385 

Kennerson, Harry V., accountant, Curtis Co H 17 93 

Kepperley, James E., vice president and general manager, Curtis Co. . H 17" 608 

Kettering, Chas. F., vice president, Dayton-Wright Co H 10 665 

Kiefer, Clarence, vice president, City National Bank, Dayton, Ohio.. HO 16 

Kiernan, Agnes, employee Curtiss Co H 17 402 



28 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Volume. Page. 

King, Sidney S., president, Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co H 10 612 

Kinnee, Herman M., comptroller, Cadillac Co H 12 402 

Kirkman, J. E., president, Giant Furniture Co., Highpoint, N. C H 3 409 

Kladv, Chas. A. , payroll auditor, Curtiss Co H 16 481 

; H 16 625 

Kuhns, Ezra M. , secretary Miama conservancy district H 10 633 

Kyte, Emmet S., plant protection, Wright-Martin Co H 14 297 

Langmuir, Maj . Dean, accountant, Signal Corps H 6 404 

H 8 124 

H 8 437 
Lake, Harry W., secretary Technical Joint Army and Navy Aircraft 

Board H 20 412 

Landon, Archer A., chief of production of aircraft H 20 413 

Lariviere, Albert, clerk, Appropriations Bureau, Aircraft Production. H 24 605 

Lee, John Randolph, manufacturing department, Ford Co H 12 159 

Lehman, Capt. Harold M. , appropriations section I H 1 501 

Leigh, Edmund, in charge plant protection, Military Intelligence H 18 373 

H 18 659 

H 19 150 

Leister, Herbert L., auditor, Ford Co H 12 249 

Leland, Henry M., president, Lincoln Motor Co H 12 466 

Leland, Wilfred C, vice president and general manager, Lincoln Motor 

Co H 4 342 

H 12 512 

Leonard, Guv, supervisor of construction of chemical plants H 19 136 

Lewis, Fred H. , manufacturer of aeroplane parts H 3 668 

Lockhart, Henry, jr., Bureau of Aircraft Production, Signal Corps H 6 308 

Lockwood, Stephen T. , United States district attorney H 17 709 

Loughead, Victor, mechanical engineer H 19 172 

Lovas, Paul, employee, Curtiss Co H 16 526 

Lueneke, Louis C, aeronautical engineer, Dayton- Wright Co H 10 477 

McCann, Benjamin F. , counsel for Deeds & Kettering H 9 560 

McCartney, James L. , draft clerk, Wright-Martin Co H 14 355 

McClelland, James F., material specifications, Signal Corps H 7 597 

McConaughy, John W., director Division of News, Committee on Pub- 
lic Information H 3 344 

H 3 658 

McCnllough, John E., superintendent George D. Emery Co H 24 544 

McGlue, W. R., employee Curtsis Co H 16 146 

McGregor, James S. , inspection section, Signal Corps H 7 654 

McGuire, William F. , vice president Wright-Martin Co H 14 347 

McKinney, Alexander, jr. , Naval Intelligence H 8 1 

Macauley, Alvan, president Packard Co H 11 569 

MacGregor, Prof. J. S H 7 654 

H 20 488 

H 21 346 

MacLaughlin, Lewis H., assistant to vice president, Houghton Co H 20 220 

Marmon, Maj. Howard C, member of Boiling Commission H 4 572 

Marmon, Walter C, president Nordyke & Marmon Co H 23 495 

Martens, Conrad C, foreman, testing department, Lincoln Co H 4 245 

Martin, Ernest D . , auditor Dayton Metal Products Co H 9 418 

H 9 690 
Martin, James V., master mariner, engineering department, Signal 

Corps H 22 240 

Marquis, Doctor, educational department, Ford Co , H 12 361 

Marshall, Nelson W., inspector machinery operation, Curtiss Co H 16 278 

Mason, Carl T. , chief engineer, Splitdorf Electric Co H 3 247 

Mason, Lee, employee, Metz Co H 4 523 

Mason, Luther, employee, Metz Co H 4 544 

Mason, Robt. B.. pay-roll department, Curtiss Co H 17 313 

Meenan, Daniel L., jr., treasurer, Standard Co H 13 419 

Mendelsohn, Aaron, secretary, Fisher Body Co H 11 513 

H 18 1 

Mendelsohn, Louis, treasurer, Fisher Body Co H 11 492 

Meyer, Eugene, jr. , director, War Finance Corporation H 20 166 



GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 29 

Volume. Page. 
Miles, Herbert E., chairman, Committee on Training Factory Wdrkers 

for War Production H 3 1 

Miller, Lieut. Tom B., property officer at Dayton H 3 717 

H 4 85 

Mingle, Harry B., president, Standard Co H 13 117 

H 13 262 

Mix, Melville W., president, Dodge Manufacturing Co H 20 321 

Mix, Kenyon, son of Melville Mix H 20 354 

Mixter, Lieut. Col. George W.. in charge inspection department, Sig- 
nal Corps H 7 506 

H 20 371 

Montgomerv, Col. Robt. L H 21 258 

H 22 1 

H 24 208 

Montgompry, William W. , jr. , Bureau Aircraft Production H 24 554 

Moore, Maj. Edward S., district manager of production, Curtiss Co . . . H 17 340 

H 17 450 

Morgan, William A., vice president and general manager, Curtiss Co. . H 3 449 

Moss, William W., vice president and comptroller, Curtiss Co H 15 369 

H 15 545 

H 20 59 

Mueller, George H. , chief engineer, Curtiss Co H 17 470 

Mulholland, Stuart L., in charge factorv accounts, Curtiss Co H 15 689 

H 16 525 

Muskovics, Fred E., vice president Nordyke & Marmon Co H 23 650 

Nash, William T., secretary-treasurer, Lincoln Co H 12 546 

Newman, Capt. James J., accounting work, Fisher Body Co H 1 390 

H 8 439 

Norlin, Lieut. Charles E. , accountant, Ford Co ■ H 12 290 

Nutt, Phillip N., employment department, Curtiss Co H 16 289 

Oakes, Earl T., chemist, laboratorv, Signal Corps H 21 508 

O'Connell, Matthew F., U. S. Navy-Curtiss Co H 16 365 

H 16 589 

Ohmer, Wilfred I., president, Recording & Computing Manufacturers H 2 448 

Oleman, Ernst, German-born employee, Curtiss Co H 16 380 

O'Neill, Victor M., employee, Curtiss Co H 16 151 

Otis, Joseph S., in charge of mahogany and hardwood H 1 293 

Ott, O. W., chemical section, Bureau of Aircraft Production H 19 145 

Parker, Lieut. J. B. B., office Chief of Staff H 20 235 

Patterson, Capt. J. Neil, Inspection Department, Signal Corps H 11 138 

Penniwell, Edward E., vice president and general manager, Standard 

Co H 13 252 

Pew, Marlen E., News Division, Committee on Public Information H 3 375 

H 3 664 

Potter, William C, chief of Equipment Division, Signal Corps H 7 217 

Quinn, James A., agent, military police, Curtiss Co H 17 718 

Read, Ensign Merle C, United States Navy, labor distribution, Cur- 
tiss Co H 16 182 

H 16 316 

H 17 33 

Richardson, Commander H. C, Curtiss Co H 17 459 

Ridenour, Orland J. , employee, Wright-Martin Co H 14 423 

Robinson, Frederick R., accountant, Packard Co H 12 64 

Rogers, Capt. Alfred B., British Army H 17 106 

Rohlfs, Charles, Government inspector of wood, Curtiss Co H 15 141 

H 17 441 

Rose, Maj. Charles B., inspector H 13 496 

Ryan, John D., director, Bureau of Aircraft Production H 8 228 

II 19 211 

Ryerson, Capt. Edward L., jr., in charge propeller work H 19 253 

H 19 471 

H 20 72 



30 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 

Volume. Page. 

Sack, Lieut. Isadore, finance division, Bureau of Aircraft Production. H 19 422" 

Sakin, Charles R., in charge spare sales, Wright-Martin Co II 14 444 

Saltzman, Brig. Gen. C. M., Signal Corps. H 22 296 

Sanderson, Ensign John, Navy accountant, Curtiss Co H 17 43 

Schott, William H., Lewis Spring & Axles Co H 8 152 

Schoonmaker, James M., chief engineer, Dayton Wright Co H 10 317 

H 10 647 

Scott, H. H.; auditor Fisher Body Co H 11 550 

Sessions, Charles C, salvage department, Curtiss Co H 16 777 

Shedley, Thomas H., superintendent of foundry, Wright Martin Co. . . H 14 393 
Sherer, Carl. J., treasurer Dayton Metal Products Co., Dayton Wright 

Co. and Wright Field Co H 9 330 

H 9 631 

H 9 682 

H 10 69 

Shull, Daniel W., employee, Curtiss Co H 16 1 

Siemms, Chester P., president and treasurer Siemms-Carey-Ker- 

bauch Co H 23 652 

Simon, Charles J., accountant, Curtiss Co H 17 179 

Simpson, E. Glenn, chief engineer, Fisher Body Co H 11 472 

Slaght, W. A., employee, Curtiss Co H 17 322 

Sligh, Maj. Charles R., in charge of wood purchasing, Signal Corps ... H 2 350 

Sloan, Lieut. John E., specifications section, Signal Corps H 8 125 

Smart, Allen R., consulting accountant, Dayton Wright Co H 9 427 

H 9 581 

H 9 701 

HO 45 

Smith, Maj. Frank E., Finance Division, Signal Corps H 8 91 

Smith, George B., confidential representative to Deeds & Kettering. . H 9 1 

H 9 271 

H 9 528 

H 10 215 

Smith, John H., in charge construction, Langley field H 2 156 

Sowers, David W., president Sowers Manufacturing Co H 23 195 

Sparks, Dale M., accountant, Curtiss Co H 16 682 

Stagers, John W., lawver representing Borglum H 6 147 

Stratton, Dr. S. W., director, Bureau of Standards H 20 451 

Stroop, William, president Citv NationalBank, Dayton H 1 

Squire, Maj . Gen. George O., Chief Signal Officer H 24 234 

Sullivan, Louis H., works manager, Standard Co H 13 430 

Sweeney, William M., fire police commissioner, Curtiss Co H 17 406 

Sweetser, Capt. Arthur, historical writer for Deeds H 3 626 

H 4 47 

Talbott, H. E., sr., president Dayton Metal Products Co H 10 488 

Talbott, H. E., jr., with Dayton Metal Products Co H 10 721 

Taylor, Howard S., engineer, Dayton Wright Co H 10 281 

Taylor, William P., factory manager, Lewis Spring & Axles Co H 3 705 

Terrell, Louis M., auditor, Ford Co H 12 248 

Thomas, George A., Government employee, Curtiss Co H 16 437 

Thomas, Owen, purchase and supplies H 5 62 

Thomas, Ulysses S., part owner, Sterling Engine Co H 3 721 

Thompson, F. C, Government accountant, Lincoln Co H 12 568 

Thompson, Col. Melville W., president War Credits Board H 21 38 

H 24 442 

Tingle, Alfred J. , manufacturing engineer, Dayton Wright Co H 10 655 

Trego, Frank N., vice president, Trego Motor Co. , New Haven H 2 596 

Vincent, Lieut. Col. J. G., former vice president, Packard Co H 22 11 

H 22 325 

Vrooman, Lieut. Samuel B., jr., mahogany inspector, Signal Corps H 24 31 

Waldon, Col. Sidney D., original member Aircraft Board , H 20 577 

Waterhouse, William J., assistant chief engineer, Standard Co H 13 454 

Webber, William H., forester H 19 431 



GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 31 

Volume. Page. 

Weller, Joseph F., chief of inspection, Curtiss Co H 17 154 

H 17 443 

Wescoat, Pvt. Leon S., accountant, Fisher Body Co H 11 528 

West, Jalma, Military Intelligence, Curtiss Co H 15 1 

Wickliffe, John C, production expert Bureau Aircraft Production H 23 341 

Wilcox, Albert L., lumber business in Panama H 20 242 

Wild, Horace B., aeronautical engineer H 22 385 

Williams, Henry K. S., assistant to Mr. Lockhart H 7 398 

Williams, Lieut. Walter D., plant accountant, Packard Co H 12 137 

Wills, C. Harold, factory manager, Ford Co H 12 184 

Wilson, Charles E., assistant to general manager, Curtiss Co H 17 730 

Wilson, John A., employee, Aircraft Board H 4 561 

Winterbottom, Charles, inspector, Curtiss Co H 15 200 

Wittemann, Chas. K., aeroplane manufacturer H 3 289 

Wolff, Leiut. Col. S. E., in charge finance department, Signal Corps. .HI 1 

H 1 217 

Woods, Lieut. Col. Arthur, field inspection, Signal Corps H 18 412 

H 20 1 

Workman, William H., representative Handley-Paige Co., England. . H 6 154 

Wright, Orville H 23 175 

Zacharias, t)apt. Allen H., planning department, Signal Corps H 6 93 

H 6 259 

H 6 395 



DIGEST 



OF THE 

TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES IN THE 
HUGHES AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION 

May to October, 1918 

130687—19 3 32a 



William Stkoop (Dayton, Ohio, June 11, 1918; Book 0). 

Principal business is representing the American Cigar Co. in 
Ohio. 1. 

Is vice president of Dayton Power & Light Co. and president of 
the City National Bank. 1. 

Gives names of directors of bank. 1. 

Became president of the City National Bank in March, 1918. 1. 

His predecessor was Mr. H. E. Talbott. 1. 

Government Secret Service man asked him about certain trans- 
actions in the bank in regard to financing of contractors who 
had the contract for the Dayton Wright Aviation Field, who 
was S. S. King. 2. 

Mr. Talbott called a meeting one day and said he thought it 
would be a good thing if 13 would finance Mr. King to the 
extent of $10,000 each; and for doing that Mr. King would 
take over the Eouzer Co., which owed the bank some $60,000 
or $70,000. 

Mr. Talbott claimed he went to Florida for his health, but wit- 
ness does not think so. Has heard it said it was in connection 
with another Government contract. 3. 

Mr. Talbott called witness to his office and told him a building 
cost $1,000,000 or more would have to be put up at Moraine 
City and was very anxious that his (witness) company should 
have that building. After the engineer had left Mr. Talbott 
said to me to " Let no one know anything about this until I tell 
you to go to Washington to see about closing the contract." 5. 

The million-dollar building was never built. Troubles came on. 
12. 
Clarence Kiefer (Dayton, Ohio, June 11, 1918; Book 0). 

Vice president of City National Bank. Has held this office for 
21 months. 16. 

Questioned as to the financing of Mr. King or the Dayton Lum- 
ber Co. in connection with Government contract which he 
had. 17. 
Walter George Davidson (Dayton, Ohio, June 11, 1918; Book 0). 

Cashier of City National Bank. 22. 

Has been connected with bank for 16 years. 22. 

Mr. King never banked with them previous to this loan. 23. 

Mr. Carl Scherer requested to remain at bank one Saturday 
afternoon in October, 1917, when some very large checks 
passed. 25. 

33 



34 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Walter George Davidson — Continued. 

Mr. Scherer is treasurer or assistant treasurer of the Dayton 
Metal Products Co., and is also connected with Dayton Wright 
Airplane Co. 26. 

Funds transferred totaled about a million dollars or more. 27. 

This transaction took place December 1, 1917, at about 2 o'clock 
in the afternoon. 28. 
Kenneth B. Allen (Dayton, Ohio, June 12, 1918; Book 0). 

Has been a civil engineer for 10 years. 35. 

Was employed by the Dayton Lumber Co. on work on Wright 
Aviation Field. 35. 

There was a great deal of incompetency and the work was ex- 
treme^ expensive. 36. 

Witness was engineer in charge, but his advice was not followed. 
40. 
Allen K. Smart (Dayton, Ohio, June 12, 1918; Book 0). 

Member of firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., Chicago, 111. 
45. 

Questioned as to the capital stock of the Dayton Metal Products 
Co. and how it was paid for. 46. 

Supervised the adjustments between Col. Deeds and his as- 
sociates. 48. 

His firm retained bv the Davton Metal Products Co. bv the day. 
52. 

" In making an audit last winter I went through the minute 
book to see if there was anything in the minutes affecting the 
accounts, and I struck that minute (minute in the meeting of 
directors of May 21, 1917, of Dayton Metal Products Co.) off 
because it did not belong there." 55. 
Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff (Washington, D. C, May 27, 1919; Book 1). 

Charge of finance department, Signal Corps. 1. 

Unable to procure clear statement of obligations under appro- 
priations from overseas forces. 1. 

Contracts abroad made under direction Gen. Foulois. 4. 

Balance of $4,000,000 out of $750,000,000 to run to end of year. 2. 

Tweleve thousand planes under contract. 3. 

Twenty thousand engines under contract, 3. 

Congress asked for $1,137,000,000 for next fiscal year. 4. 

Contract with French Government to equip 30 squadrons — ap- 
proximately 1,500 planes. 5. 

Contract with British Government to assemble planes in Eng- 
land. 5. 

Give authorities to purchase abroad for $47,000,000. 5. 

Obligations incurred abroad of possibly $300,000,000. 5. 

Disallowed certain requests from abroad, but authorities abroad 
made obligations for these larger amounts. 7. 

Advised by cable revision of contracts with French Government 
involved more than $30,000,000 in new obligations. 7. 

Out of touch with situation — one of reasons for desiring to go 
over there. 7. 

Certain contracts with French and British Governments con- 
fused. 7. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 35 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff — Continued. 

Let contract in September for purchase of $10,000,000 or 
$12,000,000 of material incident to contract with French man- 
ufacturers through French Government; this material to be 
sent abroad part raw, part semifinished, and part entirely 
finished to complete certain number of planes and engines. 
One item was 3,000 Gnome engines. 7, 8. 

Two hundred and odd cases of material in France ; two hundred 
and odd cases on docks at Hoboken; additional quantity still 
in factories. 8. 

Above contract canceled end of April. Unable to find out 
reason. 8. 

Required that report be made on extent and terms of all con- 
tracts abroad, but this had not been done. 8. 

Relieved of command finance department on May 14. 9. 

Maj. H. S. Brown now in charge. 9. Formerlv executive offi- 
cer. 10. 

Appropriation for Signal Corps up to end of fiscal year, June 
30, 1916, had never exceeded $2,500,000. 10. 

Accounts audited in field ; sent to department for administrative 
scrutiny and then paid. 11. 

Five hundred men in various factories auditing accounts. 11. 

Three traveling supervisors. 11. 

Finance department represented in each factory have a cost- 
plus contract. 

Employed accounting firm of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- 
gomery, of Philadelphia and New York, until own force could 
be organized. 13. 

Most of employees of this firm relieved about April 15. 13. 

Organized accounting force from enlisted men and civil-service 
employees. 13, 14. 

In charge of Maj. Dean Langmuir until succeeded by Capt. 
Haag. 14. 

Still retained some employees of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- 
gomery. 16. 

Depreciation of plants figured as an element of cost. IT. 

Two sections of finance department represented in each factory 
having cost-plus contract — accounts section and approvals 
section. 12. 

Accounts section makes up estimates of cost from contractors' 
books and supervises his method of accounting and finally 
passes vouchers for payment. 12. 

Approvals section passes on proposed expenditures by con- 
tractors under cost-plus contract. If proposal not disallowed 
within stated number of days, may be included as reasonable 
item of cost in final claim. 12. 

Capt. Haag head of accounts section. Formerly a general aud- 
itor, member of firm of Henry F. Walbridge & Co., New York, 
who were public-utility operators and investment bankers. 14. 

Approvals section in charge of Maj. Frank E. Smith. Organ- 
ized entirely from governmental forces, commissioned officers, 
civilians, and enlisted men. 16. 



36 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff — Continued. 

Tentative payments made to contractors account depreciation of 
plants; these payments subject to revision at the conclusion of 
contracts. 17. 

Monthly return made to Auditor for War Department called an 
accounts current, together with a statement of the amount 
they had at 1st of month, amount they drew, and the balance, 
also vouchers received. 19, 20. 

Finance department represented by 40 men at Curtiss plant. 21. 

In certain cases determination of cost on cost-plus contract made 
after work is done rather than concurrently with its doing. 25. 

France department has representatives in six districts — New 
York district, Pittsburgh district, Dayton district, Detroit 
district, Buffalo district, Chicago district — each district being 
in charge of an officer. 26. 

Capt. E. V. Lozier, in charge of New York district, was for- 
merly a manufacturer of automobile parts, an engineer, and 
formerly with the Timken Detroit Co. 27. 

Mr. E. D. Cole, in charge of Buffalo district, was an accountant, 
formerly with Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. 27. 

Maj. M. J. Butler, in charge of Dayton district, is a retired 
Canadian officer. 27. 

Capt. Paul B. Holes, in charge of Detroit district, was an ac- 
countant for the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 27. 

These men calculate amount to be allowed for overhead. 27. 

Data on file as to costs in each plant. Difficult to set standards, 
so data compiled from day to day and week to week. 33. 

On training-plane program, planes made at Fisher Body Cor- 
poration, Curtiss Co., Dayton- Wright Co., Standard Aero Co., 
Springfield Aircraft Corporation, St. Louis Aircraft Co., 
Wright-Martin Co. at its Pacific coast plant, California Avia- 
tion Co. 34. 

De Haviland bombing planes made at Dayton- Wright Co. 34. 

De Haviland bombing planes made at Fisher Body Corporation 
and the Standard Aero Co. 34. 

Bristol planes were made at the Curtiss Co. 34. 

Figures in some contracts for training planes were $4,125. 35. 

Comparative data of costs statement kept on file to show where 
there was efficiency and where there was a lack of it. 35. 

Data collated from reports by plant accountants. 36. 

Capt. Frank E. Haag has charge of making comparative state- 
ments. 36. 

Cost has varied frequently. 36. 

Comparative statements of overhead charges at different plants 
kept in form of a weekly report. 37. 

Salaries of executives figured in overhead in a cost-plus con- 
tract. 38. 

Nothing on file to show at a glance how much money paid to 
Curtiss Co. and when they got it. 39. 

Record of each contract kept on separate card. 39. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 37 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff — Continued. 

General principles of estimating depreciation and overhead laid 
down in printed instructions to accountants. These are sup- 
plemented by rulings of ruling board, composed of Maj. Smith, 
Capt. Haag, and Capt. Rottschafer. 43. 

General rulings apply to all contracts and special rulings to 
particular contracts. 45. 

Rulings kept in loose-leaf binders. 45. 

A good deal of money spent in development of plants. 52. 

Statement kept in accounts section showing amount reported 
expended by a particular company in construction and equip- 
ment. 59. 

Purchased plant of General Vehicle Co., Long Island City, and 
leased it to Wright-Martin Co. 61. 

Contractor allowed for material abandoned account change in 
contract. 62. 

Salvaged material sold to public, if no other use for it. 63. 

Was an accountant or clerk from 1890 to 1902. 65. 

Got into executive work about 1907. 65. 

Associated with firm of Hodenpyl, Hardy & Co., 14 Wall Street, 
New York City, investment bankers and financiers. Was in 
department having to do with the management rather than 
financial work. 65. 

Connected with above company until commissioned. 66. 

Only two manufacturers — Packard Co. and Fisher Body Cor- 
poration — had an efficient and sufficient cost-accounting sys- 
tem. 68 and 70. 

War Department warrants issued in cases where they were not 
advised of exact state of commitments abroad. 72. 

Cabled statements from Gen. Pershing do not agree as to extent 
of obligations in France and England. 76. 

Presidential Order No. 7 provides for allotment of funds, obli- 
gations involving $750,000,000, to three separate organizations : 
The Signal Corps, Department of Military Aeronautics, and 
Bureau of Aircraft Production. 78. 

Does not know whether existing appropriations have been ex- 
hausted, but thinks there may be a margin. 79. 

Unable to get satisfactory results by cabling. 80. 

Cables from Pershing relative to financial condition abroad. 83, 
84, 85, 86, 87. 

Total obligations as shown by cablegrams $101,010,000, but addi- 
tion of items enumerated in cablegrams is $139,510,000. 88. 

Statement of Signal Corps under date of May 9, 1918, shows 
commitments over appropriation of $640,000,000 of $173,307,- 
012.38. 89. 

One hundred and sixty-three million dollars expected to be real- 
ized by sale of material to contractors; also to other depart- 
ments of Government and allied Governments, as well as to 
use some of materials for repairs and renewals. 90. 

Excess of $11,322,002.97 over total appropriation of $640,000,000 
due to estimates of cost. 92. 



38 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff — Continued. 

If Gen. Pershing's cable is correct, showing obligations overseas 
of approximately $139,000,000, for which authorization has 
been given only to the extent of $47,000,000, it would mean 
$100,000,000 worth of contracts would have to be canceled in 
order to reduce obligations to an amount not in excess of 
amount appropriated by Congress. 94. 

Overcontracted on this side to extent of $11,000,000. 96. 

Cancellation of contracts will delay program from 30 to 60 days 
on account of time consumed in making renewals. 97. 

Contractors advanced money to make additions to plant or his 
working capital, for raw material, machinery, or otherwise. 
100. m 

Interviewing and preparation of application of applicants for 
advances carried on by Capt. Lewis B. Preston and First 
Lieut. Sidney E. Small. 101. 

Application passed upon by finance department and final action 
taken by War Credits Board. 101. 

Memorandum kept in administration section showing basis for 
advances, etc. 102. 

Statement showing advances made various companies. 103. 

In cost-plus contracts no provision made by which companies 
would be compelled to pay damages or lose a part of agreed 
price in case of delay. 104. 

No requirements with respect to time of performance, the breach 
of which would expose contractor to any damage. 105. 

Only protection Government had under these contracts in case 
a plant was inefficiently managed and there were unnecessary 
delay was the taking over of plant or cancellation of con- 
tract. 105. 

Contracts for experimental work of a confidential nature let to 
Dayton- Wright Co. and Dayton Metal Products Co. on a cost- 
plus basis, allowing 12J per cent profit. 106. 

Detailed vouchers not always kept on work of this character. 
106. 

The supervision of cost was carried on by an officer at plant 
who would check vouchers and send a memorandum voucher 
of the total number of amount for payment. 106. 

First Lieut. George Weir, employed by Col. Thompson in civil 
life, was detailed for this work. 107. 
Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, D. C, May 28, 1918; 
Bookl). 

Assistant and executive to head of Department of Military Aero- 
nautics, Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar. 112. 

Materiel section passes on all requisitions for construction. 113. 

Equipment puts requests through and pay for them. 113. 

Col. Jones with Coast and Geodetic Survey before receiving com- 
mission February 28, 1918. 118, 119. 

Looked into question of how many planes had been shipped 
abroad and why more had not been shipped. 120. 

Got information from transportation department. 121. 

Testified before Senate committee and was questioned as to Creel 
statement as to program. Stated only one plane had been 
shipped overseas. 122. 



ABSTEACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 39 

Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones — Continued. 

Chaotic condition existed. Unable to improve service. 124. 

Civilian, representing Col. Deeds, without authority authorized 
a Mr. Carl Fisher to construct an aviation field on his own 
land. Was reimbursed by Government for expenditure. 125. 

Mr. Fisher also directed to lay out flying course, costing $40,000. 
Never reimbursed by Government. 132. 

Policy is to start something and then drop it, forgetting obliga- 
tions to individuals. 133. 

Dozen cases where a thousand men were sent to places where 
there were no accommodations for them. 143. 

Commercial bill of lading used rather than Government bill of 
lading in purchasing by J. G. White Corporation, thereby net- 
ting this concern an additional income. 148. 

Explains Government bill of lading. 156. 

J. G. White Corporation only company authorized to purchase 
and handle shipments direct. 158. 

Transportation section has information as to rates for ship- 
ping. 161. 

Bills from railroad go to supply division for audit. 161. 

Officers tried to sidetrack Col. Byllsby. 166. 

Statement on expenditure of money prepared by Gen. Squier and 
Mr. Potter in error. 170. 

All money appropriated and considerably more already provided 
for in contracts. 170. 

Nine hundred and seven million dollars spent or obligated. 171. 

Chief Signal Officer can redistribute allotments. 180. 

Certain items in statement submitted by Lieut. Col. Wolff in 
error. 181. 

Statement as to estimated cost of certain flying fields. 187. 

Contract signed with manufacturing concern having no buildings 
involving $40,000,000 on a cost-plus basis, plus 15 per cent. 
191. 
Maj. C. S. Benton (Washington, D. C, May 28, 1918; Book 1). 

Commissioned June 27, 1917. 194. 

Formerly traffic manager for W. H. Edgar & Sons, Detroit, Mich. 
194. 

In charge of traffic section of the supply division. 194. 

Issues Government bills of lading on shipments for Signal Corps, 
arrange for placing of cars and getting shipments to destina- 
tion. 194, 195. 

Describes Government bill of lading and usage. 196. 

Questioned as to J. G. White Corporation. 199. 

J. G. White Corporation receives commission on money paid 

railroads covering freight shipments from Government. 209. 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff (Washington, D. C, May 28, 1918; Book 1). 

Government bill of lading only procurable through Quarter- 
master Department. 217. 

Questioned as to cost-plus contract form. 219. 

Government was to either purchase new buildings or contractor 
was to furnish them and have them depreciate over the life of 
the contract. 223. 



40 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Wolff — Continued. 

Amount allowed by Government on increased facilities is not 
figured part of cost of contract in arriving at percentage of 
profit. 228. 

Bought a million and a half dollars' worth of machinery for 
Curtiss Co., which Government owns. 230. 

Controlling ledger, trial balances, and subsidiary ledgers all 
kept at plant. 232. 

Cost plus contracts included in flat price contracts for reason 
that authorities were issued by outside contract officers. 234. 

Col. Disque authorized to expend for spruce what would be 
recouped on sale of spruce. 235. 

All authorities issued overseas are included in fixed priced 
column. 236. 

Many contracts for construction of fields were on a cost plus 
basis but carried in wrong column. 242. 

Authorities overseas request to be relieved of keeping any ac- 
counts by allotments, and given authority for blank million 
dollars with no accounting for it until after war is over. 271. 

With respect to obligations abroad, puts minimum at $75,000.- 
000, and maximum at $200,000,000. 

Interrogated quite extensively as to reasons for desiring to 
make trip overseas on temporary duty. 
Maj. C. 8. Benton (Washington, D. C., May 29, 1918; Book 1). 

Referring to contract with J. G. White Corporation, Justice 
Hughes points out that under Item B cost of delivery to re- 
quired points should not be considered in figuring percentage 
of profit to contractor. 278, 279. 

Vouchers do not show that commission on freight charges was 
paid by Government. 283. 

In conversation with officials of AVhite Co. was led to believe 
thev were receiving commission. 281. 
Joseph S." Otis (Washington, D. C, May 30, 1918; Book 1). 

Associate general manager of Otis Manufacturing Co., New 
Orleans, La. Importing and manufacturing mahogany lum- 
ber. 287. 

Left company December 31 but still retained stock. 288. 

Offered services to Government free of charge. 291. 

Was assigned to work in equipment division, propeller section, 
in charge of mahogany and hardwood. 293. 

Saw one contract he thought was of any value, which was with 
a firm in Philadelphia that did not even own its own mill. 
293. 

None of concerns having contracts, except one, Louis Thompson, 
had put up a bond. This is concern referred to above. 294. 

One of concerns having $300,000 contract was rated at $3,000, 
and poor pay. 294. 

Maj. Sligh, of Grand Rapids, Mich., had let contracts. 295. 

Louis Thompson & Co. only concern which had delivered lum- 
ber under these contracts. 296. 

Embargo placed on shipment of wood for battleplane propel- 
lers. 299. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 41 

Joseph S. Otis — Continued. 

Made up set of figures for purchase of propeller lumber and 
made prices such as he thought the poorest-equipped manu- 
facturer — . 303. 

Was told by a Mr. Wycliff that they were too low, and that 
mahogany business had changed greatly since he had left — 
two weeks previous. 303. 

His opinion mahogany men were working through Mr. Lock- 
heart, of raw materials department, Signal Corps, with a 
view to getting mahogany men in their department to handle 
the whole thing. 303. 

On October 1 or 2 Otis Manufacturing Co. offered to sell 3,000,- 
000 feet of suitable aeroplane lumber of a very strict grading 
at $215. Was not accepted. 306. 

Louis Thompson & Co.'s offer of $200 was accepted. 306. 

Bids of other companies for same amount were accepted but 
bonds were not put up, and deliveries were not made. 307. 

Purchased 300,000 feet from Cobbett & Co.'s representative be- 
low $300 a thousand. 309. 

Mr. Wycliff figured on $350 for selects (firsts and seconds, air- 
plane), and $280 for No. 1 common. Maintained No. 1 com- 
mon not an economical grade for Government to buy. Ma- 
hogany alliance insisted that Government should also take 
what he classed as rejects and pay an enormously high price 
for them. 309, 310. 

British Government paying Otis Manufacturing Co. $395 on 
logs coming out of Belize, British Honduras. 311. 

Average pripe on airplane lumber of Otis Co. for 1917 was 
$200 a thousand, and company made $200,000 at those prices. 
3.11. 

Conditions had not changed since that time, but labor had 
possibly gone up 5 per cent. 311. 

Was relieved from duty, and given commendatory letter for 
services rendered. 312, 313. 

Mr. Wycliff made an assistant buyer. 314. 

Interrogated as to cost of mahogany logs to manufacturer, price 
paid by Government, and profit. 320, 366. 
Capt. James J. Newman (Washington, D. C, May 30, 1918; Book 1). 

Commissioned September 28, 1917. 385. 

Assigned to Fisher Body Corporation of Detroit. 390. 

Company clamoring for money. 390. 

Dayton- Wright Co. approved voucher for approximated $250,- 
000. 391. 

Had not turned out any produce for Government up to this time. 
392. 

Voucher was for materia], labor, and overhead. 392. 

Overhead accounts amounting to about $90,000 not verified. 393. 

Contract was for 400 J-l machines, 1,000 De Haviland 4s, and 
3,000 De Haviland 9s. 396. 

Three officials of concern to divide $100,000 as salary during 
term of contract. 403. 



42 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Capt. James J. Newman — Continued. 

R. A. Perry of Lybrant, Eoss Bros. & Montgomery stated any- 
thing he approved would be paid by the Government whether 
or not o. k.'d by Capt. Newman. 404. 

Mr. Perry in direct charge of accounting work at plant. 406. 

At that time whole of accounts end of finance department prac- 
tically controlled by men of firm of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & 
Montgomery. 407. 

Col. Thompson of Signal Corps kept very private file. 408. 

Wrote letter to ascertain if salaries of officials should be included 
on voucher and paid, but did not receive any reply. 409. 

Put salaries on voucher and they were paid. 410. 

Orville Wright paid a salarv of $18,000 a year by this concern. 
411. 

Consulting engineer. Other people on officers' pay roll, but 
were not officers of company. 413. 

Addressed letter to Maj. Langinuir asking if it was his duty to 
investigate as to who was to share profits as contract states 
that no Member of Congress or other persons should partici- 
pate in profits of contract. 413. 

Was advised that it was not; that that clause was practically 
extinct. 413. 

Engle Aircraft Co. had contract for $2,500,000 for J. N. 4 
spares. 420. 

Lvbrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery had 12 to 18 men at Dayton- 
"Wright plant, 423. 

$1,000,000 advanced by War Credits Board to Davton- Wright 
Co. 431. 

All overhead expenses allowable under Dayton- Wright contract, 
434. 

First shipment of planes (10) was made by Dayton-Wright Co. 
after 1st of January. 437. 

40 J-ls shipped up to'lst of May. 437. 

During April approximately 90 planes shipped. 437. 

300 training planes shipped prior to 1st of April. 437. 

Signal Corps agreed not to have further changes in next 1,000 
planes. 439. 

Col. Montgomery proposed $7,000 as bogie price for De Havi- 
land planes. 443. 
Lester P. Barlow (Washington, D. C, May 30, 1918; Book 1). 

An engineer. 

Developed present type of shell United States Government has 
accepted as their official munitions. The Barlow heavy drop 
bomb. 447. 

Bomb could have been manufactured over a year ago, but Gov- 
ernment did not place order until January of this year. 449. 

Glen Martin only had order for six experimental machines. To 
be paid $50,000 apiece for them without engines. 454, 455. 

Mr. Martin had to raise $2,500,000 private capital and $2,000,000 
of that was withdrawn owing to uncertainty of Government 
negotiations. 455. 

To say anything to Col. Deeds or Gen. Squier on methods they 
have pursued would have meant disaster for Mr. Martin. 456. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 43 

Lester P. Barlow — Continued. 

Up until a few months before war was declared more hours had 
been flown by United States Army in Martin's machines than 
all other machines combined in the service. 456. 

Plant adaptable to making J. N. and De Haviland machines. 
456. 

Has not had backing of Government. 457. 

Purchased two machines equipped with 100 horsepower Gnome 
engine from Mr. Heinrich at $15,000 apiece. 457. 

Gave Mr. Heinrich contract for scout machines at fourteen thou- 
sand some hundred dollars each, without motors. 457. 

Engineers given something to do to keep their mouths shut. 
458. 

Col. Deeds negotiated contract. 459. 

Heinrich plane could have been built for $2,000 to $3,000 with- 
out motors. 460. 

Martin could have produced planes rapidly had Signal Corps 
backed him. 462. 

Equipped with Hispano-Suiza engine. Arranged with Gen. 
Squier to develop his aerial torpedo, but nothing ever came of 
it as Signal Corps failed to advance money or make contract. 
480, 481. 

Col. Deeds intimated no more newspaper publicity desirable if 
Barlow was to get contract. 484. 

Gen. Squier told Mr. Coffin to tell Senate committee investigat- 
ing aircraft production as little as possible. 488. 

Liberty motor not high order of combat engine. 495. 
Capt. Harold M. Lehman (Washington, D. C, May 31, 1918; 
Book 1). 

With finance department, equipment division. 501. 

Assigned to appropriations section. 403. 

Duty to see that amounts allotted and amounts charged against 
allotments were properly entered. 505. 

Supervised making up of weekly statement as to condition of 
appropriation. 506. 

Had not been notified by anyone as to error in statement of 
May 9. 508. 

Overobligation appears in allotments of construction division, 
amounting to $13,632,259.50. 570. 

Excess over allotted appropriation in equipment division stated 
to be $191,906,584. 511. 

Amount of excess obligations actually incurred in equipment di- 
vision over and above allotted appropriation, $37,940,901.38. 
513. 

Authority issued to disbursing officer abroad for $15,100,000 to 
pay foreign contracts. 533. 
Lester P. Barlow (Washington, D. C, May 31, 1918; Book 1). 

Col. Deeds advises about middle of February not ready to take 
up bomb dropping or bombs yet. 542. 

No planes for carrying these bombs. 543. 

Saw Government experimenting with bomb traps in December 
at Langley Field. 544. 

Promised contract July 2, 1917, for 10,000 bombs and 1,000 
traps. 546. 



44 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lester P. Barlow — Continued. 

Order given on January 1, 1918, for bombs, but not for traps. 

546. 
It is necessary to take plane into consideration in designing of 

bomb traps. 550. 
Four hundred and fifty thousand bombs under production on 

May 31, 1918. 551. 
Bombs manufactured will lie idle until used by Allies or by us 

in planes obtained from Allies. 552. 
No bombing planes of our own. 552. 

No bombing planes being constructed except Handley-Paige be- 
ing experimentally produced. 553. 
Bomb trap designed by Ordnance Department could not be used 

universally in our bombing program. 556. 
Barlow bomb can stand sleet, snow, and mud, and is practically 

fool proof. 559. 
Eecords will show Gen. Squier and Col. Deeds tried to block use 

of flying torpedo. 563. 
Flying torpedo held up four months. 565. 
Had traps, bombs, and planes for training of men. 566. 
Government accepts his trap and is to take 500. 566. 
Would train men gratis on own field. 568. 
Spoke to Col. Horner about synchronizing aircraft gun, but he 

did not seem to be interested. 579. 
Marlin gun and synchronizer was 150 shots faster than Marlin 

gun and synchronizer ordered by Government from National 

Pneumatic Co. 784. 
(In numbering 200 pages skipped in volume.) 
Seven synchronizers built by National Pneumatic Co. accepted 

by Government, but proved unsatisfactor}^. 790. 
Mr. Nelson, technical expert in employ of Government, develops 

very satisfactory synchronizer. 791. 
No definite synchronizer under production yet. 792. 
Takes several months to complete 20,000 synchronizers. 792. 
Lieut. Col. Henry Marison Byllesby (Washington, D. C, Mav 31 r 

1918; Book 1). 
Original commission dates November 15, 1917. 795. 
Past 16 years president of H. M. Byllesby Co., of Chicago and 

New York, operating public utilities. 796, 795. 
First assigned to recruiting service for Signal Corps. 797. 
Later transferred to administrative division of the Signal Corps. 

797. 
Generally administering special matters. 797. 
Served six weeks on special committee endeavoring to point out 

most obvious losses of time and money in War Department's 

conduct of affairs in city of Washington. 798. 
Was cabled for by Gen. Pershing and ordered overseas shortly 

after taking up above work. 798. 
Going across to assist Brig. Gen. George H. Harries, a business 

partner in civil life. 799. 
With reference to his observation of organization of Aviation 

Department, Signal Corps, impression he formed was not 

what it was desired he should. 799. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 45 

Lieut. Col. Henry Marison Byllesby — Continued. 

Impossible to secure information worth while in reply to in- 
quiries. Officers in charge of Production Department did not 
desire to take up time to confer with him on subjects brought 
up. Col. Montgomery one officer mentioned. 799. 

Desired to take up with Col. Montgomery the question of manu- 
facture and construction in program for building airplanes, 
progress of program, and general engineering details. 800. 

Endeavored to arrange meetings at convenient time for Col. 
Montgomery without result. 800. 

Similar results with other men prominent in Signal Corps. 801. 

Col. Deeds always kindly and complimentary ^ but talks with 
him never resulted in getting information desired. 802. 

Young men promised commissions as first lieutenants in Air 
Service after qualifying as flyers, but Government issued com- 
missions as second lieutenants, causing much complaint. 803. 

Received no complaints in regard to aircraft production that had 
come to other parties. 804. 

Estimated Wright-Martin Co. cost-plus contract would total 
$42,000,000, but due to rise in cost of labor and material, and 
it possibly would reach $50,000,000. 806. 

Estimated two years required to fill contract, which was for 
manufacture of two sizes of Hispano-Suiza engines. 706. 

Wright-Martin Co. turned into Government every month state- 
ment of their entire expenses, labor, material, and overhead of 
every description, to which was added 15 per cent, and prob- 
ably received a settlement therefor. 807. 

Every dollar of cost defrayed by Government. 807. 

No reason why Government should have given a contract bear- 
ing so large a percentage. 809. 

Stock of Wright-Martin Co. before war was looked upon on 
Street as a " skyrocket " proposition (prior to our entry into 
war) . 810. 

Regarded contract as most extraordinary one ever heard of, 
from any standpoint. 811. 

Engineering company of which Maj. Starrat was head did large 
amount of constructing of barracks and cantonments and 
roads and waterworks. 813. 
Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, D. C, May 31. 1918, 
Book 1). 

In re J. G. White Engineering Corporation contract for Lang- 
ley Field, definite construction already made amounts to 
$3,785,000, and on that project an expenditure of probably 
$10,000,000 will be necessary. 814. 

Col. Edgar in better position to talk intelligently with regard 
to contracts. 816. 

Contracts referred to all over $1,000,000. 816. 

Great delay in filling requisitions, due to red tape. 817. 

Col. Edgar complained in writing to Chief Signal Officer re- 
garding delay and seriousness of condition. 821. 

Changed heads of Air Division twelve times since aircraft pro- 
gram was started. 822. 

Charges Lieut. Col. Wolff with irregular, unbusinesslike meth- 
ods. 824. 



46 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones — Continued. 

Langley Field contract would bear criticism. 824. 

Contract was broad, loosely drawn, and very susceptible to any 
interpretation contractor might put on it. 825. 

Partiality shown — lowest bidder did not get contract. 827. 

Allowed concern to submit bid after bids were closed. 827. 

Accused J. G. White Engineering Corporation of unbusiness- 
like methods. 828. 

Some of J. G. White's former employees in Signal Corps. 829. 
Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (Washington, June 1, 1918; Book 2). 

At this time head of what was the Supply Division of the Signal 
Corps. 1. 

Duties consisted of viseing requisitions drawn up by Air Divi- 
sion for Supplies. 2. 

Traffic Division had charge of transportation of all aircraft 
material. 

Construction Division was created on May 21, 1917. 4. 

Had charge of all construction work of Signal Corps. 4. 

Albert Kahn, Detroit, was advisory architect. 5. 

Col. Starratt selected contractors for Government work. Com- 
menced in June. Under National Council of Defense. 5. 

Dr. Walcott, of Smithsonian Institute; Dr. Stratton, of Bureau 
of Standards; and Mr. Durancl, of Cornell, constituted ad- 
visory committee on aeronautics. 6. 

Early in May, 1917, finished plans for aviation training camp. 8. 

Col. Edgar, together with Gen. Foulois, submitted a report to 
Chief Signal Officer recommending fields be put at Dayton, 
Mount Clemens, and near Champlain. 9. 

Attorney Whaley, of Council of National Defense, develops 
plan of contract on cost-plus basis for construction work. 
Adopted. Has not copy then of contract. 14. 

Form of contract. 15. 

Had no supervision at Dayton-Wright or Lincoln Motor Co. 
plant. 18. 

Original order re control of all construction work again brought 
up. 19. 

Unauthorized construction work. 18 and 19. 

Acetone plants — Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Missouri. 20. 

Additional allotment made March 14; amount, $20,000,000. 23. 

Information as to items of unauthorized construction. 24. 

(These contracts let on 10 per cent basis, whereas old ones 
let at 7 per cent, Government thereby losing 3 per cent by 
handling this way.) 

Acetone proposition ran somewhere around $1,000,000. 26. 

Contract form modified by making it 7 per cent for $100,000, 
and from that down. 26. 

New form of contract in effect at Painville and West Point, 
Miss. Have spent $804,209 to date on that at maximum of 7 
per cent. 26. 

Submits memorandum to Mr. Potter, of Equipment Division, 
on making contracts with maximum of 10 per cent, limited to 
$100,000. Attached sheet showing percentages. 27. 

In ignorance of terms of the airplane contracts. 27. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 47 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar — Continued. 

Came here to confer with Col. H. H. Hutton and Col. Waldon; 
spent so far this year (June 1, 1918) $48,000,000 on organiza- 
tion of his own proposition. Shows original copy of moneys 
spent; total, $48,334,349.28. 28. 

This for construction work in United States and overseas, 
altogether $20,000,000 on overseas items. 28. 

Amount overseas charged against allotment by Equipment Di- 
vision. He had nothing to do with payment. 28. 

Mentions notification from Equipment Division that France had 
called for $9,000,000 worth of their funds for construction 
abroad. Reduces their surplus of $5,000,000 to $6,000,000 to 
a deficit. Have on hand order for $9,500,000 field hangars for 
overseas. 29. 

In case of construction overseas they are simply notified on piece 
of paper that so much money has been called for, and it is 
then taken out of their allotment. They are given no esti- 
mates. 29. 

Except an item of $1,082,000, all work done in this country, 
amounting to about $28,000,000 up to now, has been done on 
a basis of cost-plus, the percentages shown in the standard 
form of contract, as modified last spring in the way stated. 
29. 

Stated contracts made under the basis of these percentages 
could have been shaved more. 30. 

Through orders of Secretary of War they took such contractors 
as Maj. Starratt sent, he in each case sending an alternate also 
for their final choice. 31. 

Some of the contractors furnished were good and some bad. 
The United Construction Co. of St. Louis, for instance; dila- 
tory and poor work and not sufficient funds to float the 
work. 32. 

J. G. White Engineering Corporation, who had Langley Field, 
unsatisfactory on that job. Also built Morrison, Va., and 
they did a good job there. 34. 

Built camp at Carlstrom Field — cost, $799,212.01 — and camp at 
Door Field — cost, $674,206.21. These considered very cheap 
aviation fields. 34. 

Cleaned out organization of J. G. White Engineering Co. twice ; 
could not detect any graft. Maj. Harold Bennington in his 
office, trained auditor, watched this job at Langley, but could 
not nail down the place where something had been done 
wrong. 34. 

Langley Field, a large contract, laid out by Gen. Squier and 
Maj. Souder and the Aircraft Production Board. 35. 

Built buildings 100 feet high and 150 feet in length, which were 
impossible to operate. 35. 

Estimated cost of Morrison Field was $1,892,000.60, of which 
$1,873,394.82 has now been paid. 36. 

Langley Field was estimated to cost $3,785,000, but if finished 
on original plan will cost $15,000,000. 36. 

Can not explain discrepancy, as he had nothing to do with plans 
of these tremendous buildings. Did not make estimates. 
Were under what they should have been. 36. 
130687—19 4 



48 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar — Continued. 

Estimates made by Capt. Stieger, Coast Artillery, and Capt. 
Sloan, of Signal Keserve Corps. Forest had to be cut down, 
expensive drainage laid out, concrete road built to railroad, 
etc. 37. 

Contract for construction of Langley Field was placed with the 
J. G. White Co. 41. 

J. G. White Co. also made purchases of materials for the Gov- 
ernment overseas. 44. 

In May, Secretary of War started building aviation fields 
abroad. Sent in an order, for which J. G. White was retained 
on job on 3 per cent basis, to purchase and assemble in New 
York all material necessary for aviation training camp. This 
was furnished for $642,491.06. 44. 

Plans are laid out to do something, and it is a continual in- 
crease. This without exception. More buildings have been 
added, and contracts have gone right on. 46. 

The Quartermaster General draws a line and says on such a day 
the contract ceases and then lets a new contract. 47. 

White Co. heard of this and brought contract down to them, 
saying they had reached the limit, wanted old contract closed 
and new one given them so that they could procure a larger 
fee. 46. 

No limit was placed on amount of cost that could be incurred 
under these contracts. 47. 

Every contract has exceeded its estimate, J. G. White Co.'s 
overrunning more than any. 48. 

Was asked if he had completed the audit of the work up to the 
present and could say that there was nothing irregular in what 
had heretofore taken place. 48. 

States funds were wasted ; gives reasons. 49. 

With reference to facilities for schools to house Canadian 
unit. 27. 

In the way of planes, engines, etc., has correspondence showing 
that first fields were finished and there were not enough 
planes, and after planes got there there were not enough spare 
parts. Found schools where they did not have monkey 
wrenches and screw drivers, some of which were coming from 
anywhere. 51. 

The requisition order reaching the Equipment Division on De- 
cember 11 was followed on January 24 by another, in which 
time only one article on the entire list of 97 items had been 
shipped. 

This condition considered typical. 53. 

Describes memorandum of data secured on methods of Equip- 
ment Division, showing what happened to an order after it 
reached there. 53. 

After much trouble with officials in Equipment Division, suc- 
ceeded in getting authority for all fields to expend $300 a 
day. 55. 

Specifically states there was no organization and discipline in 
any of the divisions with which he was connected. 55-57. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 49 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar — Continued. 

Shows lack of judgment in orders, stating Equipment Division 
bought training planes at a terrific rate, but no spares or other 
necessaries, which kept these planes from flying. 58. 

Col. Montgomery, when he was division chief in Equipment 
Division, almost impossible to see. Often waited three quar- 
ters of an hour for interview, then nobody would see him. 59. 

Drew their attention to the fact that the man who spent the 
money should not have control of the payments. The system 
there was to give them money and let them spend it. 59-60. 

Give facts relating to flying course from Eantoul to Dayton. 
Col. Deeds was responsible for this venture, as also buying 
flying field at Miami, for which they now have to get money 
to pay for it. 61. 

Eelates experience of having 500 or 1,000 men dropped in on 
them at the fields and no place to house them. 63. 

States one camp called Palo Alto, in California, was stopped in 
the midst of construction. 64. 

S. S. King was president of the Dayton Lumber & Manufactur- 
ing Co., which company had the contract for construction of 
buildings at Wilbur Wright Field. Poor contractor; no ex- 
perience. Recommended by Col. Deeds. 66. 

Col. Deeds's position at this time was civilian advisor, a member 
of Aircraft Production Board. 67. 

Col. Deeds had some position or office with the Miami Con- 
servancy Commission, which owned the ground the Wilbur 
Wright Field was constructed on. 69. 

Also the two Talbotts, senior and junior, were interested in this 
deal. Procured money for them when they could not get their 
accounts straightened out. The Talbotts are in the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. and the Dayton Products Co. Were 
financing King, the contractor, who was writing to the trade 
that the Government was holding up his payments. 70. 

Contract for Wilbur Wright Field was $2,922,061.80. 74. 

Q. What other matters have you that I should be informed 
upon ? 78. - 

The instruction of commanding officers and others; expenditure 
of Government money through disbursing officers at these 
camps and fields without authority, which became of great 
worry and trouble. 78. 

Talking about the Air Division. Commanding officer goes out 
and gets money for maintenance of his fields, spends it on a 
clubhouse or something else that suits him. 79. 

Also commanding officer comes to a field and without authority 
takes, for instance, a machine shop, tears out partitions, and 
makes other changes involving large sums of money to turn 
it into a carpenters' shop. 79. 
Maj. Harold Bennington (Washington, June 4, 1918; Book 2). 

Been in Army since June of last year, coming from civil life. 81. 

Public accountant, in partnership with Ernest Eeckreutt in Chi- 
cago about 12 years. Came from England. 81. 



50 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Harold Bennington — Continued. 

Came to Washington after war broke out and took charge of the 
accounting for Construction Division in the Signal Corps. 82. 

Audited all accounts relating to bills having to do with costs of 
construction of various aviation camps. 82. 

J. G. White Co., who had the contract for Langley Field, came to 
him about contract entered into by Maj. Stieger. Had made 
contract with Hampton Roads Construction Co. for roads and 
temporary buildings. J. G. White Co. stated this was an 
irregular company scrambled together for the purpose of get- 
ing said contract. 84. 

Store at Langley Field very loosely supervised. 87. 

Not possible to make comparison of estimates of excesses com- 
ing up, as they were not what would be called engineering esti- 
mates, only drawn up in rough way. 88. 

Audited work of Supply Division exclusively. 89. 

Mentions Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. 90." 

Contractor, Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co., S. S. King- 
president. 90. 

Over $2,000,000 paid on Wright Field contract with Dayton 
Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 91. 

Mr. Grannis was employed as superintendent of building opera- 
tions of the Signal Corps in Dayton. 96. 

No provision in contracts where contractor was liable to any 
penalty for failure to complete work within stated time. 98. 

Describes dragging along of work at Dayton. 99. 

Mr. Grannis eventually taking charge of this work. 99. 

King utterly spineless and others had to make his decisions for 
him. 99. 

Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. were financed by their 
bankers in Dayton, of which Mr. Talbott is president. Also 
financed through an attorney at Dayton. 100. 

Mr. Smith exclusively engaged in supervising the engineering 
matters in connection with Langley Field. 101. 

Vouchers were made payable to the contractor himself. 103. 

Mr. King kept an active bank account in bank of which Mr. Tal- 
bott was president. 103. 

Total amount of payments made to Dayton Lumber & Manufac- 
turing Co. is over $2,000,000 for Wilbur Wright Field alone. 
103. 

Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. had a contract to do con- 
struction work in connection with McCook Field; estimated 
cost to be on May 24, $1,059,052. 104. 

Same inefficiency in management, and weak personnel. 105. 

Q. Was there in connection with this McCook Field con- 
tract an attempt made from time to time to get money on re- 
ceipts where money had not been paid by the contractor? 105. 

Relates one very grave instance. 105. 

Unclaimed wages amounting to $18,000 in connection with 
Wilbur Wright Field. 107. 

States item of $18,000 could not have normally been paid out. 
111. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 51 

Maj. Harold Bennington — Continued. 

Pay rolls were acknowledged untrustworthy, and it was a fair 
inference that somebody actually paid out amounts in excess 
of the money they really earned. 112. 

Name of attorney at Dayton, in connection with Wilbur Wright 
Field is O. F. Davisson, and the bank the City National Bank. 
116. 

Manner of checking up pay rolls. 118-119. 

Agrees that pay rolls were untrustworthy. 120. 

Where you find records never agreeing you have an organiza- 
tion that is inefficient. 122. 

Cites one instance in particular of man who got away with four 
jobs in collusion with the timekeeper at Mineola. 123. 

Did not believe there had been any intentional effort on the part 
of anybody, either in the service or out of it, to retard the work 
in aircraft production. 124. 
Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, June 4, 1919; Book 2). 

Authority is given for the planting of approximately 94,000 
acres of castor beans. Subsequently it was shown that the oil 
would not be needed, already had castor oil on hand that they 
were not using, but still further orders were placed. Govern- 
ment agreed to pay farmers $3.50 a bushel. 126. 

Had made no provision for plants to extract the oil from the 
beans. 127. 

Contract were made by officers in the castor-oil section of Equip- 
ment Division. Civilians before this country entered the war. 
128. 

Gives Col. Edgar as authority for the statement that contracts 
were still being made with the farmers for additional acreage 
to be planted after the discovery of the substitute for castor 
oil. 129. 

Castor-bean item, apart from the expense of reduction, would 
aggregate in neighborhood of $5,000,000. 131. 

Eeduction plants located at great distances from where they 
made the plantings. 131. 

Aerial gunnery school at Miami, Fla. 132. 

Board's report evidenced a great outlay of money that could 
have been saved in selecting another location. 13t. 

Second board sent down to report on Miami. 138. 

Col. Edgar recommended if anything were done to start on a 
small scale. Chief Signal Officer went ahead and leased 1,200 
acres on his own recommendation, cost to be $8 an acre, annu- 
ally. 140. 

$300,000 authorized for construction of buildings, filling in, etc., 
Whole thing formed of coral, impossible to dig through. 140. 

Cites instance of plane which had to be pulled out of the mud 
by a mule, the mule afterwards having to be pulled out by 
mud hooks. 141-142. 

Thinks one man leased, or obligated himself, to a lot of small 
farmers for the planting of castor beans. Thought there were 
written contracts with certain parties agreeing to take these 
beans. 150. 



52 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones — Continued. 

Mr. Hughes brings up the matter again of the going on of mak- 
ing contracts for the planting of castor beans after it had been 
learned that they would not be needed. 152. 

Failure to provide reduction plants, assuming even that the cas- 
tor oil would be needed. 153. 

Gen. Squier reported that 286 planes had flown to a point of 
embarkation. No facilities there to receive planes arriving by 
flight. 154. 
John Henry Smith (Washington, June 4, 1918; Book 2). 

Resides in Washington, D. C. 

Came here from Youngstown, Ohio, where was with the Truscon 
Steel Co., manager of the railroad department. 156. 

Requested by Col. Edgar to take charge of construction of Lang- 
ley Field. 

Albert Kahn, of Detroit, Mich., consulting architect. 157. 

Supervised the purchase of all material that goes into the field, 
and the personnel of the field. 158. 

Irregularities brought to his attention. Case of the Hampton 
Roads Engineering & Construction Co. Capt. Sloan made 
this contract without permission or authority from anyone. 
159. 

Capt. Sloan was from Front Royal, Va. 160. 

This case was investigated by Capt. Castell, who found that 
the firm were capitalized at $5,000. They were a group of 
local men at Newport News. One a lumber man, another a 
barber, etc. 161. 

Profit under this contract. 10 per cent. 162. 

The J. G. White Engineering Corporation, already on the 
ground, should have done the work, which would have saved 
one profit. 163. 

Minor irregularities in purchasing. Things bought at the last 
minute, and on a spot market. 167. 

Capt. Sloan is in France now. 170. 
Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgae (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). 

The gunnery school at Miami, Fla. 172. 

Meeting in "the Air Division to discuss this proposition. 174. 

Second board sent down. 174. 

Chief Signal Officer asks for estimate on small scale. 176. 

Kissimee, Fla.. stated to have been better location in every way 
for a field than Miami. Believes reason for putting location 
at Miami was because of local attractions for officers and avia- 
tors. All that was asked in regard to the situation of these 
aviation camps was with reference to young ladies and danc- 
ing, etc. 182. 

Castor-oil situation. 184. 

Evidence of further contracts being made for castor-oil plant- 
ings after advices had been received that no more would be 
needed. 186. 

Cites memorandum calling attention to the fact that contracts 
for two acetone plants had been placed by the Equipment 
Division at a profit of 10 per cent for the work. 188. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 53 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar — Continued. 

Contracts were let at a 10 per cent basis to people who would have 

taken it on the 7 per cent basis, but were not informed that 

they would have to by the Equipment Division. 190. 
Submits memorandum recommending the abandoning of Miami 

as gunnery field. 202. 
Between $75,000 and $100,000 had already been spent there, 

and would still need at least $66,000 more, and at best would 

only be a patched-up affair. 203. 
Field at Lake Kissimee would have cost around $250,000. Miami 

before it is finished will run over $400,000. 206. 
Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). 

Gives names of E. F. Sewell, and Frank B. Shutts, of Miami, 

as two business men Avho prevailed upon the Chief Signal 

Officer to establish gunnery school at Miami. 207. 
Presents memorandum showing acreage secured for cultivation 

of castor beans, with cities to be shipped to. 209. 
List of castor-bean contractors. 211. 
History of castor beans. 213-218. 
Statement referring to number of planes that have been shipped 

to points of embarkation for overseas. 221. 
Numbers of and dates of shipment. 223-225. 
James Kidwell Grannis (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). 

Superintendent of construction in Signal Corps, in operations 

at Dayton, Ohio, and vicinity, under Col. Edgar. 227. 
Employed since last August, and as subordinate 30 days prior 

to that time. 
Formerly in civil emplovment as superintendent of construc- 
tion. 228. 
Repeated rumor of Mr. Talbott being identified with the con- 
tract for the Wilbur Wright Field. 232. 
Criticizes methods employed in construction of Wilbur Wright 

Field. 237. 
Labor conditions at Wilbur Wright Field. 241. 
Practice of getting receipts from material men when, in fact, 

the goods had not been paid for. 243-244. 
John S. Carrington (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). 

As secretary and manager of the Chamber of Commerce of San 

Antonio, Tex., gives details of the part Texas played in the 

raising of castor beans. 250-258. 
Tells about going ahead and increasing acreage, as Signal Corps 

did not inform him of the fact that no more castor beans 

would be needed. 259-270. 
Gutzon John De Lemothe Borglum (Washington, June 6, 1918; 
Book 2). 

Sculptor from Stamford, Conn. 271. 

Will I. Ohmer, Dayton, Ohio. 284. 

Mr. Borglum could never get any data; was being interfered 

with. 289. 
Could not get permits to visit the factories. 285. 
Mr. Ohmer misses Borglum and runs across King, who tells him 

that if he gives any information to Ohmer he will do so at his 

peril. 286. 



54 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Gutzon John De Lemothe Borgltjm — Continued. 

Receives note to appear before Aircraft Board. 288. 

Learns from this interview that Col. Deeds was interested in 
the Dayton Metal Products Co., and was a partner with Tal- 
bott. 289. 

Mr. Carpenter had legal information in respect to Deeds's rela- 
tionship in this business. 291. 

Mr. Nichols, Mr. Witteman. and Mr. Miles reported to him about 
various factories. 293. 

Visited The Standard, Fisher Body Corporation, Lincoln Motor 
Cos., The Curtiss, and Fisher Body Corporation. 295. 

Reports submitted to President. 299. 

Report " Exhibit 1 " states general situation ; indicates a ter- 
rible state of confusion and irregularity, due to self-interest 
and intrigue. 308. 

Talbott tells him they are asked to leave bridge building and 
build aeroplanes ; that they did not know a " damn " thing 
about it, any of them. Twelve thousand dollars apiece for 
the battle planes, and to build 4,000 of them. 309. 

All contracts cost plus. So-called bogey, or constant cost, put 
in contract. 310. 

Mr. Talbott said he had been promised $72,000,000 worth. 312. 

Self-interest interfering with the aircraft program. 313. 

The ability of the Curtiss interests to have handled the entire 
program. 319. 

Dayton is always given preference. Battle-plane side of produc- 
tion always landed there. 322. 

Curtiss plant held back in interests of the development of the 
Liberty motor. 322. 

Lieut. Emmons. 323. 

Maj. Gray, of Dayton. 324. 

Deeds claimed to have been one of the inventors of the Liberty 
motors. 325. 

Bristol fighter; could have built a plant in 60 days, instead 
six to eight months of time were wasted. 327. 

There was nothing related to the Bristol fighter that could have 
prevented them in November from delivering 500 of those 
planes, 150-horsepower engines, by the 1st of April. 328. 

Trying to put Liberty motors in Bristol fighter. 329. 

Bristol fighter success in Europe. 329. 

Delay in blue prints. 333. 

Maj.* Gray, Dayton. 334. 

More evidences of self-interest and intrigue. 337. 

Lewis Co. offers to produce Liberty motors for $3,000 apiece. 
339. 

Further evidence of intrigue. Price fixed for so many thousand 
Curtiss training planes at $1,950. 343. 

Bonus of $750,000 promised. 344. 

Stated to be paid to them as reimbursement for new machinery 
they had to purchase. New machinery actually $40,000. 345. 

Maj. Downey interested in helping finance the Curtiss factory. 
346. (Means, seemingly, Col. Montgomery.) 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 55 

Maj. Charles R. Sligh (Washington, June 6, 1918; Book 2). 
President of Sligh Furniture Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. 349. 
Placed in charge of purchase of wood for aircraft purposes. 

350. 
Came to Washington in June. 350. 
Urges establishment of airplane grade of spruce. 351. 
Not a dollar's worth of spruce bought in name of the Government 

until August. 352. 
International committee convened in July. 353. 
Asked permission to buy 6,000,000 feet of spruce. 353. 
Arrived at estimate by United States having program for 

building 20,000 machines, based on war to end 1917. 355. 
Could not get authority until 10th of August. 10. 
Precise relation of proposition to buy so much timber to the 

progress of the aircraft program. 360. 
Attended meeting in Aircraft Production Board, Gen. Squier's 

office. 
Minutes of the meeting of the Aircraft Board. 363. 
George S. Long, representative of lumber people. 366. 
Lumber committee, subsidiary committee of the Council of Na- 
tional Defense. 367. 
Mr. Allen, knew nothing about lumber, was asked to take charge 

of the spruce matter by Mr. Coffin. 368. 
Mr. Wernicke recommended by Mr. Sligh to go to coast to take 

charge there. Mr. Allen sent instead. 371. ■ 
Mr. Allen disgrace to service all the way out. 372. 
Mr. Allen asked to resign middle of September. 373. 
Lumber interests caused Mr. Sligh's dismissal. 373. 
Col. Disque. 375. 
Col. Disque selected to take charge of spruce matters on Pacific 

coast. 378. 
Russell Hawkins finally appointed. 379. 
Col. Disque goes out to take charge. Supply decreases. 380. 
Statement presented to Mr. Coffin regarding this, giving figures. 

380. 
Explanation of his assuming charge after Hawkins had been 

appointed. 381. 
His character was such that when he was given chance to go to 

France in a position that could come but once in a lifetime, 

he worked day and night to get an appointment 7,000 miles 

from firing line. 382. 
Col. Disque issues statement that 30,000,000 feet a month will 

be required, when 10,000,000 feet are proved sufficient. 385. 
Col. Disque parcels out Pacific coast to three contractors, giving 

them absolute authority to do all logging of spruce. Contract 

huge joke. 391. 
Goes through Vancouver plant established by Col. Disque. 392. 
One of the most extravagant and unnecessary proceedings in- 
augurated in lumber proposition. 393. 
A million already spent on plant, and this only a small portion 

of what had been squandered. 394. 
Government order in which one man had shipped $289,000 worth 

of lumber and made a profit of $89,000. 396. 



56 . ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Charles R. Sligh — Continued. 

Maj. Leadbetter instrumental in having Col. Disque appointed. 
Maj. Leadbetter owned old abandoned sawmill on 20 acres 
adjoining mill established by Col. Disque there. 409. 

Raises price from $35,000 to $150,000, telling prospective cus- 
tomer he could sell his property to the Vancouver plant. 409. 

Maj. Leadbetter tries to bribe Sligh. 412. 

Leadbetter bribes Sligh's assistant, gets him commission. 413. 

Purchase of propellers. 417. 

Mentions to Gen. Squier latter part of November no contracts 
let for propellers. 422. 

Combat planes which were expected to have been built in Janu- 
ary. 425. 

Maj. Sheppler in charge of Plant Production Section. 425. 

Joseph S. Otis, Otis Manufacturing Co., New Orleans. 427. 

Mr. Wycliffe, of C. C. Mengel Bros. Co., Louisville, Ky. 431. 

Walnut and mahogany are not absolute necessities. Refused to 
buy it at prices of $300. Afterwards secured propeller wood 
at $150 a thousand. 434. 

Through reason of not ordering earlier paying $300 for stock 
that is worth $160. 434. 

Sending inspectors of wood who never had a board rule in their 
hands. 439. 

Another rejects, through ignorance, the best and takes the poor- 
est. ■ 440. " 

Sends man to South Bend about propeller stock. Drunk all the 
time. Asks inspection department to have him removed. 
Nothing done. Gives details of mess of his work. 442. 

Maj. George Henry, from Illinois, head of the inspection depart- 
ment. 443. 
Wilfred I. Ohmer (Washington, June 6, 1918; Book 2). 

Residence: Dayton, Ohio. 448. 

President Recording & Computing Manufacturers of time fuzes, 
optical instruments. 448. 

Machines Co. stockholder and depositor in City National Bank 
at Dayton. 452. 

Mr. Talbott retired from presidency of bank. 453. 

Connected with stock brokers' establishment. 453. 

Offers plant to Government. 450. (Without dollar of profit.) 

Orders given to other people who did not make a good fuze. 456. 

Sends protest to Gen. Crozier. Suggests engineers to point out 
defects of those being ordered. No answer. 457. 

Sees Senator Pomerene. Gets appointment with Secretary of 
War. 457. 

Nothing comes of it; they did not have time to go into matters 
of that kind. 458. 

Mr. Deeds and Mr. Talbott on fuse committee. 458. 

Later Deeds and Talbott go to New York, consult attorney, and 
try to throw Mr. Ohmer into the hands of a receiver and then 
take over the plant themselves. 459. 

Mr. Talbott makes remark that Ohmer would get no orders, as 
he was on the fuse committee. 460. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 57 

Wilfred I. Ohmer — Continued. 

Starts tearing down plant. 461. 

Other charges against Talbott in Dayton. 463. 

Mr. George B. Smith, secretary to Deeds and secretary of the 
Delco Co. 
• Clarence Kiefer, cashier of the City National Bank. 466. 

Mr. William Strupe, president City National Bank. 468. 

Lumber sold through more than one person in order to reach 
Wright Field at a high price. 469. 

Capt. Geraghty, Government inspector in Ordnance Department. 
477. 

P. J. Connelly, president of P. M. Harmon Co. and director in 
City National Bank. 477. 

Col. F. T. Huffman, president of Davis Sewing Machine Co. 478. 

O. B. Brown, attorney, of Dayton, and legal officer of Citv Na- 
tional Bank. 480. 
Charles A. Cruqtti (Washington, June 6, 1918; Book 2). 

President and general manager of Sterling Engine Co., Buffalo. 
487. 

Builder of marine engines; best builder of high-class motors in 
country. 487. 
Gutzon John de Lemothe Borglum (Washington, June 6, 1918; 
Book 2). 

Lawrence Driggs. 500. 

Refers to machine that fell at Mineola, due to a break that struck 
at the principle of its construction. 505. 

Aircraft Board did not hesitate to advance money to interests 
where member or members were connected with them. 51. 

Fisher Body Corporation's connections. Fuselage that would 
kill the first man that went up in it. 522. 

Eugene Meyer financed them and is connected here with the 
Government. 524. 

Deeds admits he is a German, and his sympathies are with Ger- 
many. 532. 

His name was Dietz, changed to Deeds. 533. 

Deeds appointed many Germans ; Dayton a German town ; under- 
stood secretary of Dayton- Wright Co. was a German ; confined 
in Atlanta at this time. 534. 

Reports from workmen that there was sabotage at the Curtiss 
Co., at the Dayton- Wright Co., and the Standard Co. 535. 

Built cylinders so that the magneto system could not be used. 
539. 

Delco ignition system was Deeds's. 542. 

Bureau of Standards stated no tests had been made. They would 
not let the Bureau of Standards make one. 542. 

Memorandum of intervieAV with Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones 
(Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). 

Reads letter concerning arbitrary prices charged by the Signal 
Corps to those who are fixed-price constructors for Navy sea- 
planes. 545. 

Reads letter drawing attention to ascending scale of prices for 
spruce lumber supplied through the Signal Corps on Navy 
order. 547. 






58 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

John Benner Fletcher (Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). 

No. 50 Cathedral Parkway, New York City. 550. 

At present assistant to manager of the Handley-Paige depart- 
ment of Standard Aircraft Corporation. 550. 

Old Dominion Co. 555. 

Organized to build airplanes. In existence since this country 
entered the war. 555. 

Lieut. Farwell, assistant to Mr. Coffin. 556. 

Rejected Old Dominion Co. because they could only build 300 
planes a year. 556. 

Had all the tools necessary to produce all the most difficult parts 
of airplanes. 557. 

Mr. Swindell, attorney for the Southern Aircraft Co. and also 
attorney practicing in Washington. 560. 

Mr. David Pelton Moore, Real Estate Trust Building, in Wash- 
ington. 562. 

Southern Aircraft Co. 559. 

Fletcher chosen to act as chief engineer. 561. 

Letter to Giant Furniture Co., High Point, N. C. 565. 

Manufacturers' Aircraft Association. 566. 

Formed partly by the Standard, the Curtiss, and, he thought, 
the Wright-Martin. 567. 

This association developed the cross-license agreement. 567. 

Mentions subcontract idea, as put forth by Maj. Shepler, to 
help out the Standard. 570. 

Mr. Mengle, president of Standard Aero Corporation. 571. 

Stated would be glad to let them have contracts to build the 
machines, but they were all up in the air, did not know what 
Government wanted, and there would not be any motors to 
put in them if they built them. 571-572. 

Mr. Fletcher makes arrangement to get output of Dusenberg 
plant. 572. 

Arranged meeting with Mengle and sales manager of Dusenberg 
Co. in Washington. 572. 

Mengle tries to take over the Dusenberg contract. 573. 

Maj. Shepler declared the Dusenberg motors would not be sat- 
isfactory. 574. 

Further efforts to be able to use the Dusenberg. 582. 

Tries to introduce the Farman machine. 583. 

Capital stock Old Dominion Co., $1,000,000. 591. 

Capital stock Southern Aircraft Co., $200,000. 591. 

Grand Rapids Airplane Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. 592. 

Received contracts from Maj. Shepler at the time Southern Air- 
craft people were trying to get contracts. 593. 

States they got the contracts through political influence; were 
represented to Maj. Shepler by their Senators and Repre- 
sentatives. 595. 
Frank N. Trego (Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). 

Managing vice president of Trego Motor Co., at New Haven, 
Conn. 596. 

Organized on 20th March, 1917. 596. 

Interview with Mr. Deeds. 598. 

Stated changes in design responsible for 50 per cent of the delay 
in turning out engines. 601. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 59 

Frank N. Trego — Continued. 

Relates experience with ignition system in Liberty motor as com- 
pared with Delco ignition. 603, 604. 

Sunbeam contract moved from Elmira to Toronto. 610. 

Scrap in their plant ran from 50 to 75 per cent. 613. 

Cost of work that has been rejected has been paid for by Gov- 
ernment. 614. 

Government has paid his company a little over $600,000 to date. 
Bogey price fixed in their price. 616. 

Liberty motors and the 50-hour test. 617. 
Herbert Jennings (Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). 

Resides at Mount Vernon, N. Y. 622. 

General manager of the United Eastern Airplane Corporation. 
622. 

► Organized in 1915 to build airplanes. 622. 

Reasons for being connected with United Eastern Airplane Cor- 
poration. 623. 

Made application to the Aviation Corps in August, 1917, to 
obtain contracts. 626. 

Report by inspector on United Eastern Aeroplane Corporation. 
629. 

States they were told no contracts would be let because of lack 
of appropriations. 633. 

When in Washington assured by draftsmen there were plans 
to be forwarded to them. 639. 

Mentions another letter in which orders were assured them. 
642. 

Capital of the company, $1,000,000. Large plant idle, with five 
or six men going only. 643. 

This field especially adapted for airplane manufacture. 644. 

No estimate made by Government as to their efficiency in build- 
ing planes. Had plenty of financial backing that could have 
been availed of. 647. 

Plant idle a year. 648. 
Herbert Edwin Miles (Washington, D. C, June 7 to 10, 1918; 
Book 3). 

Mr. Miles, of Racine, Wis., retired manufacturer; now chairman 
of committee Council of National Defense on training factory 
workers for war production. 1. 

Visited Standard Aircraft Corporation at Elizabeth, N. J. ; 
Wright-Martin Co., New Brunswick, N. J. ; Curtiss Co., Buf- 
falo; Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit; Dayton-Wright Co., Day- 
ton ; Nordyke Marmon plant, Indianapolis. 2. 

Found remarkable confusion at Curtiss plant in November. 
Great number of idle people. Work done in a remarkably 
amateurish way. 2. Acting manager states : " Can not get 
orders from Washington." 3. 

Got order for 2,000 Bristol fighting planes, says manager, but 
ordered not to make them until specifications were completed. 
" Specifications do not come." 3. Release from Washington 
did not come for months. 4. 

First Bristol tried in January. " Would not fly." 4. Three 

P weeks later experts came to investigate why machine would 

not fly. 5. 



60 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Herbert Edwin Miles — Continued. 

Just before January 22 order came to make 25 planes out of 
2,000. 5. 

Informed by Kepperley, toward 1st of April — " still waiting for 
changes." 8. 

Approximately 15,000 employed in five plants at Buffalo on first 
visit. Below training room were seen a hundred idle em- 
ployees. This condition corrected by 1st of April, largely. 11. 

Idleness existed because they expected orders at any moment and 
would then need employees. 12. 

Miles did not make inquiry of Signal Corps officers as to why 
orders or specifications were not furnished. 14. 

Did not have blue prints for months at Curtiss plant. 16. 

Mr. Hughes. "What blue prints were vou successful in get- 
ting? "—A. " We did not get any." 17-18. 

Miles personally tried to get blue prints through Maj. Shepler 
and others in Washington. No prints. 19. 

Mr. Mengel, president Standard Aircraft Corporation, promised 
several times to furnish blue prints. Would either get them 
from Washington or Curtiss Co. 20. 

In asking for blue prints Maj. Shepler replied, " I think you 
ought to have them." But was referred to Col. Montgomery. 
22. 

Mr. Hughes. "How did Curtiss make Bristol fighters with- 
out blue prints?" — A. "Did not have complete set; sort of 
whittled out 25." 22. 

Visited Dayton- Wright Co. " Splendid production basis " in 
March. In November had just moved in. No production. 
Making De Haviland and training planes. Had similar 
trouble with specifications as Curtiss people. 24. 

Had to throw away 90 per cent of spruce. "Used considerable 
judgment in reading orders from Washington," savs official of 
Wright Co. 25. 

Piano factories hundreds of miles around making small pieces 
for plane. Put together at Dayton. 25-26. 

Shipping about five De Havilands a day in March. 28. 

Letter bv Miles on March 13, praising production methods and 
speed at Dayton Wright Co. 29-30. 

Men laid off at Dayton for want of specifications or orders and 
partly lack of material — " waiting for Washington." 31. 

Had trouble because of changes from time to time. 32. 

Miles alludes to discrimination between Curtiss plant and Day- 
ton plant. Possibly due to different machine. 34. 

De Haviland was accepted model, Bristol not, by Washington. 
Curtiss people had no orders for De Haviland. 34. 

Order to Curtiss Co. for 2,000 Bristol January 11, 1918. But 
did not have " go-ahead " orders till March or April. 

Order for 3,000 Spad planes January 19. 1917. But were called 
off. 35. 

Order for 500 heavy bombing planes September 19, 1917. Miles 
has no knowledge about them. 36. 

Curtiss plant " trifling along on Army hydroplanes." 36. 

All these machines were to have Liberty motor. Motor was in 
same position. 37. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 61 

Herbert Edwin Miles — Continued. 

Training planes were to have motors made by another Willys 
Co. 38. 

Could not understand why they did not have an order to go 
ahead and make them. 38. 

Curtiss plant had organization and facilities to produce same as 
Dayton plant. 39. 

Did not get orders to do anything at Curtiss plant, 39. 

Mr. Deeds stockholder in Dayton Co. Did not know Deeds had 
transferred interests. 40. 

Dayton-Wright Co. assemblers, not makers. 44. 

Visited Standard Aircraft Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J. Same 
confusion as at Buffalo. Mr. Mengle president of this com- 
pany. This visit in November. 44. 

Scrap thrown away when orders were changed. Little salvage 
practiced in Buffalo. 

Cost plus, terms of contract. 

Government bore cost of idle employees. 

Rejected wood at Dayton- Wright Co. cut into small parts when 
practicable. Very great percentage would be sheer waste. 
Very little salvage possible in plane. 45. 

Government paid for rejected material. 45-46. 

Five thousand six hundred employees at Standard plant. Num- 
ber increased. 46. 

During five visits there was little idleness, but there was tre- 
mendous amount of inefficiency. Efficiency estimated at from 
40 to 50 per cent among workers. At Dayton- Wright effi- 
ciency was 75 to 80 per cent. 46. 

At Curtiss plant approximately 55 per cent. 47. 

At Curtiss and Standard they were cutting pieces of steel by 
hand at a cost of from 80 cents to $1; would cost but a few 
cents to buy a machine. 

Had heavy machines, costing a lot of money, but no little fixtures 
to put on those machines so they would work. 47. 

Curtiss plant did rig up machines for heavy production, but 
Government told them they did not want any of those ma- 
chines. 48. 

" Did not have orders to run us a week." 48. 

Order for 650 planes of same type. 49. 

One thousand one hundred to one thousand five hundred changes 
in these planes while in process. 49. 

To speed up production concentration should be on one thing, 
as Ford has done. This is done at the Canadian factory. Not 
in America. Not one American factory can run 50 per cent 
efficient unless it is done. 50. 

Mr. Mengle asked for 150 planes. 51. 

" Idiocy to have one plant making a number of different types 
of planes." 52. 

On several occasions orders were given not to proceed. 54. 

Rolls-Royce engine replaced by Liberty motor. In test Liberty 
required 62 minutes and Rolls-Royce 72. 55. 

Liberty motor " thoroughly splendid." 55. 

Lincoln Motor Co. made a thousand engines and had shipped 
400 beyond the water. 56. 



62 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Herbert Edwin Miles — Continued. 

Nordyke & Marmon Co. " wonderfully fine factory." No criti- 
cism to be made. " That does not necessarily mean the ma- 
chine is good." 57. 

Hispano- Suiza motors being turned out by Wright-Martin plant 
at Brunswick, N. J., for foreign governments. 59. 

Cross-examination by Attorney General: No battle plane 
built in this country prior to the war. 60. 
Fred H. Colvix (Washington, D. C, June 7 and 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence in East Orange, N. J. Editor of American Machinists 
since about January. With paper 11 years. Prior to that in 
publishing business, and prior to that 10 years in a shop as 
mechanic. An observer of manufacturing ever since. 62. 

Visited Ford motor, Packard motor, Lincoln motor, and Dayton- 
Wright plane plant ; also Curtiss plant. 64. 

Ford plant latter part of March not producing motors. 64. 

Lincoln plant put through six on the 29th of March. Expected 
same number next day. 64-65. 

Delays was reason for visit. Found delay due to changes in 
design and orders. First order specified 8-cylinder motors, 
but before they got into production a change was made to 12- 
cylinder, necessitating new machinery. 65. 

Other changes also made. 66. 

Production five or six a day. Expected to increase. Original 
plan called for 70 a day. 67. 

Motor was tested and accepted. 68. 

Packard plant completed 50 that week. Great many cylinders 
held up on account of connecting rods. 69. 

Official of plant felt that if they quit making changes production 
would get under way. 71. 

Mr. Wells, member of President's committee of three on investi- 
gation, informed him 700 planes had positively been ordered 
without any further changes. 72. 

Motors coming faster than planes, " but not all right." 72. 

Production delayed because of these many changes. 73. 

Intended article in Machinist " killed " because they were doing 
what the article would try to accomplish. 73. 

Visited Dayton-Wright on April 1 and observed they had a 
capacity which they were not utilizing. " Waiting, in other 
words." 74. 

Waiting for orders from Washington. 74. 

Thirty planes could be shipped on very short notice providing 
they would stop making changes. 74. 

" Signal Corps would change bottom sights ; change location of 
different instruments, and so on. They had one machine 
there wired off in a cage, which they called the goat, on which 
they made these changes, one after the other." 75. 

Plant ready to complete De Haviland planes on order to com- 
plete. 75, 76. 

Training planes had been delivered into the thousands. Diffi- 
culty was with De Havilands and Bristols. 76. 

Mr. Mueller, chief engineer of Curtiss plant, states they had been 
entirely ignored. Built more machines than anyone else, yet 
not asked for advice or anything else. 77. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 63 

Fred H. Colvin — Continued. 

Attempted to assemble Bristol plane from Signal Corps draw- 
ings, but it did not look much like a modern aeroplane. 78. 

Built one plane and found it would not go together. Was modi- 
fied so it would go together, but burned up. 78. 

No fighting plane had been in the air. 78. 

Delay due to changes. " Same story I got everywhere." " 79. 

'"A great many changes appeared absolutely unnecessary " to this 
mechanic. 79. 

" Mr. Mueller told me that they came up there and took some car- 
riage bolts and tested them for tensile strength and made 
microphotographs of the metal, and so on, and all the carriage 
bolts did was to hold slats in place on a seat, and a shingle nail 
would hold it just exactly as well. Details on that kind con- 
stantly coming up." 79. 

" Unnecessary details, and at times things which interfered seri- 
ously with production, because you could not exactly meet 
specifications which were unnecessary specifications," would 
come up. 79-80. 

" It is simply foolish specifications demanding the same high 
grade of material for stream lining a tube as though the 
strength did depend on it. 80. 

Lack of appreciation of particular need to be served. This was 
noticeable all through in everything. 80. 

Lots of spruce should never have left the coast ; it should have 
been rejected there. 81. 

Rejection was very high by Day ton- Wright plant. 81. 

Rejected because the holes varied a thirty-second of an inch in 
their regular spacing by Signal Corps inspector. 81. 

Ill-advised inspection. 82. 

Absolute inability to discriminate between vital needs and non- 
essentials. 82. 

Same was true at Curtiss plant. 

Military arm had taken to itself a considerable civilian arm. 82. 

Signal Corps blamed for inefficiency; nobody seemed to know 
who the individual was. 82. 

Curtiss plants had not shipped a plane. No go-ahead orders. 
But they were praying for them. Plants not in full operation 
by any means. 83. 

Fifty per cent in operation. Working on Navy stuff. 84. 

Shops appeared pretty empty, except over in Navy side. 84. 

Delay comes under two words — " constant changes." Was told 
this at every plant. 85. 

Ford man told him they had 700 connecting rods which were 
ordered scrapped. 85. 

Government inspection unnecessarily rigid where it did not mat- 
ter. 87. 

Plant would make other parts in place of those rejected and 
would be paid for them. 88. 

Changes would mean a loss to the Government. 88. 

A number of gauge makers declared a certain gauge should not 
cost more than $35. Cost at plant was $415. 88. 

" That is only one of a dozen things of that kind that they 
showed me." 
130687—19 5 



64 ABSTEACT OF AIECKAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Feed H. Colvin — Continued. 

Does not think Government had anything to do with subcon- 
tractor. 91. 

Informed board selects contractors acceptable to Government. 
91. 

One firm made a price of 75 cents apiece for a bolt, but contract 
was given to a concern at $1.05. 92. 

Plants did not suffer because of excessive price paid to subcon- 
tractor. 93. 

Exhibit covering a diagram was left by the witness. 94. 

(An error occurred in the page numbering of the transcript 
at this point, going from 94 to 194.) 
Frederick Steele Beackall ( Washington, D. G, June 7, 1918: 
Book 3). 

Residence in New York City. General manager Taft-Pierce 
Manufacturing Co., Woonsocket, R. I. Produce precision 
machinery and tools. An engineer. With company 15 vears. 
195-196. 

This plant secured a contract and manufactured 300 Gnome 
engines for Aircraft Manufacturing Co., of England. 196. 

Chairman of a committee appointed by the Signal Corps to 
pass on reasonableness of upset prices quoted by concerns on 
a cost plus basis. That is a bogy cost for estimates. 198. 

Thirty million dollar contract for Le Rhone engines. 199. 

Determined price by inspection of drawings and of engine. 
Not advised of changes subsequent!} 7 made. 202. 

Was of the conclusion that the Bogaci engine could not be made 
for several months. Had opportunity to figure on this, but 
" threw up his hands." 204. 

Dusenberg people had an engine they were making themselves 
which could have been adapted to aeroplane work. 204. 

Shortage of men would make it difficult to make delivery of 
engines on order given for Hispano-Suiza motors in May 
or June before the end of the year. 205. 

Reads from a statement in which he recommended that the 
engineers at the Bureau of Standards should be allowed all 
the time needed for perfection of design. Also that while 
engine was being perfected we should follow foreign designs 
that we know are right, and that manufacturing should not 
remain dormant while experimental work was in process. 
(This pamphlet is known as Blackall Exhibit No. 1.) 209. 

Engine drawings were being constantly modified. 210. 

Condemns scheme of development of an engine that is hatched 
in five days. 211. 

Argues that it would have been better to have adopted a foreign 
engine, and brought Mr. Snook, managing director of Air- 
craft Manufacturing Co., of England, to help in this scheme. 
213. 
Three hundred foreign Gnome engines were built by the General 
Vehicle Co., of Long Island. They were a success — the best 
that had ever been made. These were for the British Gov- 
ernment. 214. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 65 

Frederick Steele Black all — Continued. 

One hundred Gnome engines subsequently ordered by the Signal 

Corps. Cites this as to what could have been done had we built 

foreign engines. 214. 
Kegards the Gnome as the limit of difficult manufacture. 215. 
No opportunity to become informed as to the development of 

the Liberty motor. 215-216. 
Rolls-Royce engines being built by Stearns or Peerless Co. in 

America. 216. 
Approximately 1,000 have been built. 216. 
Slow progress laid to difficulty of getting skilled men, not in 

making that engine in this country. 217. 
Thinks it the height of absurdity to put Liberty motor in pro- 
duction until perfection has been ascertained. This Avould. 

also refer to any other machine. 217. 
Contract for 300* Gnome engines was let about August, 1915', 

and completed the beginning of 1917. 218. 
Deliverv was started within six months after contract was let. 

218-219. 
Bogy price for Liberty motor was $6,000. 219. 
Planes would have been in the air on time if we had brought 

from England and France one engine and plane of each 

type, together with men and under Government direction 

made Chinese copies, with no glory for anybody on this side 

of the water. 221. 
Declares that if engines and planes would have been brought 

over quantity production could have been had within 18 

months. 222-223. 
"A frightful risk" was taken in attempting to make a new 

motor. (Liberty.) 224. 
Under this plan quantity production would have been expected 

by the end of 1918. 223. 
It is brought out that Liberty motor, if satisfactory, will be 

on quantity production about the same time as if foreign 

models had been brought here. 224. 
Carlos W. Curtis (June 7, 1918; Book 3). 

Director and general manager Splitdorf Electrical Co., Newark, 

N. J. Manufactures magnetos and spark plugs. 226. 
This company was the main source of supply for magnetos of 

the allied governments. 227. 
Sold between 800,000 and 100,000 magnetos to Italian Govern- 
ment; 50,000 to British; 10,000 to 20,000 to French and Rus- 
sian companies. 228. 
This company's magnetos used by Wright-Martin Co. for the 

Hispano-Suiza motors; the Wills-Morrow Co. and the Curtiss 

Co. for their Curtiss OX5 and 6 motors. 228. 
Also by the Hall- Scott Co., etc. 
Supply magnetos for all motors except the Liberty motor, 

although ignition system can be used on Liberty. 224. 
In a test on 12-cylinder Liberty 12 to 20 more horsepower was 

developed than with the other ignition system, which was the- 

Delco svstem. 229. 



66 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Carlos W. Curtis — Continued. 

Never invited to develop the system of ignition for Liberty. 
Several attempts to no avail. Then went to see Col. Deeds per- 
sonally in October. (Splitdorf system standardized for all 
8-cylinder motors in aviation in the Signal Corps just re- 
cently.) 231. 

Was told by Col. Deeds that they had decided to use battery 
system on the advice of Mr. Kettering. Curtiss suggested 
that it might have been better to have inquired from a magneto 
manufacturer, and Col. Deeds admitted the contention was 
probably right. 231. 

A magneto installation was worked out and a test showed the 
motor to be more efficient than with the ignition used at that 
time. Unable to get further than a preliminary test, how- 
ever. 232. 

Col. Deeds stated that magneto system could not be used on the 
12-cylinder motor. 233. 

Advised by censor that no mention could be made of anything in 
connection with the Liberty motor. 234. 

Interview with Col. Deeds after being referred from one to an- 
other. This in re censorship. 234-235. 

Letter from Col. Arnold. (Ex. Curtis No. 1.) 236. 

Article filed known as Exhibit Curtis No. 2. 237. 

No reason for this secrecy or censorship. 238. 

Double supply of current in magneto system, therefore it was 
preferable to battery system. 239. 

Magneto system used almost exclusively abroad. 240. 

With battery S3 r stem in looping the loop the fluid would spill 
out and the system go dead. 243. 

Representatives of foreign Governments contend magneto sys- 
tem is superior. 244. 

Del co System owned by the United Motors. General Motors 
owned United Motors. 245. 

Mr. Vincent asked the engineers of the Splitdorf Co. to develop 
a 12-cylinder magneto, as he had much trouble with the Delco 
system and was willing to pay the additional cost. After be- 
ing called to Washington he seemed to have no further interest 
in the magneto ignition. (Mr. Vincent is with the Packard 
Co.) 246. 
Carl Thomas Mason (June 7, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence in East Orange, N. J. Chief engineer of the Split- 
dorf Electrical Co. With company since they took on the 
Dixie magneto. 247. 

Called to Washington in regard to getting magneto equipment 
on Liberty engine. 248. 

Letter from Signal Corps asking for assistance to remount mag- 
netos on 8-cylinder to 12-cylinder. 250. 

Correspondence back and forth. 251-259. 

Preliminary test not applied to Liberty. 266. 

Mr. Upton stayed at Dayton " practically for months for the 
simple reason that we would get excuse after excuse " (for test- 
ing purposes). 266. 

Exhibit Mason No. 8 was filed. 21. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 67 

Carl Thomas Mason — Continued. 

Letters written in regard to test and no answer. 270. 
Substantiates Mr. Curtiss's statement that magneto system is 

superior to battery system. 281. 
Blue print filed, marked " Exhibit Mason No. 15." 282. 
Maj. Vincent, at Detroit, complains: "So many damned people 

butting in on this thing that they would never get anywhere." 

285. 
Specially mounted bracket, etc., for mounting magneto fur- 
nished by company, but nothing has been done to this time. 

286. 
Charles K. Wittemann (June 8, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence in Jersey City, N. J. Building aeroplanes since 1906. 

Constructed about 300 machines. 289. 
Constructed one machine which was put to a severe test, with the 

result that it outclassed Army machines on adjoining fields. 

However^ this machine was practically condemned by Capt. 

Martin. 308-309. 
Four training machines offered to Government, but were advised 

the Curtiss was the standard machine. 309. 
Consistent effort to get Government to accept this plane seemed 

without avail. 310. 
Were able to contract for and deliver 600 machines in the first 

12 months and 100 machines per month thereafter. 311. (This 

page out of place.) 
Part of a letter read, marked " Exhibit Wittemann, No. 1." 314. 
Plane referred to on page 308-309 rejected because of color, and 

also because of light radiator. 314. 
And because of a flaw in steel of exhaust manifold. Also be- 
cause a bolt was curved to conform to the curve of the fuselage. 

315. 
See list of men testing machine. 315. 
Told by Aircraft Production Board that the Custiss JN4 and 

Standard training tractor had been standardized. 316. 
Negotiations with Aircraft Production Board since its start 

offering developed training planes. 317. 
In making offer of facilities, was referred from man to man. 

318. 
To make spare parts for Signal Corps they would have to enter 

into a contract with Curtiss Co. 322-323. 
Agreement provided that Wittemann Co. would have to pay 

royalty on their own design. Attempted to amend the con- 
tract, but were unsuccessful. 324. 
Organization declared in excellent shape for the production of 

aircraft. 325. 
Wittemann director of Aeronautical Society four years. 328. 
Wittemann plant first on list in case of further appropriation, 

but never received an order. 328. 
Orders offered to manufacturers who could not take any more. 

329. 
Statement of number of machines that could be turned out sub- 
mitted to Col. Deeds. 331. 
Curtiss plant visited and looked very disorganized. 333-334. 
Visited Canadian Airplane Co. and "Fisher Body Co. 335. 



68 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Charles K. Wittemann — Continued. 

Told by man in Fisher Body Co. it was not necessary to have an 
experienced aeronautical man. 336. 

Visited Ford plant and was told they were held back on account 
of " enormous lot of changes." 336. 

Ford disgusted. 336. 

Motors shipped out, but not satisfactory. 337. 

Ford stated that a part of engine was designed so no other 
ignition system except Delco could be used. 338. 

"According to him, it seems it was deliberately done, so it would 
be impossible to put anv other ignition svstem on there except 
Delco." 338. 

Diversion of machinery. 340. 
John William McConaughy (June 8, 1918 ; Book 3) : 

Residence, Washington, D. C. Employee of Committee on 
Public Information. Director of the Division of News. Pre- 
pared or collected from department officers matters of public 
information for the press of the country. 344. 

Statement issued for morning papers of Thursday, February 
21, 1918, produced and marked " Exhibit McConaughy No. 
1." 3-15. 

This statement was changed. Corrected copy produced and 
marked " Exhibit McConaughy No. 2." 346. 

First part of the statement of Exhibit 2 was gotten from Col. 
Deeds. (Second paragraph.) 

Beads statement as he personally got it from Deeds. 348. 

This statement given out around 10th of February. 349. 

Statement taken to Secretary of War. 350. 

Was informed at Bureau of Standards that Liberty 8 was in 
bad shape, but was later told that the Liberty 8 was not being 
produced any more, efforts being directed to the Liberty 12. 
353-355. 

Interview with Col. Deeds. 355-357. 

Statement submitted to Col. Deeds and Secretary of War for 
their approval. 360, 361. 

Exhibit 3 approved by Secretary of War. 362. 

Statement held up several days by Secretary of War, as he 
wanted to refer it to Gen. Squier. 363. 

Col. Deeds did not inform McConaughy there was any inac- 
curacy in statement. 364. 

Interview with Secretary of War with respect to inaccuracy 
of statement. 366. 

" Good deal of big league lying all through this business." See 
all of page 367. 

Exhibit McConaughy No. 4 introduced. 367. 

Gens. Salzman and Squier had to do with this statement. 369. 

Exhibit McConaughy No. 5 was introduced. 369. 

$640,000,000 appropriated in the middle of the summer and it 
disappeared from public view. 370. 

McConaughy Exhibit No. 6 introduced. 371. 

Got all information from Col. Deeds at that time. 372. 

Understood that whatever Deeds and Salzman did had the ap- 
proval of Gen. Squier. 

McConaughy Exhibit No. 7 introduced. 374. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 69 

Maelen E. Pew (June 8, 1918; Book 3). 

Employed with the Committee on Public Information in the 
news division since November 4, 1917. Later went into the 
War Department to represent the Secretary of War for the 
Committee on Public Information. Had charge of publicity 
matters in the War Department. 375. 

Recognized McConaughv Exhibit No. 2 as authorized by Col. 
Deeds. 376. 

Were not enjoying candor in the Signal Corps. 377. 

Interview with Col. Deeds. 378, 379. 

Refers to original manuscript of Capt. Sweetser. 382. 

Interview with Col. Deeds continued. 382-384. 

Refer to paragraph which was pasted on. 38G. 

Col. Deeds read story as written up and made certain correc- 
tions. 386. 

Col. Deeds authorizes statement. 388. 

Recognizes McConaughv Exhibit No. 3. 389. 

Took McConaughv Exhibit No. 3 to Secretarv of War and was 
told to publish it. 390-392. 

Refers to charges made in United States Senate. 393. 

Recites interview in Secretary Bakers office after charges were 
made in Senate, 394. 

Interview with Col. Deeds — shows him statement in the Star, 
over which he became very much excited. 394-395. 

Interview with Col. Deeds continued. 396. 

Gen. Squier enters and declares charges made on Senate floor 
was German propaganda and paid for with German money. 
396. 

Gen. Squier produces advertisement pertaining to Rolls-Royce 
motor and declared that was some more of the German 
money. 397. 

Lot of vague and rambling statements. 397. 

Refers to interview with Dr. Keppel with regard to false state- 
ment which was issued. 399. 

Interprets notes taken at the interview with Gen. Squier, Gen. 
Salzman, and Col. Deeds. 403. 

Squier is quoted as follows : " I paced the floor perfectly wild 
because I could not get training planes, then they came with a 
rush, and I got so many I did not know what to do with them, 
and we think it will be the same thing with combat planes. 
404. 

Continues quoting these men as to Signal Corps appropriation. 
405. 

Gen. Squier quoted as follows : " One hundred and eighty battle 
planes have been delivered in France." 405. 

Continues interpretation of notes taken at this interview. 406, 
407. 
J. E. Kirkman (June 8, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence, High Point, N. C. President Giant Furniture Co. 
409. 

Giant Furniture Co. contemplating turning over its property 
to Southern Aircraft Co. 409. 



70 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

J. E. Kirkman — Continued. 

Came to Washington to take up with officials the production of 
aeroplanes by the Southern Aircraft Co. 410. 

This visit was " possibly a little more than a year ago." 410. 

States briefly facilities of his company. 411. 

Is referred to Curtiss plant in Buffalo for observation. 412. 

Maj. Sheppler had statement of plant conditions and pro- 
nounced them good. 413. 

Report of inspectors not good. 414. 

" I did not see anything much but scrap," referring to trip 
through Cutler Desk Co. 418. 

Refers to a very large amount of rejected material. 420. 

Inspection by Government , inspectors " unintelligent "—too 
rigorous. 422. 

Told by Maj. Sheppler at Washington that they could not give 
the Cut Giant Furniture Co. a contract to build planes com- 
plete, "but they needed what we had at High Point." 423. 

Told to go to the Standard people and Curtiss people, and in- 
formed they had large contracts with the Government. On 
arriving at Curtiss plant found only 350 machines contracted 
for. 424,425. 

Were building for the British Government thousands of ma- 
chines and did not care whether he built for the United 
States or not. 425. 

" Identically the same way at Plainsfield." 425. 

Letter written from the office of the Chief Signal Officer, seating 
in part : " Our program is very thoroughly covered * * *." 
428. (This was marked "Exhibit, Kirkman, No. 1.") 

Recites conversation which took place in Senator Swanson's 
office. 430. 

Maj. Sheppler quoted as saying: "Kirkman, I just want to tell 
you that our facilities will get out more parts for making 
planes than the United States will want for 25 years. Your 
facilities are too immense for us to consider." 

Mr. Burman Asch charges there is a combine. 433. 

Contract finally let for 500 propellers at $85 each. 435. This 
contract let about February. 435. 
George R. Collins (June 8, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence, Saulsbury, N. O. Stockholder in Giant Furniture 
Co. Also interested in formation of the Southern Aircraft 
Co. if they could secure any business from Washington. 436. 

Agrees with Mr. Kirkman as to his recollection of interviews 
with Maj. Sheppler. 436. 

Referring to Kirkman Exhibit No. 1 and the inspection made 
September 24, states he could get no information from Maj. 
Sheppler as to whether the plant was accepted or rejected. 
437. 

Lieut. Farwell states that " it would not be right to start any new 
people into the manufacture of airplanes as long as they did 
not have enough airplane business for the plants that were al- 
ready going." 438, 439. (This on October 5.) 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 71 

George R. Collins — Continued. 

Was referred by Howard Coffin to Maj. Slieppler again with re- 
gard to contract work, but on seeing the major got the same 

results as on his previous visits. 439, MO. 
Mr. Coffin again states " program is fully covered.'' 441. 
Contract agreement, Exhibit Collins No. 1, produced and filed. 

442. 
Recites part of contract. 443. 
William Arthur Morgan (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence, Buffalo, N. Y. At one time (July 16, 1917, until 

March 1, 1918) vice president and general manager of Curtiss 

Co. 449. 
Contract let Curtiss Co. for 3,000 Spad machines and 500 Ca- 

proni or other type, and a contract for 1,400 J N 4 D training 

planes, dated September 19, 1917. Was told on November 7 by 

Col. Deeds that Spad and Caproni contracts would have to be 

canceled. 449, 450. 
Asked Col. Deeds what should be done about large plant erected 

for this contract. Was told something would have to be done, 

as it was not the fault of the company. 450. 
Col. Waldon informed Curtiss people they would want a 3,000 

contract. Few days later Signal Corps engineers stated Spad 

machine would have to be done away with. Finally came can- 
cellation of entire program. 451. 
Recites meeting with Mr. Coffin, Col. Montgomery, Col. Deeds, 

and Col. Waldon. 452, 453. 
Produces letter of Col. Waldon confirming entire conversation^ 

Exhibit Morgan 1. 455. (This letter given in transcript.) 
Produces his reply to above letter marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 

2." 465. (This letter given in transcript.) 
Produces reply to last above marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 2.'* 

467. (This letter also given in record.) 
Produces reply to letter last above dated July 28, 1917. 468. 

(This letter also given.) 
Produces reply of office of Chief Signal Officer to letter last 

above, marked "Exhibit Morgan 6." 485. (This letter also 

quoted in record.) 
Thoroughly of the understanding they won Id want plant to 

handle every machine they could. 488. 
Under that understanding a building was practicallv completed 

at a cost of $5,500,000. 489. 
At a later conference a request by Wright-Martin representative 

for one or two million dollars to put into buildings was denied. 

490. 
Morgan then informs board it was his understanding they should 

have an advance. 490. 
Informs board that if advance would not be made he would have 

to wire Curtiss plant and stop all work, but was told not to, 

491. 
Morgan was turned over to a brother of Col. Montgomery, an 

attorney for the board, and with other men outlined a contract 

whereby the Government was to pay for buildings, land, and 

equipment. 492. 



72 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT IXYESTIGATIOX. 

William Arthur Morgan — Continued. 

Wire sent by head of the Department of Justice requesting that 
the New York Legislature pass a bill which would permit the 
GoA T ernment to acquire land. 493. 

It was the understanding that the above contract would be 
signed, but were finally informed it could not be carried out : 
that they had no authority to purchase land or buildings and 
could not get a satisfactory answer from Secretary Baker. 493. 

Whole proposition "kicked" over. 494. (See page 494 for de- 
tail of conversation.) 

Another conference on September 8. (See all of page 496.) 

The} T kept saving " thev were afraid of a congressional investiga- 
tion." 490. 

Letter produced, marked :i Exhibit Morgan 7," containing 
new suggestions. 498. (Letter read into record.) 

Another letter produced, marked ** Exhibit Morgan 8." ad- 
dressed to Chairman Coffin. National Council of Defense. 
(This letter read into record in full on page 503.) 

Eeads (Mr. Hushes) from minutes of Aircraft Production 
Board. 508. 

Reads from minutes of the next meeting on September 14. 1917. 
513. 

Board decides to give out a contract. 514. 

Morgan, on ottering to personally negotiate loan to pay for plant, 
was embraced by Gen. Squier. 515. 

Contract signed on September 19 for 500 Capronis or other type 
of bombing plane. Government to pay for the machinery and 
equipment, amounting to approximately a million and a half 
dollars or option of adA T ancing money. 517. 

Contract called for deliverv of 3,000 Spads between January 1, 
1918, and July 1* 1918. 519. 

" They said the eight-cylinder Liberty motor was obsolete." 522. 

Three changes made. 524. 

Changed from the Tickers gun to Marlin and then changed back 
to Vickers. 524. 

Only part of order Curtiss people were permitted to go ahead 
with was for 750 Spads. 525. 

Wired Lieut. Emmons on October 31 for definite go-ahead order 
for production, but did not get it. 527. 

Col. Deeds informs Morgan thev would have to cancel the Spad 
contract and all of that $30,000,000 contract. 528. 

Government had not reimbursed Curtiss Co. for all work done 
on Spad planes under contract up to the time Morgan left the 
firm. 529. 

Practically all the 2,600 drawings necessary for the 750 Spads 
were completed when order was stopped. 532. 

Seven hundred and fiftv Spads could have been completed in 
March. 533. 

Mr. Hughes reads resolution of Aircraft Board at meeting of 
October 30. 534. 

Less than a hundred behind on the contract of 2,000 or more at 
the end of the year. 541. 

After test of plane an order of 600 was received. 544. 

Great many changes to be made. 545. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 73 

William Arthur Morgan — Continued. 

Letter produced, marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 9." 553. 
Letter produced, marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 11." 558. 
Morgan does not believe women were sitting around knitting in 

his plant, as was stated by a previous witness. 580. 
Does not think pay roll covering men held in readiness was paid 

by the Government. 583. 
Recites conference on November 23 with Mr. Coffin and Col. 

Deeds. 584. 
Letter covering conference directed to Mr. Coffin produced and 

marked " Exhibit Morgan 12." 586. 
Recites conversation with Gen. Squier in Buffalo. 590. 
Aircraft Board agreed to finance Curtiss Co. 591. 
Minutes of meeting held in Mr. Coffin's office on December 6, 

1917. 592. 
Sample Bristol Fighter received in December. Very incomplete ; 

no motor or radiator. 596. 
Would take a long list of names to enumerate those who ordered 

changes. 598. 
Bristol Fighter made by Curtiss Co. tested around the 1st of 

April. Some trouble with oiling system and exhaust. It went 

up and caught fire and burned up. 600. 
Changes and specifications to be followed in production usually 

came from Col. Clark's department at Dayton. 600. 
Recites different persons who ordered changes to be followed in 

production. 601. 
Does not think there was a head as to just what should be con- 
structed on a plane. 603. 
Reads minutes of a meeting of the Aircraft Board of December 7. 

604. 
Reads resolution of Aircraft Board of December 13, 1917. 609. 
No planes (combat) had been built up to the time Morgan left. 

612. 
Reads minutes of Aircraft Board of December 27, 1917. 613. 
Production program submitted by Col. Deeds is read. 617. 
Morgan states Signal Corps men would come to Buffalo and say, 

" We will release everything," and the next day it was all up in 

the air again. 618. 
Design of Bristol Fighter never settled. 618. 
A statement of payments shows Government paid Curtiss Co. on 

an estimated cost of $4,800,000 for 800 planes, the amount of 

$4,776,046, etc. 621. 
Morgan's conclusion as to the cause of the delay was that " every- 
thing was tied up in Liberty motor. 622. 
That Spad contract was canceled because the Liberty motor was 

not adapted to it. 622. 
Speed of Spad and Bristol in a flight were practically the same. 

622. 
Arthur Sweetser (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Captain in the Army since September 5, 1917. Prior to that Asso- 
ciated Press correspondent in Washington. 625. 
First duties were gathering historical data in Signal Corps, then 

on work in connection with recruiting, and on January 1 went 

to Equipment Division to make historv for Col. Deeds." 626. 



74 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Arthur Saveetser — Continued. 

Collected data about the sending of cadets to France, England. 
Italy, and Canada. 626. 

Data collected as original documents, of which some were lost, 
bringing on an investigation showing Sweetser had no written 
authority and was transferred. When retransferred back to 
this work sought papers covering this data and was told by Col. 
Arnold that " they had all dissipated through the files," 627. 

" There were not records kept," referring to Equipment Division. 
628. 

Got onlv three pages as a report from the Plane Production Sec- 
tion. '628. 

Submitted a report about February 1. 630. 

Refers to a " control board." 632. ' 

Recites work of statistical section. 633. 

Recognizes McConaughy Exhibit No. 2. 636. 

Misleading publicity coming from Congress. 637. 

Col. Deeds stated planes were on their way across about February 
10. 637. 

Recites an interview with Col. Deeds. 638. 

Acknowledges authorship of McConaughy Exhibit 2. 641. 

Interpreted Col. Deed's statement to say that planes were en route. 
642. 

Admits that the statement, " The first American-built battle 
planes are to-day en route to the front in France * * * " 
was submitted to Col. Deeds. 645. 

Admits "One hundred of the first American-built battle planes 
are to-day en route to the front in France " was the headline in 
most of the papers throughout the country. 650. 

Lieut. Grant, second in charge of plane production, " whispered 
in my ear with extreme confidence and considerable alarm that 
story was incorrect." 651. • 

In speaking of shipment of one plane thinks reference was to 
shipment from Dayton. 653. 

Charges a " perversion in spirit of the whole point and purpose 
of the story " by the Associated Press. 655. 

Has prepared a chronology of the Bristol and DeHaviland bat- 
tle planes. 656. 
J. W. McConaghy (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Produces further papers and recites circumstances in the prepa- 
ration of the statement. 658. 

Recital shows attitude of' Gen. Squier as to making a report to 
the public as to the progress of production and expenditure 
of money. 

Exhibit McConaghy No. 8 and Exhibit McConaghy No. 9. 661. 

States in substance where he got data for Exhibit 9. 662. 
Marlen E. Pew (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

States that his testimony stands unchanged. 684. 
M. W. Greer (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Mechanical engineer, graduating from Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Boston. 665. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 75 

M. W. Greer — Continued. 

Student of aeronautics since 1907. 665. 

Recites details at the time he was seeking employment with the 
Government. 666. 
Fred H. Lewis (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence, Jackson, Mich. Manufacturer of aeroplane parts 
and formerly automobile parts. Began the manufacturing 
of plane parts just after we entered the war. 668. 

Recites incidents leading up to contract with Curtiss people for 
the manufacturing of plane parts. 670. 

Entered into a contract with the Government direct. Government 
to supply the Standard Aircraft Co. Original order about 
$120,000. Arbitrary change on part of Government cut order 
down to about $35,000. 672, 673. 

States there were continuous changes in specifications and were 
never " sure of our blue prints being right at any time." Con- 
tinues explanation of delays. 674-677. 

Delay in filling order will be about 60 days. 682. 

Complete prints on another large order were to have been fur- 
nished by February 1, but have not as yet. 683. 

Original Bristol was not designed for Liberty motor, necessi- 
tating a great many changes, " and they have been changing 
it continually ever since." 686. 

Signal Corps and Curtiss Co. continually making changes every 
week. 686. 

Changes made everything obsolete that " we had manufactured." 
687. 

Requested set of samples, and when second set came were not 
much good because they had changed machine. 688. 

Out of 1,700 prints changes were made in about 900. 688. 

When changes were made " we had to dig up the information 
ourselves." 689. 

Does not know anything about a rumor that their company was 
advised to raise their bid of $3,000 on each Liberty motor to 
$6,000, which was the amount that had been determined on. 
698. 
Also denies any knowledge of Maj. Sheppler having informed 
that Lewis Co. would have to raise their price about $1,500 
on a couple of items in order to conform with others of that 
nature. 701. 
William P. Taylor (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence, Chelsea, Mich. Factory manager of Lewis Spring 
& Axle Co. since August 1, 1917/ 705. 

States Mr. Lewis's testimony is in accord with his recollection, 
but adds a few facts. 706, 708. 

States that it is his opinion the Bristol plane could have been 
used and produced as it was and that he knew they were using 
the machine effectively abroad. 709. 

Some changes that were being made were necessary in order to 
install the Liberty motor in Bristol plane, but does not think 
all changes were necessary. 711. 

" Lot of changes that would not effect an improvement in the 
machine." 



7b ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

William P. Taylor — Continued. 

Was told the Bristol was used by England just as it was. 715. 

When asked to describe a certain change ansAvers that there were 
so many hundreds of them that it was difficult to do so. 

"Practically all we have been doing for months, just watching 
these changes." 715, 716. 
Lieut. Tom B. Miller (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Second lieutenant, Aviation Section, Signal Reserve Corps, since 
December 28, 1917. Property officer at Dayton- Wright aero- 
plane factory. Prior to commission was chief 'accountant^ 
department of insurance and banking, State of Texas. 717. 

Duties at Dayton involves checking incoming material, and 
planes when completed. 719. 
Ulysses S. Thomas (June 10, 1918; Book 3). 

Residence, Buffalo. Lawyer in Buffalo for 22 years. Is a part 
owner of the Sterling Engine Co., which has a license to 
manufacture Sunbeam engines. 721. 

Recites attempts at getting contract from Maj. Squier in 1915, 
etc. 722-726. 

On page 727 Gen. Squier cancels order placed for the Sun- 
beam engine. 

Assured, however, about August, 1917, that Mitzui, one of the 
biggest Japanese houses in the world, wanted full capacity of 
plant for the Sunbeam engine, they having a market with a 
British ally. 729-731. 

Contradicting statement of Mr. Waldon. 732-735. 

Sunbeam tested by Government and accepted. 736. 

Could have completed an order for 5,000 machines within a 
couple of months. 734. 

Could have completed 1,500 Sunbeam engines of 350 horsepower 
by January, 1918. 740. 

Sunbeam engine was driving Bristol plane and used exclusively 
in Handley-Paige. 741. 

Seemed like automobile crowd was deciding things for them- 
selves. 741. 

Mr. Stettinius gives as his reason for the Sunbeam being thrown 
out of the program that it was not satisfactory, but machine 
was nevertheless flying in many thousands of machines. 742. 

Reads minutes of Aircraft Board of October 17, 1917. 745. 

" Mr. Willys is now building a thousand Sunbeam motors." 749. 

States why he felt there was favoritism in letting contracts for 
motors. 751. 

Expected to lower cost of engine below $10,000. 757. 

Would have made a proposition with Government for the pro- 
duction of 12-cylincler Sunbeam at between eight and nine 
thousand dollars. 758. 

Quarter of a million loss on the Sunbeam proposition. 761. 

Promised production of Liberty motors if not Sunbeam. 765. 
Dr. H. C. Dickinson (Washington,'' June 12, 1918; Book 4). 

Connected with the Bureau of Standards in capacity of physicist 
nearly 15 years. 1. 

Tested various engines among them the Hispano-Suiza. 2. 

Considered one of the "most typical" engines obtainable for 
research work. 4. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 77 

Dr. H. C. Dickinson — Continued. 

Considerable changes were necessary in adapting the French 
model to American practice. 5. 

Had a perfect Wright-Martin model. 6. 

Model was in shape to have been used in quantity production. 7. 

Wright-Martin factory was already making more than 100 mo- 
tors a month for the French Government of the American 
method. 7. 

Did not think facilities could have been provided to manufac- 
ture Hispano-Suiza motors in other plants in less than a year. 
10. 

Wright-Martin Co. had actually been engaged in perfecting its 
facilities for the manufacturing of the Hispano-Suiza motor 
some time prior to the entry of United States in the war. 12. 

Could have produced 50 engines a day if pressure had been 
brought to bear on the work. 14. 

Tested Liberty 8 and results not satisfactory. 27. 

States Liberty motors of the 12-cylinder type were subjected to 
the 50-hour test. 30. 

Did not test the motor at the bureau on 50-hour test, as they were 
not requested to. 32. 

Considers Liberty 12 a satisfactory and successful engine. 38. 

Could not state positively that Liberty motor had been tested 
in long hour flights. 39. 

States what he knows between the merits of the magneto and 
battery systems of ignition. 40. 

Tests put to the Liberty 12. 43-44. 
Capt, Arthur Sweeter (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). 

Produce historical record referee! to heretofore. 47. 

This to be a record or complete summary of the battle plane 
situation. 49. 
Charles Wesley Holmes (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). 

General manager of Motor Compressor Co. 51. 

Was inspector of the inspection section, inspector of airplanes 
and airplane engines of Signal Corps. 51. 

First assignment Bureau of Standards. 52. 

Never any tests of Liberty motor made during his stay there. 
53. 

One Liberty motor brought to Bureau of Standards, he and 
another inspector were refused permission to see it, although 
in possession of cards of authority signed by Maj. Souder. 54. 

First test he saw was at Dayton, Ohio, at McCook Field labora- 
tory, by Mr. Wahl. 55. 

Made at request of Splitdorf Electrical Co. 55. 

Was only allowed to watch the inspection for three or four 
minutes when requested to leave laboratory by Mr. Wahl. 56. 

Lieut. Testoni, Italian Special Military Commission and Lieut. 
Mezzatisti, Italian Military Aeronautical Commission at later 
date stated they thought magneto ignition far superior to bat- 
tery ignition. 57, 58. 

Relates further experience with Delco ignition system in which 
difficulties were encountered. 59. 

Relates faults of Liberty motor as witnessed by him. 62. 



78 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Charles Wesley Holmes — Continued. 

Aeronautical testing laboratory — testing of a Liberty motor. 
65. 

Lubricating system not sufficient. 67. 

This remedied, but as much trouble as ever. 68. 

Explains danger of having motor in actual flight which was 
not sufficiently cooled. 70. 

Liberty motor for test purposes used means not possible to use 
if in air. 73. 

Statement from Lieut. Testoni. 74. 

Lieut. Taylor present when motor referred to blew up. 76. 

Possible all right for bombing machines. 77. 

Capt. Marmon, was with the Nordyke-Marmon Co. at India- 
napolis. 78. 

Could not get a test for their aeroplane starters. 78. 

Use a hand crank for Liberty motors. 81. 
Tom B. Miller (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). 

Kelates visit to Dayton Wright Aeroplane factory. 85. 

The Talbotts and Mr. Kettering the real heads. 86. 

Scrapped material. 91. 

Government did not take over any material unsuitable for use. 
92. 

Stuff called " dope " an overbuy. 92. 

Unnecessary expenditure of money. 94. 

Target practice for guards. 95. 

Gas masks for the guards. 96. 

The Dayton-Wright, the Delco, and the Davton Metal Products 
called the " Triangle." 99. 

Expenses of beautifying the grounds comes under overhead 
expenses. 101. 

Signal Corps refuses to pay for this. 101. 

Trying to get rid of approvals section, because they objected 
to expenses. 103. 

L. V. Bedell not allowed to work any. H. E. Talbott told them 
not to allow any more purchasing orders to come to him for 
approval. 103. 

Maj. Frank E. Smith, in charge of approvals section in Wash- 
ington. Overrules Mr. Talbott. 104. 

Mr. Longacre, sent out by approvals section to look into lumber 
conditions, refused admittance by Mr. Talbott, jr. 104, 106. 

Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. 106. 

Lieut. Ong. 107. 

Promoted out of factory ; did not want him there. 108. 
Herman C. Daych (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). 

With the McCready Publishing Co., Cranford, N. J. 109. 

Associated with Standard Aircraft Co. one year. 109. 

Assistant to Mr. Mingle, president. 110. 

Everything haphazard, extremely disorganized. 110. 

Plant at Plainfield, N. J. 

Took over the Elizabeth, N. J., plant. 112. 

Technical name of the Standard Co. There are two corpora- 
tions, one the Standard Aircraft Corporation and the other 
the Standard Aero Corporation. 113. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 79 

Herman C. Daycii — Continued. 

Instance of manipulation by Mr. Mingle of Government finances. 
113. 

Benefits from adding subsidiarv to Standard Aero Corporation. 
117. 

Salaries of officers of Standard Aero Corporation. 122. 

Increases in these salaries. 122. 

Corporation entirelv owned and controlled by Mitsui & Co. 124. 

This a dangerous situation. 125. 

Eeports rendered to Mitsui by Mr. Mingle Thursdav of everv 
week. 126. 

Unger Bros., contractor for the Standard. 129. 

Next-door neighbor to Mr. Mingle. 129. 

Maj. Arnold. 130. 

Change tack one-eighth of an inch, and thereby hold everything 
up. 131. 

No particular irregularities noticed in the course of production, 
excepting general disorganization of place. 135. 

Men working overtime, Sundays. 135. 

Case of graft by Government inspector; that is, holding up 
production. 137. 

Methods of inspection department tending to retard production 
merelv through ignorance. 138. 

Capitalization of Standard Aircraft Co., $5,000,000. 139. 

Produces papers marked " Daych Exhibit 1, June 11, 1918," 
which he had kept, showing financial statement of the com- 
pany, a statement of which was refused the Government. 140. 

Statement exposes Mitsui's connection with Standard. 140. 

Bought only Hall-Scott motors. 142. 

Resigns from Standard. 147. 

Mr. Mingle kept his bank account (one of them) at Broadway 
Trust Co., in Woolworth Building. 149. 

Mingle interested in building operations covering several hun- 
dred thousand dollars for the new plant for which Mitsui 
furnished the money to purchase the property. 152. 

General antagonism to Government interests, done in ignorance, 
though private ownership of plants. 153. 

Produces, among others, exhibit marked " Daych Exhibit 4, 
June 11, 1918," which was filed away. This is a life history 
of Mr. Mingle, dictated by himself, in which he says he is 
general counsel for Mitsui & Co. 155. 

Preduces statement, filed and marked, " Daych Exhibit 6, June 
11, 1918," being day-to-day production sheets. 155. 

Produces statement, filed and marked, " Daych Exhibit 6, June 
11, 1918," showing that on August 20, 1917, five motors were 
shipped to Japan direct from California. 156. 

Presents name of man who was connected with Mingle during 
the early part of the company's history, who can give a great 
deal of information about manipulations then. (This paper 
filed and marked " Daych Exhibit 7, June 11, 1918.") 156. 

Presents two cards of high Japanese officials who called to see 
the plant. Others also, lieutenants and generals, one in Im- 
perial Japanese Navy. These filed and marked u Daycii 
Exhibits Nos. 8 and 9, June 11, 1918." 157. 
130687—19—6 



80 ABSTllACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Herman C. Daych — Continued. 

Shows paper setting forth cost of machine to the company and 
cost to the Government. Cost to company, $2,354.17; to 
Government, over $6,000, besides to this is added overhead 
charges. 157. 

Presents paper showing approximate cost of the new additions 
to the plant. 159. 

Presents another statement showing another machine destined 
for Japan. 159. 
M. W. Greer (Washington. June 11, 1918; book 4). 

Facts in case will show incompetency, with perhaps malicious 
intent. 161. 

Not a Dayton man. 161. 

Letters read showing Mr. Greer's status as an aeronautical en- 
gineer, and urging the use of metal in pl'anes. 162-164. 

Germans using all-steel planes. 165. 

Letter submitted to Director Aircraft Production urging all- 
metal planes, citing two " Lufberry and Potter," which have 
just come down in flames. 168. 

Reply. 169. 

Submits further letter showing reasons for all-metal planes. 
171. 

Men of inaction, '■ mathematical moles " men not fitted to act 
sent to service in this great emergency of the world. 172. 

Was asked by Mr. Durance for a written proposition in Sep- 
tember of the year before for making tests. 172. 

Never received an answer. 173. 

Shows performance of persons who are set to serve in positions 
bevoncl their experience and capacity. 177-178. 

Mr. W. B. Stout. 178. 

Later learns they are trying to develop an all-steel framework 
by the Empire Art Metal Co., of Brooklyn, N. Y., College 
Park. 182. 

Mr. Diffin, who had made numerous promises to test the sample,, 
has a brother in New York who goes to the Conger office. 183. 

His plane tested at Bureau of Standards, which test was con- 
vincing to every engineer without exception, except this group 
of men in the Government. 183. 
Alfred Robert Gormully (Washington, June 10, 1918; book 4). 

Former business automobile and sugar machinery, New York. 
185. 

Comes to Washington to represent the Fiat Co., of Italy. 186. 

An American corporation of the Fiat Co., Mr. Josephs, presi- 
dent. 187. 

In use on the Italian and French fronts. 188. 

Been in actual use in battle planes for several years. 189. 

Horsepower raised from 325 to 360 by continual improvements. 
189. 

Q,. Have any steps been taken to have that engine used for 
planes in the United States for our forces? — A. I was here 
for that purpose, but did not accomplish anything. 189. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 81 

Alfred Robert Gormully — Continued. 

Tried to present a proposition that the Fiat engines should be 

used until American production came along. 190. 
Presented to many of the representatives of the American Gov- 
ernment, including Mr. Baker. 190. 
When he first came connected himself with the equipment divi- 
sion. 190. 
Col. Waldon. 190. 
Fiat Co. had done business with the American Government in 

Paris. 191. 
Was never able to talk to but one man about the United States 

placing orders for the Fiat engine. 193. 
Called upon him 30 or 40 times, but could never see him. Tried 
to make an appointment with him a dozen times, but always 
failed. 193. 

Had already made a statement of his mission. 193. 

Again told by Mr. Baker, as did all others, to see Col. Deeds and 
also talk with Gen. Squier. 194. 

Has interview with Col. Montgomery. Told him Fiat Co. 
were capable of much greater production; that the engine 
was accepted and recognized as the primary motor of the 
world, etc. 196. 

Plant at Turin, Italy, 38,000 employees, financially independent, 
did not need any help from America. 196. 

Fiat Co. from the very beginning could have turned out several 
hundred a month. - 199. 

Saw Mr. Coffin, he referred him as everybody else did to Col. 
Deeds. 201. 

Mr. Atkins, of the Navy, was enthusiastic, took up the matter 
with the board, as he needed the engines badly. Finally he 
told Mr. Gormully he had been " blocked " and could not get 
it through. 202. 

Sees Mr. Daniels. 203. 

Plan was to bring 10 engines over here and try them in boats 
they had, and if by that time the Liberties were not coming 
through, ship our boats over and put these engines in them. 
206. 

Fiat engine tested in this country. 211. 

Tests at Langley Field with De Haviland planes. 211. 

Lieut. Emmons tells him to go back to New York. 213. 
Frederick C. Bahr (Washington, June 10, 1918; book 4). 

Formerly in security business in Detroit, Mich. 218. 

Morcron & Co. 218. 

Assigned to finance division of Signal Corps. 219. 

Asked to put in follow-up system for Signal Corps. 220. 

This was developed in fall of 1917. 221. 

This system was described to succeeding executors of that divi- 
sion and is on file in equipment division. 221. 

Specification section was a part of the inspection division. 224. 

Maj. Gray at the head of this section. 224. 



82 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Frederic k C. Bahr — Continued. 

Says there is historical account in files of Signal Corps which 
would show actual state of production under the cost-plus 
contracts 1 

Speaking of his own section which is the follow-up, or expedit- 
ing department. 225. 

Q. How could there be an expediting department or fol- 
low-up section which, if in successful operation, did not have 
r 11 the ir formation of changes in specification relative to cost- 
plus contracts? 225. 

No production had come through up to the time he left Wash- 
ington. 226. 

The follow-up section did seek to find out why, and amongst 
a thousand orders difficult to remember answers, but in a gen- 
eral way never got any answers. 22 T. 

Changes always in the departments higher up. 228. 

Had met Col. Deeds and Col. Waldon. 229. 

Did not think all information they needed was available, or if 
it was, was not given to them for reasons which those higher 
up knew better. 230. 

Was informed that so far as cost-plus contracts were concerned 
the administrative work was being done by the district man- 
agers of equipment. 230. . 

Much delay in Signal Corps on account of not paying their bills. 
231. 

Curtiss Co. having trouble in getting metal parts, as they were 
not meeting their bills. 232. 

Curtiss Co. dilatory in production with respect to planes con- 
tracted for under cost-plus contracts. 233. 

Expediting section could not get information with regard to 
production of planes and engines that were being made on 
a cost-plus basis. 235. 

Heads of divisions did not seem to be aware of this expediting 
department, as they tried to start another department entirely 
opposed to this one in some respects. 23G. 

Too aggressive in trying to get information, ordered to Detroit. 
237. 

Was getting in control of all such things as goods for export. 
Knew by night from a report on his desk how many tons of 
freight and its cubic volume was ready to be moved to any 
part of the country and where it was located. 238. 

Sent to Detroit hj Col. Horner and Lieut. Col. Horner. 239. 

Asked to have an organization put in the field as it was neces- 
sary to control the situation. After submitting this report he* 
was sent away. 240. 
Gutzox John Delemotte Borglum (Washington, June 11. 1918; 
Book 4). 

Presents records covering ordering of the Delco system for 
20,000 motors. 244. 
CoxRAn Charles Martens (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). 

Highland Park, Mich. 245. 

Foreman of testing department of Lincoln Motor Co. 245. 

Was with Cadillac Car Co. in similar position. 245. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 83 

Conrad Charles Martens — Continued. 

Began assembling and testing marine motors about 18 years 

before. 24:6. 
Goes to Pacific coast to Hall- Scott Motor Co. to get acquainted 

with their methods of building airplane engines. 247. 
Looks up tools required in their department for building the 

engines. 248. 
Changes in horsepower. 251. 
The testing was very satisfactory, as they learned a great deal 

about tools. 254. 
Changing to a heavier crank shaft. 255. 
Did not have any motor to work on. 257. 
Government had no perfected motor they could hand to the 

manufacturers and say to build that one. 257. 
After engine tested, make some changes in the locks in the oil 

pump and the water pump. At first not secured by a lock of 

any kind. 267. 
No report of any endurance test in the air has ever been sent to* 

the factory. 267. 
Thinks the trouble with overheating as much the trouble of the 

aviator as with the engine. 269. 
States Delco system can be used on Liberty engines. 271. 
Can not use the magnetic ignition. 271. 
Says since change in connecting rod it has turned out to be a 

perfect engine. 274. 
Mr. Martens is shown something which came from a Liberty 

motor. 275. 
Admits that it looks flimsy and that at one time he thought it 

looked serious. 275. 
If it should break a man would lose his oil. 276. 
Shows he does not entirely approve of it. 277. 
Eelative to the 50-hour test. 279. 

After strengthening it Signal Corps did not feel it was neces- 
sary to subject it to 50-hour test, as the new rod had been 

tested at different plants. 281. 
Wanted to test it on his own initiative, as had never been satis- 
fied. 282. 
Harry E. B. Baker (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). 
Business man and manufacturer of Cleveland. 284. 
Organized the Engel Aircraft Co. 284. 
Was president and general manager. 284. 
Had a contract with the Government for supplying standard 

parts. 285. 
Recites contracts that were placed with the company and after- 
wards canceled. 285-286. 
These contracts reinstated. 288. 
Maj. Grav head of Engineering Division of Aircraft Board. 

290. 
Were fairly well up in production at time of cancellation of 

orders. 290. 
States reasons of his withdrawal from Engel Co. and reason for 

cancellation of orders. 292. 



84 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Arthur P. Homer (Washington, D. C., June 12, 1918; Book 4). 

Naval architect and marine engineer. 302. 

Represented Pierce Oil Corporation, Lloyd's Register of Ship- 
ping, Valentine & Co., the Odorless Refrigerator Co., and 
Sterling Engine Co. 302. 

Goes to Europe in 1915, in September, to investigate the air- 
craft engine situation for them. 302. 

Relates result of visit to Great Britain, in which Sunbeam is 
called most favorably to his attention of all other engines. 
304. 

Sails again for Europe in January, 1916, where contracts are 
completed with Sunbeam Co. 306. 

British Admiralty refuse at first to let the Sunbeam Co. make 
the contract as they considered Sunbeam a Government secret. 
307. 

Finally returns to this country with Sunbeam engine, with 
plans, specifications, etc. 307. 

These drawings had to be changed into American figures. 307. 

Under Mr. Souther's orders they accepted preliminary order for 
two engines. 308. 

In June, 1917, tested the first Sunbeam engine and presented 
results of test to United States Navy Department and Maj. 
Souther. Also reported test to Gen. Squier, who stated that 
it was the first ray of hope he had seen. 308. 

Try to see Mr. Walton and appear before the Aircraft Produc- 
tion Board. They refused to see them. 308. 

Arrange in June to get large plant in Buffalo after consultation 
with Maj Souther. 309. 

In July Maj. Souther asks to be informed what production the 
Sterling Co. could give on Sunbeams. 309. 

Could arrange production at any amount they required. 309. 

Get option on King Sewing Machine Co. 309. 

Maj. Souther changes his plans and tells them to build Liberty 
motors. 310. 

Having been promised an order and then to have this order 
changed in face of all the things that could be promised them, 
they would not buy the plant contracted for. 310. 

Tries to secure from Sterling Engine Co. at actual cost to them, 
for the Sunbeam license, and offering same to the United 
States Government which would have placed the United 
States Government in a position of having engines of an ac- 
cepted type. 312. 

Offer was turned down on strength of statement by Col. Boiling 
in August and no investigation as to worth of the Sunbeam 
was made in any way. 312. 

In the meantime, the Marling-Rockwell Co. sent representatives 
to Europe to investigate aircraft situation and are informed 
that the Sunbeam engine is the best engine in Europe for 
adaption to American methods. Was of highest type. 312. 

Mr. John Willys also was informed by his representative that 
the Sunbeam was the best type of machine then existing. 312. 

Willys endeavored to secure a license, but could not. 313. 






ABSTEACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 85 

Arthur P. Homer — Continued. 

Mr. Willys offered the Navy Department to go into production 
on Sunbeam engines within four months on a large scale if it 
were desired. 313. 

Eeports interview with Maj. Vincent and Capt. Marmon just 
returned from Europe with regard to Sunbeam. 316-317. 

No changes could have been made in motor that would have 
retarded production here as it had already passed the break- 
clown test in Europe, which took seven months. 319. 
€ol. Edwin S. George (Washington, D. C, June 12, 1918; Book 4). 

Lieutenant colonel, Signal Corps. 325. 

Duty, procurement of the motor transport equipment for the 
Signal Corps. 325. 

Has nothing to do with the production of aircraft. 326. 

Velie Motor Corporation, at Moline, Kelly Springfield Co., at 
Springfield, Ohio, Federal Motor Truck Co., at Detroit, etc., 
furnish the heavy aviation trucks. 327. 
Dr. Frederick W. Buck (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). 

Maker of airplanes, torpedoes, and gas engines, Pueblo, Colo. 
329. 

The Buck Aircraft & Munitions Co. 329. 

Organized January, 1917. Could have built airplanes a year 
ago if they could have gotten the order. 330. 

Brought out an all-metal airplane. 330. 

Wrote to Washington; no results. 331. 

Gave him as their reason for refusal to consider metal planes 
there was so much head resistance. 333. 

Company incorporated for $3,000,000. 334. 

Aircraft Production Board state in letters they have already 
advanced $145,000,000 for new companies. 337. 

Understood that they had advanced four million to Curtiss, some 
twelve million dollars to the Wright-Martin Co. 338. 

Did not understand that War Credits Board had been organ- 
ized for purpose of determining amount of advances that were 
made. 338. 

Can not secure an engine to put in their model. 340-341. 
Wilfred C. Leland (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). 

Manufacturer, Detroit, Mich. 342. 

Vice president and general manager of Lincoln Motor Co. 342. 

Looks to securing of plant for manufacture. 346. 

Fails, consults with authorities at Washington. 346. 

See Mr. Vandervort, Col. S. D. Waldon, and Mr. Deeds. 356. 

Turn in resignations at Cadillac Co. on strength of assurance 
that their high-grade work would naturally put them in a 
position to receive contracts, and relying on honesty of pur- 
pose and desire to get only the best. 347. 

Have further interviews in the meantime with members of the 
Aircraft Board with respect to the contracts to be allotted. 
349. 

No definite motor in mind ; would build whatever was decided to 
be best, 351. 

Mr. Charles F. Kettering, of the company, came with them. 351. 

Belonged to Dayton, Ohio, Delco Ignition Co. 351. 



86 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Wilfked C. Leland — Continued. 

Helped to bring out self-starter for car called the Delco starter r 
or the Delco ignition system. 352. 

Cadillac owned no interest in Delco Co. 352. 

Delco system was pioneer system. 354. 

Mr. Ernest E. Sweet, consulting engineer of Cadillac Co. 356. 

Mr. D, T. Conley, engineer with Cadillac Co. 356. 

Mr. Frank Johnson, motor engineer, Cadillac Co. 356. 

Has some stock in United Motors. 358. 

Knew United Motors owned the Delco. 359. 

Lincoln Motor Co. incorporated in August, but in meantime had 
to get another company out which had same name. 359. 

Gives list of stockholders. 360. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. had $100,000. 361. 

Mr. Kettering's stock comes in Dayton Metal Products. 363. 

Had met H.^E. Talbott. sr., and his son, Mr. Talbott, jr.. and 
Mr. McCann. 364. 

Designed the plant for postwar production. 366. 

Gen. Squier's name on list of those thev consulted in Washing- 
ton. 367. 

Discuss in general way Rolls-Royce, Sunbeam, and Gnome as 
type of motors to build. 369. 

Mr. Kettering had been with Cash Register people. 371. 

See Gen. Squier. 372. 

Never been financially connected with Mr. Kettering or Mr. 
Deeds. 374. 

Mr. Kettering was one of the three leading engineers in design- 
ing the Liberty motor. He was chosen to handle the ignition 
svstem for the Liberty motor. 376. 

Mi\ Vincent, of the Packard Co., and Mr. Hall, of the Hajl-Scott 
Co., were also selected to design the Liberty motor. 377. 

Cadillac Co. built connecting rods for first 10 Liberty motors. 
378. 

Mr. Hall comes to Cadillac Co. and tells of progress in design- 
ing Liberty motor, and reasons for believing it was adapted 
to American methods. 380. 

Mr. Kettering called up to work out ignition system for Liberty 
motor. 381. 

Assured by Government authorities if plan worked out well Lin- 
coln Motor Co. would be called upon to furnish 20 motors a 
day. 383. 

When further assurance held out proceeded to buy plant. 
385-386. 

Buy Holden Avenue plant, costing $20,000 or $30,000. 386. 

Approximately $4,000,000 been paid to Lincoln Motor Co. to 
date. 389. 

Mr. Nabel is property officer of Government, 391. 

Contract with Lincoln Motor Co. on cost-plus basis. 392. 

First contract calls for 6,000 motors. 392. 

War Department now decides they will need to have 100 a day 
turned out of eight-cylinder type instead of 20. 393. 

Go to Detroit to seek new plant for enlarging purposes. 393. 

Decide they will have to erect buildings. See their bankers in 
Detroit First National and Peoples' State Bank. 393b. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 87 

Wilfred C. Leland — Continued. 
Agreement reached. 894. 
Mr William H. Murphy and Mr. David Boyer and Mr. Lei and 

indorse paper so that $4,000,000 may be available. 394. 
Resolution of Aircraft Board read giving terms of order placed 

with Lincoln Motor Co. for 6,000, etc., engines at a price to 

equal the cost thereof plus $913.05 as a fixed profit for each 

motor so ordered, plus 25 per cent of any sum by which the 

estimated cost, of each motor, fixed at $6,087 per motor, shall 

exceed the actual cost. 397. 
Bogy cost first fixed at $6,087, but later* changed to $5,000. 398. 
Gives reasons for setting it originally at $6,087. 398. 
Reads further resolutions of Aircraft Board. 393b. 
Reads minutes of meeting of Aircraft Board further in refer- 
ence to estimated cost of $5,000 for each engine, fixing profit at 

12J per cent on each engine. 395b. 
That the Government make an allowance for depreciation of 

company's heat treating plant. 396b. 
That the cost of the company's testing plant be allowed as part 

of the production cost of the engines to be manufactured. 

396b. 
That an advance payment of $4,000,000 be made to the company 

on account of the contract. 396b. 
Packard Co. secures an advance of $2,500,000 on its contract. 

397-398b. 
(As you will notice, paper incorrectly numbered here, as pages 

go to 398 and then start in again on 390.) 
Lelancl not interested in Packard Co. at all. 398b. 
Total expenditure of plant $6,200,000. 401. 
Get the $4,000,000 from the Government in one payment early 

in December. 402. 
Five per cent interest on first advance. 405. 
Also two other loans from banks in neighborhood of $1,750,000 

or $2,000,000. 406. 
A second contract with the Government for spare parts. 406. 
No additional contract for motors. 406. 
Reads minutes of Aircraft Board recommending this contract 

with Lincoln Motor Co at cost-plus profit of 15 per cent and 

providing for depreciation clause. 408. 
The first contract for 6,000 motors for the Government and this 

last-mentioned contract only two Lincoln Motor Co. ever had 

with Government. 408. 
Estimated cost of the 6,000 Liberty engines. 409. 
Estimate by Government that the spares to be produced would 

cost $6,000,000. 410. 
Possibly $40,000,000 involved in the two orders. 410. 
Statement is produced showing sum of $8,423,966.38 paid by 

Government to Lincoln Motor Co. 410. 
In March two more advances made by Government, bringing 

total up to $6,500,000. 411. 
Lei and Exhibit No. 2 shows payments amounting to $4,177,076.75 

from the Government to Lincoln Motor Co. exclusive of ad- 
vances. 411. 



88 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Wilfred C. Leland — Continued. 

Can not seem to state what method, if any, had been employed 
to determine cost of making of these motors. 414—415. 

Mr. Leland's attorney states accounting system not built up yet 
when started production, and that it was laid for determining 
cost in lots of 800 motors, which is not yet reached. 417-418. 

Mr. F. C. Thompson was Government accountant in charge. 419. 

Chief accountant for Lincoln Motor Co. William T. Nash. 419. 

Furnishes salaries of officials of company. 420. 

Increases in force. 421. 

Explains delays in production. 422. 

Change made from 8 C3 T linder to 12. 423. 

Question is asked what reason there Avas for failure to get any 
engines at all because they were going to try for increased 
horsepower. 424. 

At time orders were received to change had not completed tools 
for motors they were then planning to build. 425. 

Later finish making of these tools to use up stock on hand. 426. 

One hundred and sixty-nine motors are finished with lighter 
connecting rod. 430. 

Some delays in getting blue prints. 431. 

Go along for six week or two months experimenting on connect- 
ing rod. 431. 

In February find they will need heavier connecting rods. 432. 

Change in a particular part many times affects 10 or 50 or 100 
other parts. 434. 

Tool-making establishments not adequate for work throwfci 
upon them. 437. 

In many instances seem to have been motives for holding up, 

willfully holding up the making of the tools. 438. 
. Gave a list of these tool-making concerns in Detroit to Depart- 
ment of Justice. 438. 

Understanding is given that Signal Corps follow a policy to 
standardize entire output of motors; not put into production 
different types of motors, but to have one type which is finally 
reached as a result of all the work of development. 441. 

Did not have full supply of labor. 443. 

Shortage of aluminum castings. 443. 

Government pays cost of all scrapped material. 455. 

Amount would be large, although would not state even ap- 
proximately. 456. 

Factory tests to which motors are subjected. 458. 

Connecting rod change, in February, last important change. 
460. 

Could not state that the Liberty motor was vet standardized. 
462. 

Buy the Delco ignition system and install it when they make 
an engine. 463. 

All special tools that apply particularly to Liberty motor are 
charged to this motor. Amount for special tools runs possibly 
a million and a quarter. 464. 

In case of special tool account, the tools will be the property of 
the Government, but in the case of machinery and equipment 
the same will belong to the company. 467, 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 89 

Wilfred C. Lelaxd — Continued. 

Can not recall debit balance against Government under their 

system at end of April. 472. 
Government pays all the salaries of officers and employees of 
the company of every kind. 477. 

The company itself, during the time this contract is being car- 
ried out, bears absolutely no expense except whatever interest 
it pays on borrowed money. 477. 
Contract contemplated this order would be completed in 10 
months. 478. 

$5,000,000 clear profit for the company under contract, 478. 

In addition, Mr. Leland and father each getting salary of $25,000 
from the Government. 479. 

Statement says that between the 1st of September and the mid- 
dle of February over a thousand changes made in the Liberty 
motor. 479. 

Acknowledges probably only 10 per cent in some years, perhaps 
20 in others, was written off on machinery and equipment in 
the Cadillac Co. at end of year when inventory taken. 481. 

Changes in design of Liberty motor have caused three months' 
delay. 484. 

In spite of all these delays that have occurred, company still 
safe with respect to the limit, 484. 

No estimate made of what they could produce in 1918. 487-488. 

Had never heard of an estimate by Signal Corps figuring that 
the Packard, Lincoln, and Ford Cos. would produce a total 
of 32,626 Liberty motors. 488. 

Can not recollect any estimate ever being given to Signal Corps 
in Februarv that thev could turn out 9,850 motors in the vear 
1918. 489." 

General Motors owns the Cadillac Co. 490. 

Figured that if contracts were to be closed out for 6,000 engines 
and the spare parts, thev would have a debt on their hands of 
$4,000,000. 491. 

Expected to pay about 80 per cent of the $5,000,000 profit in 
taxes. 491. 

This constituted the $4,000,000 of indebtedness to the Govern- 
ment, 493. 
Lester P. Barlow (Washington, June 13, 1918; Book 4). 

When last testifying stated he expected to go to Dayton for pur- 
pose of examining workings of Liberty motor. 501. 

Was sent by instruction of Col. Bane, or technical division of 
Department of Military Aeronautics. 501. 

Two hours getting a pass to hangars. 501. 

Sent him to another field, when they had three motors at the 
field he could have used. 502. 

Returns to Washington with nothing accomplished. 504. 

Is told by Col. Bane to return and all will be fixed up all right, 
Wires Col. Hall to be allowed to use motor at Bureau of 
Standards. 505. 

Drops whole thing. 506. 

Gets plane with motor, so that he can conduct test in actual 
flight. 506. 



90 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Lester P. Barlow — Continued. 

Gives details of L. W. F. machine. 507. 

" W J' stands for Willard, " F " is for Fowler, and " L " the old 

original company. Lawrence. Known as L. W. F. Co., of Loiw 

Island City. 508. 
Built a number of training machines for the Government. 509. 
Engines turned out by Government could have had this system of 

radiation attached to them without difficulty. 509. 
Col. Deeds tells Senator Hitchcock that $10,000 had been set 

aside authorizing Martin to expend that sum on drawings. 

511. 
Received letter from Director of Military Aeronautics inform- 
ing him that that section did not at that time desire to test 

such an arrangement. 511. 
Not one man on the board qualified to make such a statement. 

512. 
Did not call him to explain the device ; they had no blue prints 

to look at; could not have possibly given it any consideration. 

512. 
All prominent men connected with aeronautics said it should be 

tried out, 512. 
Gen. Squier stating that if Germany were using it they could 

practically destroy and drive the people out of both London 

and Paris in a single night, 513. 
Gen. Squier thought the cost of this campaign would probably 

be a billion dollars. 514. 
Practicability of 'the device could have been determined for 

$150,000. '514. 
No bombing machines being made in this country excepting some 

experimental work on Handley-Paige. 515. 
Is asked while at Dayton if he had any simplified trap in mind, 

as the one they had was very complicated. 515. 
To get the most efficiency out of a machine, bombs should be de- 
termined before the plane is built, 516. 
No machines being built by the Government to carry the accepted 

type of bombs. 516. 
Ordnance Department stops work on certain type of bomb, 

which throws 70,000 practically finished ones into junk. 517. 
Believes Liberty motor has reached point of development or use 

in military aeronautics for combat purposes, but not as bomb- 
ing machine. 518. 
Considers that either the Rolls-Royce or Sunbeam motors are 

better engines. 519. 
Liberty motor may in time prove equal to them, but as to these 

motors thev were certain, as they had been in active service. 

520. 
Principal thing against the Liberty motor was throwing the 

eggs all in one basket right in the middle of the war. 520. 
Sunbeam would not have had to go through an experimental 

stage. 520. 
Lee Mason (Washington, June 13, 1918; Book 4). 
Lives at 1414 B Street NW., Washington. 523. 
Followed the automobile trade and electrical trade. 523. 
Metz one of the companies he has worked for. 523. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 91 

Lee Mason — Continued. 

Makers of airplane parts. 524. 

Factory at Waltham, Mass. 524. 

Had contracts with the Government. Make all the wooden 
parts and all metal parts except the motor. 524. 

Goes to Metz factory to work, working in sheet-metal depart- 
ment, and finds he is working under a German-born foreman. 
525. 

Name was Byng, and did not think he was naturalized. 525. 

Reported twice a week to the police. 526. 

Ran a standing ad in Boston local paper every day for 50 sheet- 
metal workers. 527. 

Out of stock and did not seem to try to get any. 527. 

Men sit around and loaf; he was told not to go home; read a 
newspaper or anything ; go to the toilet and sj^end a few hours, 
or anywhere, but not to go home. 528. 

Goes home, and then goes back to go to work. Same condition 
of affairs. Told he might have to lay around for a month, but 
not to go home. Did not know when thev would get stock. 
528. 

He received 30 cents an hour. 531. 

Good Germans got 37, 37J, or 40. 532. 

He with about two others were the only Americans around. 532. 

The Germans never talked with him; always seemed to meet in 
groups so far out he could never reach them. 532. 

Superintendent of the plant was a German. 533. 

Understood that older Mr. Metz was born in Germany. 533. 

Blue prints were allowed to lay around on benches so that any- 
one could have taken them home at night and return them in 
the morning. 534. 

Woodworkers' department running same way. Men idle, but 
ad running in Boston papers for 100 woodworkers. 535. 

Asked to " just stall around." 536. 

Enormous office force. 537. 

Three Signal Corps officers there. 539. 

Production manager, Mr. Schauffler, was a German. 539. 

Holding up airplane work by finishing off automobiles. 541. 

These men Were skilled to do airplane work, but they would not 
put them on it. Bring in some old clodhopper or stonemason 
and put him on filing parts down assembling. 542. 
Luther Mason (Washington, June 13, 1918; Book 4). 

Lives at 1414 V Street. 544. 

Been living in Waltham, Mass. 544. 

Was in the automobile assembling at Metz factory. 546. 

Finally gets in airplane department, but is immediately taken 
back to helping on automobiles, and green hands put on air- 
plane work. 547-548. 

Got in lumber by carloads, but never turned out any parts. 549. 

Official of the company told him the reason thev did not accom- 
plish more was because they were always getting a new out- 
fit of blue prints. 552. 

Mr. Pickens, business manager of the company. 552. 

States Mr. Byng Avas unnaturalized German. Police had his 
picture and finger prints. 552. 



92 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Luther Mason — Continued. 

Lieut. Boehm represented the Government at the plant, 553. 

Man making pro-German remarks was given work in depart- 
ment doing Government work. 555. 

Mentions idle office force, and blue prints lying around. 556. 

Cites instances of sabotage at plant of Sturtevants, near Wal- 
tham. 558. 
John A. Wilson (Washington, June IT, 1918: Book 4). 

Besides Franklin, Pa. 561. 

In the oil business. 561. 

Working for the Aircraft Board. 561. 

Gentleman calls to see him with stabilizing machine. 562. 

Every step opposed by colonel in charge of the Signal Corps. 
562. 

Make demonstration at Mineola of a perfect stabilizer. 563. 

The Macey Engineering Co., at Franklin. 566. 

Have contract with Government. 566. 

Col. Deeds makes the contract for the Equipment Division. 
567. ■ 

Waiting for the motors. 568. 
Maj. Howard C. Marmon (Washington, June IT, 1918; Book 4). 

Major, Signal Corps. 572. 

Prior to this, civilian. 5T2. 

With Xordyke & Marmon. 

Went to Europe to study aircraft with Col. Gorrell, Col. Boil- 
ing, Col. Clark. 5T3. 

Keport turned in to Secretary Baker (Sept. 1). 5T4. 

Called the Boiling Commission. 5T4. 

Examined Rolls-Boyce, Sunbeam, etc, 5T6. 

Sunbeam criticized by fliers at the front, 5TT. 

Two or three thousand Sunbeams in use over there. 5T8. 

Found the Rolls-Bovce the only engine that at that time was 
really filling the bill. 589. 

Did not think there had been a fundamental change in the Lib- 
erty engine. 591. 

Lhiderstood when over there that American machines would 
not be over until July, and in the meantime our forces would 
be supplied by European manufacturers. 595. 

That was their excuse for oblioatino- the United States for 
$100,000,000 spent for aircraft while over there. 596. 

Thought it was unnecessary to put into production a foreign 
engine to meet an immediate need, as thought there was 
plenty of time to develop the Liberty. 596. 

Boiling Commission went abroad again in June; found over 
there that it was desired that the American Government 
should devote its attention to high-power engines. 604. 

Changing rod on Liberty delayed them about two weeks. 606. 

Trouble with respect to lubrication caused two or three weeks' 
delay. 606. 

Col. Vincent was at head of engine design section of the Signal 
Corps, which made the drawings for the Liberty motor. 607. 

Cablegram from Gen. Pershing on March 15 asking for revised 
estimate schedule of motor production by months, etc, 608. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 93 

Maj. Howard C. Maemon — Continued. 

American Government asked to have motors shipped to other 

side, where they could be tested. 612. 
States that outside of changes in connecting rods there has been 

no delays in production of Liberty motors. 614. 
Last October or November the Government had a set of draw- 
ings for the Liberty that were at least 99 per cent complete. 

616. 
No lack of blue prints that would cause delay in production. 

617. 
Everyone having a contract should have gotten started into 

production in October, 1918. 619. 
Think it an absolutely good motor. 621. 
Is of opinion there will be less difficulty with the Liberty engine 

than the Allies have had with any of their engines. 625. 
Commander Briggs, in charge of engine-building work for 

England, thinks this a thoroughly satisfactory ignition. 631. 
Part of delay in the Liberty engine output ascribed to severe 

specifications and inspection requirements. 640. 
Maj. Haizlett in charge of Government office at Detroit. 
Lieut. Col. Henry B. Joy (Washington, D. C, June IT, 1918; 
Book 5). 

Previous to connection with Signal Corps actively engaged with 

Packard Motor Car Co. 1. 
Became associated with Signal Corps in October. 1. 
Now is largest individual owner of Packard Motor Car Co. 

securities. 2. 
Assigned to duty in connection with raising 12,000 to 15,000 

industrial trops for service in France. 2. 
Acquainted with development of Liberty motor. 3. 
Libertv motor outgrowth of work of Packard Motor Car 

Co. 4. 
Obtained from Ralph de Palma the German Mercedes airplane 

motor. 4. 
Packard Co. developed a 300-horsepower and plus motor and 

notified Government such a motor was ready to show them 

about time war was declared. 6. 
Work on this motor was all done prior to April, 1917. 6. 
English and French officers thought motor behind times be- 
cause more power -and lighter motor desired. 8. 
Liberty motor evolved from sketches made by Mr. Vincent and 

on experimental work conducted by Packard Co. 9. 
Feeling in August or September that eight-cylinder motor was 

most important. 13. 
Trend of opinion toward hio-her power. Does not know whether 

any eights were contracted for. 13. 
Reason for delay in production of Liberty -motor is because 

design was not completely and satisfactorily finished and 

O. K'd in all details before it was turned over to factory for 

production. 14. 
Have been changing design of motor all the time. 15. 
Great difficulty in spark plugs. Power and ability of motor 

to-day is limited to spark plugs. 18. 



94 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Henry B. Joy— Continued. 

-Changes in jmotor while under production causes a lairgo 
amount of scrappage of material and wasted money. 18. 

Liberty motor changed with respect to bearings, lubrication, and 
connecting rods. 22. 

Thought Packard Co. going ahead too fast. 23. 

Private manufacturers could not do it. Can only do it with 
Government's till behind you. 23. 

Thought Deled ignition system best. 27. 

Did not think air program of having 3,500 planes on battle 
front in spring could be lived up to, but for expressing his 
opinion was called pessimistic. 37. 

Packard Co. shipped some motors in December to appease pub- 
lic demand, which were not up to standard. 40. 
Owen Thomas (Washington, D. C, June 17, 1918; Book 5). 

Engaged in Government work under Gen. Johnson in Depart- 
ment of Purchase and Supplies. 62. 

In charge of collecting drawings, engineering data, and speci- 
fications of all Government equipment. 62. 

Previously a consulting engineer. 62. 

Been two years in England and Canada on war work for 
English Army. 63. 

Was a lieutenant colonel in British Army. 

W r as consulting engineer of Mercedes Co., a German concern, 
previous to war. 64. 

Practical to build motors of Mercedes type from Mercedes 
motor Packard Co. had. 68. 

Taken about five or six months to get into production. 68. 

Mercedes type of forced-speed lubrication better than any- 
thing else. 70. 

British copied Mercedes motor in Rolls-Royce. 73. 

Mercedes motor was built in Germany with American tools. 77. 

Germans beneficiaries to-day of American experience in manu- 
facturing of Mercedes engine. 78. 

Main difference in Mercedes motor and Liberty motor was in 
lubrication. 82. 

No question but what planes in quantity could have been turned 
out last fall in both 6 and 12 types. *84. 

Discussion on change in lubrication system of Liberty motor 
took months rather than weeks. 85: 

Was at front until January, 1917, making study of engineer- 
ing matters for British Army. 86. 

Commendatory letter from Lieut. Gen. Hughes inserted in 
record. 87. 

Offered services to Council of National Defense, but was ad- 
vised under date of May 2, 1917, by Mr. Coffin that did not 
think situation warranted his making the sacrifice. 88. 

English nationality objected to. 90. 

Found Delco ignition system good., 94. 

Mercedes is not handmade design like other European motors. 
100. 

English planes made by women labor who had not had any ex- 
perience previous to war. 101. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 95 

Owen Thomas — Continued. 

Services accepted by General Staff as stated in telegram of 
November 23. 103. 

Very familiar with production of planes in Europe, but had 
very little to do with it in this country. 104. 

Natural difficulties in manufacturing planes augmented by lot 
of experimentation not warranted. 105. 

Considers Liberty motor on light side of safety, due to sac- 
rificing strength to lightness. 105. 

Thought it was possible to obtain production of De Haviland 
planes before 1st of January. 106. 

Does not think Hispano- Suiza engine a practical American 
manufacturing design. 106. 

Signal Corps weak on engineering end. 107. 
Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall (Washington, D. C, June 18, 1919 ; 
Book 5). 

Charge of production engineering on Bristol and De Haviland 
fighting planes at all factories. 109. 

Been on that assignment about 90 days. 109. 

Previous to that was consulting engineer on Production Board. 
109. 

Duty was to organize all factories, help organize them to build 
the Liberty motor, and clean up design of motor itself. 110. 

Previous to entering service was vice president and general man- 
ager of Hall-Scott Co., on Pacific coast. 110. 

Has had about 20 years of gas-engine designing. Has probably 
designed 100 different types and about 13 different types of 
aviation motors. 111. 

All aviation motors known as Hall-Scott motors. 111. 

Russia standardized on Hall-Scott motors during war. 112. 

Up until war was declared United States Government had about 
200 of their motors. 112. 

Since entering war has about 3,000 training motors. 113. 

Familiar with every type of motor that exists. 113. 

Knew more about what was going on in Germany with respect to 
motors than our own Government. 114. 

Col. Vincent and himself designed Liberty motor. 114. 

Came to Washington for interview upon receipt of telegram from 
Col. Deeds. 115. 

Knew Col. Deeds through business connections. 116. 

Bought Delco starting equipment for railway motor cars, which 
he built, from Col. Deeds and sold him original 8-cylinder auto- 
mobile which he built and Cadillac used for their first experi- 
ments. 116. 

Never had met Col. Vincent. 118. 

Col. Vincent had come to Washington to make arrangements with 
Government to purchase engine designed by Packard people. 
118. 

Motor was impracticable for aviation. 119. 

Went to Willard Hotel with Col. Vincent to design new motor. 
119. 

Conferred with English and French mission as to what was 
desired in way of motor. 121. 

130687—19 7 



96 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall — Continued. 

Army and Navy Technical Board appropriated $250,000 to com- 
plete six engines of each type (8 and 12) of design accepted. 
123. 

Four-cylinder motor was about 375 pounds and would develop 
120 horsepower. Six-cylinder motor about 480 pounds and 
would develop 220 horsepower. Eight-cylinder was to weigh 
600 pounds and develop 270 horsepower. Twelve-cylinder mo- 
tor was to weigh about 780 pounds and develop 380 horsepower. 
124, 125. 

Mercedes engine owned by Packard Co. not suitable for aviation 
and was only used by Germans in experimental work. 162. 

Never thought it possible to develop or build up an engine from 
that motor which could be used for aviation work in high 
powers. 127. 

Liberty motor is same type as German Mercedes. 129, 130. 

Thought Hall-Scott lubricating system best, but was changed be- 
cause of mission coining from abroad and the Rolls-Royce en- 
gineer coming over and selling his system. 131. 

Does not approve present lubricating system on Libertv motor. 
132. 

Aside from Liberty motor, Rolls-Royce engine regarded better 
than any other. 134. 

Has had no trouble in cooling Liberty engine. 136. 

Only got radiator suitable to Liberty motor within last couple 
of weeks. 137. 

Now uses same t} r pe of radiator used abroad by French and Eng- 
lish. 138. 

Other battery systems that could be used on Liberty motor. 143. 

Perfecting of motor should have been done in three months. 145. 

Delay in production due to lack of machinery. 146. 

Real production has not begun yet. 147. 

Col. Vincent in charge of perfecting motor during his absence. 
148. 

Ford Co. had gone ahead producing tools for the manufacture 
of 8-cylinder Liberty and were building 5,000, when it was 
abandoned. 149. 

Bureau of Standards inexperienced and not capable of making 
good block test of motors. 152. 

Motor w T as not air tested sufficiently. 152. 

Delay of probably three months in preliminary production, be- 
cause instead of perfecting design went ahead on production 
and testing products in air, and not sufficiently at that. 153. 

Delay in larger production due to lack of equipment and tool- 
makers and to manufacturers miscalculating. 154. 

Report of breakdown tests marked "Hall Exhibit 1, June 18, 
1918." 156. 

Part of report inserted in record. 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162. 

Instead of giving first experimental engines breakdown tests, 
were sidetracked for exhibition flying and show purposes. 

Had to redraw a great many of drawings and practically rewrote 
all specifications. 164. 

Continued down to February. 165. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 97 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall — Continued. 

Bad feature was manufacturing limits set, which also caused 

waste. 165. 
Tried to make machine like watch — impossible. 166. 
Would have been possible to have run breakdown tests on all 

motors between June and September. 167. 
If breakdown tests had been made before manufacturers started 

to make tools, it would have been much easier, as then they 

would not have had to make changes in tools. 168. 
Packard plant and Ford could have been turning out 10 motors 

each daily in January if breakdown tests had been made. 169. 
First 1,000 engines faulty by reason of having light crank shafts, 

light connecting rods, and light bearings. 170, 171. 
Dangerous condition, but motors were shipped abroad. 
Life of motors in service will probably average 50 to 75 hours, 

when it should be 300 hours. 171. 
Always against cost-plus contracts. 176. 
Do not create initiative to go ahead. 176. 

Estimated cost of Liberty motor $2,400, without overhead. 177. 
This price included manufacturing losses, such as parts spoiled 

and rejected. 
Manufacturing concern like Packard Motor Co. would incur no 

risks whatever in making Liberty motor under contract. It 

would have been a wonderful contract to get. 179. 
Thinks Liberty motor was a life-saver for Packard Co. 180. 
Up to two months previous Hall-Scott Co. built more motors 

than anybody else in this country. 182. 
Was offered contract for 1,000 Liberty 12's by Navy, but plant 

could not handle it. 182, 183. 
Under cost-plus contracts seems to be a tendency to use too many 

people to do a certain thing. 187. 
Looks to him as though some plants were loading up on machin- 
ery. 189. 
Engine manufacturers were claiming his figures were too low 

($2,400). 190. 
Basing overhead at 100 per cent, entire cost of engine would be 

$3,600. 192. 
With overhead 200 per cent, it would make entire cost $4,800. 

193. 
Plant using Taylor or similar system would probably have 200 

per cent overhead. 193. 
Would not build Liberty motor himself on a bogey price under 

$10,000 for two or three hundred motors. His price of $2,400 

was for a large production. 194. 
Five thousand motors would justify his price of $4,000, which 

includes overhead, for cost of a Liberty motor. 194. 
Mentioned this price ($4,000) to Col. Montgomery and Col. 

Deeds. Was told by them that manufacturers thought he was 

too low. 195. 
Was given full responsibility to get production in any way he 

could get it. 196. 
Got into production end through a meeting held in Maj. Gray's 

office, who had charge of production engineering. 197. 



98 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Haul — Continued. 

Only 75 per cent of drawings ready for machines because there 
was nobody who could complete the job. 199. 

Made model machines for each of plants, finishing Dayton- 
Wright model first, as they were only people who could com- 
plete job at this time. 

Machine guns and necessary mounting of them, method of put- 
ting in ammunition boxes, the radio and method of putting it 
into plane, photographic apparatus, and all other necessary 
apparatus was information lacking, and was holding back 
completion of planes. 200. 

Difficulty to get information accountable to lack of organization. 
200. 

Great deal of prejudice at Day ton- Wright plant to overcome. 
People in plant engineering organization and production men 
do not like an outsider to come in. 201. 

Signal Corps puts their men in plant and actually taught men 
how to do the work. 202. 

Inspection Department of Signal Corps very poor. 202. 

Way it was lined up would hold up production, and there was 
nobody actually responsible. 202. 

First machine produced was sent abroad without any equip- 
ment. Probably put it on over there. Anybody who knows 
business can put on equipment in two or three da} r s. 202. 

Supposed to be shipped complete. 202. 

Government inspectors did not inspect during assembling of 
machine, but waited until it was complete. They then gen- 
erally found 50 or 100 things wrong. 203. 

Dayton- Wright people had done a great deal to try to get infor- 
mation and necessary equipment. 201. 

No one connected with Equipment Division who knew business 
well enough to coordinate all that stuff. 201. 

Had to get appropriation to buy $195,000 worth of stuff which 
Ordnance Department should have furnished. Also helped 
Ordnance people to redesign their bomb-dropping apparatus. 
205. 

Concentrating on De Havilands first. 206. 

Took up Bristol job about April 11. 206. 

Curtiss Co. had contract for 2,000 Bristol planes, at estimated 
cost of $13,500,000, and had not started work on them in 
April. 208. 

They would have stayed in that same position for weeks and 
months if somebody had not taken it up. 208. 

Had made an effort to make headway, but practically all they 
did was to get in a row so that when he went there everybody 
was damning everybody else. 209. 

Curtiss Co. have not gotten into production of Bristol planes vet 
(June 18, 1918.) 209. 

Built two machines for testing purposes; break-down test; but 
two boys got killed because of failure of cloth. Grade A linen, 
specified by Specification Department of Signal Corps, is not 
strong enough. 210. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 99 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall — Continued. 

Does not know whether this fact was known before specification 
was made. 210. 

Considered original linen used (50 threads per inch) much bet- 
ter than linen called for in the specifications (98 threads per 
inch). 211. 

The linen was lower in quality than it should have been and 
should not have been passed by inspectors. 212. 

Q. " How did it happen that linen of that unsatisfactory 
quality was ordered?" — A. "From a laboratory standpoint 
they think is is the best. From a cloth-quality standpoint any- 
body would say it was the best. But the engineers, who have 
been in the airplane game from the practical side of it, think 
it is poor. We object to lots of things which the Signal Corps 
specify, just as we do in regard to the engines." 214. 

Engineers at work on specifications had no experience witli air- 
planes. 215. 

Thinks Orville Wright knows more about aerodynamics and 
airplanes than any other man in this country. 215. 

Believes there will be a shortage of motors. 216. 

Contracts with General Motors, of December 28, for 1,000 United 
States, 12; March 29, 1,000 United States, 12; April 1, 1,000 
spares, at a fixed price of $2,000,000 for spares, and an esti- 
mated cost on the cost-plus basis aggregating nearlv $14,000,- 
000 for the engines. 216, 217. 

Jobs handled under Government inspection are doubly difficult. 
217. 

Does not like Government system of inspection. Should have a 
man in the plant who is big enough to have a very small force 
and merely check the factory's inspection force. 218. 

Gradually turning his work at Dayton-Wright plant over to a 
Mr. Shepler, put there by the Government. 219. 

The average life of an engine (time beyond which it is not advis- 
able to repair) would be about 300 hours or 30,000 miles in the 
air. 221. 

Production on OX-t engine is more than necessarv for program. 
222. 

Availability of Le Khone rotary engine more than can be used. 
Made all drawings, specifications, and everything for that en- 
gine, and tried to keep them from building it; feeling it was 
too expensive, but foreign representatives impressed on them 
the necessity of building it. 222. 

No reason for maintaining the manufacture of rotary engines 
for airplanes in this country. Good secondary training en- 
gine, but cost is awfully high. 223. 

Hispano-Suiza engines available for practically secondary train- 
ing and single-plane fighters. 224. 

Curtiss Co. just started making an English single-seater fighter 
SE-5. 224. 

SE-5 is very small machine, while Bristol is a two-seater fighter 
and more of a reconnoissance plane. 224. 

Practically all Fiat parts, such as crank shafts, connecting rods, 
and valves are made in this country. 227, 228. 



100 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION.- 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall — Continued. 

Eeferring to plan to developing an all- American motor, minutes 
of the Aircraft Production Board of May 31, 1917, contain 
the following : " It is not intended that this plan should inter- 
fere in any way with the present production of training ma- 
chines or the plan to bring designs of French motors here at 
once for production." 228. 

Q. " Do you recall any reason why foreign engines that had 
stood satisfactory tests in the actual conduct of the war 
should not have been put in production here in 1917 ? " 
A. " Well, there were no motors, as I understand, which 
actually gave any real service, except the rotaries, at that 
time to my knowledge." The Navy was practically using 
the Rolls-Royce. 231. 

Germans had come out with a 6-cylinder, 160-horsepower 
Mercedes and maintained it ever since the war, and it is still 
in use in combat planes. 231. 

Condition at Curtiss's plant with respect to production of Bristol 
lighter on March 18 was a job-shop condition rather than a 
manufacturing condition. 235. 

Instead of redesigning Bristol plane to receive Liberty motor, 
should have ended it by stating plane was not suited to motor. 
237. 

Government engineers at that time were not very practical, but 
more or less green. 238. 

One of the mistakes of the Production Board to insist upon 
Bristol. 239. 

Bad selection of engineering talent, given as explanation of de- 
lay. 240. 

Delay in production of Bristol fighters at Curtiss's plant due to 
mistakes of Engineering Department. 241. 

One day the French would go to the Production Board and sell 
them one of their designs, next day the English would sell 
them their design, next day the Italians, and the next day the 
Russians, and that made it very difficult for anyone over here, 
who did not know, to be advised. 241, 242. 

Practically rebuilt Bristol plane from one end to other but still 
called Bristol fighter. 242. 

Released 400 and intends to release 800 of old Bristol plane to 
hold Curtiss organization together. Can be used for secondary 
training. 243. 

Mr. Marlin brought back synchronizer from England in unde- 
veloped state last September but practically nothing was done 
on it. 245. 

Plane program held up work on synchronizers and vice versa. 
246. 

McCook Field organized for experimental work first and mak- 
ing all installations and changes. 248. 

Lincoln Motor Co.'s contract for Liberty motors very advan- 
tageous to them. 252. 

Reason for waiting for the development of a new plant for the 
manufacture of Liberty motors was Mr. Leland's reputation 
as a manufacturer of high-class articles. 253. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 101 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall — Continued. 

Policy of Ford plant not to manufacture anything until they 
know just exactly what they are going to do, and are sure of 
their ground. 256. 

Expect to get 1,500 motors this month, but he does not believe 
they will get a thousand. 256. 

Packard Co. promised 700 engines for month of June, Lincoln 
650, Ford 500, and the Buick and Cadillac 300, but from what 
he knows of their estimates, he has cut them all on an average 
of 50 per cent, but thinks he can gamble more on Ford's pro- 
duction of motors than anybody else. 257. 

It takes one and a half motors per plane. 261. 

Do not ship planes abroad without extra motors. 261. 

Present program for Liberty motors something like 150 motors 
a day. 262. 

Q. "What is being produced, or will be so in 30 days? '' — 
A. " Thirty days from now not over 60 or 70 a day." 262. 

Thinks Dayton- Wright Co. would increase their production of 
planes to 40 a dav within 90 days if enough pressure was 
used. 264. 

Program for De Haviland planes overestimated. 266. 

Was in charge of getting production speeded up in the Dayton- 
Wright, Fisher Body Co., and Curtiss plants since February. 
270. 

Would not have been any production unless he had been doing 
this work. 270. 

Never furnished Planning Department any information which 
would justify them in making an estimate of production as 
appears to have been made under date of March 18, 1918. 
271. 

Paper referred to was filed and marked " Hall Exhibit 4, June 
18, 1918." 271. 

Program of Planning Department that total in view of De 
Haviland 4's on August 2, 1917, was 8,000; on August 10 it 
was 7,500; on August 22 it was 5,000; August 24 it was 6,000; 
and on August 25 it became 15,000 ; six days later, August 31, 
it was reduced to 6,000; on September 4 it was increased to 
15,000; on October 17 it fell to 250; on October 29 it was in- 
creased to 1,000; on January 18 increased to 2,600; on Feb- 
ruary to 4,500; and on February 19 to 8,000, at which it re- 
mained. 272. 

Does not know of any reason why a program should change so. 
273. 

Minutes of meeting of Aircraft Board on April 18, 1918, shows 
Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Co. were encouraged to 
prepare for production 150 motors a day, without regard 
to the size of their outstanding contracts, and with Govern- 
ment's assurance of protection in the necessary investments. 
274. 

Letter from Capt. Rowe setting forth reasons for necessitated 
delay in producing present DE^-r machines over time which 
might have been required to reproduce the English machine. 
283. 



102 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Elbert John Hall — Continued. 

In order to get planes out, it was necessary to have some of 
them made in more or less of a crude form rather than made 
from tools. Could not wait to make up dies. 289. 

Considers job was getting worse every day up to the time he 
went on it due to lack of coordination. 294. 

Does not know why Dayton- Wright Co. did not go ahead on 
Col. Deeds's order for 250 planes. 295. 

Thinks it would have been advisable to go ahead with manu- 
facture of these planes in October. 296. 

Lewis gun only being used on single-seater fighters by British. 
297. 

Lewis gun is nothing more than a rifle. It is not really a ma- 
chine gun. 298. 

Manufacture of a bullet-proof gas tank is a considerable job. 
299. 

Would say there have been 2,500 corrections in last 60 days on 
D H 4's. 301. 

Thinks they had a great deal more training planes than were 
necessary. 302. 

Fisher Body Co. to build Caproni planes in addition to De Havi- 
lands. 303. 

Parts for Caproni's planes being made by a lot of small furni- 
ture concerns in Michigan. 305. 

JN planes made at Standard Co. withdrawn from service. 306. 

Believes he could have accelerated production, if he had had op- 
portunity. 309. 

Made as high as 453 horsepower for seven hours with Liberty 
engine. 310. 

Average horsepower of Liberty was 420. 311. 

Liberty motor has lowest consumption of gas and oil of any 
motor ever built, except possiblv special stationary engines. 
313. 

Considers Liberty most economical engine to-day. 314. 

Propaganda at Day ton- Wright plant that Signal Corps was a 
pretty rotten organization. 315. 

Did not blame them for this propaganda in a way, because it 
was really brought about by the general organization scheme 
that existed of the Signal Corps. 315. 

Under date of February 9 Col. Deeds directs the taking the DH 9 
out of production for Vincent to change design. 316. 

Twelve-cylinder Liberty motor is faster than the Rolls-Royce. 
317. 

Gives names and uses of various aviation fields near Davton- 
Wright plant, 318, 319, 320, 321. 

Engineering department could have been located at field ad- 
joining Day ton- Wright plant. 321. 

Now uses McCook Field, which is used entirely for this class of 
work. 320. 

A million dollars invested in McCook Field. 323. • 
Gutzon John Lemothe Borgltjm — Recalled. (Washington, D. C, 
June 18, 1918; Book 5.) 

Letters from President to Mr. Borglum regarding his investiga- 
tion. 327 to 348, inclusive. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 103 

Gtttzon John Lemothe Borglum — Continued. 

Col. Deeds one of the owners of Dayton Metal Products Co. 
350. 

Col. Deeds owner of McCook's Experimental Field at Dayton, 
upon which the Government is spending considerable money. 
352. 

States Col. Deeds is part owner of the buildings and properties 
occupied by Dayton-Wright Airplane Co., with which he 
placed Government contracts for over $50,000,000. 354. 

Col. Deeds, as managing vice president of National Cash Reg- 
ister Co., was indicted and convicted, with a jail sentence, etc. 
359. 

Col. Deeds, as chairman of subcommittee on fuses and detonators 
of Council of National Defense, had committee pass a resolu- 
tion allotting fuses only to companies that had made Russian 
fuses. 365. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. was only company that had made 
such fuses. 365. 

Col. Deeds sought and secured a place on Aircraft Board. 367. 
(Aircraft Production Board.) 

Col. Deeds made statement to witness that he would tie up 
$320,000,000 available for plane production before week's end. 
373. 

Preliminary report of Mr. Borglum states: "He further (sup- 
ported by documentary evidence and witnesses) to be a heavy 
beneficiary in contracts and directs that there shall be no 
inspection of materials from his company. He increases in a 
pencil stroke a contract for his ignition system from 15,000 
to 20,000, and excludes this item from further consideration 
and forbids competition bv other makers. This item alone 
appears to run into something near four millions." He — re- 
ferring to Col. Deeds. 373, 374. 

Witness questioned as to evidence he has to substantiate above. 
374, 375, 376. 

Letter from Col. Deeds to Aircraft Production Board finder 
date of August 28, 1917, setting forth his corporate interests. 
377, 378, 379. 

Witness questioned as to truth of statements in this letter and 
his reasons for believing them not correct. 380, 381, 382, 383, 
384, 385, 386, 387. 

Col. Deeds was a stockholder and officer in the following : 
United States Motors Corporation, of New York. 
Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co., of Dayton. 
Dayton Metal Products Co., of Dayton. 
Domestic Building Co. of Dayton. 378. 
An incorporator of Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 
President and large stockholder in Domestic Engineering 

Co., of Dayton. 379. 
Owns ground embraced in Moraine Experimental Flying 
Field, near Dayton, used for aviation purposes. 379. 

Has severed connection with first four of above-named corpora- 
tions. 378. 

United States Motor Corporation has order for 2,000 motors. 
388. 



104 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Gutzon John Lemothe Bqrgltjm — Continued. 

Col. Deeds and Mr. Kettering, made three and a half million 
apiece on transfer of stock to United States Motor Corpora- 
tion. 389. 

Has no other documentary evidence than typewritten statement 
by a Mr. Ohmer. 393. 

Use of Delco ignition system in connection with Liberty motor 
all a part of Deeds's work. 394. 

Col. Deeds was allowing Splitdorf people to go to great expense 
in experimenting with system for application of magneto igni- 
tion system to Liberty motor when he had already ordered 
20,000 of those systems on 20,000 motors. 395. 

No tests had been made of Delco ignition system. 396. 

Lieut. Sloane of accounts section gave him information. 397. 

Col. Deeds "directs that there shall be no inspection of materials 
from his company" (the Delco Ignition Co.). 398. 

Deeds increased order from 15,000 to 20,000 by pencil stroke. 399. 

Deeds left room and had order signed by some one else. 400. 

Ford says that Kettering stated — either Kettering or Vincent — 
that they literally placed cylinders so that no other system 
could go in there. 401. 

Deeds, Waldon, Montgomery, and Coffin created cost-plus form 
of contract. 403. 

Cost-plus system has " been the agent for more general dissatis- 
faction, waste of money, excessive overcharges, and establish- 
ment of an unnatural, if not corrupt, relationship between the 
board and contractors than all other conditions prevailing." 
404. 

Q. " Have you any information that in the actual working 
out of the cost-plus contract there has been any corruption 
anywhere ? " 404. 

" I mean by that an intentional inflation of costs, laxity in 
the sense of intentional looseness in inspection in order to per- 
mit an undue allowance by the Government, computing of 
pay rolls, or anything at all which would give you a basis for 
a charge of corruption in the execution of the cost-plus con- 
tract." 405. 

A. " There are wagon loads of that." 405. 

Cites Trego factory as an instance. 405. 

Does not know what Mr. Talbott's salary was before he started 
in, but he is now getting $30,000 or $35,000 a year, his son the 
same, and possiblv Mr. Kettering the same. 406. 

Mingle, president of the Standard Co., got $62,000 a year. 406. 

Trego got contract for three and a half million dollars, went to 
New York and borrowed a million five hundred thousand dol- 
lars from bank, stating he would make that amount on his 
contract. 407. 

Has used up six or seven hundred and odd thousand dollars and 
75 per cent of it wasted. 407. 

Curtiss plant has been carrying 13,000 to 14,000 people on its 
pay rolls under a cost-plus contract and has been suffering from 
60 to 70 per cent id]eness; it has been toying with our con- 
tracts and yielding us nothing. 409. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 105 

<xutzon John Lemotiie Borglum — Continued. 

Curtiss plant has acreage and man power enough to turn oat 565 
planes a day if it were put into the hands of a good organi- 
zation and were allowed to go forward. 410. 

Day ton- Wright plant utterly incompetent, 411. 

Never could satisfy himself why the Fisher Body Corporation 
got any order. 414. 

Eugene Mayer financed the Fisher Body Corporation. 414. 
June 19, 1919 : 

Col. Deeds soon after his entrance on the aircraft work boasted 
ability to name 80 'officers in the Signal Corps. 412. 

Albert Badlow sold the Dayton-Wright Co. cotton for linen. 
422. 

Lieut. E. C. Charles Comston, an appointee of Deeds, assisted 
Havward to prepare a report for the Senate investigation re- 
port. 423. 

Capt. A. W. Corndorf knows of connection of Deeds with fuze 
committee. 424. 

Capt. Christy, Production Department, Signal Corps, appointee 
of Deeds/ 425. 

Dr. Orlando Ducker, examining physician of the Signal Corps, 
knew a family in northern Maryland by the name of Dietz, 
who had a cousin by the name of Dietz, who changed his name 
to Deeds, that lived in Ohio. 426. 

Halph M. Easley, Metropolitan Tower, a Gevernment agent, in- 
vestigated Mr. Borglum. 426, 427. 

Flint L. W. F. Co., College Point, claimed to have built 30 sea- 
planes on verbal order of Deeds. 427. 

Mix stated that Deharbor, secretary and treasurer of the Dayton- 
Wright Aeroplane Co., was a German spy and had been ar- 
rested as such and interned in the Federal Prison at Atlanta. 
430. 

Quoting Mix, " Deeds is a crook." 431. 

Lieut. Harly, private secretary of Deeds. 438. 

"" Congressman William Schley Howard had some very interest- 
ing experience with Deeds and the board in trying to get them 
to accept a plane that was invented by one of his constituency. 
Howard's people were to build this plane at no cost to the 
Government." 439. 

Deeds appears to be interested in J. G. White Co. 450. 

Lieut. Ryerson, in charge of propellers, appointee of Deeds. 
450. 

Was told that Col. Montgomery obtained a loan of $4,000,000 
for Curtiss people and got it through his own financial con- 
nections, but does not implicate him. 453. 

Loan was afterwards taken up by Government loaning them 
money and the loans finally amounted to something like eight 
or nine million dollars. 453, 454. 

Maj . Charles Sligh had charge of spruce for Aircraft Board ; was 
associated with Deeds in the early part of activities. 454. 

William H. Schlott well posted on Deeds and board's activities. 
Was told by Vincent to raise his price on figure submitted. 
Vincent told him to base his figures at $25 per horsepower. 
455. 



108 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Gtjtzon John Lemothe Borglum — Continued. 

Eefers to contract of Lewis Spring & Axle Co. on Liberty 
motors. Stated would make any number for $3,000 and make 
a great deal of money out of it. 455. 

Did not get an engine order. 455. 

Mr. Harris, of Contract Department, with reference to a bid of 
Lewis Spring & Axle Co. for spare parts, stated, " You had 
better raise your figure $500. We are going before the Mili- 
tary Committee and we do not want to show any discrepancy." 
456. 

Awarded contract for 400 sets of spares for Bristol fighters at a 
fixed price of $1,890,000 under date of February 4, 1918. 457. 

H. E. Talbott, jr., vice president of Dayton-Wright Co., at sal- 
ary of $30,000 a year, was Deeds's private secretary when he 
first came to Washington. 459. 

Vauclain, associated with Deeds in fuse contracts; should be 
investigated. 459. 

Capt. Marmon was under Deeds's control. 463. 

Col. Deeds reported to own 55 per cent of the stock of the Bijou 
Electric Co., of Jersey City. 467. 

Made a mistake in stating yesterday that United Motors had a 
contract with Government ; should have been General Motors. 
470. 

Lieut. Lufkin, formerly at the testing laboratory of the Signal 
Corps at the Navy Department, too honest and was sent away. 
471. 

Col. Deeds " Blocked the production of lenses in America and 
succeeded in ordering their estoppal while under manufacture 
in a rival company in Dayton, so that now the metal parts of 
the range finders are completed without the lenses — therefore 
rendered useless. 483. 

Gen. Squier only made one report to him. First report was 
good and useful. " Then I began to meet obstacles every- 
where." 488. 

Lieutenant assigned to him as stenographer. 489. . 

" Owing to almost complete failure of Deeds's immediate asso- 
ciates and partners in Dayton to deliver standard machines, 
he is protecting them, it is believed, by holding back produc- 
tion in other companies." 490. 

Referring to Mr. Coffin, " He has, however, issued and is daily 
causing to be issued, statements hostile, untrue, unfounded, 
deceiving our own people, excepting those who understand, but 
not deceiving allies or enemies." 496. 

Refers to article in Saturday Evening Post. 496. 

Has quite a little stuff that corroborates what he has gone into. 
502. 
Charles M. Addas (June 20, 1918; Book 6). 

Residence, Highland Avenue, Newark, N. J. Employed as 
service manager with New York Lubricating Oil Co. in 1915. 
On French front and later connected with American Air 
Service. Services consisted of collecting and classifying vari- 
ous papers, confidential documents in connection with the- 
French Government. 3. 



ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 107 

Charles M. Addas — Continued. 

Speaks of a contract for five or six thousand planes from French 
Government to be delivered before July 1, this year. 4. 

Understanding that United States was to supply raw materials 
and necessary machine tools. 5. 

Arrangement with British Government to deliver 20 squadrons 
of machines. 6. 

Knows that shipment of raw material and machine tools had 
been greatly delayed. 8. 

No deliveries made at all up to the time he left for tour of 
inspection, January 26, 1918. 8. 
Referring to machines. 

Mr. Hughes read statement of airplanes and engines ordered in 
France. 8. 

Goes into detail about tour of inspection. 12. 

(Recital of inspection trip continues to page 27.) 

Estimates the total number of planes delivered under the con- 
tract on the completion of his tour to be about 900. 28. 

French Government directly influenced in annulling the con- 
tract of August 30 through the delay in sending raw material 
from this country. 31. 

Four hundred cadets without training planes at Saint Traxient 
due to failure of French Government to supply training 
planes. 33. 

Charges that failure of French Government to make delivery 
was due to lack of foresight on the part of the American Ex- 
peditionary Forces. 33. 

Lack of planes at training centers. 39. 

Resigned position with Air Service because of these bad condi- 
tions. 45. 

Col. Boiling lost his administrative power on the arrival of 
Gen. Foulois in France. 17-48. 

Writes letter to John D. Ryan stating that he would like to 
inform him of conditions in France. 48. 

u Necessary cooperation from America seemed to be lacking." 
52. 

Lack of personnel; took weeks to answer an important cable- 
gram regarding production, 53. 

Things wanted over there did not seem to arrive from America. 
54. 

Cites foreign criticism on Liberty motor. 58. 

(This evidently pertains to the first lot of motors.) 

Gen. Foulois did not seem to approve of inspection trip by Maj. 
Greene in Italy. 60. 

Afraid this information might be used against Foulois, 60. 

Had opportunity of purchasing Fiat Co. Scia machines (2,000), 
" but for some reason no action was taken." 64. 

Mr. Hughes reads minutes of Aircraft Board. 66. 

Unable to discover a contract for Scia machines, although that 
should have been a part of the record. 71. 

(Many papers that could not be found. Files in poor condi- 
tion. 72. 

Mr. Hughes reads from minutes of Aircraft Board. 77. 



108 ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION-. 

Charles M. Addas — Continued. 

Lost on an average of two men a day at one of the French camps, 
due to accidents. 84. 

(At this point there is a page missing in the record.) 

Considers the men at the head of different departments were 
too young. 88. 

Because there was a change in the head, Gen. Foulois taking 
charge, Col. Boiling's personnel and Maj. Greene's personnel 
had nothing to do for several weeks. 90-91. 

Foulois took charge, and the work that Col. Boiling had been 
doing was duplicated, throwing Boiling's personnel out of 
work, and they did nothing. 91. 

Addas gives as his reason, on cross-examination, for resign- 
ing, that his department was thrown out of work and soldiers 
not being protected by proper airplane service. 
Capt. Allen H. Zacharias (June 20, 1918; Book 6). 

Residence Detroit. Occupation before commission in Signal 
Corps was that of a manufacturer, buicler and designer of 
houses. Was placed in charge of planning department of 
the Signal Corps, and is also liaison officer in Gen. Johnson's 
office. 93-95. 

Judge Hughes : " Have you any original data in your office 
which will show how it happened that on August 21 it was 
contemplated that there would be 6,000 De Haviland 1's, and 
on August 25, 15,000, and on August 31 it is back to 6,000. 
and on September 1 it is up to 15,000, and on October 17 it is 
down to 250?"— A. " I have not." 101. 

Asked further as to similar variations, 103. 

States that shifting of program was due to optimism. 111. 

Is asked to show data setting forth that there was any reason- 
able expectation by anyone in the Signal Corps that these 
planes would be delivered in accordance with expectation. 
113. 

Exhibit Zacharias No. 3 produced. 116. 

Exhibit Zacharias No. 1 produced. 117. 

Exhibit Zacharias No. 5 produced. 118. 

In making up programs of production he would go to his ex- 
ecutive officer, Col. Horner, to have them approved. Also to 
Col. Montgomeiy. 119. 
Col. Henry B. Joy (June 20, 1918; Book 6). 

Letter written by Col. Joy to Mr. Hughes filed and marked 
Exhibit Joy No. 1, June 20, 1918. 128. 

History of Liberty Motor, with photographs, filed and marked 
Exhibit Joy No. 7, June 20. 128. 

Quotes from notebook in which he said no product would 
be forthcoming until well after the first of the year. 

Offers explanation of testimony on a previous day when he 
stated that the reason why the motor was made so light was 
because the French engineers pressed for it. 130. 

Explains how the Packard Co. acquired through Ralph de Palma 
the Mercedes motor, due to the fact that de Palma could not 
get any more parts from Germany. 136. 

Did not make any estimate of the cost of the Liberty motor, 12 
cylinder in its development. 137. 









ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 109 

John W. Stagers (June 20, 1918; Book 6). 

This consists of a description of papers produced by Mr. Stagers. 
110. 

A pamphlet was produced which showed the earnings of the 
Curtiss Co. to be $1,000,000 monthly. 143. 

A weekly market letter covering the Curtiss Aeroplane Co. is 
filed. 144. 

Residence, Washington and New York. Member of the Wash- 
ington Bar. Also Missouri, Colorado, and the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Represents Gutzon Borglum. 147. 

Recites statement of Mr. Metz, of the Metz Motor Co., that he is 
" a German through and through, and I would close my fac- 
tory before I would allow munitions of war to be manufactured 
to be shot at my own people," this statement being made a 
considerable time before the United States entered the war. 
149. 

The information that the Metz Motor Co. was manufacturing 
depth bombs and other war work " struck me like a dagger," 
says Mr. Staggers. 150. 

Made a report to the Department of Justice in November. 151. 

Cites a case where a manufacturer with several hundred thou- 
sand feet of spruce ready to build aeroplanes was somewhat 
discourteously " turned down " when he applied for a con- 
tract. 151. 
William Harold Workman (June 20, 1918; Book 6). 

Temporary residence, Hotel Biltmore, New York. Lived in 
England for past six or seven years. Home is in Cleveland, 
and is an American citizen. Since May 4 of last year has 
been in this country representing Mr. Handley-Paige, of 
Handley-Paige Aircraft Co. of England. 154. 

States Handley-Paige machine is in the course of production 
and that the first machine will be flying in about three weeks' 
time. Machine produced at the Standard Aircraft Corpora- 
tion. 155. 

Standard Co. only corporation assembling the machine, but 
about 20 other concerns are making different parts. 155. 

Told by Mr. Waldon and Mr. Deeds last May that there would 
be no bombing planes in the program. 156. 

Offers to sell the rights of Handley-Paige Co. in United States. 
156. 

(Goes into lengthy recital.) 

Found that everything that had been done would have to be cor- 
rected and that about $400,000 had been wasted. 163. 

Cites a considerable agreement increase in wages of six men from 
England which had already been stipulated before coming to 
United States. 164. 

These six men taken from under the supervision of Mr. Work- 
man — " should not communicate with me whatsoever on any 
subject." These men, however, were brought here by Mr. 
Workman as his staff. 165. 



110 ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 

William Harold Workman — Continued. 

Claims he could have had machines on the western front with- 
in 90 days, but that the Signal Corps even in January and 
February and up to the middle of March 50 per cent of the 
parts for the production of this machine had not been con- 
tracted for. 165. 

British Government led to believe they were going to have thou- 
sands of airplanes to assemble and made arrangement to do 
so. 166. 

Schedule was drawn up months before that calling for at least 
50 sets of Handley-Paige parts by the 1st of May. 167. 

Several officers came back from England in an endeavor to 
speed up program, but states " I have only seen one of them 
for a few hours since I got here Tuesday morning." 

Changes made against Mr. Chamberlin's recommendations, even 
though he was the chief of the staff of six men. 169. 

The cruising radius of the American-built Handley-Paige had 
been reduced and the American machine was 33^ efficient 
compared with plane turned out in England. 169. 

Produced a copy of offer made on Mav 31. 1917. Marked 
" Workman Exhibit 1, June 20, 1918.'' 

Gen. Cormack arrived here with certain drawings. 172. 

Recites details of attempt to get drawings. 173. 

Declares if they had any intention of making the machine they 
should have come to him first. 180. 

Declares they were showing hostility toward every effort that 
he was making. 181. 

States they did not want to make the Handley-Paige plane or 
make it a success. 182. 

Signal Corps did not seem to contemplate making parts ap- 
propriate to the Handley-Paige and sending them to the» 
other side for assembly. 183. 

Exhibit Workman No. 2 produced, which is an agreement be- 
tween United States Government and Workman. 186. 

Handley-Paige machine United States is now trying to produce 
is obsolete. British put new machine in air four weeks ago. 
189. 

Reiterates the statement that within 90 days he would have been 
making at least 100 machines a week. 193. 

Would use either Rolls-Royce or Sunbeam engine. 193. 

Was not his idea Rolls-Royce engine could be put into pro- 
duction in 90 days in this country. 193. 

German Gotha plane is a reproduction of Handley-Paige. 199. 

Were using Sunbeam engine satisfactorily in England. 199. 

Reiterates that due to the Signal Corps officers not having proper 
drawings there was a loss of approximately $400,000 in wasted 
work and materials. 200. 

Reads from minutes of Aircraft Board of January 17, 1918. 
201. 

British Government, acting under the impression that the Sig- 
nal Corps was going to produce 1,500 Handley-Paige ma- 
chines, sent men abroad to get the assembly plant ready. 205. 

This building has been standing since the 1st of May and are 
waiting now to get the parts. 208. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. Ill 

William Harold Workman — Continued. 

Mr. Hughes gives it as his understanding that the production 
of these 1,500 Handley-Paige machines was going on with in- 
complete drawings when Workman returned to the United 
States in December, 1917, and that the work had to be done 
all over again. And Mr. Workman states that is correct. 211. 

Does not believe the Signal Corps intended producing any 
Handley-Paige planes, because they ignored technical advice, 
help, and assistance of Handley-Paige in person. 213. 

Mr. Hughes reads letter from office of Chief Signal Officer 
to Col. Blomfield, Air Division. 216. 

Mr. Hughes reads extracts from minutes of several meetings of 
the Aircraft Board. 220-222. 

Letter from chief of Mr. Workman's mechanical staff is pro- 
duced. 226. 

Mr. Workman is unable to account for the fact that the salary 
of the men of his mechanical staff was increased by the Signal 
Corps and that they were notified not to have anything to do 
with him. 230. 

Mr. Workman is told by Col. Montgomery that he had nothing 
to do with the construction of the Handley-Paige machine. 
233. 

Provision in contract that salary of men was to be paid to Mr. 
Workman was not carried out. 235. 

Likens driving a bombing plane with a high speed motor, such 
as the Liberty, to driving a 5-ton truck with racing car engine. 
237. 

Report by Mr. Chamberlain covering present state of production 
at Standard Works produced. 238. . 

In the production of Handley-Paige machine they have ignored 
mature advice from England. Result is, machine is heavy and 
dead. 243. 

Cites comparative test of Liberty motor and Matabele motor. 
251. 

States he could have had 5,000 Handley-Paige planes " over 
there " by this time. 256. 

Makes a final statement that Signal Corps can not know as much 
about a foreign machine as those who produce it and that they 
should take into consultation the original designers of the 
Handley-Paige plane. 257. 
Capt. Allen H. Zacharias (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Certain program schedules produced. 259. 
Capt. Robert Lewis Chamberlain (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Holds rank of captain in Signal Corps. Duties since first of 
year that of keeping production record of the planning sec- 
tion. 285. 

Quotes from book contemplated production from month to month 
and states this information came from Capt. Zacharias. 289. 

This book will show exactly the number that have been delivered 
by any company. 292. 

130687—19 8 



112 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Capt. Clement R. Ford (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Holds rank of captain in Aviation Section. Is assistant to CoL 
Horner, chief of executive staff. In this position about 10 
weeks. Duties ; general office administration. 293. 
Lieut. Edward W. Clark, 3d (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Worked in Approvals Section, finance department of Equipment 
Division, in charge of property officers. Since March 1, acted 
as aid to Col. Wolff, in the Finance Department. 297. 

Later duties were to take charge of property officers at the 
various plants. 300. 
Henry Lockhart, Jr. (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Residence, New York (city). "New York, Rye." In charge 
of materials department in Bureau of Aircraft Production of 
Signal Corps. Duties of the department are to procure ma- 
terials necessary in production of airplanes, except motors and 
instruments. In this work since January 31. 308. 

Files Lockhart Exhibit No. 1, which shows history of activities 
of his department, 308. 

President of Goodrich Lockhart Co., New York. 310. At one 
time president of Wright-Martin Co. 311. 

Col. W. B. Thompson and others own the Wright-Martin Co. 
to-day. 312. 

Has no connections with any company doing business with Gov- 
ernment. 313. 

Instructed to furnish raAv materials abroad. 315. 

Shipped British, French, and Italians their requirements regu- 
larly. 316. 

In certain instances made discrimination between materials 
needed by these countries for either their own production and 
that of the United States forces. 316. 

States that in his opinion the fault lies with the J. G. White 
Co. in delays to provide raw materials for production of planes 
in France. 319-320. 

Not the slightest reason, in his mind, why raw materials should 
not have been provided. 320. 

Claims that part of the delay was due to the French methods 
being slow. 322. 

Says Col. Disque (under Gen. Squier direct), had to do with the 
letting of spruce contracts. 325. 

States how he got into relation with the Signal Corps. 326. 

Also has to do with the purchase of propeller woods. 327. 

Cites method of purchasing hardwoods. 329. 

Filed Lockhart Exhibit No. 3. 332. 

Also cites discussion which took place at a meeting called in 
Washington to take up the mahogany situation. 335. 

Contract price about $320 per thousand feet. 336. 

Manufacturers submitted statements to him showing their cost 
of operation. 338. 

Explains how it is that the price at the higher figure per thou- 
sand feet of cost is no greater than previously. 341. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 113 

Henry Lockhart, Jr. — Continued. 

States they will use substitutes. Oak. 343. 

States requirements for balance of year will be about 21,000,000 

feet, excluding England. (There is a large discrepancy in 

figures at the bottom of this page.) 344. 
This amount should take care of about 140,000 propellers. 345. 
Thirty thousand planes would be supplied with this amount of 

propellers. 346. 
Files Lockhart Exhibit No. 4 showing complete list of contracts. 

347. 
Reads amount of woods under contract at this time. 353. 
States supply depends a great deal on the ships that will be 

allotted them by the Shipping Board. 361. 
Boats taken out of charter that had been chartered for the work 

of carrying food to the natives producing the wood. 365. 
Twenty million feet required this year yet to be shipped from 

foreign ports. 370. 
Has not consulted Federal Trade Commission in regard to estab- 
lishing cost. 372. 
Has not been to Federal Trade Commission on any woods, but 

has gone to War Industries Board. 370. 
Mr. Legge or Mr. Chamberlain, of War Industries Board, 

passed on costs of this material. 375. 
Files in Lockhart's office would show data with respect to con- 
tract for mahogany. 377. 
Reads minutes of Aircraft Board of March 7. 381. 
Recites accident the other day due to quality of linen, or supposed 

linen. 382. 
It was claimed cloth had been reduced to a tensile strength of 

only 3,0 pounds. 383. 
Never had any dealings with Joseph S. Otis except on two occa- 
sions, one with regard to work and another with regard to 

statement by Otis that Lockhart was connected with some 

hardwood company. 385. 
Has no memory of any communications from Otis regarding 

price of mahogany or that it was exorbitant, 387. 
Endeavored to ascertain a fair price giving a reasonable profit. 

389. 
Cites shortage of linen and hardwood lumber for propeller-blade 

stock. 392. 
Capt. Allen H. Zacharias (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Files report (weekly) marked " Exhibit Zacharias No. 38." 395. 
States different classes of information at his office which are 

available. 396. 
Files schedule for February 8, Exhibit Zacharias 39. 398. 
Statement of promised and actual deliveries of orders placed 

in France of planes and engines marked " Exhibit Zacharias 

No. 40, June 21." 399. 
Translates pages 7 and 8 of Exhibit 44. 400. 



114 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Dean Langmuir (June 21, 1918; Book 6). 

Holds rank of major, Aviation Section, Signal Corps, since 

August 29. In civilian life was an accountant. Up to March 

29 had charge of all accounts in connection with production 

of airplanes and engines. Since March 20 has been waiting 

to go to Europe. 401. 
For past few weeks has been absolutely idle. 405. 
Vouchers coming in from plants submitted to accounts section. 

406. 
Is somewhat evasive when questioned as to what should go 

in as salaries. 407-408. 
Acted under orders from Col. Wolff with respect to salaries. 

410. 
Salarv of Mr. Mengel, president of Standard Aircraft Co., 

$62^,000 a year. 411. 
However, salary has never been allowed, although Maj. Lang- 
muir passed the voucher. 413. 
All salaries came before rulings board, whose duty it was to 

consider the salary paid. 414. 
Howaed E. Coffin (June 24, 1918; Book 6). 

Mr. Hughes reads resolution of Council of National Defense 

creating Aircraft Production Board. 418. 
Mr. Coffin was left at liberty to select the civilian members of 

the Aircraft Production Board, but does " not think " he was 

as regards official personnel. 422. 
Waldon, Deeds, and Montgomery were designated by Mr. 

Coffin! 423. 
Col. Montgomery knew nothing of aircraft or aeronautics be- 
fore his connection with this board. 424. 
Discussion of the selection of men continued up to page 436. 
Cites the origin of the production program. 437. 
Tells what Production Board had to do with organization of 

Signal Corps for securing production. 440. 
States how work was divided between Deeds, Montgomery, 

and Waldon. 446. 
Gen. Squier was Col. Deeds's immediate superior. 446. 
Makes a brief statement up to Mr. Potter's coming in. 448. 
Now continues statement from the time Potter came in. 459. 
Makes statement as to information and supervision of aircraft 

production. 468. 
States that board did nothing as interference was resented by 

the Army, particularly coming from a civilian quarter. 470. 
Kept in touch with existing conditions, that is, as to rapidity of 

work, designs, etc., only in a general way. 473. 
Board relied practically entirely upon the information given by 

representatives of Army and Navy. 473, 474. 
Understood work was going forward satisfactorily. 474. 
Visited several plants. 476. 
States that manufacturers hesitated to talk to him as chairman 

of the Aircraft Board when their accountability was to the 

military department. 476. 
Did not think he should go thoroughly into the question of a 

concern's production on his visits. 480. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 115 

Howard E. Coffin — Continued. 

Did not regard it the duty of the Aircraft Board to see that 
production was brought along in accordance with the pro- 
gram. 482. 

Mr. Hughes enters on the record an order regarding the func- 
tions of the Aircraft Board signed by Gen. Squier and ap- 
proved by Secretary Baker. 483. 

Understood that the equipment division was responsible with 
respect to the performance of contracts. 490. 

Mr. Hughes asks what possible value the recommendation of 
the Aircraft Board could have. 497. 

States situation with regard to the anticipation of the success- 
ful carrying out of the program. 499. 

Eeads minutes of Aircraft Board of January 3, 1918. 501. 

Was informed by Signal Corps that 1,900 combat planes would 
be ready by July 1, and which was the testimony given to 
Senate committee. 502. 

Thinks military organization dropped their initiative due to 
investigations. 505. 

There seems to be a break in the testimony at this point. (See 
pp. 506, 507.) 

Thinks the injection of Potter, Fletcher, and Kellogg was an 
advantage. 508. 

Makes a statement in re Col. Deeds's administration. 508. 

Made no serious inquiries into equipment division. 509. 

Questioned as to whether any inquiry was made as to whether 
the equipment division would accomplish its results. 512. 

Tells whole history of article which appeared in the Saturday 
Evening Post on January 5, 1918, written by Mr. Coffin. 513. 

Knows nothing of the picture which headed his article illus- 
trating a certain make of aeroplane. 

Does not recall supplying any specific facts in connection with 
this article. 518. 

Mr. Hughes refers to minutes of Aircraft Board of December 
13 referring to an article in the Saturday Evening Post of 
January 19, 1918. 519. 

Mr. Hughes further reads minutes of Aircraft Board under 
date of December 5, 1917, pertaining to publicity. 521. 

Had nothing to do with preparation of Zacharias Exhibit No. 
1, pertaining to a program of De Haviland 4's. 523. 

Conversant with program contained in Zacharias Exhibit No. 5, 
which states that 2,000 machines would be delivered by the 
end of June. 531. 

Admits that statement of McConaghy Exhibit No. 9, was mis- 
leading. 538. 

Informed substantially to the same effect by Col. Deeds. 538. 

Explains the fact that efforts on the part of Aircraft Board 
was regarded as butting in. 540. 

Legal department of Signal Corps originated cost-plus system 
of contracting. 543. 

Explains how he got the so-called bogey cost. 544. 

Mr. Hughes reads minutes of board on August 24, 1917. 545. 



116 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Howard E. Coffin — Continued. 

Also of minutes of Aircraft Board on August 31, 1917. 516. 
Above minutes pertain to cost of motors and a set profit of 
$913.05. 518. 

Savs he urged a larger number of sources of supply. 550. 
Howard E. Coffin (June 25, 1918; Book 7). 

Goes on citing his attempts to develop the source of supply, sub- 
mitting the names of various companies to the Signal 
Corps. 1. 

States that Eugene Meyer, representative of the Secretary of 
War disapproved of having too many companies engaged. 2. 

Cites, however, reasons which would probably have some weight 
against having a large number of small concerns. 1. 

Does not know of a recent order condemning planes, turned out 
by the Standard Aero Co. 25. 

States there was no other course at the beginning but to intro- 
duce foreign engines. 26. 

Asked by Mr. Hughes to take up each engine (foreign) and fol- 
low it through. 27. 

During this recital Mr. Hughes reads several excerpts from min- 
utes of the board. 30-31. 

Continues recital of Sunbeam motor on page 36* 

Asked to explain why a big change in the delivery of Hispano- 
Suizas took place. 43. 

States that 180 Hispanos are in quantity production and had been 
delivered this month. 52. 

Questioned by Mr. Hughes as to whether it was not understood 
that there would be a continual development in planes so that 
almost any plane which was selected would be varied and 
modified, and Mr. Coffin admits there was. 57-58. 

A patent difficulty existed with respect to Hispano-Suiza mo- 
tor. 59. 

Is asked why it would take longer to produce the Hispano 
Suiza motor than to produce Liberty Motor. Admits it would 
take about the same length of time. 60. 

No scout planes manufactured in the United States that are now 
in use on the front. 62. 

Admits if Army had settled upon a plan for planes and the 
180 Hispano-Suiza engine last August scout planes would now 
be in use on the front, 62, 

Mr. Hughes reads minutes of Aircraft Board, quoting cable- 
gram from Col. Boiling. 61. 

Gives history of Sunbeam engine. 66. 

States in his opinion the Fiat engine had the best chance for 
quantity production in this country. 70. 

Thinks Navy had to do with nonadoption of that engine. 70. 

Cites difficulty of producing foreign engine. 72. 

Says representations of French were the} r could easily take care 
of all of our needs in aviation. 71. 

States he has never seen any chart showing foreign production. 
Makes lengthy statement. 76. 

Savs Secretarv Baker refused to send mechanics. 78. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 117 

Howard E. Coffin — Continued. 

Says cause of nonfulfillment of French contract was due partly 
to the French administration and partly to the Signal Corps. 
81. 

Cites knowledge of orders given to the Italian Government. 82. 

Admits Owen Thomas, of the Ministry of Munitions and the 
Imperial Munitions Board of Canada brought to his attention 
Thomas's experience with the Mercedes motor. 89. 

Makes confidential statement regarding Mr. Thomas to show 
why his offer of his services were not favorably looked upon. 
92. 

States they could not obtain bids from contractors on a fixed 
price basis, and therefore the cost-plus system was used. 96. 

Signal Corps seemed to think a price of $20 to $30 per horse- 
power was about right. 97. 

Thinks Montgomery, Walclon, and Deeds were in charge of ne- 
gotiations which brought about the bogey cost of $6,087. 97. 

Thinks bogey cost in the Ford Co. was $5,000. 98. 

Contract originally made November 22, 1917, was on a bogey 
cost of $6,087. 99. Later reduced. 99, 

States exactly what happened in the case of the Lincoln Motor 
Co., where, in consideration of assistance bv the Government, 
the bogey cost was reduced from $6,087 to $5,000. 99. 

In case the cost was less than the bogey costs the manufacturer 
received 25 per cent of the saving. If the cost exceeded the 
bogey cost, there was no penalty. 101. 

Mr. Hughes cites abstract of terms of Packard contract. 103. 

Agreement or rule laid down that profits of manufacturers in 
this field were permitted to vary 10 or 15 per cent. 108. 

Cites where fixed profit was $913 per motor for $6,087 motor, 
and where it was reduced to $625 when bogev price was reduced 
to $5,000. 

Five million four hundred thousand dollars would be profit to 
Packard Motor Co. at a profit of $913 per motor on a contract 
of 6,000 motors. 113. 

Goes into provisions of contract as to depreciation, etc. 115. 

Mr. Hughes reads into record resolution of Aircraft Board cover- 
ing contract with Lincoln Motor Co. 117. 

Mr. Hughes goes into detail about depreciation clause. 118. 

Asked if he recalls contract with Lincoln Motor Co. for 6,000 
spare parts at $5,950,000 he answers in the negative. 120. 

Hid not know that if Lincoln Motor Co. complies with its con- 
tracts it would make at the end of the year 1918 approximately 
$5,000,000. 120-121. 

Admits it would appear that these concerns could realize 100 per 
cent on their capital within a year. 123. 

Admits Mr. Ford's contract for 5.000 United States Liberties pro- 
vides a profit of $3,250,000. 127. 

Does not know what brought about such contracts. 

Mr. Coffin states his knowledge of the Delco system. 130. 

Was not aware there was a limitation as to the type of ignition to 
be used. 131. 



118 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Howard E. Coffin — Continued. 

Thinks there are good reasons why the cost of Liberty should be 
four or five times as much as the highest grade of automobile 
motor. 133. 

Thinks outlay for new equipment by the Packard Motor Co. 
would be great, due to the difference in the size of their motor 
and the Libertv. 
Edward P. Butts (June 25, 1918 ; Book 7) . 

Eesidence, Springfield, Mass. ; office in Buffalo. Manager of the 
Ferguson Shipbuilding interests. Also employed by the Gov- 
ernment as manager of engineering in the Signal Corps on the 
production of battle planes from early December until 20th of 
April. 137. 

Trained in engineering at Pennsylvania State College. 138. 

Gave careful study of situation and offers to outline the causes of 
delay, which he does beginning on page 139. 

Maj. Shepler never recognized the Signal Corps organization in 
Buffalo ; would never go into the office of the district manager. 
147. 

Here continues narrative about production at Curtiss plant. 149. 

States engineering plan was very cumbersome. 154. 

" Mr. Webber's influence there has continually interfered with 
production in that plant." 155. 

Charges that men knew parts were of wrong dimensions, and yet 
they went on making them. 157. 

These instances were quite common. 159. 

Mr. Webber never able to give a direct answer. 160. 

Had positive sensation of there existing some subtle influence in 
the Curtiss plant to retard things. 160. 

One hundred and eighty orders placed not in conformity with 
Signal Corps specifications. 162. 

Government would pay for rejected parts under certain condi- 
tions. 165. 

Charges that Curtiss Co. repeatedly bought material of a lower 
grade than required by Signal Corps in the hope it might pass 
inspection. 166. 

Charges there was an order issued under which material not in 
accord with Signal Corps specifications would actually be used 
with the assent of the Government for the manufacture of 
planes. 168. 

Found various fittings on machines that had holes drilled in them. 
174. 

Does not know of actual sabotage at Curtiss plant, outside of cases 
" I have cited." 182. 

Cites cause of bad conditions at Curtiss plant. 184. 

Gives his reasons for leaving the Signal Corps. 189. 

Finally stated reason was lack of confidence in the organization of 
Signal Corps. 190. 

Goes into lengthy explanation of what he means by management, 
as relates to " lack of confidence in the organizing of the op- 
erating management." 190. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 119 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (June 26, 1918; Book 7). 

States that he returned yesterday from a trip to Dayton. 196. 

Is asked to state conditions of Wilbur Wright field. 196. 

Outlines possibilities of floods. 196, 197. 

States that majority of field (1,200 acres) would be under 10 
feet of water in case of 1913 flood. 203. 

Here produces several papers as exhibits. 205. 

Gives results of investigation of supplies. 208, 210. 

Continues recital of investigation, up to page 216. 
William C. Potter (June 26,^ 1918; Book 7). 

Residence, New York City. Before being employed by the 
Government was a member of the firm — Guggenheim Bros. — 
who are copper people, miners. Appointed as chief of Equip- 
ment Division of Signal Corps on February 20. Brought 
here by a number of suggestions by Col. Montgomery and Mr. 
Stettinius. 217, 218. 

Performed miscellaneous duties in Equipment Division unoffi- 
cially between early January and February 20. 219. 

Continued as chief of Equipment Division until it was abolished 
under the Overman bill. 220. 

On the entrance of his duties in Equipment Division he found 
no program at all. 224. 

Reviews with Mr. Hughes exhibits of programs. 224-230. 

Outlines what he found situation to be after coming to the con- 
clusion organization was not according to correct lines. 
230, 231. 

Shows the duties of various heads. 232-236. 

Redesigning of De Haviland done by Dayton-Wright Co. with 
assistance of Signal Corps. 237. 

Gives his reasons for lack of production, which includes " Lack 
of knowledge * * * of design, lack of experience in con- 
struction of airplanes, the immaturity of the Liberty motor." 
238-241. 

Approximate date first De Haviland 4's were shipped from fac- 
tory was late in March. 243. 

Found certain things were not right with these planes, however. 
244. 

Thinks planes with " proper complement of equipment " were 
completed in April. 244. 

Lack of theoretical knowledge and experience cause of delay. 
245. 

Finds it difficult to explain why this knowledge was not gained 
earlier. 246. 

Col. Deeds did not have requisite information. 248. 

Much information and personal help from England. 249. 

De Haviland plane was built at Day ton- Wright as early as 
October 29, 1917, and " was supposed to be satisfactory." 251. 

Knows it to be a fact that a redesign of gun mount was ordered 
after it was in production. 252. 

Prepared to believe that several changes causing delays were 
made. 253. 

Takes four to five months after first design to get into produc- 
tion, according to foreign information. 254. 



120 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

William C. Potter — Continued. 

Without delays in equipment quantity production could have 

been had perhaps in February. 255-256. 
Thinks gun chute should have been completed last fall. 258. 
Had engineers, but did not know much about this subject. 260. 
Mr. Hughes referring to engineers : " They might know as much 

as those who knew nothing? " Answer by Mr. Potter: "Abso- 
lutely." Not much effort made to get the best men. 260. 
Cites qualifications of Col. Hall. 261. 
Also other men. 261-262. 
Outside of foreign representatives engineers did not know more 

about putting on a machine gun than a man who might be in 

the hardware business. 262. 
When Potter took charge, immediately secured Commander 

Briggs, of British Navy. 263. 
In spite of lack of knowledge in this country, Commander 

Briggs went ahead, and the result was planes began to be 

produced. 264. 
Tells what he knows about synchronizer delays. 265. 
Cites causes of delay on gun sights. 266. 
Delay in camera and camera mounts taken up. 268. 
Also pertaining to oxygen apparatus. 269, 
Eecalls delay in furnishing radio equipment. 269. 
Delay in Bristol worse than in De Haviland. 271. 
Asked for transfer of Lient. Col. Clark, because of inefficiency. 

271. 
Goes into lengthy discussion on Clark's deficiency. 272. 
Goes into detail about Bristol plane. 272. 
Cites failure of Bristol machine. 273. 
Bristol plane used extensively in England. 273-274. 
Reason we can not use ^Bristol is because of engine. 274. 
Bristol program will have to be discarded and substitute De 

Havilands until time comes when we can make Bristols. 274. 
Defect in Bristol has killed two men and smashed one plane. 

275. 
Takes up construction of Caproni plane. 

Contradicting orders about the production of Capronis. 276. 
Speaks of Handley-Paige and contract with England for the 

assembling, building of plant, and furnishing of bricklayers. 

277. 
Is questioned about the men coining from England under Mr. 

Workman to assist in the building of the Handlev-Paige. 

278-279. 
Examined conditions at Curtiss plant and found them " a little 

chaotic." Goes on citing conditions in Curtiss plant. 280-281. 
Gives records of Mr. Mueller, Mr. Webber, and Mr. Schwebel. 

282. 
Training-plane production at Curtiss factory had S'one very 

well. 283. 
Speaks of scrapped materials. 283-284. 
Has heard that 60 per cent of spruce was rejected. 284. 
Since establishment of cut-up plant, quality better. 285. 
Goes into a further statement about delays of planes and im- 
maturity of Liberty motor. 285, 286. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 121 

William C. Potter — Continued. 

Eecites difficulty with Hispano motor. 287-288. 

Sets forth contradicting orders by Gen. Pershing relative to 

the building of single seaters. 290. 
Examined conditions at Standard Co. and found conditions bad, 

due to incompetent management and insufficient finances. 292. 
Mr. Mengel denied to Mr. Potter that he owned any stock in 

Standard Co. 292. 
He seemed to have reference to actual ownership, however, or 

to the point as to whose name it stood in on the books. 292. 
Gives reasons for the discarding of Standard J. Planes. 293. 
Disposition of overhead charges is taken up, and the question 

of salaries. 294. 
Mr. Mengel's salary is being held up. 295. 
Gives Maj. Gray's reasons for leaving Signal Corps. 296. 
Discusses report of Capt. Preston on the spruce situation, in 

which cut-up plant is criticized. 298-299. 
Continues discussion up to page 319, which includes Chicago, 

Milwaukee & St. Paul Kailway proposition. 
Mr. Hughes asks for copy of railroad contract. 322. 
Mr. Hughes quotes from contract with Siems, Carey-H. S. 

Kerbaugh Corporation providing for the sale of 250,000,000 

feet spruce-lumber flitches. 322. 
Each airplane requires about 2,000 feet of first-class spruce. 323. 
Twenty-eight million feet of spruce per month required for 

America and the Allies. 325. 
Not familiar with protests due to the appointment of Mr. Blodell 

or Mr. Long. 325-326. 
Col. Disque had charge of price fixing. 326. 
So much spruce that it is not worth much and stumpage question 

is not serious, according to Pacific coast claims. 328. 
Mr. Hughes reads letter from Aero-Marine Plane & Motor Co. 

with regard to price of spruce. 329. 
High cost of spruce from cut-up plant is due to the cost of the 

cut-up plant. 330. 
Nine thousand to twelve thousand military men in spruce pro- 
duction on west coast. 333. 
Inadequate supply of spruce during June, July, August, and 

September expected. 336. 
Gives actual production of spruce and fir per month. 338. 
Mr. Hughes reads further from Capt. Preston's letter. 341. 
Mr. Potter thinks probablv Capt. Preston's report is exaggerated. 

343. 
Should have approximately 8,000 De Haviland 4's by the end of 

this year, but they will not all be on the front. 345-346. 
Liberty motor now in a fairly satisfactory state of development. 

Testifies as to what is being done with regard to pursuit planes. 

350. 
Understands contract by J. G. White was quite satisfactorily 

filled. 353. 
Ought not to rely on the French to fill out our complement of 

planes this year. 



122 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

William C. Potter — Continued. 

Going to send Hispano-Suiza 180 engine, starting in July. 358. 

Eecites facts in connection with accounting department. 359. 

"We started out with a lot of bad inspectors, but they have 
gotten better now." 360. 

Inspectors had very little knowledge of their work. 360. 

Regarded it as necessarv to call for the resignation of Mr. Heat- 
ley Green. 361. 

The same is also true of Mr. Butts. 363. 

Cites friction between Maj. Shepler and Messrs. Webber, Butts> 
and Green. 364. 

Explains why he overruled Maj. Shepler 's recommendation that 
what Mueller and Webber said should control. 365. 

Ten million dollar advance to Curtiss Co. explained. 367. 

Mr. Hughes reads market letter with respect to Curtiss Co. : 
"Earnings now running at the rate of $1,000,000 monthly." 
367-368. 

Did not know of systematic effort on part of Curtiss plant to 
buy material of poor quality. 369. 

Finds difficulty in connection with Standard Aero Co. that does 
not exist in other plants. 371. 

Mr. Frier son asks for correct information as to the number of 
airplanes and engines now under contract. 372 ; also, 373-377. 

Questioned as to whether 12J to 15 per cent net profit is in accord 
with general practice. 378. 

Lincoln Motor Co. " is getting an enormous return on its capital." 
382. 

Mr. Potter goes into an explanation of these profits. 382-383. 

Thinks if manufacturers had been induced to take contracts at 
a lower percentage it might have lessened their enthusiasm. 
383. 

Mr. Hughes quotes from Lincoln Motor Co. contract. 388. 

Five million dollars is total profit of Lincoln Motor Co. 390. 

Keady turning over of the capital ought to be taken into con- 
sideration. 393. 

Was never familiar with a cost-plus contract until he came to 
Washington. 393-394. 

Knows of no reason why Packard plant should need a greater 
capital than the Lincoln Motor Co. 394. 

Working capital being supplied by Government. 395. 

Ford's profit being $3,125,000, together with allowance for de- 
preciation, is admitted by Mr. Potter not to be a serious risk. 
396. 
Henry K. S. Williams (June 27, 1918; Book 7). 

Residence, White Plains, N. Y. Retired for over six years. 
Prior to that was a member of the lumber firm of Ichabod T. 
Williams & Sons, dealing in " native woods, mahogany, and 
foreign woods/' That firm is still very large importer of ma- 
hogany. Mr. Williams, however, has no connection with anv 
lumber firms. 397-398. 

Became connected with Signal Corps 5th clay of February, 1918. 
Engaged by Mr. Lockhart. 398. 

Thinks mahogany interests formed into an association about that 
time. 399. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 123 

Henry K. S. Williams — Continued. 

Produces memorandum of consultations with committee of ma- 
hogany men. 399. 

Continues outlining his early activities with Signal Corps. 402. 

Tells what contracts were made. 403. 

Speaks of arrangement with British merchants. 404. 

Asked for average prices, quotes I. T. Williams & Sons, contract 
was at $300 for the firsts and $220 for the seconds. 406. Con- 
tinues quoting contracts. 406-407. 

States Maj. Mixter drew up specifications for propellers. 410. 

Proceeds with statement as to the way in which prices were de- 
termined. 412. 

Contracted on the basis of $350 for firsts and $280 for No. 1 com- 
mon. 413. 

Speaks of Mr. Wyckliff as being the most able man he had come 
across. 419. 

Refused to consider a price of $400 a thousand. 421. 

Goes into much detail from page to page relating to price and 
contract. 

Otis Co. will make 13 per cent a thousand on their cost on this 
mahogany. 431. 

Three million one hundred thousand feet minimum comes from 
Africa. 435. 

All manufacturers paid about the same price. 436. 

States difficulty of getting boats to bring out this wood. 442. 

Seven million five hundred thousand under African mahogany 
contract. 443. 

Walnut production increased through the assistance of the Boy 
Scouts. 443. 

Relates affiliation with Boy Scouts. 444-445. 

Twenty-six million seven hundred and three thousand total pur- 
chases to date. 446. 

Mr. Hughes reads Mr. Ryerson's statement. 447. 

Purchasing for all the Allies except the British. 452. 

No arrangement by Signal Corps to establish whether or not a 

fair basis is used. 453. 

Questioned as to whether there is not a way of being absolutely 
sure in respect to the cost of a log to the manufacturer. 454. 

Cites why Government should pay more for logs in 1918 than 
they did in 1917. 456. 

Reads from minutes of Aircraft Board pertaining to the letting 
of mahogany contracts. 457. 

Mr. Wycliff, secretary of Mengel Co. was here in consultation 
on prices. 461. 

Does not want to state why Joseph Otis was discharged. 462. 

Cites facts in regard to Mr. Wycliff; what led to his appoint- 
ment and his duties. 463. 

Impossible to figure out profit until deliveries are made. 465. 
Richard F. Howe (June 27, 1918; Book 7). 

Member of Aircraft Board November 14. Prior to that a manu- 
facturer in harvesting machinery. Has not had any experi- 
ence in aeronautics. 468. 

Board was purely advisory and not an executive board. 468. 



124 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Richard F. Howe — Continued. 

Was sent to the Pacific coast in January with reference to spruce 
production. 469. 

Was considerably impressed by Col. Disque. 469. 

Gives personnel of commission named to assist Col. Disque. 470.. 

Several members of committee interested in lumber business. 
471. 

Cut-up plant seemed advisable. 472. 

Visited Dayton, Detroit, and Buffalo plants. 473. 

States delay at Dayton- Wright was due to getting accessories. 
474. 

Had a general knowledge of the form of contracts. 477. 

Visits to factories was before members of Aircraft Board were 
advised not to hold communication with the manufacturers. 
479. 

Aircraft Board, in initiating proposals for contracts, acted upen 
proposals presented by the members representing the Army 
and Navy. 481. 

Independent investigations made at times by Aircraft Board. 
One of these covered the Liberty motor by Engineer Creigh. 
482. 

Eelied entirely upon the Army as to requirements for wood r 
metal, engines, and different types of planes. 483. Likewise 
pertaining to the Navy. 483. 

Mr. Hughes reads from minutes of Aircraft Board covering a 
forecast of production of United States, 12 engines. 484. 

Did not get program of production from Signal Corps regu- 
larly. 487. 

Explains why three civilians, including Mr. Howe, should at- 
tempt to secure facts for presentation to the General Staff. 
488. 

States Signal Corps was underorganized and recommended a 
production man. Produces letter. 491. 

Recommendation by Aircraft Board on the acquisition of the 
General Vehicle Co. 493. 

Discussion with respect to contracts for the building of a rail- 
road in the State of Washington. 494. 

Mr. Hughes reads letter from Mr. Howe to Mr. Coffin. 496. 

Mr. Hughes asks if it was understood that railroad development 
added greatly to the value of timberlands. 498. 

Reads resolution of board in re the building of railroad. 499. 

Discusses cross-license matter. 501. 

Had no opportunity to take part in the formulating of cost-plus 
contracts. 503. 
Lieut. Col. George W. Mixter (June 27, 1918; Book 7). 

Connected with the Army since July 10, 1917. Received his com- 
mission about August 15. Formerly vice president of Deere 
& Co., manufacturers of agricultural machinery. Engaged in 
that work about 20 years. 505. 

Was placed in charge of the inspection department of the Signal 
Corps. 506. 

Inspection related purely to purchases. 507. 

Took position as production manager about May 1. 508. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 125 

Lieut. Col. George W. Mixtee — Continued. 

Cites distinction between inspection department and the depart- 
ment of district offices. 509. 

Visited Dayton-Wright factory, producing the De Haviland 
planes. 510. 

Found delay primarily due to lack of engineering decision. 510. 

Under impression that after January 1, through efforts of pro- 
duction engineering department, created about that time, engi- 
neering decisions were reached as rapidly as possible. 511. 

Responsibility for a lack of engineering decision before January 
1 laid to Col. Deeds as chief of division. 513. 

Gives facts which led him to think delay at Dayton was due to 
lack of engineering decision. 514. 

Took three months to get certain difficulties in production 
cleaned up. 515. 

Six hundred changes necessary in the production of J-l train- 
ing plane. 515, 516. 

Trouble at Dayton due to defects in drawings furnished by 
Standard Aero Co. 516. 

First training plane delivered' by Dayton- Wright Co. approxi- 
mately October 1. 518. 

No further production, however, between October 6 and 25, due 
to change in landing gear and gasoline supply. 518. Also 
failure to get metal parts. 

National Cash Register Co. slowed up on production of parts 
to get out a new cash register. 519. 

Chart produced showing very slow progress in the completion 
of planes by Dayton-Wright Co. 520. 

These planes not satisfactory in the field. 521. 

Recent order withdrawing about 1,600 Standard planes. 521. 

Last above represents an investment by the Government of ap- 
proximately $10,000,000. 521. 

Thinks withdrawal was due to number numerous accidents with 
this plane. 521. Trouble with Hall-Scott engine. 521. 

Nature of engine trouble was such that it would mean a com- 
plete tearing down. 522. 

Gives his opinion as to nature of engine trouble. 522. 

Four hundred planes made by Dayton-Wright and those made 
by Fisher also subject to withdrawal for same reason. 523. 

No indications of disloyalty at Dayton plant. 527. 

Gives reasons for delay in the training plane at Curtiss plant. 
528. _ 

Delay in fighting planes at Curtiss plant clue to failure to fur- 
nish anything definite to produce. 528. 

Gives course of production of Bristol Fighter. 529. 

Matter taken out of the hands of the Government at one time 
and put into the hands of Curtiss people. 532. 

No cooperation between Green-Butts combination and Maj. 
Sheppler. 533. 

Many branches of Government operating directly on the plant. 
534. < 

States it is pretty nearly true to say that the job was undefined 
on the Bristol Fighter from November 1 up to date. 537. 



126 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. George W. Mixter — Continued. 

Serious question as to whether 50 Bristol Fighters practically 

complete at this time will not have to be scrapped. 537. 
Gives his opinion of Mr. Butts. 539. Also of morale of work- 
ing force. 
Large number of employees working only part time. 540. 
Describes two cases of sabotage. 541. 
Trouble with Bristol Fighter the last month is whether it is a 

flying machine or not. 542. 
Explains how neglect can be attributed to the Curtiss Co. itself. 

545. 
Fisher plant best run plant. 549. 
Very bad organization at Standard plant. 553. 
Main trouble is Mr. Mengel. 553. 
Goes into ownership of Standard Co. 554. 
Contract let to this company amounts to over $9,000,000. 555. 
States who passes on the letting of contracts. 556. 
Selection of manufacturer is left practically to the production 

manager, who is Mr. Kellogg. 559. 
Price is fixed by Mr. Fletcher. 559. 
MengePs salary over $60,000. 562. 
Speaks of contract recently given. 562, 563. 
Two hundred and fifty thousand dollars fixed price on four 

Caproni planes. 564. 
Signal Corps has no engineering organization to stand the 

strain. 565. 
Gives engineering organization of Signal Corps and says it is 

not efficient because it is disorganized. 566. 
Very serious and fatal lack. 568. 
Worse shape to-day (production engineering) than on March 1. 

570. 
Opinion is shared by 99 out of 100 that under the leadership of 

Mr. Kellogg organization will not be efficient. 580. 
Refers to elements of destruction existing. 580. 
Asked to state how it is that difficulties have been overcome in 

the production of engines and not in planes. 582. 
Thinks decision could have been reached with regard to gun 

chutes, shell chutes, etc. 583. 
Gen. Foulois did not send specific list of requirements. 584. 
Goes into " training-plane list." 589. 
Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (June 28, 1918; Book 7). 

Produces statement showing number of training planes shipped 

week by week. 592. 
James Farley McClelland (June 28, 1918; Book 7). 

A mining engineer. Received training at Columbia and also 

taught at Columbia in mining branch. Was editor in chief of 

specification section of engineering department of equipment 

division. Covered both planes and engines. 595, 596. 
Had charge of material specifications, etc. 597. 
Describes condition of department as " fine." 598. 
Does not think conditions were as bad prior to reorganization 

under Overman bill as they are now. 604. 
Describes Col. Hall as " a star performer." 606. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 127 

James Farley McClelland — Continued. 

Engineering department not interested in the planes which were 
then being produced. 610. 

Not adequate engineering attention given to development of 
planes. 612. 

Delay of two weeks in getting reply to a request for a decision. 
615. 

Claim by Dayton- Wright that they did not get certain informa- 
tion u is a quibble." 621. 

Man named Sergt. Klemin one of the parties relied on to make 
decisions. 623. 

Engineering decisions would have caused more rapid progress. 
625. 

Delays due to lack of knowledge. 626. 

Overheard discussion as to what instruments should go on a 
plane. 629. 

Mr. Hughes questions about a request for synchronizing device 
in November which was not billed February 14. 633. 

Maj. Barr, of Ordnance Department, appeared with a bombing 
gear in January. 640. 

Gives understanding as to why Col. Hall was put in charge. 642. 

Goes into reasons for delay in production of Bristol Fighter. 
642. 

Gives reason why the taking away of De Havilands from his 
section would demoralize his section. 650. 
James S. MacGregor (June 28, 1918 ; Book 7) . 

Eesidence, Pelham Manor, N. Y. With Signal Corps since Sep- 
tember 1. In inspection section. Had occasion to observe 
production. 654. 

States function of his department. 654. 

States what he thinks contributed to the delay of the De Havi- 
land 4's. 655. Continues to page 675. 

Knows Sergt. Klemin to be a very young man. 676. 

Gives his idea as to why Standard J planes were withdrawn. 
682. 

Speaks of efforts made to get material for plants. 68^ 

Makes vigorous charge of wasted time. 687. 

Cites difficulty in furnishing stress sheets. 689. 

Is questioned further by Mr. Hughes as to training and experi- 
ence. 690. 

Curtiss plant 50 per cent off in its chemical analysis. 691. 

Great many spurious specifications. 695. 
Maj. A. C. Downey (June 28, 1918 ; Book 7). 

Major in Signal Corps. Previous to that in the office of the 
Auditor of the War Department. Prior to that in the office of 
the Comptroller of the Treasury. Assigned to Aircraft Pro- 
duction Board as contracting officer and disbursing officer. 
697, 698. 

Explains duties. 698. 

States what he actually done with respect to contracts that have 
been let. 699. 

Explains variation in terms of contract. 701. 

Gives names of those who conducted negotiations. 702. 

130687—19 9 



128 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. A. C. Downey — Continued. 

Explains how bogey cost of $6,087 on Liberty motor was reached. 

703. 
Tells what led to reduction of bogey cost to $5,000, saying in 

part that it was ridiculously high. 704. 
Estimated cost of Liberty motor $3,200. 705. 
Bogey price includes part of salaries at Packard plant. 706. 
Cites bogey cost by other plants. 707. 
Bogey cost $630 too high at Fisher Body Co. 708. 
Salaries at Fisher Body Co. covered in bogey price. 708. 
Mr. Mengal's efforts in the way of financing the company. 709. 
States who developed the cost-plus contract. 709. 
No provision of penalties covering delivery. 711. 
Speaks of Fowler Co. on Pacific coast. 712. 
States why provision for liquidated damages was not in large 

contracts. 713. 
Inducement to manufacturers in saving which could be made 

on bogey cost. 714. 
Speaks of " a sharing of the excess cost." 714. 
Gives names of those who made negotiations. 715. 
States why contract was recently let to Standard Co. 716. 
" Fought agreement " of cross license. 717. 
States substance of cross-license agreement. 718. 
Continues this in much detail up to page 734. 
Alexander McKinney, Jr. (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918 ; Book 

8 )- 

Special agent for Office of Naval Intelligence. 1. 

Been on duty there one year. 1. 

Has investigated Aeromarine Plane & Motor Co. 1. 

Contract given to Aeromarine Plane & Motor Co. by Navy De- 
partment signed October 30, 1917. 2. 

Item 1 is for 200 seaplanes at $6,750 each. 2. 

Item 2 is for 200 power plants for same, without engines, start- 
ing machines, and thermometers to be furnished by Govern- 
ment, each at $1,000. 

Item 4 is for 20 spare radiators at $85 each. 2. 

Item 5 is for 20 gasoline tanks at $80 each. 2. 

Item 6 is for 40 groups of seaplane parts at $7,900 each. 2. 

The contract in total amounted to $1,869,300. 2. 

Testimony of this witness relates solely to the Navv. 
Frank G. Diffin (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). 

Assistant to A. A. Landon, chief of production. 23. 

In charge of entire production of aircraft. 23. 

Principal duty of witness is to determine the matter in regard to 
crank-shaft failures on engines; to eliminate failures and 
bring about a greater percentage of acceptable crank shafts 
for use in the Liberty engines. 27. 

Previous to this had charge of the standardization work. 28. 

Attended meeting in London early in February as representa- 
tive of United States, which had to do with the standardiza- 
tion of aircraft specifications among the Allies. 28, 29. 

No American planes in France when he was across in February 
! and March. 31. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 129 

Frank G. Diffin — Continued. 

Keported it was absolutely imperative that we supply the Allies, 
primarily England, with engines. 31. 

Week before he left, England shipped 762 machines to the front. 
31. 

On or about February 25, on his recommendation, England 
placed order with United States for 3,000 Liberty engines, 
calling for 1,300 to be delivered in July and increasing 
monthly thereafter. 31. 

Liberty motors had not begun to arrive in England when he 
left. Only had three sample engines. 33. 

We had 56 'second-rate machines at front about March 18 ob- 
tained from France. 34. 

France and England at that time would not deliver planes to 
us unless we were occupying a big percentage of the front, 
because the destruction at that time was enormous. 34. 

Destruction very close to 100 per cent a month. 35. 

Q. " Did you ascertain the causes for the nondelivery of 
planes by the French Government in accordance with their 
contract? " — A. U I could not answer that definitely. My im- 
pression was that we had failed to make good on our own con- 
tracts with the French Government." 

Q. " In what respect? "—A. " Raw materials." 36. 

French specifications impossible of fulfillment. 36. 

Material being furnished French Government now under J. G. 
White contract. 37. 

France practically scraped cleam of raw materials. Practically 
impossible to get keg of nails over there. 38. 

French did not plan abandoning their own requirements in our 
favor. 38. 

England's total minimum requirements for spruce from Febru- 
ary 1, 1918, to February 1, 1919, is 120,000,000 feet. 40. 

On March 14 England had less than a 30 days' supply of spruce 
on hand and unless instant steps were taken by United States 
to supply England with spruce it would mean that produc- 
tion must stop. 

Upon return to this country secured a million feet for imme- 
diate shipment to England ; a percentage of spruce which was 
going to our own factories was largely diverted to England. 
Allies were getting 50 per cent of spruce and we were getting 
50 per cent. 41. 

Germany is keeping up with the airplane production. 41. 

Germany uses other kinds of wood. 41. 

We now have metal under development and will shortly go into 
the production of metal to take the place of spruce in the 
spars and ribs. 42. 

" If there is any one thing that has delayed production, it has 
been the military supervision of it, and I think we have suc- 
ceeded in spite of the military supervision instead of with it." 
44. 

Too much red tape. 45. 

Great number of men with great deal of ability hedged in by 
authority and rules and regulations. 45. 46. 



130 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Frank G. Diffin — Continued. 

His contention we should always produce airplanes in quan- 
tity irrespective of quality. 48. 

No reason why combat planes could not have been put in pro- 
duction during year 1917. 49. 

Dayton- Wright plant produced a satisfactory plane at end of 
October, 1917. 

Could have put that into production in December without un- 
necessary supervision. 54. 

From his observation on both sides, a quick decision as to 
equipment and the putting of those planes into production 
would have resulted in serviceable planes which could have 
been used satisfactorily on the front as early as last April. 
55. 

Q. "From your observation abroad, were there engines 
which could have been put into production in the United 
States, pending the development of the Liberty engine ? " — 
A. " Yes, sir." 57. 

During the winter months conditions were almost absolutely 
prohibitive in this country as to production and also the 
supply of manufactured products, due to embargoes of every 
possible kind. Had to meet them on every hand to get 
priorities over what we termed negligible stuff. 60. 

Condition as to priorities actually affected the production of 
either planes or engines. 61. 

Pretty well mixed up during the winter months as to what con- 
stituted real priority. 61. 

They had so many priority orders they did not stop to read 
them. 61. 

The reason for such a situation existing was due to the railroads 
being taken over by the Government, our War Industries 
Board getting into operation, and all the various boards here 
starting to function in Washington, some of them to varying 
degrees of efficiency. 62. 

Holds no brief for the Day ton- Wright Co., although thinks they 
are an admirable manufacturing organization. 63. 

Something like 800 changes have been made on Bristol machines 
since they went into production. The majority of them would 
interfere with production. 65. 

Does not regard Bristol as being developed as a practical serv- 
iceable machine. 65. 

They are trying to put a 400-horsepower motor into a machine 
originally designed for a 180-horsepower engine. 65. 

If it is true that a satisfactory De Haviland 4 had actually been 
built as a sample machine at the Day ton- Wright plant by the 
end of October, they would have been in production within 60 
days after that. 65, 66. 

The only practicable Handley-Paige built to-day is the Handley- 
Paige we are at present starting to build in this country. 66. 

Was not practicable last year to put Handley-Paige into pro- 
duction in this country. 66. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 131 

Frank G. Diffin — Continued. 

Does not believe in Sunbeam engine. England uses them as a 
last resort now. 67. 

Sunbeam engine, as designed in England, is not a commercial 
engine, to our methods of production. 67. 

Came to Washington a little over a year ago from Meadville, Pa. 
Started building aircraft parts in Pennsylvania, which he sold 
out before he came down here. 67. 

Twenty-one or twenty-two years' experience as a manufacturer 
and engineer. 

Reason for not letting contracts on a fixed-price basis was due 
to fact that manufacturers in this country did not know what 
they were required to produce. In many cases entire heats of 
steel have been lost, due to the fact that we had to reject them 
as not being up to aeronautical requirements. 68. 

Would not, as a manufacturer, have undertaken the manufacture 
of the Liberty motor on a fixed-price basis, 68. 

All depends on honesty of individuals to contract as to what 
constituted a reasonable or unreasonable profit. Ten per cent 
plus cost can be worked so it would be cost plus 100, if you 
want to work it that way. 69. 

If the entire cost is borne by the Government and all financial 
obligations — the Government advanced capital on it — the per- 
centage of profit ought to be a fixed one. 71. 

Synchronizer had not been adopted July 1. 75. 

Bomb-dropping devices were in use, 75. 

Q. (By Attorney General.) " What would be your judgment 
in a general way as to whether, in the matter of production, 
say, which was started on July 1 of last year, it was desirable 
to impede production by adopting these more important 
changes as have come along, or whether it would have been 
better, possibly, to have proceeded with the construction in 
accordance with the plans in existence July 1 and to put into 
subsequent planes the improvements which were developed. 
Which, in your judgment, would have been the better 
policy? " — A. " My personal judgment is that the better policy 
would have been to put into production a given type or model 
or design of equipment and any improvements made thereon 
be put into subsequent machines. That is simply good com- 
mercial practice." 75, 76. 

Thinks Liberty motor best engine built to-day. 76. 

PCan not ordinarily use it for training planes ; it is too big a motor. 
The 12 is the only one in production to-day. 77. 
The purpose was not the development of an American engine, 
but was the development of an engine that could be made in 
America. 78. 

k Cylinder is essentially a copy of the Mercedes cylinder. 78. 
Got into production on Liberty engine quicker than they could 
have on the foreign engines. 79. 
Most successful battleplane used abroad was probably the Sup- 
wroth. 79. 



132 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Frank G. Diffin — Continued. 

Could have put that plane into production in America. 79. 

Q. " What was the best foreign engine on July 1, 1917, used 
on the battle front at that time that, in your judgment, could 
have been produced in this country ? " — A. " Two engines there, 
each in a class by itself — the Rolls-Royce and the Hispano- 
Suiza." 79, 80a. 

In one of the Rolls-Royce factories in England it took -10,000 
operators to produce 46 engines in the last week there. 80. 

Handwork feature enters into the production of any foreign 
engine. 81. 

Up until the time of this war England had relatively few auto- 
matic machines in the entire country, where we have thousands 
and thousands of them here. All of our work is done on auto- 
matics. England did not have them. They did not exist. 
Their work is almost entirely handwork; certainly 95 per cent 
of it. That is the reason for our production here that they do 
not get there, and never will, until they adopt American meth- 
ods of manufacture. Their labor guilds and labor organiza- 
tions will not let that kind of machinery go into their plants. 
82, 81. 

Machine-made parts are interchangeable and hand-made parts are 
not. 81. 

Pretty well along in the fall before synchronizers wore really 
commercially practicable. 86. 

Planes we are now sending over all contain synchronizers. 86. 

The Handley-Paige in the Curtiss is designed for both the Rolls- 
Royce and the Liberty. 89. 
Maj. Frank E. Smith (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). 

In charge of the field forces of the finance division of Bureau of 
Aircraft Production and also have charge of the approvals and 
appraisals department of the finance division. 91. 

Been engaged in this work since early last October. 1917. 91. 

Has had long experience in manufacturing, particularly in auto- 
mobiles. 91. 

Been connected with several companies and also been receiver for 
several motor companies at different times. 91. 

Some time prior to his going into Signal Corps was in Ordnance, 
finding producers of munitions. 92. 

Has received estimate on cost of manufacturing Libertv motor. 
92. 

Costs are surveys made by our men in the field in the Detroit 
district, 93. ' 

Had a complete survey of the Packard Co. 93. 

Survey shows, first, that the cost is divided between material, 
$1,300 ; labor, $500 ; and the overhead expense of 200 per cent 
of the productive labor, amounting to $1,000; or a total shop 
cost of $2,800 per motor. Added to this is the miscellaneous 
cost of shop tools and equipment, amounting to $125 per 
motor, and various contingencies estimated, including the 
probable cost of specification changes, amounting to $275 per 
motor, or a total estimated miscellaneous cost of $400 per 
motor, making a grand total cost per motor, in accordance 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 133 

Maj. Frank E. Smith — Continued. 

with this survey, of $3,200 each. The fixed profit under the 
contract is $625 per motor, and the contractor's share of the 
saving effected between the cost of $3,200 per motor and the 
bogy cost of $5,000 per motor, or 25 per cent on $1,800 per 
motor, is $450 per motor, thus making the total profit to the 
contractor, based on the cost of $3,200 per motor, $1,075, or 
33.6 per cent profit on the cost. 93, 94. 

This would make total profit on 5,000 motors ordered of the 
Packard Co. of over $5,000,000. 94. 

Q. "Have you any reason to believe the cost is greater or 
less in any of the other plants making the Liberty motors ? " — 
A. " The Packard Co. was really the first company to get into 
production on the Liberty motor, and we will have in the very 
near future costs at all the plants, and my opinion is that the 
cost will be under this figure. I think this is a liberal figure, 
and it is predicated on a small production." 94, 95. 

This cost included an analysis of the motor, taking it part by 
part, and figuring out the total productive cost, material and 
labor, and overhead expense. 95. 

Figure based upon a small production. 95. 

Always at the start of a new job a considerable time is taken 
in experimentation and getting under way, and all that experi- 
mentation cost in preparing and getting ready for this job is 
included in the estimated production, and it makes the earlier 
cost quite high. 95. 

It takes the cost of experimentation and spreads it over all the 
motors manufactured up to that date. 95. 

Q. " Have you any rough estimate of the amount to which 
you think the cost per motor will finally come when it is 
spread over the entire production of 5,000 motors?" — A. 
" My own judgment in the matter has been that the cost would 
be around or a little less than $3,000 per motor." 96. 

Q. " What amount would that give for overhead expenses 
in the Packard plant on the entire 5,000 engines? " 98. A. 
" It would give, about $5,000,000." 98. 

Q. " What would be embraced in the overhead cost thus esti- 
mated ? " 98. A. " It would take in all of the nonproductive 
expenses, all of the operation of the Packard plant, including 
administration, shop foremen, superintendence, power, heat, 
light, and everything that is not productive in the manufac- 
ture of those motors." 98. 

District manager of finance in the Detroit district, Capt. Holmes, 
submitted estimate. 100. 

Packard Co., has not seen it to his knowledge. 100. 

Does not know whether it accords with Packard estimates, as 
he has no knowledge of what they figured. 100. 

Statement of cost referred to was marked " Frank E. Smith, 
Exhibit 1, July 1, 1918." 101. 

Has no estimates made at Lincoln Motor Co. 101. 

His opinion that cost should be less at Lincoln Motor Co. than 
at Packard Co. 102. 

Thinks it also would be much less in the case of the Ford Co. 
102. 



134 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Frank E. Smith — Continued. 

Has made survey of cost of La Khone 9-cylinder rotary motor. 

103. 
A recent survey made at the plant of the Union Switch & Signal 

Co. 104. ; 

La Khone motor contract was let with the Union Switch & Signal 
Co. for 2,500 motors on the basis of a bogy of $5,500 per motor. 
A cost survey made at this plant came to him under date of 
June 21. 104. 

This was a cost-plus contract. 104. 

"The cost survev showed that the direct cost of material was 
$432.07; direct labor, $379.67; the overhead expense 200 per 
cent of the productive labor, amounting to $759.34, or a total 
shop cost of $1,571.08, added to which is the miscellaneous 
cost, consisting of special tools and equipment amounting to 
$160 per motor, a liberal estimate of depreciation on special 
buildings amounting to $120 per motor, making a total esti- 
mated miscellaneous cost per motor of $180, or a grand total 
cost per motor, as per this survey, of $1,761.08. The profit for 
this motor, fixed under the contract, was $687.58 per motor, 
in addition to which the contractor is entitled to 25 per cent 
of the saving effected between the bogy price of $5,500 and the 
cost per motor of $1,751.08, or 25 per cent of a total of 
$3,748.92, amounting to $937.23, making a total estimated 
profit under this survey of $1,624.73 per motor, or 92.8 per cent 
profit on the cost." 105. 

Paper containing summarv of these figures marked " Frank E. 
Smith Exhibit No. 2, July 1, 1918." 

Union Switch & Signal Co. only concern in this country making 
the La Rhone engine. 105. 

The survey of the La Rhone cost is under date of June 21, 1918, 
and 46 motors had been completed up to that time. 106. 

The cost submitted is very liberal, and when company gets into 
production it should be greatly reduced. 106. 

Have had a good deal to do latterly with the De Haviland 4 
plane. 107. 

Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., Fisher Body Corporation, and 
the Standard Airplane Co. were given contracts for construc- 
tion of this plane on the basis of a bogy price of $7,000. 107 

Had a committee appointed to go to Dayton and take all the 
available parts and by a comparison between those parts and 
parts of other airplanes arrive at some reasonable figure in 
the way of determining the cost, which was completed in Feb- 
ruary. 108. 

Figures submitted are on a basis of 15 of these planes per day. 
The total cost, including direct labor, material, and overhead, 
with a profit of 15 per cent, would not exceed $3,525. 109. 

Does not include overhead as it was actually being incurred by 
the Dayton-Wright Co. because they were operating very in- 
efficiently at that time; it included a smaller percentage of 
overhead, such as was thought would be fair. They had a 
large nonproductive force and a large number of clerks, fore- 
men, and all that sort of overhead running on without any 
production in the factory. 109. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 135 

Maj. Frank E. Smith — Continued. 

Was not a necessary force, but expense of it included in the cost 
the (government was paying. 110. 

Condition in all the three large airplane factories has been any- 
thing but efficient up to date — the Curtiss, the Standard, and 
the E^ton-Wright. Last survey made showed the Dayton- 
Wright Co. had twice as many, in dollars and cents, of non- 
producers as the Fisher Body Corporation. 110. 

Committee which investigated costs was composed of a man 
named Bourne, of the accounts section; an engineer from the 
approvals section named Randolph; a representative of the 
production department named Kehoe ; an outside industrial 
engineer, who had made a specialty of airplane investigation, 
named Mead. 

Mr. Henry E. Mead has been quite a number of months with 
Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, investigating the cost in 
Canadian aircraft corporations and other plants, and was well 
qualified for such an investigation as this. Ill, 112. 

He is what is called an industrial financial engineer. 112. 

Cost of De Hayiland plane as estimated by Dayton-Wright Co. 
prior to fixing of bogy, $6,900. 112. 

Memorandum by Maj. Smith, setting forth in detail what should 
constitute cost of De Haviland 1 airplanes minus motor. 114, 
115, 116. 

Overhead in case of planes figured at 100 per cent, and 200 per 
cent in the case of motors. 116. 

Dayton- Wright factory is more an assembly proposition. 117. 
Q. " Do you know whether there is any other plant owned 
by the Dayton-Wright Co. as a separate corporation which 
makes anything ? " — A. " Yes, sir ; they have a plant in Mi- 
amisburg and they have the Dayton Metal Products in Dayton, 
and I do not know what others. I have those in mind." 118. 

Dayton Metal Products makes principally metal fittings for 
Dayton-Wright Co. 118. 

Greater part of scrap losses confined to lumber. The percent- 
age saved of lumber is very small. In some cases it has 
not exceeded 3 per cent of the cost of the lumber that came 
into the plant. 119. 

Separate account kept of scrapped material at each plant and 
the amounts, if any, of the saving effected. 119. 

Loss at practically all the airplane factories is mainly due to 
the fact that the spruce delivered is not up to specifications. 
People who are producing and shipping spruce do not seem 
to have the same idea of what is needed as the people who are 
using it. In other words, the inspection department at both 
ends of the line did not seem to do that work exactly the 
same. 121. 
Maj. Dean Langmuir (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). 

" My problem was organization almost entirely. Dealing with ac- 
tual figures was left with the plant accountants, and had to be. 
In other words, I had a terrible problem in building up a force 
of 400 men out of nothing at all, getting the organization to- 
gether and prescribing its functions, and things of that kind, 



136 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Dean Langmuir — Continued. 

so I am not very familiar with those figures." Witness was 
asked whether all the provisions with respect to depreciation 
in the various plane contracts were substantially the same. 
124. 
Lieut. John Eyre Sloan (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). 

For four or five years was building airplanes and gas engines 
and just prior to entering the Army was with the Guaranty 
Trust Co., in the trust department. 125. 

Was owner and operator of Sloan Manufacturing Co., Plain- 
field, N. J., which was organized in 1915. 125. 

Made biplanes for exhibition purposes and some military-type 
machines. 126. 

The Standard Co. was successor to his company. 126. 

Sold the Sloan Co. to Mitzui '& Co. 127. 

They first formed the Standard Areo Corporation of New York, 
and then the Standard Aircraft Co., but whether they dis- 
solved the Sloan Manufacturing or not unable to state." 127. 

When war broke out was given a position in the equipment 
division, Signal Corps. 127. 

Was assigned to the specifications section. 127. 

Wrote specifications for the materials, etc., for going into air- 
planes, motors, and other equipment. 

Carl Zimmerschied was head of section. 128. 

Later transferred to approvals section, Finance Department. 
128. 

Had supervision of all work Maj. Smith did not handle per- 
sonally. 128. 

Acquainted with original specifications made for Liberty motor. 
124. 

Q. "Will you state how the various accessories were ar- 
rived at?" — A. "Why, I was writing the specifications, I 
guess it was about the end of October, probably, and I was 
told to draw specifications for various parts and told to put 
in on the bottom of the specifications that inasmuch as cer- 
tain parts had been used in the experimental motor and found 
satisfactory they would be used on the first 20,000 motors." 
124. 

At the time he was told to draw up specifications a number of 
papers were handed to him as authority for doing that by 
Maj. Gray. 124. 

Parts referred to were the ball bearings, gaskets, carbureter, 
high and low tension cables, valves, spark plugs, spark plug 
terminals, battery ignition apparatus. 130. 

Did not put memorandum on specifications, as they were not 
completed when he left specifications section. 130. 

Recognized Borglum Exhibit 23-A as a memorandum prepared 
for the signature of the chief of the equipment division. 131. 

Col. Deeds refused to sign it; Delco ignition was there. 131. 

Memorandum was then turned over to Lieut. Emmons to obtain 
his opinion as to whether these parts should be used on the 
first quantity of motors. 131, 132. 

Attention was called to Borglum Exhibit 23-C relative to chang- 
ing to number of motors orders from 15,000 to 20,000. 132. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTICxATION. 137 

Lieut. John Eyre Sloan — Continued. 

Had alteration on when given to him. 132. 

Did not make statement, that he can remember, that Col. Deeds 
had signed that paper. 132. 

Borglum Exhibit 23-E was recognized as being one of the papers 
handed him. 133. 

Duplicate of Borglum Exhibit 23-A with numerals opposite 
the various accessories, apparently indicating the order in 
which they were to be placed, was identified. 133. 

Does not know significance of the arrangement. 133. 

Borglum Exhibit 23-E was also with papers handed him with 
regard to specifications. 134. 

This exhibit was a suggestion to advise the motor manufacturers 
sent to Lieut. Emmons by Maj. Gray. 

Q. " Do you know whether Maj. Gray got any instructions 
with respect to that?" — A. "Well, there was another sheet 
with these papers." 134. 

This sheet was identified as Borglum Exhibit 23-D, which was 
a memorandum from Lieut. Harvey to Lieut. Emmons. 134. 

Lieut. Harvey was secretary to Col. Deeds. 135. 

Maj. Gray told him Col. Deeds had refused to sign what is 
known as Borglum Exhibit 23-C. 136. 

Lieut. Harvey did no other work except as secret arv to Col. 
Deeds. 136. 

Q. " Note the arrangements of the dates, or the order of 
dates ; that under date of October 6 we had a memorandum for 
Col. Waldron; then, under date of October T, a memorandum 
for specifications section, with the number changed from 15.- 
000 to 20,000, drawn apparently for the signature of colonel. 
Signal Corps. Then, under date of October 8, a memorandum 
as follows : ' What do you think of the attached ? Is it O. K. V 
'(Signed) Harvey,' apparently addressed to Maj. Gray, with 
the words ' L. K. Emmons ' ; and last, under date of October 
13, that is five days later than the one of October 8, the state- 
ment : c Would it not be well to advise manufacturers of the 
Liberty motor of the decision to use only certain accessories on 
the first 20,000? Specifications will be prepared or revised, 
as the case may be, within the next few days; but advance 
information to avoid mistakes in the placing of orders seems 
desirable.' * * *." 137. 

Memorandum of October 6 was prepared for Col. Waldron bv 
Maj. Gray. 138. # 

Col. Waldron had just ceased to be chief of equipment division. 
138. 

Had no information as to what consultations preceded the sug- 
gestions that particular accessories should be put in the speci- 
fication. 141. 

Contract offered Willys-Overland for supplying the Curtiss Co. 
with OX-t engines called for $1,950 a motor with a bonus of 
$150 a motor. - 141. 

Later changed to two deliverv dates, one at $1,950 and one at 
$2,100. 142. 



138 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. John Eyre Sloan — Continued. 

Changed because contracting officers refused to sign it as first 

drawn, as he did not think it was proper to pay a bonus for 
making the delivery that they had agreed to make. 142. 
Resolution of Aircraft Board relative to matter. 143. 
Deliveries not made on schedule, and Aircraft Board made 

recommendation to Chief Signal Officer that $150 bonus be 

still paid to insure Government against destruction against 

one source of supply. 146. 
To do this would cost $750,000, while duplicate set of tools 

would cost about $40,000 or $50,000. 147. 
Aircraft Board adopted resolution recommending that $2,500,000 

be advanced to Willys-Overland Co. on account of this con- 
tract. 151. 
Understands no payment of $750,000 was ever made. 154. 
William Hency Schott (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). 
Engineer and contractor. 156. 
At present time engaged at Lewis Spring & Axle Co., Jackson, 

Mich. 156. 
A year ago came to Washington, called at office of Board to 

ascertain requirements to qualify on contract for either engines 

or planes. 156. 
Got one of first sets of drawings on Libertv 8-cylinder engine. 

157. 
Bid on 1,525 at either $5,000 or $5,500 or would meet any other 

price fixed as being fair. 158. 
Price fixed on delivering all of them before Julv 1 of this vear. 

159. 
No contract awarded. Could never find out reason. 159. 
Had built 6,000 or 7,000 engines at Chelsea plant and had every 

facility for building 8-cylinder engine. 161. 
Offered to build any kind of airplane on either a fixed price or 

cost-plus basis. Could start deliveries in 90 days and give 

them five a day. 163. 
Mr. Lewis very familiar with airplanes. 163. 
Never got contract for planes. 164. 
Was given part of Handley-Paige program in September or 

October, but was not given go ahead until 8th dav of May. 

164. 
Contract was not written up for above until April 13, 1918. 

165. 
Contract was for wings, fuselage, and all that sort of thing. 

167. 
In excellent shape to produce DeHavilands. Now making a 

very large number of parts for DeHaviland as a subcontractor. 

172. 
Can take DeHaviland or any of machines and in 90 days' time 

give them five a day. 173. 
Could have done that during the winter. 173. 
Twenty-four or 25 Government inspectors at his plant. Over- 
inspected. 180. 
Government has not made any advances; furnishing own capi- 
tal. 180. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 139 

Maj. Hiram Stanton Brown (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; 
Book 8). 

Commissioned October 31, 1917. 185. 

Formerly in public utility business for over 13 years, last 7 years 
as a member of firm of H. D. Walbridge & Co., 4 Wall Street, 
New York City. 185. 

Was associated with Lieut. Col. Wolff as an employee in same 
firm. 

Sent for by Wolff and accepted commission. 186. 

Was connected with management and organization of appro- 
priations section of finance department. 186. 

Promoted to executive officer of the finance department. 187. 

Asked to explain methods he has at present time with respect to 
vouchering claims of contracts for overhead expenses, par- 
ticularly with regard to the claims for salaries. 187. 

Salaries of officials of Dayton- Wright plant allowed from Sep- 
tember to either March or April through an oversight. 191, 
193. 

Got Capt. Frank E. Haag to come in and displace Maj. Lang- 
muir, wholly from inefficiency. 194. 

Familiar from a financial standpoint of conditions at Standard 
plant. 196. 

Signal Corps has right, under act of October 6, 1917, to purchase 
materials used in aircraft manufacture and sell same at not 
less than cost to airplane manufacturers. 197. 

Sold Standard Aircraft Corporation $800,000 worth of material 
and Mr. Mingle stated he was surprised when he was called 
upon six or eight weeks ago to reimburse Government for 
large amount advanced. 197. 

Received frequent requests from commercial vendors to expedite 
Standard Aircraft Corporation's payments to them. 198. 

Credit of this concern was very poor. 198. 

Explained to Mr. Mingle Government had 53 representatives in 
his plant checking up vouchers, doing accounting work for 
him, when he ought to have an organization doing it himself. 
200. 

Had great deal of trouble with Mr. Mingle, of Standard Air- 
craft Corporation, from a financial standpoint. 201. 

Mr. Mingle has referred to the fact repeatedly that the Mitzui 
are back of him. 203. 

Mr. Mingle's company not successful in getting together an ef- 
ficient accounting organization. 203. 

Submits vouchers to them with wrong extensions, with high 
prices. Did not catch them in first instance. 205. 

Dayton- Wright Co. insisted on Government paying for welfare 
work, baseball uniforms and tennis courts, and expenditures 
of that character, shotguns and shells for guards to practice 
with, etc. 211. 

No such thing as account for commitments abroad for the pur- 
chase of planes and engines. 215. 

Cabled abroad asking permission to send Maj. Wolff and Maj. 
Langmuir to straighten out finances. 217. 

Has total amount of commitments fairly well ascertained now. 
214. 



140 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Hiram Stanton Brown — Continued. 

Production Department of Bureau of Aircraft Production 
should be able to inform committee relating to the perform- 
ance and nonperformance of contract. 225. 

French Government only delivered 250 planes out of several 
thousand, due to our failure to supply raw material. 226. 
John D. Ryan (Washington, D. C, July 2, 1918; Book 8). 

Took charge of Bureau of Aircraft Production morning of 26th 
of April. 228. 

Made Director of Bureau of Aircraft Production by order of 
President, under so-called Overman Act, and order was issued 
on May 20. 229. 

Explains conditions with reference to organization at time he 
took charge. 224, 225. 

States Mr. Potter's duties. 231. 

Mr. Landon has been made chief of production division. 231. 

Mr. Landon was formerly vice president of American Kadiator 
Co., being in general charge of production. 233. 

Mr. Kellogg in charge of production engineering. 235. 

Have just selected Mr. Hunt, formerly chief engineer of the 
Packard Co., to be in charge of the Liberty engineering. 237. 

Whole question of large supply of airplane wood seemed to 
hinge upon building a railroad into the Clallam County 
spruce tract on Olympic Peninsula in Washington. 240. 

Col. Disque made contract with Siem, Care}^ — H. S. Kerbaugh 
(Inc.), to get out a maximum of 300,000,000 feet. 241. 

Corporation was formed to take over this particular business. 
242. 

Col. Disque was contracting officer of Signal Corps on Pacific 
coast. 244. 

Approved this contract without reference to Washington. 244. 

Stated he was director of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail- 
way Co. and member of executive committee, and could have 
no part in negotiations. 248. 

Mr. Stettinus negotiated with railroad and was unable to get 
them to build. 249. 

Did not think Government properly safeguarded with spruce 
contract. 251. 

Provision in contract that Government would increase price 
paid to these contractors if prices generally of lumber prod- 
ucts in Northwest increased during period that they were in 
production. 253. 

Government had no control over price contractor might pay 
for stumpage and he could have that included in his cost if 
he saw fit to take advantage of clause in contract, providing 
that he could ask for a cost-plus basis if he was losing money 
on contract. 254. 

No limitation of profit in this contract. 255. 

Agreed contractor should have 7 per cent in any event. 255, 256. 

If contractor would do certain things, agreed to waive right to 
fix their profits. 257. 

Estimated production of spruce to be obtained under this con- 
tract was 300,000,000 feet. 261. 

Contractors financed by Government. Needed $6,000,000. 262. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 141 

John D. Rfan — Continued. 

More favorable a contract is to Government, more difficult it is 
to get advances from War Credits Board. 264. 

Feels contractor is taking a great deal of risk and his chance for 
profit is practically limited to 7 per cent. 265. 

Considering the use of substitute woods. 266. 

Little trees in Germany make airplane material because they 
have been planted carefully and grown carefully. 268. 

Germany much better provided than any of Allies in matter of 
woods. 268. 

Thinks Carey-Kerbaugh will have to build 65 or 75 miles of 
logging railroad in addition to one to be built for Govern- 
ment. 269. 

That will be their own railroad. Will be paid for as part of 
cost by Government. 269. 

He will be able to hold the railroad, unless the Government 
wants to fix the profit, limit his profit to 15 per cent. 269. 

A number of owners control the acreage of timber in that sec- 
tion, but the great bulk of area is controlled by three or four 
large concerns. 284. 

Q. " How will the contractor and the owners of the timber- 
land be left when this contract operation is concluded? You 
have said that the contractor would have the railroad, would 
have the mill, assuming, of course, that the Government had 
not taken it over, and the timber people would have a better 
outlet to market?" — A. " But it all depends on what kind of a 
trade we make with the owners, or what we do under our 
authority to commandeer the stumpage. * * *." 286. 

Does not think Government has got a right to make any part 
of the profit on something that it does not need. 287. 

Whole country will be opened up through this operation. 288. 

Does not think contractors had any advance information as to 
plan of Government to open up this tract. 288. 

As far as he knows, there has been no syndicate or organization 
taking advantage of situation. 289. 

Liberty engine production last month was about 1,200. 290. 

In negotiation with a man who is best fitted man in world to 
take particular charge of inspection. 291. 

Any interest paid by contract or any advance from the War 

Credits Board would be considered as a part of his cost, 291. 

Maj. Hiram S. Brown (Washington, D. C, July 2, 1918; Book 8). 

Willys-Overland Co. have delivered to date 4,072 motors; 2,400 
have been paid for at $2,100. 294. 

Premium of $150 per motor paid to them in March on 700 
motors. 301. 

When Aircraft Board determined that cost-plus contracts were 
desirable, it was realized immediately that the Government 
would need a corps of accountants to administer them, and 
determined to employ firm of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- 
gomery. 303. 

It started on an original authorization of around $10,000, and 
on Mav 15 volume of expenditures had exceeded over $30.- 
000. 303. 



142 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Hiram S. Brown — Continued. 

Col. Thompson, first chief of finance department, created Gov- 
ernment organization to displace Lybrant organization. 304. 

Called to his aid some members of his own firm, of whom Maj. 
Langmuir was one; his most intimate personal friend, S. E. 
Wolff, now Col. Wolff; and Col. Wolff wrote for him. 304. 

Weakest point was accounting department. 305. 

On May 15 completely displaced Lybrant organization. 307. 
Interdepartmental costs committee formed. 310. 

Question of allowance of executive salaries referred to that 
committee. 311. 

Committee did not act, so he urged that finance division shoulder 
responsibility. 311. 

Had not allowed salaries to executives except in case of Day- 
toil- Wright Co. 312. 

Has no evidence to show that voucher is other than an adjust- 
ment of expenditures made by Dayton- Wright Co. 314. 

Dayton- Wright Co. had proceeded with work in anticipation 
of formal contract under verbal instructions or assurances 
of Col. Deeds. 

The contractors had gone ahead expending money, making 
experiments and tests, merely on their confidence in Col. 
Deeds and their friendship for him. 316. 

Overhead expenses to include interest, rent, and such taxes as 
income taxes and excess-profits taxes imposed by Govern- 
ment. 323. 

Col. Waldon informed Capt. Coleman he did not know who in 
the United States approved a list of property and the speci- 
fications therefor, and we have not been able to obtain such 
a list and specifications. 332. 

Knows Mr. Tilson, purchasing agent for J. G. White, quite in- 
timately. 332. 

Have placed an officer or representative in J. G. White & Co.'s 
office. 334. 

No check as to the property itself other than J. G. White & 
Co.'s. 334. 

No one representing the Government undertook to ascertain 
whether J. G. White & Co. had bought the material desired 
or not. 335. 

Col. Thompson at present is chairman of War Credits Board. 
339. 

Col. Thompson's business has been that of fine lawyer and 
accountant. 340. 

He assisted in drafting- nearly all of cost-plus contracts. 340. 
Capt. Francis E. Haag (Washington, D. C, July 2,1918; Book 8). 

Chief of Accounts Department, Finance Division of the Air- 
craft Production Board. 342. 

Held position since March 21, 1918. 

Prior to that time had charge of field forces, acting as super- 
visor at different plants, to determine questions of accounting 
that arose. 342. 

First three months was really getting acquainted with work 
and practically did nothing but assist Mr. Sweet to lay down 
rules. 342. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 143 

Capt. Francis E. Haag — Continued. 

Asked to produce certain vouchers on file which relate to pay- 
ment of executive salaries at Dayton-Wright plant. 343. 

Can not explain why voucher covers period from April 1 to 
August 31. 343. 

Allowed 75 per cent of each item. 343. 

Overhead expense of Dayton-Wright Co. in voucher referred 
to amounted to $76,452.40; allowed $57,339.30. 344. 

Deducts 25 per cent as factor of safety. 345. 

Voucher No. 10 contains expenditures for overhead to October 
31, 1917, amounting to $325,610. 347, 348. 

Voucher No. 12 shows overhead salaries for month of November 
of $34,130.53. 348. 

Itemized statement of executive salaries for month of Novem- 
ber. 349. 

Certain payments made for executive salaries in case of Fisher 
Body Corporation, Standard Aero Corporation, and Wright- 
Martin Aircraft Corporation. 353. 

In number of cases salaries have not been paid at all. 354. 

Practice of office not to pay any salaries since May 3. 354, 355. 

Was no practice prior to May 3. 355. 

Has a man making special report on corporate relations of 
Standard Aircraft Corporation to the Standard Aero Corpora- 
tion and H. B. Mingle. 364. 

Charges made on books against H. B. Mingle Co. which are 
being investigated. 365. 

Standard only company having an adjustment of salaries. 369 3 
370. 

No executive salaries paid to Lincoln Motor Co. 372. 

Natural thing for other companies to do would have been to 
present vouchers for general overhead, and have them allowed 
to the extent of a percentage as the Dayton-Wright Co. did, 
and the fact that they did not do that leads to the natural 
inference that somebody must have suggested that it would 
be better to wait. 382. 

Day ton- Wright voucher No. 1, including $76,452.40 for overhead 
expenses, not thoroughly audited before payment. 382. 

Duty of accountant before certifying, to verify and make a test 
check of the amount shown by contractor's books. 384. 

Voucher No. 1 does not bear evidence of anyone having been 
over it and checked anything on it. 386. 

No indication that voucher was checked at plant. 386. 

Vouchers marked Haag Exhibits 1 and 2, July 2, 1918. 387. 

Total overpaid of $54,960.17. 388. 

No other adjustment except with the Standard. 391. 

Salary allowed president of Standard was $15,000 and presi- 
dent of Dayton-Wright Co. $35,000. 392. 

Lieut. Eeik in charge of vouchers in accounts department. 394. 

Has nothing from Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. indicating that 
it did not consider it what it purported to be, an adjustment 
as to these prior vouchers. 399. 

Q. " I simply want to know what reason there is, if you know 
of any, why there should have been an adjustment in May, 
130687—19 10 



144 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Capt. Francis E. Haag — Continued. 

1918, or any other time, of the overhead expense of the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. for the period from April to October 
31, 1917, while it appears that in the case of no other com- 
pany has there been an adjustment of overhead for the period 
antedating October 31, 1917, and the amount, as adjusted, 
allowed at 100 per cent. Can you give any reason for it ? " 
401. 

Voucher No. 30, of May 18, 1918, marked Haag Exhibit No. 3, 
July 2, 1918. 406. 

Policy from May 3 to hold up all vouchers for executive sala- 
ries until approved by approvals section. 411. 

Vouchers taken up with Capt. Eotshafer in contract section. 
417. 

Experimental contract with Dayton Metal Products Co. under 
which executive salaries were allowed. 424. 

Quotation from letter addressed to Capt. Haag from Lieut. 
Weir referring to contract with Dayton Metal Products Co., 
"The amount representing costs of Packard truck as shown 
in my previous letter was erroneous and should have read 
' $3,574.62,' which is the Government price plus the tax. This 
we will handle after getting further advice from Col. Edward 
A. Deeds, as per Maj. C. M. Hall's conference last Saturdav." 
428. 

Experimental contract supposed to be of such a nature that no 
one excepting Maj. Hall and possibly Col. Deeds knew what 
work they were doing. 429. 

Maj. Hall is same man who is now Col. Hall. 429. 

Maj. Hall is Signal Corps engineer who is out in Dayton and 
under whose direction this secret experimental work is being 
conducted. 429. 
Maj. Dean Langmuir (Washington. D. C. July 2, 1918: Book 8). 

Data concerning payments for executive salaries of Standard 
Aero Corporation was marked " Langmuir Exhibit 1. Julv 
2, 1918." 

Data concerning general method and procedure of paying exec- 
utive salaries marked " Langmuir Exhibit 3. July 2, 1918." 

Data concerning payments for executive salaries of Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. marked "Langmuir Exhibit 2. Julv 2, 
1918." 
Capt. James J. Newman, Washington. D. C. July 3. 1918: book 8. 

Recalls that on or about October 31 he asked for a ruling on the 
question whether or not the company should be reimbursed 
for the expenses of executive officers. 439. 

Also requested a ruling as to whether rent of offices would be 
allowed. 440. 

Was told that Dayton-Wright Co. were going to make a re- 
quest for this allowance. 444. 

Voucher for office rent, etc was presented to him,' but he held 
it awaiting a decision or ruling from Washington. No ruling 
ever made up to time he left. May 13. 445. 

Mr. Hiller succeeded him at Dayton-Wright Co. and Maj. But- 
ler in the district. 446. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 145 

Capt. James J. Newman — Continued. 

Objected to payment of voucher as he thought offices were not 
necessary in connection with production of airplanes. 450. 

Contract with Dayton-Wright Co. excludes rent as an item of 
cost. 451. 

Col. Deeds and his personal secretary had offices in same build- 
ing. 452. 

Clean-up voucher of May 13, 1918, marked " Newman Exhibit 
6," was finally adjusted for period from April to October 31, 

1917, and the salaries of Mr. Talbott, sr., at rate of $35,000 
a year; Mr. Kettering, at rate of $35,000 a year; Mr. Talbott, 
jr., at rate of $30,000 a year; and Mr. Orville Wright, at rate 
of $18,000 a year were included as amounts to be paid for the 
period from August 1, 1917, to October 31, 1917. 465, 466. 

Supporting vouchers prepared by Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- 
gomery. 467. 

Salaries were passed, subject to the determination by the Rul- 
ings Board as to what was to be done with them. 468. 

Q. " Will you explain how it happened that this amount was 
allowed for salaries in this clean-up voucher of May 13, 

1918, when no ruling had yet been made with respect to the 
amounts to be allowed for executive salaries ? " 464. 

A. "We were informed when the first salaries were paid that 
they would be paid and we should continue to pass them 
until we were told otherwise ; until a ruling had been made." 
470. 

Mr. Sherer had asked him when he was going to pay any exec- 
utive salaries. They were very short of money during this 
period. 471. 

Accountant in charge put it through and he decided to let it 
go to Washington. 471. 

Allowed executive salaries to go through in November, but 
wrote letter with voucher stating he had gotten no FBffiftonse 
to previous request on subject. 475. 

Had had interview with Maj. Langmuir, Lieut. Col. Wolif, Col. 
Thompson, Maj. Smith, and Capt. Haag, also Capt, Trax, 
regarding this matter. 476. 

Mr. R. A. Perry was replaced at plant bv a Mr. A. A. Vaughn. 
481. 

All expenses incurred by president of Dayton- Wright Co., trav- 
eling on company business, to be paid by Government, even 
in June, 1917, before they had any contract at all. 49S. 

That period very hazy to him and most of those who were on 
duty. 493. 

First contract company had is under date of September 7, 1917. 

Traveling expenses of $4,648.60, all antedating August 31, 
1917, were allowed. 498. 

Talbotts, Kettering, and Orville Wright, with possible excep- 
tion of Mr. Orville Wright, are the only stockholders of the 
Dayton- Wright Air Plane Co., and salaries mentioned are for 
a part of their time only, they being affiliated with several 
other companies, from which thev also drew salaries. 502. 



146 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Capt. James J. Newman — Continued. 

Also with Dayton Metal Products & Domestic Engineering Co. 
503. 

Q. " On what possible basis was the telephone service for April, 
1917, allowed to the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co ? " — A. 
"I do not remember any particular circumstance in connec- 
tion with it. The items in question are so small in connec- 
tion with the general total that we probably did not give 
them the attention we might have." 

Q. " They are very small items, but they are very significant 
items." 507. 

Tried not to include anything relating to the expenses of getting 
the contract. 508. 

Welfare account commences with August 18, 1917. 509. 

General office expense items aggregating $3,957.71, attributable 
to period prior to October 31, 1917, allowed in final clean-up 
voucher. 512. 

Garage expense down to October 31, 1917, a total of $2,232.65 
allowed in final clean-up voucher. 515. 

Took figures of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. 519. 

Was told by Col. Montgomery in November to use as broad a 
viewpoint as possible in passing vouchers for any of these 
companies and to avoid looking at things narrowly that might 
tend to create friction between the Signal Corps and the con- 
tractors. 520. 

Contract refers back to certain expenses prior to its being made 
and says they shall be reimbursable. 527. 
George Banckoft Smith (Dayton, Ohio, July 8, 1918; Book 9). 

Resides at 635 Salem Avenue, Dayton, Ohio. 1. 

Personal and confidential representative of Col. E. A. Deeds and 
Mr. C. F. Kettering. 1. 

Mr. Deeds's interest in Delco Co. 2. 

Mr. Deeds held 38 shares of $100 par value in Delco Co. 3. 

Sold preferred stock to Mr. Kettering. 4. 

Repeats conversation in which Col. Deeds stated that such stocks 
as were owned by him in corporations that would be engaged 
in filling contracts for the Government should be disposed 
of. 9. 

Specially mentioned the Delco stock. 14. 

Mr. Kettering gets stocks at par value. 16. 

Circumstances of the transfer of this stock over to Mr. Ketter- 
ing. 26. 

No charge against Kettering for the Delco stock. 27. 

Deeds disposes of all his common stock in the Delco Co. to United 
Motors Corporation. 33. 

Mr. Deeds held 30,000 shares in United Motors Co. 33. 

Sells part of this stock in 1916. 44. 

Final 17,500 given to Col. Deeds's wife as gift. 35. 

(Pages "36 to 79, inclusive, give detailed information concerning 
transfer of Deeds's stocks.) 

Domestic Building Co.'s stock did not reach books until De- 
cember, 1917. 80. 

Col. Deeds never a stockholder or director of the Dayton-Wright 
Airplane Co. 83. 






ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 147 

George Bancroft Smith — Continued. 

Sold stock of Dayton Metal Products Co. on May 22. 84. 

Certain details handled at this period by Mr. Allen K. Smart, a 
chartered public accountant. 86. 

Produces memorandum compiled by Smart. 87. 

Consideration for Deeds's stock in Dayton Metal Products Co. 
was to be determined as the result of Mr. Smart's examina- 
tion of the accounts and determination of the book value. 95. 

Did not think there was ever any written agreement for the sale 
of the stock in the Dayton Metal Products Co. by Mr. Deeds to 
Talbott, sr., Talbott, jr., and Mr. Kettering. 109. , 

No bill of sale or memorandum of sale. 109. 

Points to Deeds's ledger showing personal account with Ketter- 
ing. 110. 

Joint transactions in which Mr. Kettering and Mr. Deeds are 
engaged in in a general way. 113. • 

How long Col. Deeds and Mr. Kettering have been associated in 
enterprises. 114. 

Notes given for Dayton Metal Products stock by Kettering and 
the Talbotts were not paid or renewed. 116. 

Domestic Building Co. built building now used by the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. 116. 

Original stockholders of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 117. 

Stockholders of the company at the present time. 118. 

Entire stock, with certain exception, is held by the Davton 
Metal Products Co. 118. 

Produces paper showing adjustment of the accounts between 
the Talbotts, Mr. Kettering, and Col. Deeds. 119. 

Agreement with respect to Dayton Metal Products Co. 122. 

H. E. Talbott, C. F. Kettering, and H. E. Talbott, jr., have 
joint account. 125. 

Only way to finance the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to enable 
it to take the Government airplane contracts was through the 
Dayton Metal Products Co. 131. 

Mr. Kettering gets salary of $35,000 a year from Davton- 
Wright Airplane Co. 145. 

Produces memorandum relating to closing up Domestic Build- 
ing Co. transaction and fixing of the adjustment, marked 
" George B. Smith Exhibit 22." 148-149. 

Produces letter to Mr. Deeds. 150. 

His attention is called to a letter from Office of the Chief Sig- 
nal Office to Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., Dayton. " Sub- 
ject, Erection of temporary buildings." 162. 

Col. Deeds at present a director, stockholder, and an officer in 
Domestic Building Co. 166. 

Nash Motors Co. stock was sold by Col. Deeds to Mr. Kettering. 

168. 8 

Mr. Deeds sold his stock in National Cash Register Co. to Mr. 

Kettering. 169. 
No written agreement or memorandum of understanding or any 

paper relating to Nash Motors Co. stock. 171. 
Deposit "tickets of the City National Bank of the Davton- 
Wright Airplane Co., Dayton Metal Products Co., and H. E. 
Talbott, C. F. Kettering, and H. E. Talbott, jr. 171. 



148 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

George Bancroft Smith — Continued. 

Land of McCook Field originally purchased by E. A. Deeds 
and C. F. Kettering. 174. 

Col. Deeds sells his holdings to Mr. Kettering, Mr. Kettering 
subsequently selling his interest to the Dayton Metal Products 
Co. 175. 

Auditors sent to audit the books of the Domestic Building Co. 
and these figures used by Mr. Smart. 175. 

Letter from Mr. Deeds to Mr. Kettering, " George B. Smith 
Exhibit No. 25, July 8, 1918." 

United Motors Corporation. 178. 

Produce letter written by Mr. Smith to Mr. Deeds. 178. 

In this letter he tells Deeds that National Cash Kegister stock, 
the Nash Motors Co. stock, and United Motors Corporation 
stock is now all taken care of and stock records clear of Mr. 
Deeds's name. 181. . 
Mary E. Devine (Dayton, Ohio, July 8, 1918; Book 9). 

Resides at 15 Schantz Street, Dayton, Ohio. 184. 

Bookkeeper, secretary to Mr. Talbott, sr. 184. 

So employed eight years. 184. 

Mr. Talbott is president of the Dayton Metal Products Co., is 
chairman of the board of the City National Bank. 184. 

President of the Dayton Metal Products Co. and the board of 
directors. 185. 

Receives $1,048 semimonthly from Dayton- Wright Airplane 
Co. 185. 

Mr. Talbott, sr., receives $5,000 a month from the Dayton Metal 
Products Co. 186. 

Mr. Charles Craighead, secretary of the Dayton Metal Products 
Co. 187. 

Minutes of the meeting of the Dayton Metal Products Co., 
April 7, 1917. 187. 

Another minute read in which Mr. Deeds has explained to 
them his call to Washington, and that he desired it that he 
might act as uninterested, directly or indirectly, etc. 190. 
* Other minutes read in which the request of the Aircraft Pro- 
duction Board is set forth that they should make a report 
as to the facilities of the Dayton Metal Products Co. for 
the manufacture of certain airplane parts. 192. 

Another minute read in which meeting was called for discussion 
of buying entire capital stock of the Dayton- Wright Air- 
plane Co. 195. 

Minute relating to pledging of the shares of the stock of the 
Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. as collateral security for the 
notes of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 197. 

Agreement entered into on November 28, 1917, between H. E. 
Talbott, C. F. Kettering, and H. E. Talbott, jr., parties of 
the first part, and the Dayton Metal Products Co., party of 
the second part. 197. 

Another entry in which it is agreed that the capital stock of the 
Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. be used as collateral security 
attached to the notes of the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., 
said notes, $2,500,000, being payable to Secretary of War on 
behalf of United States. 202. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 149 

Mary E. Devine — Continued. 

Mr. Allen R. Smart present at some of the meetings. 206. 
Transactions with respect to the payment by Mr. Talbott of 

stock of Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 211. 
Mr. Sherer, the treasurer, has details of account of Mr. Talbott, 

Mr. Kettering, and Mr. Talbott in reference to deposit slips 

in City National Bank, December 1, showing a deposit to 

credit of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. by Messrs. Talbott 

and Mr. Kettering of a million dollars. 212. 
Messrs. Talbott and Mr. Kettering give check on December 1 to 

the Dayton Metal Products Co. for amount of $1,134,537.20 

for securities. 215. 
Points to entry in Mr. Talbotts's account which shows his note 

given to Mr. Deeds for the Dayton Metal Products Co. stock. 

215. 
Stock-certificate book of the Dayton Metal Products Co. 225. 
Edith P. Cummin (Dayton, Ohio, July 8, 1918; Book 9). 

Law clerk and stenographer for Craighead & Dowden, attorneys, 

in Dayton, Ohio. 238. 
Have at times been engaged in connection with the work of 

keeping the minute book of the Dayton Metal Products Co. 

238. 
Wrote up all the original proceedings. 239. 
Mr. Craighead's office represents the Dayton Metal Products 

Co. 243. 
Mary E. Devine (Book 9). 

Goes over, in summary way, the companies in which Mr. Talbott 

is interested and salaries which he receives. 245. 
Mr. Talbott, sr., in all companies in which he is interested seems 

to be able to assist them very greatly in the financial end of 

the work. 247. 
Mr. King. 251. 
Mr. Talbott had small amount of stock in Dayton Lumber & 

Manufacturing Co. 253. 
Miss Devine keeps contracts of the Dayton Metal Products 

Co. 255. 
Asked to bring all the contracts between the Dayton Metal 

Products Co. and the Government. 256. 
Keads contracts upon the record. 257. 
Attention is called in contract of January 25, 1918, between the 

Dayton Products Co. and the United States, represented by 

Maj. A. C. Downey, of Signal Corps, in which experimental 

work is to be paid for in pursuance of the agreement. 261. 
Transaction regarding the purchase of the Miamisburg plant. 

261. 
Mr. Craighead, trustee. 264. 
Is asked to produce certificates shown on investment ledger of 

Dayton Metal Products Co. in an entry under the Lincoln 

Motor Co. of $100,000 stock taken by the syndicate from Day- 
ton Metal Products Co. 268. 
George Bancroft Smith (Book 9). 

Asked to state what companies, if any, Col. Deeds has been in 

receipt of a salary since April 1, 1917. 271. 
Book of record of Col. Deeds's stocks. 273. 



1 50 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

George Bancroft Smith — Continued. 

Domestic Building Co. became indebted to Col. Deeds for the 
amount representing the value of his interest in the land 
known as McCook Field. 286. 

Stock of the Domestic Building Co. worth $1,000,000. 287. 

Owned principally by Col. E. A. Deeds and Mr. C. F. Ketter- 
ing. 287. 

Settlement of the Domestic Building Co. arrived at on which 
notes were finally given by the two Talbotts and Mr. Ketter- 
ing to the Domestic Building Co. 289. 

Among other items they received the tract of land known as the 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co.'s field. 291. 

South Field owned by Col. Deeds. 294. 

Adjoining land belongs to John H. Patterson, formerly presi- 
dent of the National Cash Register Co. 294. 

Asked if it is not correct that when notes had been executed by 
Messrs. Talbott and Kettering to the Domestic Building Co. 
the plant and property to which they became entitled were at 
their direction transferred directly to the Dayton- Wright Air- 
plane Co. and the consideration from the Dayton- Wright Air- 
plane Co. for that transfer was embraced in acquisition of the 
stock of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. by these gentle- 
men. 298. 

Mr. Blose, private secretary of Mr. Deeds. 299. 

Statement known as "Analysis of the transactions of the Domes- 
tic Building Co.," as of December 31, showing capital, stock, 
loans, interest, etc. 302. 

Produces books of Domestic Building Co. 322. 

Mr. Deeds does not hold any stock in the Lincoln Motor. Co. 
320. 
Charles J. Sherer (Federal building, Dayton, Ohio, Julv 9, 1918; 
Book 9). 

Twenty-five Perrine Street. Dayton, Ohio. 330. 

Treasurer of Dayton Metal Products Co. 330. 

Been with the company since May, 1915. 330. 

Also treasurer of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 331. 

Mr. Craighead, secretary of Day ton- Wright. 331. 

Mr. A. B. Hilton, jr., secretary of Dayton Metal Products Co. 
331. 

Also treasurer of Wright Field Co. 331. 

Dayton- Wright Airplane Co., incorporated in April, 1917. 333. 

Original subscribers to the stock Mr. Talbott, Mr. Talbott, jr., 
Mr. Kettering, Mr. Mead, and he thought Mr. Craighead. 
333. 

Original issue $500,000 common stock. 333. 

Subsequent issue $100,000 common and $400,000 preferred. 334. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. subscribed for stock in the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. 335. 

Dayton-Wright gave check for $955,071.25 to joint account for 
purchase of the building, the Moraine plant, and the Miamis- 
burg plant. 338. 

Check of the Dayton Metal Products Co. for $183,459.55 to 
credit of Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 339. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 151 

Charles J. Sherer — Continued. 

Nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand five hundred dollars 
from Dayton Metal to the joint account. 353. 

Deposits a check of the joint account to the order of the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. for $1,000,000. 353. 

Item "E. A. Deeds, $150,000" represents a certain note of E. A. 
Deeds to the Dayton Metal Products Co. 357. 

" C. F. Kettering, $150,000 " ; same explanation. 357. 

"H. E. Talbott, jr., $45,000"; same explanation. 358. 

Is asked to get a statement from the books of the Dayton Metal 
Products Co. showing what the items are that enter into this 
item. "E. A. Deeds, $150,000; C. F. Kettering, $150,000; 
H. E. Talbott, jr., $40,000." 365. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. has contract with the Government 
for the production of 1,585,000 mark 2 detonating fuses. 366. 

First contract of Dayton Metal Products Co. with the Gov- 
ernment was August of 1917. 367. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. had experimental contract with the 
Government. 368. 

Mr. McGee, assistant in the executive office of Dayton Metal 
Products Co. 369. 

Entry of $999,500 relating to purchase of the stock of the 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 369. 

Government has paid all experimental charges that have been 
submitted. 375. 

C. E. Stacey Co. 376. 

Expenses in connection with Stacey & Co. are listed in the 
records of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. as an uncol- 
lectible item. 377. 

Total amount paid by the Government to the Dayton-Wright 
Airplane Co., $10,000,000. 378. 

Two million five hundred thousand dollars of this as advances 
by the Government. 378. 

The Government holds as security for collateral the stock of 
the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., except the qualifying share, 
on part of that they have certain personal indorsements. 
379. 

Salaries of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 380-383. 

Salaries have been held for a couple of months ; up to that time 
certain of these salaries allowed by the Signal Corps. 386. 

The terms of the contract are such that any payments do not 
operate as final payments. 387. 

Check of $1,136,537.20 for purchase of securities by joint ac- 
count. 393. (Deposited in City National Bank on December 
1, 1917.) 

Dayton Metal Products Co. purchase stock of Lincoln Motor Co. 
on October 8. 395. 

Afterwards disposed of to Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 396. 

This stock again returns to Dayton Metal Products Co. 396. 

Messrs. Talbott and Kettering get securities from Dayton Metal 
Co. for that retransfer. 398. 

Finds records of the item " E. A. Deeds, $150,000 " referred to on 
page 357. 401. 



152 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Charles J . Sherer — Continued. 

Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. charged for experimental work of 
Stacey & Co. (Stacey, an inventor supported by Kettering, 
409) in favor of Dayton Metal Products Co., and Dayton 
Metal Products Co. pay the money to C. F. Kettering to 
reimburse him. 409. 
Ernest D. Martin (Dayton, Ohio, July 9, 1918; Book 9). 

Auditor for Dayton Metal Products Co. 418. 

Adjustment made as to the price to be paid for Mr. Deeds's 
stock in Dayton Metal Products Co., which was transferred 
to Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 418. 

The items " E. A. Deeds, $150,000," and " C. F. Kettering, 
$150,000 " are demand notes. 425. 
Allen Rich Smart (Washington, July 9, 1918; Book 9). 

Resides in Chicago. 427. 

Certified public accountant. 427. 

Associated with Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co. 127. 

Consulting accountant of the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 427. 

Have been the auditor of the Dayton Metal Products Co. 428. 

Has made an investigation of the Dayton Lumber & Manu- 
facturing Co., for an attorney in town, Mr. Warren James. 
428. 

Directs his attention to the adjustment that was made at time of 
taking over by Messrs. Talbott and Kettering of the plant 
which had been provided by the Domestic Building Co. 430. 

Mr. Geo. Smith, representative of the Domestic Building Co. 
432. 

Miamisburg plant had been purchased by Mr. Talbott, si*., in- 
dividually. 434. 

Transferred to Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 435. 

The sum at which the Miamisburg plant was sold to the 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co., showed a profit of $67,202, for 
the Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 

Government had no hand in the appraisal of this property. 440. 

Government had no written statement that they could have this 
property at its real value, $60,000. 440. 

Particulars regarding purchase of Moraine plant which was 
deemed to be suitable for Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. by 
Messrs. Talbott and Kettering and made over to that com- 
pany. 450. 

Smith Exhibit 31 are the syndicate books, or Messrs. Talbott and 
Kettering. 457. 

Moraine plant figured a total of $836,401.08. 458. 

Mr. Talbott, sr., Mr. Kettering, and Mr. Talbott, jr., subscribed 
for stock of Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 466. 

Original amount of the stock $400,000 but now increased to a 
million. 466. 

The syndicate subscribed for the $1,000,000, entire preferred 
stock as well as the entire common stock. 468. 

Explains construction of financial arrangement which permitted 
the payment of these shares to be made without cash. 468. 

Charged the Domestic Building Co. with Col. Deeds and Ket- 
terings debts. 480. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 153 

Allen Eich Smart — Continued. 

Refers to provision of the contract between the Dayton Metal 
Products Co. and the Government regarding experimental 
work. 494. 
Col. Deeds at end of settlement owed $79,963.17 to Domestic 
Building Co. 499. 

Asked if he made an examination of the books to ascertain book 
value of stocks of Dayton Metal Products Co. transferred by 
Mr. Deeds to Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 500. 

Knows nothing of the actual transfer. 502. 

Minutes of meeting wherein Col. Deeds offered for sale, etc., his 
stock in Dayton Metal Products Co., his entire holdings of 
stock at book value, less 15 per cent to cover costs and possible 
losses. 503. 

Explains why he crossed this minute out. 506. 

Agreement of purchase by Dayton Metal Products Co. of the 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co.'s stock. 516. 

Calls attention to agreement of November 28 wherein it is stated 
that option be given to said parties of the first part to repur- 
chase ail of said stock, etc. 523. 
George Bancroft Smith (July 9, 1918; Book 9). 

Produces trial balances of Domestic Building Co. 528. 

Domestic Building Co. had no transaction with the Government, 
but has transaction with the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 
532. 

Moraine Development Co. 536. 

Officers of the Moraine Development Co. 537. 

Asked to state as succinctly as possible the facts in connection 
with the purchase of 97 acres of land by the Domestic Build- 
ing Co., from the Moraine Development Co., and two sales of 
portions, with respect especially to those used for aviation 
purposes, who were the original owners, etc. 545. 

Col. Deeds was reimbursed for the moneys which he expended 
upon the improvements of North Field with respect to 
hangars, etc. 549. 

Another field leased from Kettering which has been referred to 
as the Acceptance Field. 552. 

Explains way in which the word "Moraine " is used in com- 
munity. 552. 

Gives details regarding " Acceptance Field." 554. 

Ten thousand dollars paid to C. E. Stacey in order to cover 
expenses of his work, when book showed expenditure of only 
$9,000. 
Benjamin Franklin McCann (Dayton, July 10, 1918; Book 9). 

Attorney, practicing in Dayton, Ohio. 560. 

Local, private counsel for Col. E. A. Deeds, and also for Mr. C. 
F. Kettering. 560. 

Produces letter addressed by Col. Deeds to Secretary of War. 
560. 

Col. Deeds's statement filed with Council of National Defense. 
563. 

Mr. McCann goes over details connected with above papers. 566. 

Letter in which he hands in his resignation to Dayton Engineer- 
ing Laboratories Co. 570. 



154 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Benjamin Franklin McCann — Continued. 

Resignation from United Motors Corporation. 572. 
Allen R. Smart (July 10, 1918; Book 9). 

Produces settlement sheet of December 1, which filed and marked 
" Smart Exhibit 1, July 10, 1918." 581. 

Explains how the different items for preliminary expenditures 
on various fields, etc., figures in the ultimate adjustment, and 
how these matters passed to the books of the Dayton- Wright 
Airplane Co. 582. 

States what temporary buildings have been included in the sub- 
missions to the Government. 589. 

The expenses of the Research Division after the 1st of July, 
1917, and the expenses of the South Field after July 1, 1917, 
were submitted to the Government. 593. 

He is asked with whom the question had been raised, under the 
contract of September 7, 1917, that there was any right on the 
part of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to charge the Gov- 
ernment with the items for experimental work and hangars. 
597. 

Knew there were discussions with reference to the bogy cost to 
be fixed. 601. 

Dayton Wright Airplane Co. had no complete cost system. 603. 

On a trip to 'Washington was shown the terms of contract or 
general form of contract which was proposed to be entered into 
with the various concerns contracting with the Government 
for aircraft. 610. 

Asked for modifications principally in regard to depreciation 
and amortization of the plant. 611. 

Company's outlays in getting a contract satisfactory to itself 
were included in the cost to the Government contemplated by 
the contract. 624. 

Four thousand dollars for traveling expenses. 625. 

Take up experimental work on Standard J-4 planes on June 1, 
although the contract was dated considerably afterwards — 
August 1. 628. 

Mr. Smart's attention is called to the computation he made for 
the purpose of determining the amount to be paid to Mr. 
Deeds by Messrs. Talbott and Kettering for Deeds's stock in 
the Dayton Metal Products Co. 635. 

Presents original figures. 639. 

To Dayton Metal Products Co., research division. 660. 
Carl J. Sherer (Dayton, Ohio, July 10, 1918; Book 9). 

Asked to produce a file of the contracts of the Dayton- Wright 
Airplane Co. Asked to state on the record the contracts which 
the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. has had and now has with 
the Government seriatim and chronologically. 631. 

Asked to give the substance of the advance contracts. 682. 
E. D. Martin (July 10, 1918; Book 9). 

Asked date of entry on folio 109 of journal of Dayton Metal 
Products Co. 690. 

Calls attention to trial balance of June 30, in which entry has 
been made over an erased amount. 391. 






ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 155 

Allen R. Smart (Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. plant, Dayton, Ohio, 
July 11, 1918; Book 9). 

Produces book or ledger of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 

701. 
Turns to accounts which show what items entered into the ad- 
justment in the fall of 1917 between the Messrs. Talbot and 

Kettering and the Domestic Building Co. 701. 
Takes up balance sheet of December 29, 1917, " Smart Exhibit 

11." 716. 
Produces paper entitled " The Dayton- Wright Airplane Co., 

Dayton, Ohio." Contents : Estimated valuation of J-l planes 

and J-l spares delivered, etc. 722. 
To a final cost of $192.87 per plane is added 10 per cent on ma- 
terial for waste and floor loss. 727. 
Statement is noticed in one of the sheets of metal fittings sent to 

Fisher Body Corporation. 731. 
Explains special manner of treating depreciation of the plant by 

Miamisburg plant. 733. 
Balance sheet of December 29, 1917, making total charges to the 

United States Government, contracts down to December 29, 
1917, of $1,950,800.32. 736. 
Next sheet shows estimated profit on Standard J airplanes 

shipped of $18,600. 736. 
Down to December 29, 1917, date of the balance sheet, the num- 
ber of Standard J planes shown as having been shipped were 

32. 739. 
Asked with respect to 8.34 acres of land adjoining property of 

company on the north which was purchased after main plant. 

740. 
Schedule I covers the entire amount deemed by the company to 

be chargeable to the Government under all its contracts down 

to May 31, 1918. 744. ■ 
Harley M. Howell (Dayton- Wright Airplane Plant, Dayton, Ohio, 
July 11, 1918; Book 10). 

Auditor since 18th of June, 1917, with Davton-Wright Airplane 

Co. 1. 
Fourth page of " Smart Exhibit No. 11," items under head of 

" Experimental." 1. 
On what basis were these items made payable by Government 

before any contract had been made. 2. 
Character of the work which went into experimental voucher 

paid by Government. 5. 
Had a contract which called for the antedating of work — ex- 
perimental work — that had been performed previously up to 

the time of the date of the contract. 9. 
What purpose was in view in treating these experimental 

charges during the fall of 1917 as separate from the cost 

under the main contract. 9. 
Voucher submitted under contract No. 2713 dated January 25, 

1918, is dated May 21, 1918, being submitted for experimental 

expenses. 11. 
Asked to explain how they presented vouchers and received pay- 
ment on vouchers under the main contract for work that did 

not belong under that contract. 15. 



156 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Harley M. Howell — Continued. 

Produces depreciation accounts in ledger. 22. 

Temporary buildings carried in ledger at cost value, no depre- 
ciation. 25. 

Distinguisli between a temporary building and a permanent 
building by the purpose for which it was intended. 26. 

Employment building, the commissary building, and the Mo- 
raine hangars on South Field styled temporary buildings. 26. 

$7,611.33 expended on commissary building. 27. 

Employment building, expended on it $2,159.31. 28. 

Testing building, $3,810.71. 28. 

Produces statement showing an analysis of permanent assets as 
of May 31, 1918. 29. ■ 

Other temporary buildings. 30. 

Net result will be that at end of the contract they will have 
very substantial building usable as part of the plant which 
Government will have paid for. 32. 

Asked why these are charged as temporary buildings to the 
Government when they are just as permanent as main plant. 
32. 

Temporary commissary building experimental work under the 
contract of January 25, 1918. 34. 

Was passed by Government accountant. 31. 

Experimental motor and gun test building, $7,717.02. 31. 

Contract calls for a completed plane, but nothing is said about 
testing it. 36. 

Submits voucher showing submission for depreciation. 41. 

This was paid by the Government. 13. 

Actually in the plant at work as early as August, 1917. 16. 

Total of $11,883.75 been charged for depreciation to Mav 31, 
1918. 18. 

Ledger accounts show that $51,252.35 has been expended for 
office furniture and fixtures down to May 31, 1918. 19. 

All this account at plant No. 1. 49. 

Office furniture account at plant No. 2, Miamisburg. 50. 

Office furniture account at Golden Street factory. 50. 

Office furniture account at South Field experimental station. 
50. 

Asked to produce vouchers of outlays under administrative and 
general expenses shown in balance sheet of December 2?, 
^ 1917. 51. 

Takes voucher and tells when, in the adjustment, the salaries 
were allowed and paid. 53. 

Traveling expenses. 51. 

Mr. Bourne, of Lybrant, Ross Bros., and Montgomery, repre- 
sented the Government in this matter. 55. 

All traveling expenses of executive officers included in this ac- 
count before the date of any of the contracts. 56. 

All postage, telephone, and telegraph charges charged to the 
Government. 57. 

Government allowed full amount, $2,717.37, down to October 
31, 1917. 58. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 157 

Harley M. Howell — Continued. 

Western Union Telegraph bill of E. A. Deeds for May, $51.38. 
59 

(As of May, 1917.) 

Principle of these charges. 60. 

No special instructions from any one as to what should be sub- 
mitted to Government. 61. 

Office furniture and fixtures submitted to Government under 
office expenses instead of under the head of office furniture 
and fixtures. 62. 

The plan they worked on was that everything they laid out from 
the inception of the company, barring incorporation expenses, 
was to be paid by the Government. 63. 

Capt. Jam'es A. Newman, accounting officer, was assigned to 
this plant and he acknowledged these matters. 61. 

Voucher of $255,255.85 allowed by Government without any 
audit. 65. 

(Keference, p. 4.) 

Anything not paid for in this voucher ultimately went into the 
clean-up voucher, No. 30, which was settled on May 3, 1918. 
66. 

Government contract with the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 
contains provision which excuses them from the necessity of 
testing anything they made or even being assured what they 
made would do the work expected of it. 66. 

See article 12, entitled " Protection against infringement." 67. 

This the reason for the " Experimental work " contract. 67. 

Asked to produce memorandum with respect to amount expended 
in connection with the building of the first De Haviland 
plane. 69. 

Authorization from the Government comes from Col. Deeds. 69. 

Asked when Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. obtained title to this 
plant 71. 

Produces copy of original authorization under which experi- 
mental work done prior to January 1, 1917, was submitted for 
payment. 73. 

Executive salary list of voucher No. 2, 77. 
(Salaries put under certain numbers.) 

Various matters held in abeyance for a considerable time be- 
tween the company and the Government. 81. 

Produces telegraph file of April, 1917. 84. 
(Pages 84 to 176 contain telegrams.) 
Charles A. Craighead (Federal Building, Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 
1918; Book 10). 

Member of the Ohio bar. 177. 

Secretary to Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 177. 

Attorney and counsel to Dayton Metal Products Co. 178. 

Name of his own firm, Craighead & Cowden. 179. 

Attorney for Mr. Talbott 20 years. 185. 

Minutes of meetings pasted not pasted in proper place. 18. 

Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. purchases plant formerly owned 
by Enterprise Carriage Co. at Miamisburg. 198. 

Charles A. Craighead trustee of company. 199. 



158 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

■Charles A. Craighead — Continued. 

Asked about acquiring it for $60,000 and turning it over for 

$127,202. 200. 
Money seems to have been paid by Mr. Talbott. 203. 
Turned it eventually over to Dayton- Wright Airplane Co . 204. 
Record shows property was turned over to Dayton- Wright Air- 
plane Co. for $127,202. 205. 
Questions him about telegram from Deeds, of Equipment Divi- 
sion, to H. E. Talbott about having worked out a lease for the 
North Dayton field. 207. 
Acted as trustee in this matter. 209. 
Asked to get details that will enable him to give a clear account 

of this transaction. 209-210. 
Minutes of November 28 state that property is held by Dayton- 
Wright Co. from the Enterprise Carriage Co. 212. 
Cteorge Bancroft Smith (July 12, 1918; Book 10). 

Produces correspondence of Col. Deeds from his file, one for 
1917 and one for 1918. 215. 

(Pages 216 to 227, inclusive, letters and telegrams.) 
Special attention called to one on page 223, in which reference 
is made to loan secured by an officer connected with McCook 
Field. 224. 
Mary E. Devine (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). 

Produces Mr. Talbott's file of correspondence with Mr. Deeds. 
228. 

(Pages 229 to 280, inclusive, letters and telegrams.) 
Howard Smith Taylor (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). 
Engineer with Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 281. 
Produces certain correspondence, telegrams and letters, taken 
from the executive office file. 281. 
(Pages 282 to 316, inclusive.) 
James M. Schoonmaker (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). 
(Resides Pittsburgh, Pa.) 
Chief engineer of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. since June of 

last year. 317. 
In Ordnance Department at Washington before coming to Day- 
ton. 317. 
Had been with the Talbott Co. previous to going to Washington. 

318. 
Describes condition of affairs as he found them when he came to 

Dayton- Wright Co. in 1917, about June. 318. 
Drawings for planes received early in July very incomplete. 

320. 
Chief difficulty in connection with production of the Standard J 
planes was in getting the material which had been made from 
the Standard blue prints to assemble properly. 321. 
Had to make drawings from these and the model before they 
could be released to the manufacturers. 322. 
. Factory was not then in shape to go ahead, because they could 
not make the tools until they had received the drawings. 323. 
Began to tool up on some parts in latter part of July, but some 
parts were not released to the factory until as late as Octo- 
ber. 323. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 159 

James M. Schoonmaker — Continued. 

Standard J planes in 90 per cent production during November, 

but had been held back by defects discovered. 324. 
First plane delivered on 8th of December. 325. 
Production from then on averaged about eight planes per day. 

325. 
The entire 400 called for by the contract 1st of August, 1917, 

were delivered April 11, 1918. 325. 
Chief reasons for delay. 326. 

Two types of training planes, Curtiss and Standard. 329. 
Asked, if Curtiss was in quantity production, why they did not 

take that up and make all the planes they needed from that 

type. 329. 
Telegram to Col. Deeds from Dayton- Wright Airplane Co., giv- 
ing schedule of deliveries to be counted on of the Standard J 

planes. 331. 
Explanation of failure to make delivery of any Standard planes 

at all until two months later. 332-334. 
Engineer not consulted with respect to estimates set forth to 

Col. Deeds in telegram. 335. 
Shortage of material principal cause for delay. 336. 
Gives further and more complete reasons for delay. 337. 
Calls attention to letter from Col. Deeds of November 26, 1917, 

in which he makes mention that too much time has been wasted 

over Standard J changes. 338. 
Asked to produce files which would show these changes. 339. 
Attention drawn to telegram from Col. Deeds to Mr. Talbott 

crowding production. 340. 
From December 5 were in condition to produce as fast as their} 

capacity would permit. 341. 
Shipments fall down to small quantity per day. 341. 
Engineering difficulties had even been solved up to about 90 

per cent during the summer. 342. 
Shipments held up by failure to deliver by subcontractors. 342* 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. made all the wood parts, fixing of 

linen for the wings, etc, 343. 
Dayton Metal Products Co. made turnbuckles, perhaps a few 

bolts. 343. 
Shown telegram from Col. Deeds addressed to Dayton-Wright 

Airplane Co. in which Standard J planes withdrawn. 344. 
Difficulty with the Hall-Scott motors. 345. 

First De Haviland 4 completed and flown October 29, 1917. 345. 
No changes in design, excepting a few minor details which could 

not delay production. 345. 
Necessary to redesign the De Haviland to take the Liberty 

motor. 346. 
Attention called to telegram from Col. Deeds, August 5, 1917, 

stating sending De Haviland to Dayton. 346. 
Telegram from Col. Deeds stating sending drawings (dated 

August 14, 1917) of De Haviland 4. 347. 
Asked if apart from the adaptation of the plane to the Liberty 

motor there was anything to delay production of the ma- 
. chine. 348. 

120687—19 11 



160 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

James M. Schoonmaker — Continued. 

Some parts of the machine never made in this country before, 
therefore experimental stage necessary. 348. 

Lack of spruce would not account for any considerable delay. 
349. m 

Had Liberty motor in plenty of time. 351. 

All through with engineering difficulties by October 29. 352. 

No information could be obtained on the equipment. 355. 

With the Standard J planes in shop also could not have gone 
ahead on big production, but could have produced at least 
150 a month in December, January, and February; also 
March, if could have obtained equipment information. 356. 

Reads part of history of De Haviland. 357. 

Reads further part of history. 358. 

Endeavoring from October, 1917, to some time in April, 1918, 
to get statement of the equipment that was needed in order 
to finish the drawings. 358. 

Conducted correspondence with Col. Vincent at McCook Field, 
358. 

Gives summary of course of production of the De Haviland 
plane. 359. 

Did not reach definite results until April, 1918. 360. 

In correspondence practically only with production engineering 
department head, Maj. Gray. 361. 

States as his testimony detailed course of the production of the 
De Haviland plane. 361. (Pp. 362-374). 

Drawings for changes in the double gun mount and the rede- 
sign of the cartridge boxes furnished by the Signal Corps were 
not correct and designs not satisfactory. 375. 

Thinks that these delays have really been caused by honest 
mistakes. 378. 

Recites delays which have been occasioned by mistakes of Day- 
ton-Wright Airplane Co. 379. 

Delay in furnishing information as to equipment in the par- 
ticulars described cost this country three months in getting 
the production which was achieved in April and from April 
on. 381. 

Assumed they had knowledge as to equipment, as they did not 
know whether equipment was to come, as they had never 
heard anything. 385. 

Requested information of Signal Corps October 9, 1917, as to 
gun sights, without which they could not make up any pro- 
gram for delivery, but no bill of particulars or drawings in 
connection therewith was received until February 13. 387. 

Equipment of the first plane that went out from the factory in- 
complete. 398. (No gun that would work.) 

Asked how they could get along without a drawing of the gun 
they were to use in making the first plane for it. 389. 

This plane finished and sent to France, and yet it was incom- 
plete and no one could fight with it. 390. 

Telegram from Mr. Talbott to Col. Deeds asking for recall of 
first 100 planes. 391. 

That first incomplete plane intended for the American Exgedi- 
L tionarv Forces in France. 392. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 161 

James M. Schoonmaker — Continued. 

No shipments for the Expeditionary Forces between February 
4, 1918, and April 3, 1918. 393. 

Produces photographic exhibit of the program for the D. H. 4 
from the Planning Department, Equipment Division, of the 
Signal Corps, marked "Zacharias Exhibit 1," purporting to 
show program from August 2, 1917, to May 3, 1918, which 
brings out admission that they had only one bona fide program 
but lots of others that were not. 393. 

Schedule made up on April 9 first bona fide schedule based on 
accurate information. 395. 

This schedule produced which shows they did not take into ac- 
count what had been shipped prior to April 9, thereby making 
May 2 as the date on which quantity production commenced. 
406. 

Shipping planes in which nuts have been admitted in securing 
the bolts. 413. 

Bolts and schackles and cotter pins throughout the machines 
badly fitted. 415. 

Thirty or forty inspectors, but only 4 or 5 have had experience. 
415. 

Jammed pulley wheels and bad joints at the landing gear struc- 
ture. 416. 

From October to the present time inspectors and engineers and 
employees all alike have been getting their experience in the 
producing of airplanes. 418. 

This does not in a considerable measure explain the delay. 419. 

Disloyalty on part of men working in the plant. 421. 
August Hiller (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). 

Plant accounting officer, Bureau of Aircraft Production. 427. 

Arrived at plant on April 11, Capt. Newman, his predecessor, 
was working on the clean-up voucher No. 30. 428. 

Credit balances due the Government of approxihately $94,000. 
429. 

Question of traveling expenses. 433. 

Voucher No. 1 under which $255,255.85 was paid the contractor. 
434. 

Present attitude of the Government accounting office with re- 
spect to salaries at this plant. 437. 

Shifting sums from one contract to another. 438. 

Attitude of the Government with respect to temporary buildings 
and the allowance of, vouchers for temporary buildings. 445. 

Operation of a commissary an actual necessity. 448. 

Depreciation ratio of the cost of the Miamisburg plant. 449. 

Always an effort on part of the contractor to get everything 
out of costs he can. 455. 

Padding the pay rolls. 456. 

Private chauffeurs carried on the pay rolls of the company. 456. 

These chauffeurs entitled to get oil, cars, gasoline, etc., on free 
list for use in running the private cars of all officers of the 
company to and from Dayton. 457. 

Ruling issued on this June 8 from Washington that no more 
money shall be allowed for such purposes. 458. 



162 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

James M. Sghoonmaker — Continued. 

Produces list of the officials, with signature of president of the 

company, who are supposed to be on free list for oil, gas, and 

tires. 458. 
Mr. Butts, oil, gas, and tires ; Mr. Talbott, sr., gets oil, gas, and 

tires; Mr. Talbott, jr., also, etc., 465. 
Expense accounts sent in for railroad fare, moving of furniture, 

etc., for employees. 467. 
Baseball nine maintained. 467. 
Officers submit bills for traveling expenses to Washington and 

otherwise, and then will not give details. 470. 
Difficulties encountered in trying to install a proper cost ac- 
counting system. 471. 
Officials of the company would not cooperate in helping anyone 

to put in adequate cost system. 472. 
Scrapped material. 474. 

Getting at the cost of the airplanes shipped. 475. 
Louis Crist Lueneke (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). 
Engineer, general aeronautical engineer. 477. 
Went with Dayton-Wright Co. in 1915. 479. 
Started in with D. W. K. Airplane Co. on experimental work on 

March 1, 1917, at South Field, headquarters at the Delco. 

480. 
Held position of airplane designing when this company was 

formed. 480. 
Designed the F S, now at South field. 480. 
Started on the construction of these the latter part of March. 

481. 
Connection with the Standard J. 481. 
Now assistant chief engineer. 482. 
Factory manager, Mr. Sutton. 482. 
Mr. Williams, assistant to the president. 483. 
States causes of delav in production of the Standard J 1 planes. 

484. 
Chart shows number of planes in final test on July 12, 1918, as 

729, and number of planes shipped 654, while according to Mr. 

Lueneke's statement only 632 had passed into final test. 486. 
HE. Talbott, Sr. (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10.) 

Actively identified with Dayton Metal Products Co. and the 

Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. Also in the paper business and 

chairman of the board of directors of the City National Bank 

in Dayton. 488. 
President Dayton Metal Products Co. 488. 
Dayton Metal Products Co. organized to carry out a contract for 

making detonating fuses for foreign Governments. 489. 
Mr. Talbott, his son, Deeds, and Kettering were asked by the 

Government to take over construction of some trading ships. 

490. 
Thinks they called themselves a company. 490. 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. grew out of this. 491. 
This matter of obtaining contracts from the Government was 

suggested to them by Mr. Waldon, connected with Gen. Squier's 

office, or with Howard Coffin's department of aircraft produc- 
tion.' 491-492. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 163 

H. E. Talbott, Sr. — Continued. 

In spring of 1917 they were asked to take over the building of 

the Domestic Engineering Co. 492. 
Probably suggested by Waldon and Coffin and Mr. Deeds. 492. 
Domestic Building Co. by Mr. Deeds and Kettering. 494. 
Mr. Deeds and Mr. Kettering interested in Moraine Development 

Co. 494. 
Asked as to the situation with respect to Dayton-Wright Air- 
plane Co.'s interest in this building during summer and fall 

of 1917. 495. 
Had no written statement or exchange of papers, but in this joint 

statement it was agreed to provide Domestic Engineering Co. 

with quarters. 497. 
Daj^ton- Wright Airplane Co. organized in April, 1917. 497. 
Understanding by Mr. Talbott, sr., Mr. Kettering, and Mr. Tal- 
bot t, jr., as to transfer ultimately of the Domestic Building 

Co. to Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 499. 
States when this matter of obtaining a contract for planes was 

first taken up on behalf of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 

499. 
Some prior to the date of the contract that the order was given. 

501. 
Asked about telegram from Mr. Deeds under date of May 11, 

1917, saying, " Think your whole plan ideal." 501. 
Further telegrams from Deeds. 502. 
Mr. Kuhns is secretary of the conservancy board of directors. 

504. 
Had been an attorney or secretary at the National Cash Register 

Co. 504. 
Telegram from Deeds to Ezra M. Kuhns, " Option should be 

rushed in vicinity of a fir field, raising prices, if necessary. 

504. 
Gives explanation of measure of which he asked approval of 

Col. Deeds in telegram of May 11, 1917. (Page 501.) 508. 
Col. Deeds stopped publicity in matter on account of increase in 

land which would have resulted had it become known Govern- 
ment was going to purchase it. 509. 
Mr. Talbott had an idea that expenses in connection with flying 

field would be $150,000 or $200,000 in buildings. 510. 
Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. received contract for work 

to be done on this field, which has already run into several 

millions of dollars. 511. 
S. S. King, one of leading stockholders in this company. 511. 
Secured the capital to invest in this company through the City 

National Bank, $60,000. 512. 
Acquired most of the stock. 513. 
States how he negotiated the contract for King in the name of 

the company for this work. 513. 
Reads telegram to Mr. Talbott from Mr. Deeds, under date of 

May 25, regarding King's inability to take care of this con- 
tract alone. 515. 
Finds out he has recommended a man too small for the job. 516. 



164 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

H. E. Talbott, Sr. — Continued. 

Telegram from Deeds to Talbott, in which he asks his discretion 
in regard to making public a statement about King's con- 
tract. 517. 

Asked how Deeds anticipated criticism with regard to King's 
being given this contract if they were innocent of any conniv- 
ing. 518. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. loaned King several hundred thou- 
sand dollars, indorsed his paper, and introduced him to their 
bank in New York, the American Exchange. 519-520. 

Said Dayton Metal Products Co. did not get any compensation 
for its service to King. 521. 

Explains reason for carrying this big loan in New York. 522. 

Local lumber man known to Ezra Kuhns recommended by Deeds 
as a person to whom should be handed contracts in connection 
with this work. 526. 

Telegram from Mr. Talbott, sr., to Mr. Deeds, although he still 
insists he was not interested in the contract. 523, 531. 

Still further interest displayed. 535. 

His attention again called to telegram from Deeds, in which he 
says, " Think your whole plan ideal," all this being 12 days 
before King got the contract. 538. 

Calls attention to telegram from Mr. Deeds, dated June 7, to Mr. 
Talbott, jr., mentioning purchase requisition for 500 planes 
that had been started by Government. 540. 

Telegram asking Mr. Talbott to come to Washington for confer- 
ence on form of contract. 542. 

Concerned over the article in the contract on depreciation. 545. 

Telegram from Talbott to Col. Deeds asking if it would be pos- 
sible to have Government officers come first of week to conclude 
contract, this being on September 15. 547. 

Their contract not the same as Curtiss Co. 549. 

Thinks Col. Deeds transferred and sold his stock in the Dayton 
Metal Products Co. to him in May. 552. 

Settlement made by notes. 553. 

Keason of the two-fifths, two-fifths, and one-fifth arrangement. 
553. ; 

No written agreement or any form of agreement to show that 
there was an agreement. 556. 

Barrow, Wade & Guthrie to determine on the book value less 15 
per cent. 557. 

Arrangement in November, 1917, with respect to the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. stock when that was transferred to the 
Dayton Metal Products Co. the D. M. P. Co. should only have 
the profit on that stock to the extent of a certain percentage. 
557. 

After giving a certain percentage to the Dayton Metal Products 
Co. the rest divided in a proportion which gave Mr. Kettering 
one-twentieth more than either of the tAvo Talbotts. 559. 

Goes over their salaries. 561. 

Is again shown note dated May 22, 1917 (see p. 555), and asked 
to state when it was delivered. 563. 

By June 30, 1917, Mr. Talbott had through indorsements and 
direct paper loaned $550,000. 566. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 165 

H. E. Talbott, Sr. — Continued. 

Lays conception of Wilbur Wright Field on Mr. Deeds. 567. 
Is again asked to fix the date of the delivery of the note mentioned 

on page 555. 570. 
Hold joint meeting to discuss disposal of Deeds's stock. 575. 
Minutes written up later. 577. 
His attention is called to his personal ledger regarding this note 

of May 22, 1917, in which entry is made as of September 30, 

1917. 595. 
Was asked if he had a special arrangement for the receipt of tele- 
gram from Mr. Deeds. 596. 
Acquisition by the Dayton Metal Products of the Dayton- Wright 

Airplane Co. 597. 
Purchase of this stock was considered some time in the summer. 

599. 
Note to Deeds for $207,706 for 200 shares of his stock in Dayton 

Metal Products Co. overdue. Only $7,706 ever been paid on it. 

601. 
In the arrangement for the sale of the Dayton- Wright Airplane 

Co. to the Dayton Metal Products Co. provision is made for 

repurchase by the Messrs. Talbott and Mr. Kettering. 602. 
No written agreement with Deeds on any subject. 604. 
No memorandum regarding transfers of these different stocks 

with reference to payment of the notes or the reacquisition of 

any interest as represented by these notes. 605. 
Is shown salary account of Dayton Metal Products Co. in which 

is entered salary for E. A. Deeds for June, 1917, as well as May 

and earlier months. 606. 
Reasons for buying or paying $60,000 for Miamisburg plant and 

then turning it over to himself practically again for greatly 

increased valuation. 607. 
Stated that Mr. Schoonmaker's testimony was in accordance with 

his understanding of facts, but not complete. 610, 611. 
Sidney Scott King (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; Book 10). 
Lumber business. 612. 

President Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 612. 
Formed in 1894 ; been president about a year. 612. 
Became principal owner in April, 1917. 613. 
Acquired 521 shares in April. 613. 
No large contracts between 1908 and 1917. 615. 
Owned a planing mill and lumber yard ; also bought through Mr. 

H. E. Talbott's influence as president of the City National 

Bank. 615. 
Recites the same feature as Mr. Talbott as one of the reasons for 

this loan to him of $60,000 from Mr. Talbott. 615. 
The first he heard of anv buildings to be erected at Wilbur 

Wright Field was on May 16, 1917. 617. 
Signed this contract for this field on May 23. 619. 
Went to Mr. Deeds's office and Deeds took him to Col. Edgar. 621. 
Contract signed on May 23 was just letter signed by Chief of the 

Signal Corps, Marshall, instructing them to proceed with the 

work pending final contract. 633. 
Expected to get his capital from Mr. Talbott. 624. 



166 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Sidney Scott King — Continued. 

First pay roll was a thousand dollars a week; in four weeks it 
had grown to $158,000 a week. 625. 

Saw Col. Deeds a great deal in Washington. 627. 

Cost of aviation up to November 1, 1917. 629. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. advanced him money on July 16. 
630. 

Dayton Metal Products Co. advanced $825,000 down to October 
27. 631. 

Asked to produce missing sheets from ledger. 632. 
Ezra M. Kuhns (Book 10). 

Secretary of the Miami conservancy district since Julv 7, 1915. 
633. 

This district acquired Wilbur Wright Field practically all in 
1917. 633. 

Was advised 1st of April that Government was interested in this 
tract. 637. 

Terms of leasing to the Government. 644. 
James M. Schoonmaker (July 13, 1918; Book 10). 

Produces file which shows the numerous changes in the Stand- 
ard J-l. (Reference p. 339.) 647. 

Complete set of drawings ready for manufacture of De Havi- 
land 4 on January 5, 1918. 649. 

Reads letter addressed to Mr. H. E. Talbott, in which he ex- 
plains to him how the engineering department had to drop 
work on the DH-4 and start on the DH-9, and then even- 
tually go back again to the D-H4. 650. 

First 12 days in July they had 321 changes on the De Haviland 

. plane. 652. 
Alfred J. Tingle (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; Book 10). 

Manufacturing engineer with Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 655. 

Produces minutes of engineering data, containing record of the 
shipments of the J-l machine, also showing some of the causes 
of delay. 656. 

This too technical, and is asked to make up a statement which 
would be better understood, which he does. 659-664. 
Charles Franklin Kettering (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; 
Book 10). 

Vice president Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 665. 

Vice president Dayton Metal Products Co. 665. 

First came to Dayton in July, 1904, and took a position at the 
National Cash Register Co., and was a designer there then in 
the engineering department. 666. 

Col. Deeds was then vice president. 666. 

Was the inventor of the Delco system. 667. 

Short history of the Delco system. 668. 

Made the development through corporation known as the Delco 
Co. — The Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co. 668. 

Sold the stock of the Delco Co. to United Motors Co. in latter 
part of 1916. 670. 

Preferred stock not made over. 671. 

Still president of the Delco Co., at salary of $50,000. 672. 

Relates story in connection with his association with Mr. Deeds 
in Dayton Metal Products Co. 672. 



ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 167 

Charles Franklin Kettering — Continued. 

Still vice president of the Dayton Metal Products Co. at a salary 

of $20,000. 674. 
When the Delco Co. stock was transferred to United Motors in 
1916 Col. Deeds still continued as vice president of United 
Motors and also as president of the Delco. 674. 
In the winter of 1915-16, along the first of the year, did their 
first worok at the South Field, in which were associated Mr. 
Talbott, Mr. Deeds, and Mr. Talbott, jr.; this afterwards 
developing into the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 676. 
Relates visit of Col. Foulois and Mr. Howard Coffin and several 

others to look over this field. 677. 
Can not recall the date when Col. Deeds approached him on 
the subject of the transfer of his stock in the Dayton Metal 
Co. 680. 

No memorandum or statement of any which would show the 
transfer. 680. 

Does not remember the time when Barrow, Wade & Guthrie com- 
pleted their adjustment and made a statement. 682. 

No records of any kind to show the way in which the transac- 
tion regarding the purchase by the Dayton Metal Products 
Co. of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. from Mr. Kettering 
and Mr. Talbott. 685. 

Asked about the arrangement of the proportion of two-fifths, 
two-fifths, and one-fifth. 686. 

Asked about the note of November, 1917, for $273,000, which 
he gave to the Domestic Building Co., also Mr.- Talbott for 
same amount, and Mr. Talbott, jr., for one-half the amount. 
689. 

Does not know whether it has ever been paid or not. 691. 

Does not know whether Mr. Talbott has ever paid his note or 
not. 692. 

Does not recall anything about giving a note to Col. Deeds for 
$206,706 for 200 shares of the Dayton Metal Products Co. 
stock. 692. 

Could not state if it had been delivered. Did not know it was 
overdue. 693. 

Mr. Kettering's attention called to agreement of repurchase. 
694. 

Asked whv the note to Mr. Deeds for $207,706 has not been paid. 
696. 

Speaks of the delays occasioned by changes in design, etc., men- 
tioned by Mr. Schoonmaker. 708. 

Defines the different purposes of the Wilbur Wright field, the 
North field, the McCook field, and the South field. 711. 

His attention called to his note under date of May 22, 1917, for 
$207,706 payable to E. A. Deeds. 714. 

Is shown his bills-payable book, which shows this note entered 
after the date of August 3, 1917. 715. 

His attention called to ledger of the Dayton Metal Products Co., 
showing minutes pasted in wrong places, also others; with- 
drawn. 717. 



168 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Harold E. T. Talbott, Jr. (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; Book 10). 

After occupying various positions, arrives in Dayton in Novem- 
ber, 1914. 721. 

Took up work with Dayton Metal Products Co. 721. 

First took up matter of airplane construction early in spring 
of 1917. 722. 

His work is confined entirely to personnel of the organization. 
724. 

States what is embraced under head of personnel. 725. 

Mr. Sherer has charge of the system of vouchering to the Gov- 
ernment, 726. 

Gives companies in which he is an officer, with salary. 720. 

Has some recollection of a date when he joined with Mr. Ket- 
tering and his father in the signing of a check for a million 
dollars to the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., in payment of its 
capital stock. 731. 

Does not recall the actual cost of the land on which the Dayton- 
Wright airplane plant is built. 735. 

Heard that " they " paid $60,000 for the Miamisburg plant. 735. 

Asked what accounts were taken into consideration in this trans- 
action. 736. 

Gave his note approximately for $100,000 for his share of Mr. 
Deeds's stock in the Dayton Metal Products Co. 739. 

Can not state when he signed it or when it was delivered. 740- 
741. 

Asked for explanation of the two-fifths, two-fifths, one-fifth 
plan. 749. 

Gives $4,000,000 as total profits on whole contract made out 
of De Havilands and spares. 751. 
Maj. James Goodrich Heaslet (Detroit, Mich., July 16, 1918; 
Book 11). 

Major, Signal Corps, since last September. Prior to that was 
vice president of Studebaker Co. Had production engineer- 
ing work of the Studebaker Corporation, 1-2. 

Employed in inspection service. 2. 

States what concerns he had jurisdiction over. 3. 

Outlines what he observed at Fisher body plant. 7. 

Gives reason for delay at Fisher Body Co. 10. 

" I saw a very efficient organization standing around waiting for 
information." 14. 

When they were ready to take something up a change would 
come. 15. 

Concerns making fittings for the Dayton-Wright Co. were in- 
competent. 16. 

States why contract for parts was let through the Dayton- 
Wright Co. instead of to the National Cash Register Co. 
direct. 17. 

Mr. Hughes quotes delivery contract and Maj. Heaslet testifies 
that the Fisher Body Co. could have gotten this work out 
promptly if they had the necessary information. 20. 

Situation similar with De Haviland planes. 21. 

Fisher Body Co. had their first De Haviland in the air about 
three weeks ago. 21. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 169 

Maj. James Goodrich Heaslet — Continued. 

Dayton- Wright Co. switched from De Haviland 9 to De Havi- 
land 4. Took until April to get under way with 4s. 22. 

Believes Fisher Body Co. proceeded as well as they could. 26. 

Outlines production of Fisher Body Co. 26. 

Fisher Body Co. capable of producing 40 planes a day. 28. 

There will be a shortage of motors. 29. 

Fisher Body Co. three months behind Dayton-Wright Co. because 
he thinks they did not receive information as quickly. 30. 

Received up to date 61 motors. Seemed to be no lack of motors 
at Dayton-Wright plant. 34. 

When they were well into the tools a change would come and 
they would have to start over again. 38. 

Is questioned as to the cause of this delay of many months at the 
Fisher Body plant to which he answers that minor changes 
have been made from time to time. 39. 

Mr. Hughes states that he can not understand why the Fisher 
Co. had not produced a plane before July 1, and continues, 
" For I confess I do not understand your statement." 42. 

Is asked again what reason there can be why the Fisher Body 
Co. should not have gone ahead as rapidly as the Dayton- 
Wright Co. 

Answers it may be because the Engineering Department is lo- 
cated at Dayton and Fisher is "isolated up here, away off." 
43. 

Some evidence of retarding production at Lincoln plant. 45. 

Again Maj. Heaslet states that Fisher Body Co. has not inten- 
tionally delayed the work. 46. 

States Fishers themselves are not Germans for several genera- 
tions. 47. 

Estimates that four planes will be ready for shipment during 
" the present week." 57. 

Gives number of Liberty motors produced from date to date by 
Packard Co. 58. 

Also gives number of motors with respect to other plants. 59. 

" Labor condition frightful." 61. 

Due to lack of production of crank shafts will not have a thou- 
sand motors from Packard in August. 62. 

Cites trouble with cam shaft housing which may delay produc- 
tion. 65. 

Ford " has fallen down on his estimate badly." 66. 

Can not give any reason why well-equipped concerns like the 
General Motors, Cadillac, and Buick got no orders before De- 
cember. 68. 

Tooling up in six months " was a wonderful piece of work." 69. 

Cadillac and Buick plants were in as good shape to make an air- 
plane motor as any other concern. 69. 

Could have handled larger orders. 72. 

Other companies got orders for 6,000 and they got orders for 
only 2,000. 72. 

Contract for 5,000 with Ford let in November, 1917; tooling up 
not accomplished yet. 73. 

Ford produced 97 motors up to date. 77. 



170 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. James Goodrich Heaslet — Continued. 

Optimism greater about Ford plant than Packard because Ford 

has greater facilities. 79. 
Asked for an explanation as to the reason the first contract was 

let to a concern that did not have a plant. 81. 
Describes great scarcity of toolmakers and struggle with Adju- 
tant General's Office in getting 87 toolmakers out of Camp 

Custer. 83. 
Two regiments of men were refused by the General Staff that 

could have been used. (2,800 men.) 83. 
Held in camp near to five months (motor mechanics) and " taken 

away from the factories in this country." 85. 
Continuous discussion of this matter up to page 88. 91. 
Sending of these men to Detroit would have aided in getting 

planes. 91. 
Lincoln Motor Co. produced 763 motors up to July 15. 91. 
Estimate for August is 700. 92. 
And for December, 1,250. 92. 

Nordyke Marmon plant just coming into production. 95. 
Their contract was let in September, 1917. 96. 
Hall- Scott contract had to be finished before Liberty motor 

could be taken up. 97. 
Seven hundred and fourteen motors produced thus far in July 

out of a contemplated production of 1,950. 100. 
Thinks they may get 2,500 in September. 101. 
One hundred to one hundred and fifty hours is supposed to be 

about the life of certain parts of the Liberty motor. 107. 
Thinks a new engine can be produced with less men than it takes 

to repair one and therefore does not favor reestablishing an 

engine. 108-109. 
Life of a plane is not over 90 to 120 days, therefore requiring 

probably three motors to the plane. 109. 
Spare parts holding them back from schedule. 110. 
Makes statement relative to Liberty motor. 112. 
Had motor been run as originally designed at 330 to 350 horse- 
power there would have been no serious change. 114. 
Col. Hall will state the scupper system was adequate. Col. Vin- 
cent will tell you we had to have pressure system. 115. 
Propeller head on crank shaft changed three times. 116. 
Great deal of question during fall and winter as to whether Hal] 

or Vincent had control of the Liberty motor. 118. 
Hazard an estimate that had no engineering changes occurred, 

would not have had over 1,000 engines more than we have. 

118. 
Had 595 engines the 1st of May. 119. 
Thinks manuf actnrers were misled by believing that this was an 

automobile problem and not a totally different problem. 121. 
Only saved twelve one-hundredths of a pound per horsepower in 

order to bring it up to 400. 124. 
The heads of tool room at Lincoln plant apparently had banded 

together with certain subordinates, and thinks there was a 

deliberate case of retarding tool work, which, of course, was 

the important work. 124. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 171 

Maj. James Goodrich Heaslet — Continued. 

Barrel dropped on a propeller one day and we never have dis- 
covered where the barrel came from. 127. 

English claim they can not get the results with the Zenith car- 
buretor that we supplv with the engine and they want the 
Clotele. 130. 

About 1,200 engines shipped with light connecting rods. 133. 

Estimates on March 25 was that we would have 4,620 engines bv 
the end of June. Only had 1,625. 134. 

Had counted on Ford for 1,200 and they really had not pro- 
duced anything. 135. 

J. H. Walker Co. of Cleveland, fell down flat on cam-shaft hous- 
ing. 136. 

General Motors production sheet marked " Heaslett Exhibit 3, 
July 16, 1918." 136. 

Ford production sheets marked " Heaslett Exhibit 4, July 16. 
1918." 136. 

Lincoln Co. sheet marked "Heaslett Exhibit 5, July 15, 1918. 
136. 

Sheet showing total production marked " Heaslett Exhibit 6, 
July 16, 1918." 137. 
Capt. J. Neil Patterson (Detroit, Mich., July 16, 1918; Book 11). 

Has been an officer of the Signal Corps about 10 months. 138. 

Went to Washington in middle of August and offered services. 
Finally succeeded in connecting up with motor production de- 
partment under Lieut. Emmons. Given rank as aeronautical 
mechanical engineer. 138. 

Was told to go to Buffalo and visit motor plants in district and 
find out some means of hurrying up production of planes at 
Curtiss, Hammondsport, and Buffalo, and later at Elmira, 
N. Y. 139. 

Had been in Packard shops for nine months and then went with 
Packard deal in Pittsburgh on technical work. Later became 
salesman for Packard dealer in Detroit. From there took 
charge of Detroit factory branch of Lozier Motor Co. Had 
various other positions in connection with motor business. 
139, 140. 

Found companies that were not working on the Curtiss equip- 
ment with the energy and capacity they could. The main 
reason being the Curtiss Co. did not pay their bills. 142. 

Transferred to inspection department, Signal Corps, and sent 
to San Francisco to be district manager of inspection there. 
143. 

After work completed there reported back to Washington and 
then ordered to report to Maj. Heazlett, Detroit. 144. 

Conditions at Curtiss plant at that time very chaotic. 146. 

There was no one man there who was boss. 146. 

They had enough men but not enough assistants in the executive 
department. 150. 

Makes statement as to how conditions were remedied. 151. 

Had as many as 15 drawings up and down the State of Cali- 
fornia for the same parts that were all different. 160. 

Fowler, in some miraculous way, received an order for training 
planes. He did not have any organization and he did not 
have any factory. 164. 



172 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Capt. J. Neil Patterson — Continued. 
He had conversational capital. 165. 
Pretty much handicapped through the Curtiss Co. not sending 

drawings and drawings not checking with one another. 167. 
United States Aircraft Corporation was a body of men who had 

a contract; they had had a plant and they were going to use 

that if they could get somebody to put up the money to build 

airplanes. 168. 
They found a man who would put up enough money if he could 

take 51 per cent of the stock. 169a. 
Fowler Co. finally closed its doors because of lack of finances. 

169a. 
Company is now well financed and they are building a very good 

plane. 170. 
Understands Standard planes at different flying fields have been 

retired. 177. 
California Aviation Co. made spare parts. 178. 
Curtiss Co., with organization they had, did all they could to 

furnish accurate drawings. 181. 
The climate out West is such that they can work practically all 

the year round. They needed no coal for factories, and you 

could get a factory quick. 182. 
Western fields needed equipment. 182. 
Did not believe anyone figured that there would be a tremendous 

overstocking of orders into the plants in the East that would 

sort of eliminate the little fellows. 183. 
At Fisher Body Corporation he found one of the finest plants 

he had ever been in for what he thought was the building of 

an airplane. 185. 
Fisher Body Corporation working toward 40 planes a day. 189. 
Body of men in Washington controlling all deliveries of what 

the Signal Corps furnish to the plane manufacturers. 195. 
Capt. Bayne controls the purchasing of that equipment. 195. 
Allotment is done in Washington and man in charge of that is 

Mr. Hena, working in Col. Mixter's office. 196. 
Fisher Body Corporation entirely out of synchronizers ; possibly 

out of navigation light equipment. 198. 
Charles Fisher knows most about finances of the company. 209. 
Only Hall- Scott and Curtiss motor used on machines built in 

West. 213. 
Only Standard and Curtiss planes built in California. 213. 
Liberty Iron Works in Sacramento and Fowler Airplane Co. in 

San Francisco are adequately equipped, financially and in 

their personnel, and in factory equipment, to carry out any 

reasonable orders and deliver the right kind of an article. 

214. 
Western fields need 40 training planes a month. 214. 
Fisher Body Corporation also supplying bodies to motor compa- 
nies. 215. 
Capt. Hall B. Holmes (Detroit, Mich., July 16, 1918; Book 11). 
Entered service October 1, 1917. 217. 

Prior occupation was auditor of American Telephone & Tele- 
graph Co. 217. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 173 

Capt. Hall B. Holmes — Continued. 

Previous to that was on staff of Patterson, Teele & Dennis, certi- 
fied accountants. 218. 

Spent summer of 1907 in automobile plant. 218. 

Assigned as district accounting officer, Detroit, upon receiving a 
commission. 218. 

Had charge of Government accounting in all plants operating 
under cost-plus contracts. 219. 

Packard Motor Car Co., Ford Motor Co., Lincoln Motor Co., 
Fisher Body Corporation, Lewis Spring & Axle Co., Wilson 
Body Corporation, Grand Eapids Airplane Co., Hays-Ionia 
Co. of Grand Eapids, Mich., and the General Motors Corpora- 
tion were all operating under cost-plus contracts. 219. 

Lewis Spring & Axle Co. has contract to manufacture spare 
parts for Bristol fighter. 219, 220. 

Wilson Body Co. make spares for De Haviland 4s. 220. 

Grand Eapids Airplane Co. manufacture wood parts for the 
Handley-Paige. 220. 

Grand Eapids Chair Co. is one of subsidiary companies of Grand 
Eapids Airplane Co. 220. 

Grand Eapids Airplane Co. is an association of furniture manu- 
facturers. 220. 

Got contract for 1,000 spare parts for Handley-Paige and par- 
celed out the performance of it. 221. 

Up to July 6 vouchers had been passed in field for payment to 
Fisher Body Co. amounting to $3,060,968.42. 221, 222. 

Plant accounting officer, Leon S. Wescoat, supervises vouchers. 
223. 

Witness supervises accounting. 223. 

Any question on which the Government's attitude is not clear 
to plant accounting officer is referred to him and he rules upon 
it or forwards it to Washington, or he may rule upon it tenta- 
tively and forward it to Washington. 223. 

Salary payments have not been finally approved. 226. 

Statement of salaries paid by the Fisher Body Co. to its officers. 
226, 227. 

A portion of these salaries only is charged to the work under 
Signal Corps contract. 229. 

Enumerates just what salaries and percentage charged to Gov- 
ernment. 229, 230. 

Been informed by Washington that all salaries are subject to 
approval in Washington. 231. 

Dispute at Fisher Co. as to costs and work done by Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. for them on 400 J-l planes. 232. 

Fisher Co. has a cost system in operation, but it has not produced 
accurate and reliable results. 233. 

Fisher Co. claims a percentage of profits on parts made for Day- 
ton-Wright. 235. 

Dayton-Wright also claim a percentage of profit on parts made 
for Fisher Co. 235. 

Bogy in Fisher Body Co. for J-l Standard planes is $4,130. 
237. 

Eoughly estimate cost of manufacture to be about $3,400 or 
$3,500. 237. 



174 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Capt. Hall B. Holmes — Continued. 

Fisher Body Co. get 15 per cent, or an equivalent amount of the 

sum of $4,130 fixed as the bogy cost for the Standard J plane. 

238. 
In addition, it gets 25 per cent of saving effected. 238. 
Fisher Body Co. supplied Dayton- Wright Co. with cowling on 

the basis of cost plus 15 per cent, and that cost to Dayton- 
Wright Co. went into its cost which Government was to pay. 

241. 
Allowed as part of cost by special ruling issued by the Rulings 

Board in Washington. 241. 
Enumerates contracts Fisher Body Corporation has with the 

Government. 251, 252. 
When Fisher Body Co. submits vouchers for profits, they do not 

show how much is due the Government on all advances and 

what should be retained to meet those advances. 257. 
Sheet, dated July 6, 1918, giving a summary of the nature of 

expenditures on 400 J-l planes marked " Holmes Exhibit 1, 

July 16, 1918." 258. 
Letter sent to Washington relative to salaries of officials at 

Fisher plant. 267. 
Payment of executive salaries began with October 1, 1917. 269. 
Down to July 6, 1918, payments made to Packard Co. amounted 

to $7,437,861. 274. 
Payments per engine accepted amounted to $4,302. 276. 
Payments to Lincoln Motor Co. down to July 6, 1918, amounted 

to $5,711,204. 276. 
Payments per engine accepted amounted to $8,855. 276. 
Case of Ford Co. total payments down to July 6, 1918, amounted 

to $1,325,043. 276. 
Payments per engine amounted to $19,486. 277. 
Total payment to Cadillac Co. down to July 6, 1918, amounted 

to $1,056,696. 277. 
Payment per engine accepted, $16,257. 
Total payment to Buick Co. down to July 6, 1918, amounted to 

$416,669. 277. 
Payments per engine accepted, $4,190. 277. 
Number of engines delivered takes no account of the application 

of cost that is included in payment to contractor. 279. 
' Statement of " Estimated cost of Liberty motor, exclusive of 

profit and bonus, March 22, 1918," made up by Lieut. Purdy. 

281, 282. 
Lieut. Purdy on staff of witness as technical man. He is familiar 

with automobile construction and efficiency. 282. 
Formerly with General Motors Corporation as a planning- 

department man in connection with time studies, planning, 

production, and statistical plant accounting. 282. 
Estimated cost of Liberty motor, exclusive of profit and bonus, 

is $3,200. 284. 
Fred J. Fisher (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). 

Been connected with Fisher Body Corporation for 10 years. 290. 
President and manager. 290. 

Six brothers of Fisher family identified with company. 290. 
Five Mendelsohns in the organization. 291. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 175 

Fred J. Fisher — Continued. 

Concern engaged in building bodies for automobile trade at time 
we entered the war. 291. 

At time we entered the war had all the plants but the two taken 
on since ; built one and took second plant on lease. 291. 

The new plant is on an 11-acre site, covering practically the en- 
tire ground, and was completed in 48 days after work started. 
292. 

Government advanced money to build the building. 293. 

Mr. Waldon first brought to his attention the idea of building 
airplanes for Government. 293. 

First contract was for 400 Standard J planes, dated about Au- 
gust 1. 299. 

Set-price contract of $6,500 for each training plane. 300. 

Price was arrived at at meeting in Washington with Mr. Mingle, 
of Standard Aircraft Co., Mr. Deeds, Mr. Waldon, Mr. Tal- 
bott, Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Mendelsohn, and himself. 300. 

Price was arrived at through figures mentioned by Mingle more 
than anybody else. 301. 

Contract was subsequently canceled. 301. 

New contract, dated November 6, embraced 400 training planes 
(Standard J-l planes), 3,000 De Haviland 9's, and 1,000 
fuselages complete for DH 9's and 1,500 sets of all fabricated 
parts. 303. 

New contract was on cost-plus bais. 304. 

At a meeting in Dayton, Ohio, about January 18 or 20, Maj. 
Hall, Col. Vincent, the two Talbotts, Mr. 'Deeds, and Mr. 
Simpson being present, it was decided to be the policy to have 
Fisher Body Corporation build a small lot of De Haviland 4's 
instead of 9's, until 9 was properly designed and all changes 
incorporated to take new Liberty motor. 311, 312. 

No change made in contract, but it was understood he would 
proceed on the DH 4's in same way contract provided for 9's. 
312. 

Letter from War Department relative to changing bogey price 
on Standard J-l planes. 314. 

Mr. Fisher's reply. 315. 

Made statement that if Government paid them 15 per cent (the 
Fisher people) and the others 12^ per cent, their planes would 
cost less than the rest of them. 321. 

" We make our drawings all over. We work from nobody's 
drawings." 

Production retarded on first contract by failure to furnish him 
drawings. 330. 

Was delayed getting into production through failure of con- 
tractor to deliver metal parts. 333. 

Contracted for all-steel fitting for the entire plane. 333. 

Mr. Waldon and Mr. Deeds told him Cash Eegister Co. was a 
wonderful organization and that they would be in a position 
to make these metal fittings very much better and quicker 
than he would. 334. 

Mr. Deeds and Mr. Waldon requested him to place contract for 
fittings with Dayton- Wright Co. 334. 
130687—19 12 



176 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Feed J. Fisher — Continued. 

Dayton- Wright had given Cash Register Co. contract to furnish 
fittings, and they thought it best to have fittings furnished 
through Dayton-Wright Co. He had no control of the fit- 
tings situation with the Cash Register Co. 335. 

" In all our early negotiations the Talbotts were always in on 
every conference, practically, that we had in Washington 
with Montgomery and Deeds." 344. 

Really inability to get fittings that delayed completion of con- 
tract for 400 Standard J planes. 350. 

Made contract with Dayton Metal Products Co. for turnbuckles. 
351. 

The matter of giving contract to Dayton Metal Products Co. 
first suggested at conference in Washington with Talbotts, 
and later, when on inspection of plants connected with Day- 
ton-Wright Co., accompanied by Mr. Talbott, Mr. Kettering, 
and Mr. Deeds. 356, 357. 

The Fisher Body Corporation was to furnish certain materials 
to Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 358. 

Terms were not discussed. 359. 

Government's man decided on what basis they were to build 
these supplies. 359. 

The amount of profit is still open. 362. 

Went to Cash Register Co. and took out the unfinished parts 
they had on hand, in order to complete planes. 364. 

File of correspondence between Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 
and Fisher Body Co. with respect to these matters. 366-374. 

Report of meeting held at Dayton, July 8, relative to changes 
to be made in airplanes. 388, 392. 

Only a few metal fittings for the DH 4's that can be used on 
DH 9's. 396. 

Told bv Mr. Deeds he was to wait and get drawings from 
Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 397. 

Had absolutely no work. 399. 

Had to let all help go when training plane contract was com- 
pleted because could not build the De Haviland 4's. 402. 

English Government said they wanted to make a contract with 
Fisher Co., but he said no, to make a contract with the Ameri- 
can Government. 412. 

Only change in the DH 4 and DH 9 was in the cockpit and tak- 
ing the gasoline tank and moving it forward or backward. 
415. 

Were questioning Mr. Deeds and Mr. Montgomery about the 9. 
416. 

Kept. Messrs. Deeds and Montgomery informed that they were 
not able to proceed with the DH 9. 417. 

Started to tool up for production of De Haviland 4 in January, 
418. 

Have about 7,000 people on pay roll right along. 419. 

Plant was practically idle. 419. 

Plant was idle from some time in April, when first contract was 
completed, until within the last five of six weeks. 420. 






ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 177 

Fred J. Fisher — Continued. 

Had an order, but it was a question of changes on parts and 
things of that sort. 420. 

Q. " Is it not better to have manufacturers getting out 
planes, even though some of the parts were obsoleted, than to 
have no planes at all ? " — A. " That is the way we looked at it." 
Q. " Why did you not do it? " — A. " We were not permit- 
ted to do it." 421. 

" They sent a De Haviland 4-plane up here from Dayton about 
six weeks ago that was supposed to be an up-to-date plane, 
with everything on it, but it was not, but a long ways from 
it." 428. 

Did not think it right to ship those planes across to the front in 
that condition. 430. 

Did not feel like sending planes over that had light connecting 
rods. 431. 

Knew that planes going from Dayton-Wright were to a con- 
siderable extent in an unsatisfactory condition. 433. 

Did not give Mr. Deeds or Mr. Waldron, or anyone else any 
program for the De Haviland 4's. 436. 

Never told Col. Deeds or Gen. Squier, Col. Waldon, Col. Mont- 
gomery, or anyone connected with the Government that he 
would have 2,000 planes, or 1,500 planes delivered by the end 
of July, 1918, that is, De Haviland 4's. 437. 

Under date of November 5, 1917, sent telegram to Col. Deeds ad- 
vising him that he was unable to get any information, draw- 
ings, or specifications which would allow him to proceed with 
program mapped by board. 439. 

Eeceived reply next day stating two DH engineers on way and 
that some DH drawings had been forwarded on Saturday. 
440. 

Never saw the DH engineers referred to. 440. 

They were making promises which they did not have means of 
carrying out. 442. 
Charles T. Fisher (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). 

Vice president of Fisher Body Corporation. 443. 

Production manager. 443. 

Went into production on DH 4's as they could, according to the 
way they got information. 443. 

Dates will be shown in diary. 444. 

Thought they were going to ship 250 planes in July. Will 
probably ship 25. 447, 448. 

It was up to the Signal Corps to come in and pass on a plane 
and say, "Now, that is all right. Go ahead with it." 461. 

Takes four or five months from the time you get your informa- 
tion to produce the tools and produce complete planes. 465. 

If we had gotten the information when we were through with 
the training-plane drawings, and the engineering end was 
through with them, and had turned the engineering on battle 
planes, and they had let us go right on, there would not have 
been any intermission between the production of training 
planes and the battle planes." 468. 



178 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

E. Glexx Simpson (Detroit, Mich., July IT, 1918; Book 11). 

Been connected with the Fisher Body Corporation about six 
years. 472. 

Now chief engineer, airplane division. 472. 

Had never had any experience with airplane construction. 473. 

No one connected with Fisher Body Corporation had had any ex- 
perience with airplane construction in the beginning. 473. 

Got an aeronautical engineer soon after they started. 473. 

Name of engineer referred to is Verbile, and he was with the 
Curtiss people. 473. 

Mr. Yerbile now in France, working under Mr. Besherow for 
the Government, supposed to be the best aeronautical designer 
in the world. 474. 

First undertook to make De Haviland 4's about January 23. 475. 

Has not got complete drawings yet. 475. 

Simply running a shop proposition now. Put up a sample ship 
in shop and then follow that up with drawings. 478. 

Explains why they have not kept up with Day ton- Wright people 
in production. 479, 480. 

Had trouble on installation of bomb gear. 482. 

Had to change all ship in production because of later informa- 
tion as to bomb gear. 482. 

Lack of information prevented them from going ahead with con- 
struction of De Haviland 9's prior to January 23, when they 
were told to switch to the 4's. Information was not in this 
country at that time. 485. 

New bomb drop was received from Lieut. McCardis, of produc- 
tion engineering end at Washington. Drawings were dated 
May 7, but they did not receive final changes until Lieut. 
McCardis came on July 2. 490. 

Up to that time had been working on an entirely different in- 
stallation. 490. 

Lieut. McCardis said they were all wrong and out of date and 
furnished the new drawings. 490. 
Louis Mendelsohn (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). 

Treasurer of Fisher Body Corporation. 492. 

Held that office nine and one-half years. 492. 

Capital of corporation is $5,000,000 of preferred stock and 
$20,000,000 of no par value stock. 492. 

Present capitalization took place a year ago, when company was 
refinanced and all small companies amalgamated. 492. 

Government advanced them $2,000,000 for specific purposes; 
$1,200,000 for units 2, 3, and 4 ; $800,000 to pay back the money 
they had expended on unit 1. 493. 

Government really had title to this property. 494. 

Plants Nos. 10, 14, 17, and 18 are used in making planes for the 
Government. 495. 

Plant No. 10 is a new plant, a reinforced concrete building, 
one-third of it being used for Government work. 495, 496. 

No. 14 is old plant built about 25 or 30 years ago. 496. 

No. 17 is a new plant used entirely for Government work, and 
leased from a man bv the name of Shiffman. 496. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 179 

Louis Mendelsohn — Continued. 

Plant 18 consists of units 1, 2, 3, 4. Units 2, 3, 4 cost between 
$1,000,000 and $1,200,000. Unit 1 cost a good deal more be- 
cause of power plant, water switch, etc. 497. 
Balance sheets of Fisher Body Corporation as of April 30, 1917, 
and 1918, were filed and marked "L, Mendelsohn Exhibits 
Nos. 1 and 2, July 17, 1918." 500. 
Total cost of plant 18 about $1,760,000. 505. 
Pages in volume mixed here and testimony seems to be that of 

Mr. Macauley, of the Packard Co., 509-512. 
Understood Mr. Vincent had authority to deal with experi- 
mental payments relating to a period during which he was 
connected with the Packard Co. 511. 
Mr. Vincent suspended from the Packard connection. 511. 
His salary continued until August 10, the date of his resignation. 

511. 
Somebody at Washington approved Mr. Vincent's action in al- 
lowing these amounts. 511. 
Aaron Mendelsohn (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). 
Secretary to Fisher Body Corporation. 513. 
Statement of Fisher Body Corporation, Aeroplane Division, 
investment in fixed assets, material, and labor, May 31, 1918. 
515-521. 
Net amount expended by Fisher Body Corporation in its air- 
plane division down to May 31, 1918, totaled sum of $2,443,- 
555.46. 524. 
Private Leon S. Wescoat (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). 
Been engaged as plant accountant since April 25. 528. 
Came there in subordinate capacity. 528. 
Prior to that for one year was general manager of Horn & 

Hardant Manufacturing Co. 528. 
Prior to that was appraiser of the Hoffman Co. 528. 
Prior to that was chief accountant of Felix Isman (Inc.) 529. 
Government has paid Fisher Body Co. on account of contracts, 

separate from advances, approximately $3,200,000. 529. 
Estimates cost of Standard J plane at $3,400. 531. 
Executive salaries allowed from 1st of October. 533. 
Apparently dealt fairly with Government in presenting requests 

only for amounts to which they were entitled. 534. 
Very clean record with respect to their vouchering. 534. 
Has not observed any intentional delay of production. 536. 
Fishers and Mendelsohns impress him as being thoroughly loyal. 

537. 
Government has paid approximately $2,000,000 on account of 

De Haviland 4s and has not got a plane yet. 539. 
A great deal of spruce rejected after it has been accepted as a ' 

part of the cost. 541. Approximately 60 per cent. 542. 
Understands there is an agreement in existence with the under- 
writers of the present Fisher Body Co.'s stock, by which the 
executive salaries shall not be increased during the period of 
underwriting. 547. 
H. H. Scott (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). 
Auditor for Fisher Body Corporation. 550. 



180 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

H. H. Scott — Continued. 

Explains statement referred to in testimony of Aaron Mendel- 
sohn. 551. 

Has no completed costs on the Standard J-l planes. 563. 

Has kept a system of cost control in plant. 564. 

Charts showing depreciation to May 31 marked " Scott — 
" Exhibit 1, July 17, 1918." 567. 
" Exhibit 2, July 17, 1918." 567. 
" Exhibit 3, July 17, 1918." 567. 
"Exhibit 4, July 17, 1918." 568. 
" Exhibit 5, July 17, 1918." 568. 

Statement of vouchers submitted and amounts paid by the Gov- 
ernment marked " Scott Exhibit 6, July 17, 1918." 568. 

Shows $3,023,449.94 paid by Government and $638,431.10, in- 
cluding $75,000 for special tools, not paid. 568. 
Ajlvan Macauley (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 11). 

President of the Packard Motor Car Co. 569. 

Has held that position for a little over two years. 569. 

For six years was general manager and part of that time vice 
president. 569. 

Prior to that general manager of Burroughs Adding Machine 
Co. 569. 

Makes statement in relation to what is known as the Liberty 
motor. 570. 

About three years ago last November Packard Co. decided defi- 
nitely to go extensively into the development of air motors. 
570. 

Designed approximately ten or a dozen motors and spent close 
to $400,000 in development work up to the time of the so-called 
Liberty production. 570. 

Had one of the Mercedes motors imported by Ralph De Palma. 
575. 

Thoroughly familiar with the Mercedes as they knew very thor- 
oughly every motor of prominence in the world. 575. 

Had used Delco ignition system in their regular product for 
number of years, having also used the magneto, and the Delco 
had given much more satisfactory results. 576. 

Substituted magneto for Delco ignition on experimental motor 
on advice of such aeronautical authorities as our Government 
had and of visitors from Europe familiar with aeronautical 
matter. 578. 

Was not practicable, taking engine as it stood, to use magnetos 
unless you used two. 580. 

Would have required a good many changes in design to drive 
four. 579. 

Motor 299 used by De Palma in making world's record. 588. 

Motor 905 used by William Rader in making world's record. 
581. 

The 905 motor was seen by very many officers when exhibited at 
the aeronautical show "in New York City in January, 1917. 
582. 

Pamphlet regarding motor published at time was marked Ma- 
cauley Exhibit 1, July 18, 1918. 582. 



ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 181 

Alvan Macatjley — Continued. 

905 motor, model 2, developed 267 horsepower at about 2,500 
revolutions per minute. 587. 

267 horsepower was obtained in July, 1917. 588. 

By latter part of May, 1917, had so far accomplished in develop- 
ment of their motor that at a Sunday morning conference on 
May 27, 1917, it was decided that Mr. Vincent should go im- 
mediately to Washington with their prints, drawings, and 
photographs and lay them before Government officials, and 
state plan they had for manufacturing them in large quanti- 
ties, etc. 588. 

Mr. Vincent arrived in Washington May 28. Met Mr. Deeds and 
Mr. Waldon, and others. 589. 

Mr. Vincent told him over telephone on Monday or Tuesday 
authorities in Washington were highly pleased with their ten- 
der of their development and facilities ; that they were gladly 
accepted and would be made the best possible use of. 599. 

Within a few days Mr. Vincent told him it was considered by 
Government authorities to be highly desirable to increase 
horsepower of motor, as designed by Packard Co., and get 
more horsepower with lighter weight per horsepower. 589. 

Heard nothing more from him for several days. He finally told 
him (witness) that he had made some sketches in conjunction 
with Mr. E. J. Hall enlarging the motor and improving it 
in some respects. 590. 

Also told him Packard Co. should sink their identity with motor 
because Congress would not be interested in appropriating 
hundreds of millions of dollars to build Packard motors, and 
this was assented to. 590. 

Mr. Vincent came back to Detroit with sketches made at Wash- 
ington and asked them to build wooden model of motor, which 
was done in three days. 591. 

Asked to build a full-size operative model, which was complied 
with, and shipped it to Washington on the second, arriving 
the third, and set it up in the Bureau of Standards on July 4. 
591. 

This was an 8 cylinder engine. 591. 

Eight-cylinder project abandoned within about 90 days. 592. 

Had about two months' start on making tools for the 8 when 

they were called off and told to make the 12. 592. 
Correspondence of company relating to development of motor 
and Mr. Waldon's connections with Packard Motor Car Co. 
594-611. 
Contract for Liberty 12's let to Packard Co. under date of 

September 4, 1917, calling for 6,000 motors. 612. 
Contract schedule called for 50 in November, 200 in December, 
500 in January, 800 in February, 1,000 in March, 1,200 in 
April, 1,200 in May, and 1,050 in June. 612. 
One motor shipped in November, 25 ready for shipment in De- 
cember, 43 in January, 96 in February, 153 in March, 314 in 
April, 439 in May, 599 in June, and July to date 377. 612, 
613. 
Expect to finish 6,000 engines in November. 613. 



182 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Alvan Macauley — Continued. 

Summary of statements made in letter to Mr. Frierson, Assistant 
Attorney General, under date of May 22, 1918, relative to 
obstacles encountered in bringing the Liberty motor up to 
point of production. 614. 

Delay was occasioned by a great many things, a part of it by 
lack of drawings. 619. 

Contract was made on September 4, 1917, before Government 
had decided definitely just what it was to have made. 620. 

Trouble in Washington was lack of knowledge and lack of or- 
ganization. 623. 

Delayed a good deal by lack of organization in Signal Corps. 
625. 

Lack of legal authority to provide an organization to do any- 
thing that should be done in a business way in this matter. 
627. 

Have had as high as 162 Government men in plant at various 
times. 631. 

Delco equipment complete cost $117.45. 634. 

A total of $5,000,000 advanced to Packard Co. up to date— July 
18, 1918. 639. 

Total of unpaid advances about a million dollars. 639. 

In order to get motors ahead, had to run up an inventory of 
$23,000,000. 639. 

Refers to publication known as "Packard Inner Circle," issue 
of November 22, 1917, and statement therein relative to the 
amount of motors assembled for Twin-Six motor carriages as 
one reason for this tremendous inventory. 637, 640. 

Borrowed two and a half million dollars from Government in 
connection with Liberty motor contract. 641. 

Something over a million dollars still due on advances. 642. 

Original bogey cost of $6,087 had been arrived at when he 
reached Washington to negotiate contract. 643. 

Col. Montgomery, Col. Deeds, and he does not know who else, 
arrived at this figure. 643. 

Matter of bogey cost had all been talked over with Lelands (by 
Col. Montgomery and Col. Deeds) before he got to Washing- 
ton. 648. 

Bogey cost was reduced to $5,000 by contract dated December 
12, 1917. 649. 

There was also a reduction of the rate of fixed profit in this 
contract. 649. 

Col. Montgomery and Mr. Harris came to Detroit and told him 
that from later information they had reason to believe price 
established was too high ; that they had seen all the other con- 
tractors and that the other contractors had agreed to this re- 
duction, and so he agreed to it. 649. 

An important change in engine in process now. 653. 

Capital of Packard Motor Car Co. approximated $20,000,000. 
654. 

Has an outstanding issue of debenture notes amounting to $7,- 
500,000. 654. 

On June 1, 1918, company had issued common stock of $11,815,- 
930 and preferred stock of $8,000,000 ; had no bonded indebted- 
ness, but had $7,500,000 in debenture notes at 5 per cent. 654. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 183 

Alvan Macatjley — Continued. 

Two million five hundred thousand dollars was an increase in 
the issue of debenture notes issued in November, 1917, and 
delivered to the Signal Corps as security for an advance. 655. 

Eleven million eight hundred and eight thousand four and four 
dollars and forty-seven cents devoted to aircraft motor manu- 
facture by Packard Co. 656. 

Under date of January 29, 1918, had further advance of $2,- 
500,000, making total of $5,000,000 referred to previously. 662. 

At the end of contract a committee of three shall value the heat- 
treating building, having in mind its value to the Packard 
Motor Car Co. for its own business, and the difference between 
that and the cost of it shall be treated as depreciation. 668. 

The Government buys the equipment; it buys the test field and 
everything on it. 669. 

His salary increased from $10,000 to $50,000. 672, 

Sure he could have produced the 150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza 
engine. 671. 

Could probablv have produced it a little quicker than the Lib- 
erty. 671. 

Went ahead on experimental work totaling $219,159.10 on verbal 
orders of Lieut. Col. Vincent. 691. 

Thinks he discussed matter of allowance of this amount with 
Mr. Vincent, 698. 

Judge Hughes stated that of the invoices, of which Mr. Rob- 
inson produced a list, which total $219,159.10, there appear to 
be only two that antedate August 11, 1917, one of $2,500 for 
8-cylinder wood model and another for $25,000 for an 8- 
cylinder engine, making a total of $27,500. Bequests explana- 
tion as to how, prior to the other invoices, the amount of 
$101,500 was obtained from the Government, 703. 

Understood Mr. Vincent was passing these payments on some- 
body's authority at Washington. 707. 
Ormund E. Hunt (Packard Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich., July 18, 
1918; Book 12). 

Chief engineer of the Packard Co. 1. 

Liberty motor: why 8-cylinder was selected as the type. 2. 

Relates reasons for adopting the magneto ignition for Model 
No. 2, or 905 engine. 1. 

Reasons for making the change to Delco. 5. 

Further considerations in favor of the Delco. 6. 

Most of the magnetos had been imported from Germany, or 
made in this country by German workmen under German pat- 
ents. 7. 

Also states that Packard, without any outside influence, would 
have eventually used the Delco. 8. 

Date of discovery of the unfitness of the crank shaft and the 
connecting rods for the 12-cylinder motor. 9. 

Asked for information about vouchers for $101,500 or total 
amount of $219,000. 12, 

Makes general statement concerning these vouchers. 11. 

Not Packard experimental work, but developing of the Liberty 
motor. 17. 



184 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Ormund E. Hunt — Continued. 

Accumulated figures on overhead at the time order was closed 
would indicate 110 per cent. 19. 

Asked how they could make such an arrangement with Mr. Vin- 
cent who was at that time in the employ of the Packard 
Co. 19. 

Did not care whether Mr. Vincent could give an order for the 
Government or not, work had to be done, trusted some one 
would be square enough to pay them for it afterwards. 21. 

Talked with Col. Deeds over telephone. 21. 

Vincent left the Packard Co. on May 27, but they paid his 
salary until August 10. 23. 

Did they get this money ultimately through Mr. Vincent ex- 
clusively, or whether through Col. Deeds, and how. 23. 
George Albree (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 12). 

Resides Concord, Mass. 26. 

President of the Albree-Pidgeon Co. 26. 

Interested in the monoplanes which were ordered by the Gov- 
ernment, one of which was delivered at Mineola field, and 
the other branch of the business, the glue part of it. 27. 

Hands over copy of concise statement of their investigations 
made under suggestion of Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. 
dwell, marked "Albree Exhibit No. 1, July 18, 1918." 27. 

Relates experiences in dealing with the Government. 28-34. 
(All these experiences connected with Col. Deeds.) 

Mr. Albree immediately sends statement to Mr. Crowell asking 
as one of four things that they would under no circumstances 
be asked to have further dealings or conferences with Col. 
Deeds. 34. 

Mr. Crowell assented to these propositions, and also refers to 
the " automobile gang." 35. 

Considers Col. Deeds one of the brainiest men he had ever done 
business with; so it was no fault of his lack of intelligence 
that things were not accomplished. 36. 

Is asked to meet officers of Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, 
but none of them appear. 37. 

Their glue has been a matter of investigation by the Government 
for one year, and the investigation is not concluded yet. 37. 

Have had 20 years' practical use of this glue. 37. 

Can produce letter over signature of Dr. Stratton, of the Advi- 
sory Council, in which he states the Bureau of Standards re- 
ports it the best glue ever tested for the Signal Corps. 38. 

Col. Deeds's connection with the glue matter. 40. 

States what he knows about Mr. Klemin, instructor in the Mas- 
sachusetts Institute of Technology. 41. 

Mr. Klemin in charge of the tests of the monoplane. 46. 

Mr. Klemin's approval of the plane. 47. 

Thought Klemin displayed hostility by placing Mulloy as super- 
visor of the work at the Pigeon factory. 48. 

Mulloy delayed progress in the construction of the machines. 
49. 

One plane delivered in September, and the other in November to 
Langley Field. 50. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 185 

George Albree — Continued. 

Pilot states it to be the fastest machine he had ever flown in 

his life, and perfectly safe. 52. 
Col. Clark, in writing, reports that it is unsafe. 52. 
Finally, in February, get the data upon which this report is 

based. 52. 
Col. Clark states they tried to hold up the Government on the 

price of the glue. 53. 
Test of the machine made at McCook field, or rather of the glue 

in connection with the machine. 54. 
Explains sand test, and how his two machines were destroyed. 

55. 
Test unfair. 59. 
Col. Clark tells him the machines will be accepted, and paid for, 

and junked. 56. 
Col. Clark now gives three other reasons for not accepting the 

machine for final flight, none of which are true. 57. 
Mr. Klemin in charge of the sand test. 60. 

Repeats, for purpose of record, how he happened to come to De- 
troit. 60. 
Klemin's connection with the sand test may be the explanation 

of the failure of the machine. 62. 
Frederick R. Robinson, (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 12). 
Connected with the Packard Co. eight years, always in connec- 
tion with accounting. 64. 
Gives their system of arriving at the cost of the Liberty motor. 

64. 
Bogey cost in contract, $6,087. 67. 
Actual cost, $3,960.43. 68. 
Cost, of course, on 6,000 engines would be reduced more than on 

600 engines. 71. 
Percentage of 220 on overhead, covering a number of years back. 

74. 
Produces ledger sheet showing estimated depreciation for fiscal 

year ending August 13, 1918. 77. 
Goes through process of arriving at different depreciation values 

to be credited to each department. 77-78. 
Corrects himself in stating that he had included a certain amount 

for depreciation in an additional overhead charge of 50.4 per 

cent. 80. 
Asked to produce sheet by which he calculated this additional 

50.4 per cent overhead charge. 81. 
Produces three sheets to show the calculation of this cost. 82. 
What is included in the item of overhead under discussion. 84. 
Depreciation is calculated by divisions. 88. 
Explains this computation by divisions. 89. 
Produces sheet showing figures actually used, what the depre- 
ciation was he took for this period of the 600 engines, and how 

he got this percentage. 91. 
Allowed certain amount for depreciation under contract, and 

they again make allowance for depreciation in calculating the 

cost. 96. 
Classes of items which come under the head of administration 

engineering expenses. 97. 



186 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Frederick R. Robinson — Continued. 

Mr. Hughes, by going through the statements of cost and add- 
ing up the different items, arrives at the final cost of $3,960.43 
per engine. 98-103. 
Figuring fixed profit under the contract, this would give them 
$3,750,000 profit on 6,000 engines, and, calculating savings 
under bogey cost, this adds $1,500,000 in addition. 103. 
When they get through they will have included depreciation in 

addition to profit. 104. 
Produces vouchers, dated July 2, 1918, showing salaries for De- 
cember, 1917, being correct statement as they then stood, and 
paid by the Government. 106. 
Shows final total of $27,694.01 in salaries charged to the Gov- 
ernment for the months of August, September. October, No- 
vember, and. December. 109. 
Mr. Hughes says he wishes the record to show that in reading* 
the foregoing figures reference was had to contractor's voucher 
No. 107, supplement No. 23, public voucher, July 2, 1918, 
contract No. 1646, supporting voucher No. 6. 110. 
Vouchers which have been presented to the Government covering- 
total overhead charges. 113. (Under contract 1646.) 
The total for the entire contract, No. 1646, for overhead expenses 

down to May 1, 1918, amounted to $872,946.63. 114. 
Certain proportions of the salaries were charged to the aircraft 

expenses. 116. 
Overhead expenses of $61,791.87, included in the special item of 
$249,159.10, began with the start of the work on the 11 experi- 
mental engines, June, 1917. 118. 
Nothing was included in this estimate of cost of 600 engines on 

account of experimentation. 119. 
Amount paid for the 11 engines, $249,159.10. 119. 
Gives statement showing how this cost was arrived at. 119. 
This order was their own order and did not come from the 

Government. 122. 
Traveling expenses, design section at Bureau of Standards. 
$16,852.93. 122. 
Ormund E. Hunt (Book 12). 

This comprised some 16 detail men, Mr. Vincent, and one other 

engineer. 123. 
Asked if Mr. Vincent's expenses are covered in this. 123. 
Refers to force of men working in Washington, which includes 
Mr. Vincent. 124. 
Mr. Robinson (Book 12). 

Explains why this is called Packard overhead expense and what 

it was on. 124. 
Estimate for engines is made out on date they billed the last 

two engines, January 14, 1918. 125. 
First engine billed at $25,000 on July 3. 126. 
These 11 engines delivered to various points for use of Govern- 
ment as specimen engines, on no order from the Government ; 
just understanding. 126. 
When the first engine was billed for $25,000 it was accepted and 
paid for by the Government. 127. 



ABSTRACT 01' AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 187 

Mr. RojtfiNSON — Continued. 

Paper is produced showing shipments of the 11 engines that 

entered into this billing comprising the $249,159.10. 128. 
Also explains what the $104,500 was presumed to cover. 128, 

(See p. 12.) 
Asked why they left out three engines supposed to have been 

shipped in September in this estimate of $104,500. 129. 
Eequest for payment was evidently not supported by invoice, 

and not supported by goods delivered either. 130. 
Does not think it likely they will have any information which 

will show the make-up of the voucher. 131. 
Mr. Hughes reminds him this is a very important matter, getting 
$100,000 when they did not have an order and did not have a 
contract. 132. 
Mr. Hunt sent to obtain further information. 133. 
Frances Lester Jandron (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 12). 
Assistant secretary to the Packard Co. 134. 
Asked if he knows anything about the check for $104,500 from 

the Government, as it bears his name. 134. 
Understands the check came through the Council of National 

Defense. 135. 
As the Council of National Defense was hardly a disbursing 
agency, how could they obtain the check through them? 135. 
E. A. Deeds and R. L. Montgomery. 135. 
Lieut. Walter D. Williams (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918 ; Book 12) . 
Plant accountant, officer in charge of the Packard plant. 137. 
Everything to do with contract 1646, but none of the others. 137. 
Nothing to do with vouchers paid by the Government aggregat- 
ing $249,000. 138. 
States no overhead or cost charges including overhead in the 
vouchers submitted called K-9199 of $249,159.10 and the 
vouchers for 1646. 139. 
Were told to leave the matter of the K-9199 account alone. 141. 
Salary distribution begins with August, and the contract was 

made in September; asked to explain. 143. 
Allowances for depreciation have been paid by the Government 

on an estimated basis. 144. 
This estimate fixed on the basis of 12 per cent of productive 

labor. 145. 
Not according to basis fixed by Rulings Board. 145. 
Took the matter up with Capt. Brooks's department in Wash- 
ington, and it was agreed to. 146. 
The scrap problem. 148. 
Estimate made of the cost of making Liberty motors in March, 

but he was not consulted about it. 149. 
Men sent down by the Government. Used the figures in a secre- 
tive way. Meeting in his office one night at which cost was 
arrived at, and said nothing to him about it. 149. 
Understood cost was around $3,200 after adding 250 per cent 

overhead. 150. 
In the estimate of cost they have included depreciation, and have 

also increased their original estimate of overhead cost. 151. 
In matter in the nature of holding up the work reported to Mr. 
Black, who was in the Dime Savings Bank. 154. 



188 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

John Randolph Lee (Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; 

Book 12). 
Assistant to Mr. Wills in the manufacturing department. 159. 
Has had charge of the work being done for the Government by 

the Ford Motor Co. under Mr. Willis. 159. 
Ford Motor Co. has two contracts with the Signal Corps, one for 

the Liberty engine cylinder forgings No. 2899, dated January 

30, 1918, and one for 5,000 standardized 12-cylinder engines, 

No. 2129, dated November 21, 1917. 159. 
Commencing about September, 1917, they made some prelimi- 
nary experiments under direction of Col. Deeds. 160. 
Started actual work in anticipation of receiving a contract in 

latter part of September in making general layout of the 

plant for the work. 160. 
Asked why, in view of the above, first deliveries were not made 

until April. 161. 
Had no knowledge which would have enabled them to state what 

time they could have put any foreign engines into produc- 
tion. 162. 
Their agreement was to build a motor as per prints and speci- 
fications, presumably did not anticipate changes in design. 

163. 
Could not explain why contract was not made until November, 

when they had all details arranged in September. 163. 
Col. Deeds conducted negotiations on behalf of the Government ; 

Mr. Wills, Mr. Ford, and Mr. Mayo, on behalf of the com- 
pany. 163, 161. 
Delay in execution of contract did not retard production. 164. 
Has to look up in the books the time they began to date their 

costs. 164. 
Delivered first Liberty motor under this contract on the 14th of 

June. 164. 
Delivered up to the present time. 123. 165. 
Expect to have 300 this month prepared for the final test. 165. 
Gives rate of production for August, September, October, and 

November. 166. 
This shows that under the new contract they will be prepared 

to produce at the rate of 1,500 a month. 167. 
States difficulties which arose in the course of production, which 

delayed things. 168. 
Their orders entirely for the 12-cylinder engine. 170. 
Refers delay by strengthening of connecting rods to Mr. Wills, 

170. 
Lubricating system caused a delay of four or five weeks. 170. 
Other changes causing delay. 170. 

Will produce memorandum showing the causes of delay. 170. 
Adds that they have made a comparative study of the changes 

involved, and the changes meted out to them, as compared 

with their regular work. 171. 
The designing, the tool designing, and drafting room is under 

charge of Mr. Carl Emde. 174. 
Has heard a great deal at different times that was antagonistic 

to the patriotic . spirit on the outside, with regard to Mr. 

Emde's loyalty. 174. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 189 

John Randolph Lee — Continued. 

Tells what has been repeated to him, Mr. Lee. 175. 

Was not removed from this position in which he had power to 
slow up or handicap the first stages of the work. 176. 

Held this position for six or seven months. 176. 

Were not sure whether he was or was not pro-German, there- 
fore Mr. Lee said he should have been removed right at the 
start. 178. 

Others in the shop disloyal who were associatd with Mr. Emde. 
178. 

Mr. Ford's pleasure that Mr. Emde should remain. 178. 

Read statement made by Mr. Ford. 179. 

At this meeting Mr. Clemett read reports from the various mem- 
bers of the drafting department who felt that the department 
was practically a pro-German institution. 180. 

Relates several instances of things that have come up showing 
disloyalty somewhere. 181. 

Thinks the policy of giving a man a fair chance in normal 
times not a wise policy in war times. 182. 

Taking things more into " their own hands " and not consult- 
ing Sir. Ford so freely. 183. 
C. Haeold Wills (July 18, 1918; Book 12). 

Factory manager of the Ford Motor Co. 184. 

Has had charge of the production of the Liberty motor since the 
beginning of the work. 184. 

Work of preparation begun in September, 1917, but contract 
not signed until November. 184. 

After 10 days' work on 8-cylinder motors, word was received 
that they were to build 12 -cylinder motors. This took about 
10 weeks to get the data together. 186. 

At the end of seven weeks they were just getting the drawings 
completed. 187. 

Explains in detail what they did during those seven weeks. 187. 

Thinks delay in signing the contract was caused by Mr. Lucking 
bringing up some legal details. 188. 

Thinks Mr. Lucking had information from the Packard Co. 
that the estimated cost at that time was about $6,000. 189. 

If there had been no changes in the design, they would have 
reached the amount produced in July two months earlier. 191. 

States what in his experience caused delays, to what extent, and 
what caused them. 192. 

States that through red tape at Washington two or three weeks 
is always lost in making arrangements to secure priorities 
and get the transportation they needed. 192. 

Fuel Administrator would not let the people making the crank- 
shafts have coal. 194. 

When they found they could not get the fuel they decided to 
use oil, and the railroads would not move the oil. 194. 

Closed down for a week or five days on order of the Fuel Ad- 
ministrator, and they did not regain their impetus for two 
weeks afterwards. 195. 

Asked why they released their men before communicating with 
Washington. 196. 

Same let up all along the line through this order. 198. 



190 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

0. Harold Wills — Continued. 

Notwithstanding all these other impediments, they would have 

been able to have advanced their production a couple of 

months if there had been no changes. 199. 
Describes a little more in detail the nature of the changes and 

what were the most important ones. 199. 
They made a practice of not starting on the production of what 

was developed, but waited until a perfected plan was de- 
veloped, and thereby saved time. 200. 
At one time were delayed by what they believed would be a 

necessary change and for which they waited. 200.. 
Did not think they could have hastened production if they had 

of had the designing to do themselves. 201. 
Packard Co. went to work four or five months prior to the Ford 

Motor Co. 203. 
No delay because of the lubricating system. 203. 
No delays because of radiation. 204. 
No delays due to disloyalty in the plant. 204. 
No noticeable indications among the workmen of a desire to 

delay production. 204. 
First 70 motors cost about $37,000 a piece. 205. 
Does not know what proportion of their capital is invested. 207. 
All the work of the Liberty motors kept separate from the regu- 
lar plant. 208. 
Thinks accurate statement of their investment in this work could 

not be ready for 120 days. 209. 
Government will reimburse them from time to time, but Ford 

Motor Co. has up to this time financed all these Government 

contracts itself entirely. 210. 
One hundred and seventy-eight thousand dollars, first material 

and machinery charges, was charged against the Signal Corps 

in the month of November. 211. 
Salaries. 212. 

Packard Co. stated the bogy cost. 213. 
Did not know the occasion of the reduction of the bogy cost 

from $6,087 to $5,000. 213. 
Had nothing to do with depreciation in the plant. 213. 
States what the contract made in January, 1918, No. 2899 was 

for. 214. 
Are now making cylinders for all the Liberty engines excepting 

the Nordyke-Marmon. 216. 
Furnish these forgings on a fixed price of $8.25. 216. 
First 50,000 the Government ordered they paid $19 for. 217. 
Only make profit of 75 cents a cylinder. 217. 
Produces figures showing the total up to the end of August, 

September, October, and November. 218. 
Understands arrangement has been made for 4,000 more. 219. 
The price stipulated in this contract are terms the Government 

handed up. Neither sought the work nor stipulated the price. 

220. 
Took the work at the price the Signal Corps said they had made 

other contracts. 220. 
Price as reduced from the bogy cost being $5,000. 221. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 191 

C. Harold Wills — Continued. 

Fixed profit was made in the supplement document at $625. 221. 

Date of this supplemental document, May 17, 1918. 221. 

At that time knew more than when they started, but now the} 7 

know less. 221. 
The profit on the price which the Government hands them will 

give them profit of $3,125,000 on 5,000 engines. 222. 
Figuring 25 per cent of the saving under the $5,000 cost will 

make the profits upward of $5,000,000. 222. 
Terms with respect to the new order left entirely in the hands 

of the Signal. 223. 
Does know that the company were profited in the first contract 

by being guided entirely by what Col. Deeds said as to the 

general price arrangements he made with everybody else. 221. 
Maj. Downey and Mr. Fletcher have conducted the negotiations 

for the new contract on the part of the Government. 221. 
Mr. Ford always went ahead when he found out what they 

wanted and did not wait for the contract office to go through 

the details. 225. 
States how they took contract for spare parts and would not in- 
sert a bogey price. 22G. 
Mr. Emde, in charge of drafting department. 229. 
Drafting department had all the designing of the Liberty motor. 

229. 
Was possible for anyone in the drafting department who was 

out of sympathy with the work of the Government to delay 

the drafting work. 230. 
Greater proportion of the men in the drafting department of 

similar pro-German tendencies (50 or 60). 231. 
Mr. Ford did not think this department ought to be reorganized 

with different men. 231. 
In plain English, they had a man who was in sympathy with the 

German Government in connection with the designing of the 

Liberty motor. 233. 
While there were hold-ups in the tools and they were late, they 

were never able to lay it to any given reason. 234. 
Reads statement Mr. Ford is reported to have made at meeting 

on November 5, 1917. 236. 
Champion Co. at Flint, Mich., put mica in the vspark plugs to 

prevent contact. 237. 
No steps taken to prosecute them. 238. 

Mr. Wills states that they tried in other cases to have prosecu- 
tions made, but they have been turned loose. 238. 
United States district attorney, Mr. Kinnane, stops everything. 

239. 
' Eeports case of man taken to Federal district attorney with a 

lot of photographs and drawings in his possession, and they had 

to insult the officer before they could get him to call up the 

police department. 241. 
District attorney refused even to take the matter up. 241. 
Is asked for a full statement of these facts in writing 242. 
This man a great friend of Emde's. 247. 

130687—19 13 



192 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Louis M. Tereell (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). 
Auditor of Ford Motor Co. 248. 
Kefers Mr. Hughes to Mr. Leister for figures in the vouchering 

under contract No. 2129 for 5,000 12-cylinder Libert}' engines 

with the Government. 248. 
Herbert L. Leister (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). 
Auditor of Ford Motor Co. 249. 
States the Government has paid the Ford Motor Co. $1,774,000.33 

up to June 17 on contract No. 2129. 249. 
Will get later statement. 250. 

Presents statement of the total amount of their cost to date. 250. 
No voucher has been submitted for special tools. 252. 
Plant machinery loaned by the company to the aircraft work 

amounts to approximately $1,000,000. 252. 
Charged depreciation that at rate of 7^ per cent per year. 253. 
This voucher for overhead charges dated for machines in Janu- 
ary. 253. 
Government would not allow any portion of salaries to be 

charged direct. 254. 
Salaries of executives go in as items of labor — based on the 

productive hours. 255. 
Can not keep track of the time expended by executives, so there 

is practically no charge. 256. 
Vouchers submitted which contained amounts for executive 

salaries and they have been turned down. 256. 
As a basis of comparison with other plants, he is asked to tell 

just when this Avas submitted, who turned theni down, and 

what was turned down. 256. 
Is not acquainted with what has been done with respect to 

salaries at other plants. 258. 
No salaries of executives have been submitted to the finance 

division of the Signal Corps for payment : had been told 

they would not pay on that basis. 258. 
Expect to submit a voucher on basis of pay rolls. 259. 
Questions in dispute between them and the accounting officers 

of the Government. 260. 
Government allows either Packard or Lincoln $1,500 for a 

machine containing a fixture on which they failed, and will 

only allow the Ford Motor Co. the same amount after they 

have made it successful for $700 more. 261. 
Signal Corps hands them ruling that they want them to separate 

the overtime allowance, and charge that into overhead. 262. 
Government refuses to pay for overhauling the machinery they 

put into shape for doing a good job. 263. 
Other questions under dispute. 263-265. 
Signal Corps informed them they would hold up any voucher 

they rendered unless it was on a meter basis. 266. 
Henry Ford (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). 

Mr. Deeds represented the Government in the negotiations for 

the contract for the 5,000 Liberty motors. 269. 
Knew the bogey price of $6,087 an engine was high. 271. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 193 

Henry Ford — Continued. 

Had no separate negotiations with respect to his company which 
related to that amount. 271. 

Did not know what the occasion of the lowering this cost to 
$5,000 was. 271. 

No estimate has been made up to this time by his company of 
the cost of making the Liberty motors. 272. 

Understands there is a new contract to follow up the comple- 
tion of old one. 273. 

Has not had any negotiation with respect to compensation under 
this contract. 274. 

If the rate of production were only 1,500 a month it would take 
but little over two months for the production of the 4,000. 
274. 

Thinks the Liberty motor is a very fine motor; a very good 
motor. 275. (Very hard to make.) 

Never used the Delco at all in making the Liberty engine. 275. 

He thought the angle was wrong in the first place, and refused 
to make the motor that way. 276. 

This he later corrects. 278. 

Mr. 'Ford denies that he ever stated that the cylinders were set 
at a certain angle in order that the Delco ignition should be 
used. 279. 

Never even had that opinion. 279. 

Mr. Ford is asked about their expected production, and states 
there is nothing in that estimated production that furnishes 
an element of uncertainty; that they can count on a produc- 
tion after two or three months of anywhere from 1,500 to 
2,500 motors without anv reasonable expectation of difficulty. 
280. 

No difficulty in getting labor; some little difficulty in getting 
neces^aiy material. 280. 

Mr. Ford does not think that changes in design have been the 
cause of delay, because the main principle was laid down in 
the beginning. 281. 

Thinks there has been as much progress as could be expected. 
281. 

Has had no trouble with Signal Corps in obtaining decisions 
with respect to engineering questions. 282. 

Thinks they have made just as good time in getting modifica- 
tions on the Liberty motor as if they had put one of the 
foreign engines into production. 283. 

Might have saved some experimentation, but would not have had 
anything near the power. 283. 

Asked for his opinion from a manufacturing standpoint as to 
other side of problem ; would not have to have much experi- 
mentation, but was there any compensating feature in devel- 
oping an American machine, as to saving time. 283. 

Gives reasons for thinking so. 283. 

Explains why he thinks it would of even been a great mistake 
to use a foreign motor temporarily while the Liberty was 
being developed. 284. 



194 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Chaeles E. Norlin (Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 
19, 1918; Book 12). 

Rank of first lieutenant, Aviation Section, Signal Reserve 
Corps. 290. 

Commissioned as first lieutenant on November 8, 1917. 290. 

Assigned to Ford Motor Co. on December 3, 1917. 290. 

First vouchers on behalf of the Ford Motor Co. on February 
22, 1918. 291. 

First vouchers were for direct labor and material, and began 
from the signing* of the contract. 291. 

Had no charge against the Government prior to November 17. 
291. 

Would not allow the Ford Motor Co. any part of the salaries 
of those engaged on experimental work. 292. 

Would not pay any of the salaries, or parts of them, rather, 
unless shown exact proof of the time spent on aircraft work. 
291. 

The whole matter is still under consideration. 296. 

Up to and including July 8, $1,576,917.89 has been paid to 
the Ford Motor Co. 297. 

Ford Motor Co. has received no advances and have not sought 
any. 297. 

Ford Motor Co. asked Government to loan $100,000 to the H. J. 
Walker Co., who supplied the Ford Motor Co. with crank 
cases, but the Government refused. Ford Motor Co. had al- 
ready loaned them $275,000, themselves. 297. 

Nothing allowed yet for depreciation. 297. 

No payments included in the vouchers so far, as Ford Motor 
Co. able to support themselves during the course of the con- 
tract. 298. 

The unsettled question in accounting of power. 301. 

States 400 men of German ancestry employed in Ford plant. 
302. 

One man from the plant caught down town saying, " To hell 
with the President," etc. Took this man to Mr. McClure, as- 
sistant United States district attorney, but could do nothing. 
303. 

All their communications to the Department of Justice in Wash- 
ington sent through the military intelligence people. 304. 

Mr. Lee and Mr. Willis try to help all they can with this ques- 
tion but are afraid of incurring Mr. Ford's displeasure. 304. 

Mr. Emde; any slight variation in his drawings would slow up 
the work. 305. 

Thinks this was what was the trouble when for a month or two 
the work slowed up. 305. 

This happened in March and April. 306. 

There has been something; everybody felt it, but they could not 
definitely prove anything, and Mr. Ford they knew wanted 
to keep these men on his staff. 306-307. 

Instead of having 20 a day, have only had 20 the last 3 or 4 
days; for a while 10 or 12, and then it fell down to nothing. 
307. 

Inspectors report to Maj. Haeslet. 308. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 195 

Lieut. Charles E. Norlin — Continued. 

Has 400 affidavits from men in the plant who have heard other 

men make statements and remarks derogatory to the United 

States. 309. 
Filed in the educational department of the Ford plant. 309. 
Dean Marquis, in charge of the welfare outfit Ford plant. 310. 
Mr. Clemett, assistant to Dr, Marquis. 310. 
Mr. A. B. Jewett, head of the photographic department. 310. 
Ask military intelligence to send down men to arrest these men 

and they said they would as soon as they got sufficient hold. 

JNever showed up. 311. 
Had the Ford Co. arrest a man and took him down to Mr. Mc- 

Clure and he threw the matter out and said he could do noth- 
ing. 312. 
Lawyers in general do not seem favorably disposed to Mr. Kin- 

nane or Mr. McClure. 312. 
Thinks these 400 affidavits would cover at least 260 men who 

have pronounced German feelings. 312. 
No representative of the intelligence service at the plant. 313. 
Mr. Clemett and Mr. Jewett tired of getting men because no- 
body will arrest them. 313. 
Management of the plant, with respect to loyalty, excellent, but 

Mr, Ford objects to eliminating a man unless you can prove 

he has done something wrong. 314. 
Edwin Francis Clemett (Detroit/Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). 
Doing special work for Mr. Klingensmith in the factory. 315. 
Left educational department about three months ago, but still 

keep in touch with it. 316. 
American Productive League has 100 representatives in the Ford 

plant, 316. 
States his experience in submitting reports and affidavits to 

Military Intelligence Bureau. 317. 
Always, no action taken. 318. 
Have not received 400 affidavits with respect to disloyalty ; have 

received 400 reports, but not supported by affidavits. 319. 
Submitted these reports to the head of the American Protective 

League, at Detroit. 
Hands over portfolio containing about one-third of the reports. 

320. 
Dr. Marquis submits folder containing reports submitted by 

members of the American Protective League in the Ford 

plant to Mr. Clemett, 320. 
Reports on trouble on Liberty motors had been confined practi- 

( ally to the drafting department. 322. 
These half dozen men were recognized as serious cases. Report 

made by Mr. Willis to Mr. Ford, but no change took place 

in the make-up of the department. 323. 
American Protective League did nothing. 323. 
Gives names of the half dozen men in this department. 324. 
Mr. Hughes reads upon the record extracts with regard to Mr. 

Emde. Pages 325 to 340. 
Mr. E. P. Martin, superintendent of drafting department. 342. 
Further evidences. 343 to 356. 



196 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Edwin Francis Clemett — Continued. 

Two hundred men in plant whose disloyalty is open to question. 

357. 
Dr. Marquis (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). 

Became associated with the Ford Motor Co. two years ago last 

January. 361. 
In charge of the educational department, formerly known as the 

social department of welfare work. 361. 
His information regarding disloyalty of employees is based upon 

what has been reported to him by Mr. Clemett and Mr. Rounds. 

364. 
Richard H. Collins (Cadillac Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich., July 19, 

1918; Book 12). 
President and general manager of the Cadillac Motor Co. 370. 
Prior to 13 months ago was vice president of the General Motors 

Co., in Detroit, 370. 
General Motors Co. owns Cadillac Motor Co. 370. 
General Motors Co. has contract with Gov eminent for 2,000 

Liberty engines. 371. 
Work evenly divided between its subsidiary companies. 371. 
At time of cleliverv Cadillac Co. is expected to deliver 1,000 and 

the Buick Co. 1,000. 372. 
Got contract on December 11, 1917. 
Contract called for 25 in May, 125 in June, etc. 372. 
Contract changed from 1,000 to 2,000. 373. 
Combined production of the Buick and Cadillac would be 50 a 

day on the peak of capacity. 376. 
No experimental work. 378. 

Have received no advances from the Government. 379. 
No contract with the Government other than the 2,000 and an 

additional 2,000 made in contract a few days ago. 379. 
A large building which had been erected and never used was taken 

over for building of Liberty engines, 381. 
This not charged to Government as temporary building; it is a 

part of their property. 381. 
Their bogey contract $5,000 never was any higher. 382. 
No reason why they should not have undertaken building Liberty 

motors back in the early part of the year instead of starting in 

December. 385. 
Lateness in getting contract provided them with a great handicap 

in getting in their orders fcr special tools, jigs, etc., as so 

many others ahead of them. 387. 
Lateness in receiving the contract worked to their advantage in 

that they did not have to change as much as the others did after 

they had tooled up. 389. 
Takes six months as a fair estimate of the time required for a 

company to get into production on engines like the Liberty 

engine. 389. 
Thinks any foreign engine of accepted design could have been put 

into production within six months also. 391. 
Disloyalty at plant ; these people removed. 392. 
Biggest jcb they ever had was the Liberty engine connecting rod. 

396. 
Labor troubles. 398. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 197 

Herman M. Kin nee (Cadillac Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 19, 
1918; Book 12). 

Comptroller of the Cadillac Motor Car Co. 402. 

Government accountant up to the 13th of July had passed public 
vouchers amounting to $1,611,912. 402. 

First voucher passed on February 16, 1918. 403. 

All specially designed machinery for the contract charged to the 
Government. 403. 

No charges made to the Government for preliminary work, with 
the exception of work in the engineering department in pre- 
paring designs for tools they had to make to perform the con- 
tract and drawings necessary in the manufacture. 405. 

Executive salaries. 406. 

Eatio of overhead expenses to the productive labor at 175 per 
cent. 406. 

Administrative salaries. 409. 

Has been no presentation to the Government yet of executive 
salaries, as they have not yet determined on a basis. 411. 

Depreciation charges are a part of the overhead estimates. 416. 

Have made tentative presentation on account of depreciation, 
but have made no final presentation of overhead expense. 416. 

Vouchers for increased facilities. 417. 

Cadillac Co. has expended up to this time under terms of its 
contract, $2,521,782.85. 421. 

Have presented voucher for the restaurant building and the 
equipment of it, but it has not been approved by Signal 
Corps, $23,000. 422. 

Expenditure of $40,000 for heat-treating building, which has 
not been allowed. 422. 

Also a tear-down building, which cost $71,000, which they think 
will be allowed by the Government. 423. 
Horace T. Ellis (Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 20, 1918; 
Book 12). 

Tool superintendent for Lincoln Motor Co. about one year. 424. 

Started in on the design of the tools for the eight-cylinder motor 
they were to construct. 424b. 

First important change noticed was from the 8-cylinder motor 
to the 12-cylinder motor. 427. 

Some of the cylinder tools drawn were usuable. Final produc- 
tion delayed to extent of a week and a half of labor thrown 
away. 428. 

Next serious change was the change in the propeller hub. Had 
75 per cent of the tools in connection with this delivered. Had 
to begin all over again. 428. 

On October 4, 1917, delay occasioned, about a month. 430b. 

These changes had a very serious effect on production. 430b. 

Change in the crank shaft on November 21, 1917. 431. 

On 27th of November another change in the crank-shaft cheek, 
necessitating complete new forging dies. 431. 

On November 27 the propeller hub was again changed to the 
standard Army type. New forgings again. 432. 

On 4th of January, 1918, crank shaft again changed. 432. 

Other changes. 433. 



198 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Horace T. Ellis — Continued. 

On 6th of February a change was made in the distributor driv- 
ing flange, which was not settled, the final design, until March 

10. 433, 434. 
Other serious changes. 435-442, inclusive. 
Thinks these changes caused delay anywhere between two to 

three months. 443. 
Thinks every change was well taken. 444. 
Sabotage. 446. 
Produces list of 89 shops who have been producing the tools 

for them. 450. 
Delay in delivery of the tools explained by inability to get 

trained workmen. 451 to 455. 
Sabotage. 455. 

Traffic or transportation difficulties. 458. 
Did not lose time on account of stop orders, during February, 

of the Fuel Administration. 460. 
Difficulties in getting stock for tools. 460. 
Difficulties in getting the particular tool designers. 462. 
Double work of designing caused by starting out to build the 

motors in a small plant established to make 14 a day. 463. 
Total number of special tools built is 91,087; the total number 

of orders issued that involved new tools and changes, etc., 

amounted to 14,948. 464. 
Henry M. Leland (Detroit, Mich., July 29, 1918; Book 12). 
President of the Lincoln Motor Co. 466. 
Organized the Cadillac Co. in 1902. 466. 
Gives statement of his reasons for leaving the Cadillac Co. and 

organizing the Lincoln Motor Co. 467. 
In a visit to Germany saw the wonderful preparations that were 

being made. 468. 
Go to Washington and see Gen. Squier, Col. Montgomery, and 

Col. Thompson, and Col. Deeds. 470. 
First interviews were in July. 475. 
Had slight acquaintance with Col. Deeds, as they bought their 

ignition system from the Delco people. 475. 
Considers Mr. Kettering one of the greatest mechanics in the 

world. 475. 
Did not get contract until latter part of August. 486. 
Col. Deeds had been waiting for approval by the Government of 

the engine and waiting until appropriations were made for 

it. 479. 
So being satisfied himself with the engine, and feeling the ap- 
propriation would come along, he asked Deeds if the engine 

were approved and appropriations were made if they would 

get a contract. On this understanding that they would, they 

went ahead of the contract. 479. 
When contract was finally made it called for a 12-cylinder 300- 

horsepower. 481. 
Produced list of the number of parts of the Liberty engine, 484. 
Had every expectation of being able to deliver the first 80 in 

December. 487. 
Delays in getting tools and fixtures ready and lack of skilled 

and experienced men. 487 to 491, inclusive. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 199 

Henky M. Delano — Continued. 

Difficulties of employing men in uniform. 492. 

Hispano- Suiza a very difficult motor to make. Wright-Martin 

people have been on job for nearly a year, and they have made 

very few of them. 497. 
Considers it would have been entirely impracticable to have 

tried to introduce another motor while the Liberty was being 

developed. 498. 
Thinks if he had attempted to use the Rolls-Royce, which he 

considers best, as a temporary expediency, he would be in 

about the same fix that they are in now. 501. 
Finally considers that they could have gotten into production 

a little earlier by using an existing motor that would have 

been serviceable at the front. 503. 
Original contract with Government provided bogy cost of 

$6,087 per engine. 504. 
Consulted with the Packard people in arriving at the bogy 

cost. 505. 
Talked with Mr. Bealle and Mr. MacCauley of the Packard 

Co. 506. 
Bogy cost reduced to $5,000 some time in December. 507. 
This reduction in cost proposed by the Signal Corps. 508. 
Capital stock of the Lincoln Motor Co., $1,500,000. 508. 
Dayton Metal Products Co. subscribed for $100,000 of stock in 

the Lincoln Motor Co. 509. 
Knows that with Mr. Kettering is associated Mr. Talbott on 

the $100,000 deal. 510. 
W. C. Leland (Resumed) (Detroit, Mich., July 20, 1918; Book 12). 
Col. Montgomery first suggested the reduction in the bogy cost. 

512. 
In view of their pressing the Government for financial assist- 
ance the 15 per cent profit was reduced as was also the bogy 

cost. 513. 
No reliable estimate had been made at time of reduction of bogy 

cost. 516. 
Col. Montgomery advised them that he thought $6,087 too high 

in view of the fact that uncertainties foreseen at the start 

were now clarifying themselves. 517. 
. Explains the arrangement of the other part of the capital stock 

other than the $800,000 issued. 517. 
Tells of talk with head of leading bank in Detroit. 521. 
Produces stock book and memorandum relating to agreement. 

521. 
States sliding scale suggested, resulting in a price of $7,000, 

this to include a 15 per cent profit, which resulted in $6,087 

as the cost. 532-534. 
Best belief of the cost of the motors is now $3,600. 535. 
Produces program of production. 537. 
Paul W. Abbott (Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich,, July 20, 1918; 
Book 12). 

Chief inspector of Lincoln Motor Co., and also representing 

them on the Liberty engine committee. 541. 
Not much trouble in getting decisions from the Production Engi- 
neering Department of the Signal Corps. 541. 



200 ABSTEACT OF AIKCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Paul W. Abbott — Continued. 

Is asked about change which occurred on February 6, in the 
distributer driving flange which was not settled until March 
19,1918. (See pages 433-434). 542. 

This was entirely the fault of the Delco people. 542. 

The change, No. 31 on the connecting rod, was the big change 
that held them up for about 10 days. 543. 
William T. Nash (Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 20, 1918; 
Book 12). 

Resides at Royal Oak, Mich. 546. 

Has been secretary-treasurer with Lincoln Motor Co. since 
middle of August, 1917. 546. 

Lincoln Motor Co. has received $5,000,000 from the Government 
up to the present time. 547. 

Government has advanced $8,800,000, of which $8,200,000 re- 
mains unpaid. 547. 

Eight hundred and ninety thousand dollars of the total payment 
made by the Government to date is for special tools. 550. 

Take the actual overhead in this case, there being no other work 
in this plant. 551. 

This company, being organized entirely for the purpose of doing 
this work, charged as part of the cost all the work that had 
been done from the organization. 552. 

Began charging executive salaries to the Government about the 
first part of September. 554. 

Vouchers have been accepted in part, 554. 

Executive salaries have not been allowed as charged to Govern- 
ment salaries. 555. 

Have allowed such proportion of such salaries as could be 
charged to manufacturing operations. 555. 

Gives amounts of executive salaries as paid by the Lincoln Motor 
Co. 557. 

The item of executive salaries is still held for decision, also 
$16,000 which was deducted from vouchers for special tools 
still unsettled. 558. 

All machinery and equipment is subject to the 40 per cent de- 
preciation provision of the modified contract. 559. 

The heat-treating building is to be depreciated according to the 
value of the building to the Lincoln Motor Co. in the general 
motor business at the end of the contract. 560. 

Outside of heat-treating building, they are to receive the depreci- 
ation as prorated by the Rulings Board on other buildings. 
561. 

The understanding of the Lincoln Motor Co. is that the Govern- 
ment, under the contract, will be bound to pay on machinery 
and equipment 40 per cent flat, regardless of the time that has 
elapsed at the time of the completion of the contract. 563. 

And on the machinery and equipment there will be, in addition, 
depreciation to be allowed by the Government at the rates of 
approximately 10 per cent per annum on the entire cost of the 
building. 563. 
F. C. Thompson (Lincoln Motor Co., July 20, 1918; Book 12). 

Accounting officer for the Government at the Lincoln Motor Co. 
plant since about middle of November, 1917. 568. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 201 

F. C. Thompson — Continued. 

Only a difference of $1,689 between vouchers certified and vouch- 
ers submitted which have not yet been certified. 569. 

The matter of $27,000, covering executive salaries for period 
terminating in December, 1917, is still held in suspense. 569. 

Executive salaries in one or two instances went back as far as 
July. 570. 

Lincoln Motor Co. has made no charges for experimental work. 
570. 

Agrees with the Lincoln Motor Co.'s estimate of cost production 
at $3,600. 571. 

Thinks the Lincoln Motor Co have endeavored to produce as 
quickly as possible. 573. 

Regards the record of this plant, from a financial standpoint, 
as a perfectly clean record. 574. 
Charles H. Day (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J.. 
July 25, 1918; Book 13). 

An engineer by occupation. 1. 

At one time with Glen Martin as engineer and adviser. 2. 

Has been with Sloane Airplane Co. and companies that have de- 
veloped therefrom since the fall of 1915. 3 

Standard Aero Corporation succeeded the Sloane Co. 3. 

Standard Aero Corporation, until very recently, was exclusively 
an experimental plant, and the Standard Aircraft Corporation 
was a producing companv. 4. 

Originally had an order from Government for four of their 
model H3 machines, and an additional order was given for 12 
machines. 5. 

Their engineering department, headed by himself, designed what 
is called the Standard J machine. 6. 

Design was perfected in the spring of 1917. 6. 

Furnished designs for Standard J plane to Dayton- Wright Air- 
plane Co. 6. 

There were some inaccuracies in drawings furnished. 

Would not say that his drafting room had at all times been sat- 
isfactory. 11. 

So far as he has been able to find out. Standard J plane with- 
drawn principally because the Hall- Scott motor was entirely 
unsatisfactory. 13. 

Signal Corps made changes on plane without consulting design- 
ers. 14. 

Machine was designed to meet Signal Corps specification. 14. 

Order received in December for De Haviland 9s, and a contract 
was made under date of January 24 or 26, 1918, for 500 De 
Haviland 9s. 16. 

Was notified from Washington that De Haviland 9 drawings 
were ready. 16, 

Was notified by the Equipment Division, of Production Engi- 
neering Department, Signal Corps. 17. 

In forepart, of January took a trio to Dayton to investigate sit- 
uation, and found De Haviland 9 was nowhere near a point 
where it could be produced. 17. 

Either he or Maj. Sheppler suggested that he build 100 De Havi- 
land 4s while awaiting the completion of the De Haviland 
9. 19. 



202 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Charles H. Day — Continued. 

Signal Corps did not have knowledge of gun mountings, bomb- 
ing equipment, wireless installation, camera installation, 
practically none of the military equipment. 20. 

Amended contract for 100 De Haviland 4's made about Feb- 
ruary 1 and substituted contract embracing 500 De Haviland 
4's in place of 100 De Haviland 4's and 400 De Haviland 9's 
appears to have been pursuant to an order of March 28. 1918. 
21. 

Made many trips to D avion in attempts to get drawings for 
De Haviland 4's. 21. 

On February 1 told Mr. Coffin and Mr. Potter that he did not 
think there was a possibility of getting the De Haviland 9's 
into production within six months* time and that De Havi- 
land 4 was nowhere ready to produce. 24. 

Stated to Mr. Coffin there would be no substantial production 
of De Haviland 4's in February and the best that could be 
hoped for was about 25 from Dayton-Wright in March. 25. 

, And possibly an equal number from Standard Aircraft Cor- 
poration in April. 26. 

Q. " Now, with that anticipation about the 1st of Feb- 
ruary, why is it that j^ou have not as yet, being now the 
latter part of July. 1918, been able to produce a single De 
Haviland 4? " — A. "Lack of information." 

Q. "Of what?" — A. "Drawings, principally." 26. 

Asked Maj. Gray, of Signal Corps, for drawings. 27. 

When he was unable to get official drawings of the De Haviland 
4 from Maj. Gray, Mr. Mingle took it up with higher au- 
thority in Washington. 29. 

Inspection Department, Signal Corps, at Elizabeth, would not 
allow them to proceed with drawings furnished bv Davton- 
Wright Co. 30, 31. 

Got from Dayton-Wright Co. a De Haviland 4 in February. 33. 

Made drawings from that machine and built a machine which 
was flown in March. 33. 

Made request of Mr. Kellogg that they be allowed to manufac- 
ture in accordance with that machine up to a given date. 34. 

A Mr. Ruxtall, representing Col. Hall, came with a number 
of men, and it was discovered that the machine they had was 
not correct. 35. 

Was same machine Dayton- Wright Co. was building and ship- 
ping abroad. 35. 36. 

Tested wheels used on machine and found they were not suffi- 
cient. 39. 

He was not allowed to go on using the Z 2 rims and the Dayton- 
Wright Co. was. 39. 

Has repeatedly asked for a " go ahead," but it has never come 
through. 41. 

Maj. Rose is the superior officer with respect to production. 45. 

Provided there were no further changes, was ready to go ahead 
on production 10 days or a week ago. 46. 

Producing six machines for Post Office Department to assist in 
keeping experimental organization together. 49. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 203 

Charles H. Day — Continued. 

Entire engineering on Handley-Page machine in his hands. 52. 

If the De Haviland 4 had come direct to his plant from England 
and they were told to go ahead and make a machine with 
the Liberty motor installation, sees no reason why they could 
not have been producing at the very least 10 machines a day 
within five months. 54. 

Had been orders which had been retracted and it was rather 
questionable what his plant was going to build, so accepted 
order for seaplanes. 57. 

Was also told by Navy officers that he had to take it ; that the 
Navy work was more important than the Army work. 5T. 

Has been impossible for them to obtain a large enough order 
to actually know what they were going to do and to prepare 
for doing it. 62. 

Never been given a real experimental job to do at this plant. 
63. 

Was told it was not desired that the manufacturers in this coun- 
try develop any machine whatsoever; that the only machines 
which would be produced would be the English and French 
machines. 65. 

If the situation had been handled in a different manner, does 
not think there is any reason why we should not have had all 
the airplanes we desired to produce. 76. 

" We, as manufacturers, and I, as an engineer, have never been 
given any information from the Government that would be of 
any assistance to us in designing airplanes or in developing 
existing types of airplanes." 78. 

Thinks governmental work involves a series of dictatorial super- 
vision. 83. 

Made a report on the Bristol fighter at request of Govern- 
ment. 85. 

Came to conclusion that the machine had no military value 
whatsoever as it then existed. 87. 

In installing the Liberty motor, with its excess weight, and the 
added weight incorporated in the machine, and making the 
machine reasonably safe, practically did away with the ad- 
vantages of superior visibility and superior maneuver ability 
which had originally existed. 88. 

Thinks difficulties which have now resulted in the abandon- 
ment of the Bristol fighter should have been foreseen. 94. 

Handley-Paige has been subcontracted practically over the East- 
ern LTnited States. 102. 

The comparative cost will undoubtedly be excessive by this 
method of distribution. 106. 

Believes any of the large airplane manufacturing concerns could 
have equipped comparatively easy for the production of the 
Handley-Paige complete. 107. 

The difference in weight between the Hispano-Suiza engine 
used on the Bristol in England and the Liberty engine used 
on the Bristol in this country is about 300 pounds. 115. 



204 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Harry Bowers Mingle (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, 
N. J., July 25, 1918 ; Book 13) . 

President of the Standard Aircraft Corporation. 117. 

A lawyer by profession, of the firm of Mingle & Finklestein. 
117. 

Been president since corporation organized, November 1, 1917. 
117. 

Capital of organization is $500,000. 120. 

Actual owner of preferred stock, which is issued to $150,000, is 
Mitzui & Co., a Japanese corporation organized and author- 
ized to do business in State of New York. 120. 

Fifty-one per cent of the common stock is owned by Mitzui 
& Co. 120. 

Government gave them an order in May, 1916, for three of their 
H3-type machines on condition that they eliminate the Sloane 
interests entirely from the organization. 121. 

Standard Aero Corporation leases from Standard Aircraft Cor- 
poration a portion of the plant at Elizabeth. 123. 

Order for Caproni planes with Standard Aero Corporation 
stands as follows: One delivered on May 1, and an order to 
build a second, and the incompleted parts of thei other two 
are to be delivered to the Fisher Body Corporation. 126. 

Only other contract Standard Aero Corporation has with Gov- 
ernment is a verbal order issued for 450 advanced training 
machines, known as their M defense machine. This contract 
was given them in May of this year by Mr. Fletcher. 127. 

Are now in process on that work and expect to make a delivery 
of them in the next few days. 127. 

Contract was taken on a fixed-price basis, with a bogey price of 
$3,450. 128. 

Has a contract with Photographic Division, Signal Corps, for 
six JR IB machines, given on May 3, 1918. 130. 

Have all been delivered at a fixed price of $6,000 cash. 130. 

On June 5, 1916, order was given Standard Aero Corporation 
by Government for three of their H3 planes at a fixed price 
of $9,400. 131. 

Received an order on October 4, 1916, for four machines, with 
Hall- Scott motors, at a fixed price of $64,000 for the four 
machines. 132. 

On October 30 there were 18 machines of the J type at $8,500. 
133. 

On December 16, 1916, had an order with the Army for 32 hy- 
droplanes at $21,000 apiece, which was afterwards increased 
to $23,100. 133. 

On February 3, 1917, furnished the Government with 16 motors. 
133. 

All these orders down to November, 1917, when the Standard 
Aircraft organized, were given to the Standard Aero Corpo- 
ration. 134. 

Organized the Standard Aircraft Corporation for the purpose 
of keeping the aircraft production distinct from experimental 
work on a cost-plus basis. 134. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 205 

Harry Bowers Mingle — Continued. 

Following are officers of the Standard Aircraft Corporation: 
Harry B. Mingle, president; Mr. Day is vice president and 
general manager, and Mr. Finkelstein is vice president and 
treasurer. 135. 

Capital of Standard Aircraft Corporation was $5,000,000 until 
yesterday, July 24, 1918, when it was increased to $10,000,000. 
135. 

Two million dollars of preferred stock issued and is owned en- 
tirely by Mitzui & Co. ; 23,500 shares of common stock, of which 
Mitzui & Co. own 51 per cent. 135. 

Until very recently the Standard Aero and the Standard Air- 
craft have been absolutely distinct. In last few weeks, since 
the Aero Corporation received its order for 450 machines. 
Standard Aircraft have been assisting in the financing of 
that company by loaning them money. 136. 

Got an absolute transfer from the Standard Aero Corporation 
of all its interests and drawings and its good will at time 
Standard Aircraft Corporation was organized. 137. 

Leases plant at Elizabeth from Stephenson Co. at $25,000 a quar- 
ter and subleases to the Standard Aircraft Co. at $36,000 a 
month. 139, 140. 

Standard Aircraft Co. has following contracts with Govern- 
ment : Five hundred De Haviland machines, with spare parts 
for 500 machines; 150 HS 1L boats for Navy; contract to ware- 
house 450 Handley-Paige machines and to assemble parts re- 
ceived from the warehouse on 50 additional Handley-Paige 
machines, making 500 in all. 146. 

Have gotten practically $1,700,000 worth of raw materials in 
plant that are not applicable to any contract they have to-day. 
161. 

Contract for 500 De Haviland 4s under date of March 28, 1918. 
166. This was a substituted contract. 

Contract for assembly of the Handley-Paige was dated April 1, 
1918. 168. 

Objects to the responsibility being taken from an organization 
that has done what they have done. 174. 

Is not a manufacturing man, but has built an organization that 
has come through on everything they said they would do. 
174. 

Correspondence between company and Signal Corps relative to 
getting a go-ahead order. 177-225, 228-251. This corre- 
spondence also goes into the changes required on the De Havi- 
land planes. 

Edward E. Penniwell (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, 
N. J., July 25, 1918; Book 13). 

kVice president and general manager of Standard Aero Corpo- 
ration. 252. 
Has been vice president since November 1, 1917, and general 
manager since May 1, 1918. 252. 
Reason for De Haviland 4s not being produced is due to in- 
formation lacking, necessary information to compile a bill of 
material from which to purchase supplies and materials and 



206 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Edward E. Pen ni well — Continued. 

to build machines; and lack of an official go-ahead on the 
manufacture of the first machine; and due to changes which 
Mr. Day has spoken of. 252. 

Now building machines and parts of machines on drawings that 
have been approved. 254. 

Now have correct drawings for 80 per cent of machines. 254. 

Work on De Havilands considerably delayed in cleaning up J 
machine. 257. 

Making an effort to get out 20 machines in July and 50 in Au- 
gust. 258. 

Gave order for wood screws to a company in Providence and one 
in Dayton to " keep them SAveet." 262. 

Contract on Handley-Paige machines provides for a compensa- 
tion of 10 per cent on the cost, which includes the cost of build- 
ings and materials supplied by the subcontractors. 264. 

Contract was drawn by the contract department of the Signal 
Corps, No. 3439, order No. 20906, dated March 29, 1918. 265. 

Recapitulation of payments made by War Department on all 
contracts from commencement down to date to the Standard 
Aircraft Co. 278. 

Statement shows $4,262,901.71, embracing the entire amount of 
the estimated cost and the profit on that work has been paid 
company on Jl training plane contract. 279. 

Company still has claim pending against Government on Jl 
planes of from one to three hundred thousand dollars. 280. 

Referring to a blue print (Day Exhibit No. 2, July 25, 1918) 
showing the distribution of the contracts for the making of 
parts of the Handley-Page, Mr. Mingle directed it to be made 
up. 284. 
Blue print compiled on May 15, 1918. 284. 

Judge Hughes : " How do you explain a chart made up with such 
glaring errors being presented here as an exhibit with respect 
to this work?" 286. 

Standard Aircraft Corporation has only Government work. 292. 
' Standard Aero Corporation built several machines for the Japa- 
nese Government. 292. 

Explains how Mitzuie & Co. became financially interested in the 
business. 292. 

Col. Deeds is the only man in Washington with whom he has not 
come into close contact. 302. 

Correspondence between Standard Aircraft Corporation and 
Signal Corps relative to future work. 306, 316. 

Wright-Martin Co. in a position to make Hispano-Suiza motors 
all during last summer and fall. 316. 

Government offered to sell for him material he had on hand. 
324. 

Lewis & Voight now making an advanced-training type of ma- 
chine with the Hispano-Suiza engine. 326. 

It would be the purpose of the company to put in a claim against 
the Government for what it does not realize from the sale of 
the material. 328. 






ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 207 

Edward E. Penniwell — Continued. 

Has been severely criticised and condemned, having taken the 
men at Washington at their word, and gone out, as they say 
now, and bought recklessly, and without any orders or defi- 
nite contracts from the Government, and we have jeopardized 
our credit as the result of that. 334. 

When the order was given them "for Capronis, which did not 
materialize, he was instructed to go upstairs in the Signal 
Corps building and order from the spruce department, spruce 
to take care of the Caproni contract. As a result, he ordered 
500,000 feet of spruce as shipped there per month. 335. 

In April payments were held up and they were told in April or 
May they were indebted to the Government in some five, or 
six, or seven hundred thousand dollars for material which had 
been shipped there. 336. 

Has got the spruce and fir on hand but can not sell it. 337. 

Government has placed an embargo on it. 338. 

Paid $64,000 in royalties to Manufacturers Aircraft Association. 
348. 

Gen. Pershing has advised that all machines must be flown be- 
fore shipping abroad. 359. 

If he had any machines to-day, could not ship them because he 
has no place to fly them. 360. 
Charles A. Day (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13.) 

Contract for assembling 500 Handley-Page machines is on a 
cost-plus basis — 10 per cent. 362. 

Estimates a Standard J plane could be built under normal manu- 
facturing conditions for as low as $3,500. 364. 

Contract in July, 1917, was for 250 training planes at a fixed 
price of $6,450. 366, 365. 

Price was reduced as to 100 machines to $5,300 in October. 367. 
Judge Hughes : " How does it happen that there was a con- 
tract for 100 at $5,300, fixed price, when the estimated cost on 
the cost-plus basis, including the fixed profit, was $4,725 ? " 
367. 

Knows of cases where defective material was received at plant 
which had passed Government inspection. 369. 
Max J. Finklestein (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J., 
July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Vice president of Standard Aircraft Corporation since its in- 
ception and treasurer since about June 1. 373. 

Mr. Daniel L. Meenan, jr., is treasurer of the Standard Aero 
Corporation. 374. 

(Produces a " Eecord of cash received from War Department ac- 
count contract 1839, from November 1, 1917, to July 25, 1918, 
which is marked " Finkelstein Exhibit No. 1, July 26, 1918." 
374. 
Statement shows a total for overhead of $957,978.49; total in- 
ventory amounts to $894,285.14 ; total of raw materials, $1,212,- 
524.42; total for direct labor, $777,266.39; total profits on J-l 
machines, $347,257.96 ; total profits on J-l spares, $73,649.37. 
376. 
Second part of Finkelstein Exhibit 1 relates to moneys received 
on account of contract 2692-A — the De Haviland contract. 
377. 
130(587—19 14 



208 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Max J. Finklestein — Continued. 

Government has never paid anything on the 9s, and this state- 
ment refers only to DH 4s. 377. 

Total for raw material is $571,184.21; total for direct labor, 
$129,806.35; total for overhead, $193,737.44; total for special 
tools, $17,826.43 ; making a grand total of $912,554.43. 378. 

Next sheet of Finkelstein Exhibit 1 shows a record of cash re- 
ceived on account of contract 3439 down to July 25, 1918; 
Handley-Paige contract. 378. 

Another sheet of this exhibit shows a record of cash received on 
account of contract 3904, Caproni contract, down to July 25, 
1918. 379. 

Salary of president of Standard Aircraft Co. is $63,000; of chief 
engineer and vice president, $25,000; of general manager, 
$10,000 ; of treasurer, $12,000. 380. 

Government has allowed $15,000 for president, $10,000 for Mr. 
Day, $7,500 for general manager; and $7,500 for treasurer. 
These salaries are subject to adjustment or confirmation in 
Washington. 381. 

Government has paid these salaries and is still paying them. 
382. 

Mr. Mingle's salary was raised from $54,000 to $63,000 last 
autumn. 383. 

President of Standard Aero Corporation, Mr. Mingle, has no 
salary; vice president, Mr. Juclkins, receives $5,000; general 
manager receives $100 a week; treasurer gets $10,000 a year. 
384. 

Standard Aircraft placed an order with Dayton Metal Products 
Co. for gauge wires without competitive bids. 409. 

Have bought material without competitive bids repeatedly. 411. 

The cost-plus contract is now interpreted by some people at this 
plant or at another plant who yesterday was an automobile 
salesman or a tire man, and suddenlv becomes a judicial offi- 
cer. 414. 

That condition absolutely prohibits healthy manufacture, and 
unhealthy manufacture means there is not the enthusiasm, 
there is not the desire, and there is not the push and go to get 
full results. 416. 

" I want to say very frankly to you that at times some of 
our people here have thought that the Government representa- 
tives were pro-German, and that they did it purposely to hold 
up production." 417. 

" We simply never, never got out cost, and it seems to me 
that the Government of the United States is able and should 
be the fairest of vendors, the fairest of contractors, and should 
see that the contractors gets a human, living profit on his effort 
and on his investments, and we do not get it now." 418. 
Daniel Leo Meenan, Jr. (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Has been associated with aircraft industry for last four years. 
419. 

Was with the Sloan Co. ; now treasurer of the Standard Aero 
Corporation. 419. 

The profits on spare for J-l planes was determined at a con- 
ference. 420. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 209 

Daniel Leo Meenan, Jr. — Continued. 

Total estimated cost for 100 sets of spares was $74,000. 42 L. 

There was a provision of 25 per cent of saving in case the actual 
cost was under that. 421. 

Fixed profit on first order for spares was 15 per cent and on later 
order for spare parts was 12^ per cent. 421. 

Total contract for spares for the J-l contract would run up be- 
tween $800,000 or $900,000. 423. 

Total profit on spares figured at $73,649.37. 423. 

Has produced 30 or 35 machines at time bogey was arrived at. 
426. 

There was a fixed price of $5,300 for the 100-J plane order given 
to the Standard Aero Corporation. 428. 
Louis H. Sullivan (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Works manager of Standard Aero Corporation. 430. 

Has held this position two months. 430. 

Prior to that was assistant to general manager. Previous to 
that supervisor of employment, and during that time he also 
had charge of manufacturing. 430. 

Has 19 machines on floor at point of completion which are wait- 
ing for the installation of the bomb-dropping device, the 
spark-throttle control, the shutter control, and all of them 
have been undergoing changes for the last three weeks. 432. 

Has gotten parts from out West, which were scrapped in many 
instances. 444. 

Have received tie rods with nuts and lock washers on them in a 
condition that our people, our inspectors, and the Signal 
Corps inspectors ordered the nuts removed, and scrapped or 
salvaged, and new nuts made and recapped, and Ftill they bore 
Signal Corps inspection at the other plants. 446. 

Bought some suage wires from the Dayton Metal Products Co., 
which had been passed by Government inspectors at that plant 
that were so crooked that they could not be passed by Gov- 
ernment inspectors here. 447. 
William J. Waterhouse (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, 
N. J.; July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Assistant chief engineer Standard Aero Corporation. 454. 

Formerly in the production engineering section of the Signal 
Corps. 454. 

Represented the Government at the Standard Aero plant from 
October, 1916. to July, 1917. 457. 

Came to the Standard Aero about February 15 or 20. 458. 

The drawings in use at the Standard plant, which were fur- 
nished by the Standard Co. to the Day ton- Wright Co., were 
not suitable for production at the National Cash Register Co. 

kof the parts they were supplying to the Dayton-Wright Air- 
plane Co., and as a consequence the National Cash Register 
Co. made their own drawings, and when those parts were pro- 
duced they would not fit. 461. 
Represented the Government at the Dayton-Wright plant from 
August, 1917, to February, 1918. 469. 



210 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

William J. Waterhouse — Continued. 

Dayton- Wright plant was very much delayed in the production 
of De Haviland 4's because of lack of information regarding 
various parts, in some cases materials, accessories, and draw- 
ings; that is, drawings expected from abroad which were 
never received. 4:71. 

Government inspectors would not pass anything at the Standard 
plant unless there was an actual drawing with which to com- 
pare the parts made. 474. 

Thirty per cent of delay at Standard plant due to Government 
inspectors refusing to pass anything without a drawing. 476. 
Fred E. Dean (Standard Aircraft Corporation, Elizabeth, N". J., 
July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Purchasing agent of company since November 1, 1917. 488. 

Acquainted with difficulties experienced in connection with the 
suage wires received from the Dayton Metal Products Co. 
488. 

First shipment of this wire arrived early part of July. 489. 

Wrote letter to Dayton Metal Products Companv in respect to 
it. Dean Exhibit No. 1, July 26, 1918. 489. 

Turnbuckles purchased from Dayton Metal Products Co. also 
defective. 491. 
Maj. Charles B. Rose (Standard Aircraft Corporation, Eliza- 
beth, N. J., Julv 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Major, Signal Corps. Entered Army September 29, 1917. 496. 

Prior occupation was vice president of Velie Motors Corpora- 
tion, of Moline, 111. 496. 

With that company for nine years. 496. 

Upon entering the Army was assigned to inspection duty, to 
the inspection section on the aviation program. 497. 

Came to Standard plant about May 1. 498. 

Thought production methods at Curtiss plant very bad. 501. 

Some of the trouble was due to a lack of drawings and some of 
the trouble to lack of proper organization at the Standard 
Aircraft plant. 506. 

Difficulty with organization of plant is that the heads of the 
company are not manufacturers. 507. 

No excuse for lack of inspection of suage wire rods received 
from Dayton Metal Products Co. 518. 

Arrangement of building and distribution of work in Standard 
Aircraft plant is very poor. 522. 

Plant is in a disorganized condition. 523. 

The organization of the Standard Aircraft plant is such that it 
does not justify a higher order for planes. 525. 
Leighton A. Cooksox (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Been in the employ' of the Government for nearly a year. ( 526. 

Previous occupation was assistant engineer of Canadian Air- 
planes (Ltd.), Toronto. 526. 

Was asked to come to Washington to work for Government by 
Mr. Diffin and Col. Mixter. 526. 

Was assigned to the main office of the Inspection Department, 
in charge of planes and engine inspections. 527. 

Has been at the Standard plant continually for last six weeks. 
528. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 211 

Leighton A. Cookson — Continued. 

When changes came through, Standard Co. started immedi- 
ately to do the work and did not determine whether or not 
thev had something almost identical with it being made in 
the plant. 530. 

There were no two files of prints on the machines which were 
alike. 533. 

Does not feel that if he allowed the drawings to come from 
Dayton-Wright and go into production at the Standard plant 
they would be handled properly. 538. 
Maj. C. B. Eose (July 26, 1918 ; Book 13) . 

Sees no reason why the Standard plant should not have pro- 
duced airplanes within 30 days after the Day ton- Wright Co. 
produced them, because the Dayton-Wright information was 
available to the Standard Aircraft Corporation. If it was 
not available, the Standard Aircraft Corporation should have 
gone after it and gotten it. 540. 

A plane called No. 30 of the Dayton-Wright Co. was shipped to 
the Standard Aircraft Co., and they were to make a " Chinese " 
copy of that. Went ahead along those lines. 542. 

In a letter dated May 16, 1918, Col. Hall stated: "All planes are 
to be built exactly according to sample ship sent you, and no 
drawings are to be accepted changing these unless approved 
by the writer." 542. 
Leighton A. Cookson (July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Thinks the responsibility for delay in production of planes by 

Standard Aircraft Co. was partly with the Government and 
partly with the company. 547. 

Thinks Government used very bad judgment in placing 500 
De Haviland planes in Standard plant, because that is not 
enough to allow any manufacturer to tool up and economically 
build 500 planes. 551. 

About six weeks ago found this company had about $1,000,000 
in unpaid bills, which were overdue. As a consequence it was 
very hard for this company (Standard Aircraft Co.) to pur- 
chase material economically and expeditiously. 556. 

Does not think there have been any changes since the model 
ship No. 30 was sent on by the Dayton-Wright Co. which have 
seriously interfered with production. 577. 

It would help the Standard people to have an additional order. 
581. 

Would not recommend an additional order in plant unless a man 
was put in there who was thoroughly familiar with manufac- 
ture and organization. 582. 
Walter Joseph Conaty (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). 

Has been employed by the Government in this particular branch 
of service since March 11, 1918. 587. 

Formerly with the Chesapeake & Ohio lines, leaving them on 
March 9. 587. 

In 1914 was an accountant in charge of the division of valuation, 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 588. 

Government has paid the Standard Aircraft Co. under Jl con- 
tract No. 1839, $4,167,211.09 to date. 588. 



212 ABSTEACT OF AIKCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Walter Joseph Conaty — Continued. 

Government has paid to Standard Aircraft Co. to date on De 
Haviland contract No. 2698-A, $531,091.38. 589. 

Government has paid this company to date on Handley-Page 
contract No. 3139, $89,772.10. 589. 

Figures as furnished by company do not agree. 590. 

Made a report on the corporate financial relationship of this 
company and its predecessor companies. 610. 
George Harrison Houston (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, 
New Brunswick, N. J., July 27, 1918; Book 11). 

Consulting engineer and for past year has been in charge of 
the operations here at Wright-Martin Co. 1. 

President and general manager of Wright-Martin Corpora- 
tion. 1. 

Has had following experience: Educated in Cincinnati; asso- 
ciated with father in Houston, . Standwoocl & Gamble Co., 
manufacturers of steam engines and boilers, as factory man- 
ager ; left them 10 years ago and became associated with Eoot 
& Vandervoort Engineering Co., of Illinois, in various posi- 
tions, ultimately holding position of factory and sales man- 
ager. Left them to come East and take up consulting engineer- 
ing work, first by himself and then associated with Mr. Charles 
Jamieson, constituting the firm of Jamieson & Houston, later 
taking in Gen. George W. Goethals as a partner. Present time 
the firm is known as the George W. Goethals Co. 2. 

Has been something over two years actively in the production 
of aircraft, having entered the Curtiss Airplane Motor Cor- 
poration in summer of 191 6 as general manager. 2. 

Entered the Wright-Martin organization latter part of May, 

1917. 3. As vice president and general manager and was to be 
the managerial head of the company. 3. 

Capitalization of company outlined. 4. 

Wright-Martin Co. has plant at New Brunswick, N. J., which 
is now owned directly by it, having been transferred to it on 
December 31, 1917, from the Simplex Co. for the purpose 
of carrying on the manufacture of aeronautical motors for 
the Government under cost-plus contracts; second, the plant 
of the Glenn L. Martin Co., known as the Wright-Martin Air- 
craft Corporation, of California, is operating a small factory 
in Newark, N. J., for the manufacture of tools and gauges 
for New Brunswick, and at present time is organizing and 
equipping a large factory on site of General Vehicle Co., 
Long Island City, to manufacture 300-horsepower aeronautical 
motors of Hispano-Suiza type for the Government at the Gov- 
ernment's cost. 4, 5. 

Explain contract of November, 1917, for three thousand 300- 
horsepower Hispano-Suiza motors. 7. 

Wright-Martin Corporation at New Brunswick has been pro- 
ducing what is known in America as type A of the Hispano- 
Suiza motor. Has completed all of its contract for this speci- 
fication and is now starting on the production of type E of 
the Hispano-Suiza motor. 10. 

On July 31, 1917, received a contract No. 1187 for 500 of type A 
motors. 10. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 213 

George Harrison Houston — Continued. 

In. September, 1917, received contract for 500 additional type A 
motors, which was canceled on October 2, 1917. 10. 

On August 28, 1917, received contract No. 1811 for spares for 
the first 500 of type A motors. 11. 

On October 2, 1917, received contract No. 1867 for 4,000 of type 
F Hispano-Suiza engines, which was canceled on November 
13 and replaced by contract No. 2250 of November 13, 1917, 
for 1,000 of type A motor with spares. 11. 

On November 20, 1917, contract No. 1867-a for three thousand 
300-horsepower type H Hispano-Suiza engines. 11. 

Contract No. 2250 has been supplemented by following con- 
tracts: On February 2, 1918, contract No. 2250-1 for 1,000 
type A Hispano-Suiza motors and spares; on February 25, 
1918, contract No. 2250-2 for 1,000 of type E or I Hispano- 
Suiza motors with spares. 11. On May 25, 1918, received 
contract No. 2250-3 for 1,000 type E or I Hispano-Suiza mo- 
tors; on November 20, 1917, received contract 1867-a, which 
was modified by two contracts dated in 1918, No. 1867-b, set- 
ting back deliveries, and further supplemented on May 11, 
1918, by contract No. 1867-c, arranging for the manufacture 
of the type H motors in Long Island City and still further 
setting back deliceries of type H motors. 12. 

Contract No. 2250-4, elated May 27, 1918, for the fabrication of 
motors for instruction purposes at New Brunswick from re- 
jected parts under cost-plus contract. 12. 

In September, 1917, took contract No. 1494 for 50 J-l military 
training planes, which were manufactured at Los Angeles, 
Calif. 13. 

In spring of 1918 negotiated another contract, No. 3088, for 
200 JN-4 training planes for manufacture at Los Angeles, 
Calif., but after contract had. been negotiated and order issued 
it was canceled by Signal Corps as not being satisfactory to 
them, and are now liquidating the western company. 13. 

Few miscellaneous small contracts for experimental motors, 
spare parts, etc., which have not been included. 15. 

Sets forth deliveries and compares them with contract schedule. 
15. 

If it had not been for the power difficulties in the winter would 
have been up to the contract schedule by completion of con- 
tract No. 2250. 21. 

Contract 2250-1 will be only a few days behind schedule. 22. 

Would have been possible to have delivered the 300-horsepower 
motors at the times called for in contract 1867-a. 33. 

Government wanted them to continue with the production of 
smaller motor. 34. 

Discussed the matter personally with Lieut, Emmons and indi- 
cated that they were desirous of going ahead on this contract, 
and that company were thoroughly confident as to the utility 
of motor for military purposes and as to its soundness as a 
mechanical device, but were willing to abide by the depart- 
ment's decision as to what company should do. 38. 



214. ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Geokge Harrison Houston — Continued. 

Proceed slowly, through the minimum of expense, to carry on 
the production of experimental engines and the preparation 
of all the details of design until the signing of contract 1867-c 
on May 11. 42. 

Contract No. 1487 was for 500 motors at a fixed price of $5,500 
each. 48. 

Contract No. 2250, November 13, 1917, for one thousand 150- 
horsepower Hispano-Suiza motors was on a cost-plus basis, 
fixed on the estimated cost of $3,600 per motor, the profit being 
15 per cent of said $3,600. 48. 

In latter part of March were directed by the Signal Corps to 
acquiesce in an increase in wages of workmen, amounting to 
about 27 per cent, which would make an increase of about $280 
per motor. 52. 

Contract 2250-1 provided an estimated cost covering exactly 
same items of expenditure of $3,200, instead of $6,600, with a 
fixed profit of 15 per cent of this amount. 53. 

Contract 2250-2 had an estimated cost, under the same condi- 
tions, of $3,000, plus the amount that the labor had been in- 
creased by the adjustment mentioned earlier. 54. 

Contract 1867-a was on a cost plus fixed profit, plus 25 per cent 
saving basis. The estimated cost was to be determined by 
arbitration. The profit was to be 15 per cent on such estimated 
cost. 55. 

Contract 1867-c set the estimated cost as $5,000 for the first 
thousand, with a profit of 15 per cent on this amount. 55. 

In proposed contract 1867-d the estimated cost is adjusted at 
$4,000 and the penalty, which is provided in all of these con- 
tracts, whereby the contractor agrees to stand half of any cost 
in excess of 33 per cent above the estimated cost, is waived. 56. 

Cost of production at New Brunswick has, in his opinion, been 
substantially higher than it would have been if, at the begin- 
ning of their production last summer, they had been given a 
contract for a sufficient quantity of motors to keep tham going 
for the period of 12 months. 59. 

Were spending thousands of dollars every month for messenger 
service and expressage for ordinary materials that they should 
have been able to obtain normally if they had had their re- 
quirements specified far enough ahead of time. 60. 

Made continuous representations verbally and otherwise with 
respect to the advantage that would be had by giving them 
larger orders, and as a result of a series of conferences in 
July, 1917, the following correspondence passed between the 
Aircraft Production Board and company. 60. 

Correspondence. 61-72. 

The Wright Co. was organized in 1909 for the purpose of manu- 
facturing aircraft in this country and desired in 1915 to intro- 
duce into America foreign aeronautical motors. They con- 
sidered the motor situation to be the most difficult of all 
problems facing aircraft production ; and to this end they sent 
abroad in the fall of 1915 Mr. H. M. Crane, their engineer, and 
Mr. Henry Lockhart, jr., who was then president of the com- 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 215 

George Harrison Houston — Continued. 

pairy, and who is now associated with the Bureau of Aircraft 
Production. These gentlemen returned in January of 1916 
with American rights for the manufacture of the Hispano 
Suiza motor. 74. 

In order to take this license, the General Aeronautic Co. of 
America was organized as a subsidiary of the Wright Co. and 
the license was taken in its name. 74. 

In addition to the right to manufacture this motor, these gentle- 
men brought back a contract for the production of 450 of these 
motors for the French Government, this order being a portion 
of the first lot of 850 which had ever been made. 75. 

The price of this motor was very low and the order was taken 
in order to obtain American rights, the acceptance of the order 
being one of the conditions upon which the French Govern- 
ment would permit of the removal from France of the en- 
gineering data necessary to its production. 75. 

The delivery schedule for this French order was to be com- 
pleted by the late summer of 1916, but, as a matter of fact, on 
the 1st of the following May less than 25 had been shipped. 
76. 

Thinks reason for delay was because an article of the finest 
workmanship and material and entirely new to American 
shop practice was being undertaken. 76. 

It has been estimated that company lost in the development 
and production of this motor prior to May 31, 1917, $1,269,000 
and has lost in production of these motors since that date a 
very large additional sum. 77. 

In October, 1917, were in a position to put this motor into large 
production just as rapidly as they could obtain the machinery, 
make the tools, and secure the material. 81. 

If they had received orders in July, 1917, for 7,000 motors of 
this type, believes they could have produced them by July, 
1918. 82. 

Have not had any advances from the Government or financial 
help of any kind up to this time. 82. 

Under these contracts expect to obtain an advance through the 
War Credits Board, based upon the property of the corpora- 
tion, of $7,500,000 of additional working capital. 82. 

Have been able to carry a cash balance of about $1,500,000 dur- 
ing the entire past year. 83. 

From July, 1917, to July, 1918, have actually produced in New 
Brunswick plant approximately 2,500 Hispano-Suiza motors, 
exclusive of the motors for the French Government. 84. 

Contracts of the 2,250 series have gradually increased the out- 
put required to 20 motors per day. 85. 

Have stood ready at all times, under proper conditions, to pro- 
vide such facilities in whatever quantities were necessary to 
meet the Government's demands for these motors. 86. 

It would have been just as simple to have laid out the plant for 
30 motors per da3^ at the beginning and would have saved all 
the other work. 87. 



216 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

George Harrison Houston — Continued. 

Letter from Finance Department, Equipment Division, of Sig- 
nal Corps to Wright-Martin Co., relative to development 
costs. 90. 

Expected to make out of these two contracts about $2,000,000. 
Expected to recoup for their past losses. 93. 

Q. That is, the two contracts aggregating 1,000 motors? — 
A. Yes. But, as a matter of fact, 500 of these motors — one 
contract for 500 of them — was canceled; so that we lost the 
opportunity of recouping on this contract and we had to look 
for relief to later cost-plus contracts, except for something 
less than a million dollars that we ultimately made as profit 
on contract 1187. 93. 

Undertook something that had never been undertaken before in 
America, and something which on the Liberty motor develop- 
ment was undertaken onlv by the L^nited States Government. 
91. 

Strongly recommended that the Aircraft Production Board 
avoid giving contracts for the geared motor and go directly to 
the 300-horsepower direct drive. The board took this matter 
under advisement, and late in September we were told that 
instructions from Gen. Pershing made the placing of an order 
for 1,000 of the geared motors imperative. 101. 

This contract was placed and signed October 2 and canceled on 
November 13. Was followed by the contract for the 3,000 
300-horsepower motors. 101. 

Gives history of Hispano-Suiza engine, 105. 

While we were producing these 450, the Hispano Co. of Spain 
organized another French factory near Paris and began the 
active manufacture of this motor. It quickly became the lead- 
ing motor in France, and up to the present time its manufac- 
ture has been introduced into 15 different factories in France, 
2 in England, and the parent factory in Spain. 107. 

The Hispano motor of the direct drive, and later of the geared 
drive, was used in a number of planes of both the pursuit and 
day-bombing types, but its great work has always been in a 
pursuit plane, the one application being that of the Spad, de- 
veloped and engineered by a Frenchman named Berchereau. 
109. 

Would have produced the 300-horsepower motors for delivery 
early in the year 1918, and by this time could have been produc- 
ing from five to seven hundred per month. 113. 

There are a number of plants in this country that could have 
produced these motors successfully. 114. 

The Pierce- Arrow Co. has just completed a contract for the pro- 
duction of 5,000 Hispano-Suiza 300-horseopwer motors under 
a sublicense from this company. 121. 

Made a proposition to the Signal Corps for the production of 
9,450 of these motors, but, as we would not consider taking 
them on anything but a cost-plus basis, our contract has been 
limited to 5,000. 123. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 217 

George Harrison Houston — Continued. 

Have taken the position that a $10,000,000 corporation could not 
safely take $120,000,000 worth of work on a fixed-price basis 
in war time with anything like a reasonable percentage of 
profit and be safe in so doing. 123. 

Hispano-Suiza patents are not included in the cross-license agree- 
ment. 126. 

As soon as we saw we had sufficient business to make it possible 
we entered into negotiations with the Hispano-Suiza Co., 
upon our own initiative, and by their own sense of fairness we 
were told to reduce this royalty to 1,200 francs per motor for 
a quantity of 4,000 motors. 126. 

Hispano-Suiza people are willing to accept, under proper condi- 
tions, a contract all of which is in accordance with our present 
conditions and royalties on 150, 180, or 300-horsepower motors, 
for the United States, not to exceed 600 pesetas for each, a 
peseta being valued at the present time at 27 cents, as com- 
pared with a franc, which is valued at approximately 20 cents. 
That was on the first 4,000 motors, and for the following 4,000 
motors 300 pesetas per motor; and for all motors after a 
total of 12,000 thus produced 150 pesetas each, thereby re- 
ducing the royalty to almost a negligible point. 127. 

The Splitdorf magneto used on Hispano-Suiza motor. 128. 

Net work of company at present moment is approximately $10,- 
000,000. It is all invested in the manufacture of Hispano- 
Suiza motors except about $800,000 net book value of its 
Wright patents unabsorbed by royalties and about half a mil- 
lion dollars still tied up in automobile inventories. 131. 

Analysis of schedule of public vouchers of company inserted in 
record. 132. 

Statement of royalties paid Hispano-Suiza Co. 135. 

Seventy-five to one hundred thousand dollars allowed and paid 
by the Government for the outlay for materials and machinery 
and labor under contract 1867 for 4,000 geared motors, which 
was canceled. 136, 137. 

Company has earned about a million and a half dollars under 
contract 2250, and on earlier contract, 1487, about $800,000. 
141, 142. 

For the period ending March 31, 1918, the compensation paid for 
Goethals & Co.'s supervision, other than a percentage of the 
profits, was $50,000 per year. Beginning March 31, 1918, this 
percentage was increased to $150,000 per year, due to the en- 
largement of the program and responsibilities incurred and to 
the introduction into the organization of two additional repre- 
sentatives of Goethals & Co. 143. 

Gives salaries of other executive officers of the corporation. 145. 
George Harrison Houston (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; 
Book 14). 

Correspondence between Signal Corps and Wright-Martin Cor- 
poration relative to building planes for the • Government. 
160-168. 



218 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

George Hakrison Houston — Continued. 

Were particularly interested in the supplying of planes to use 
the Hispano-Suiza motor, and had in mind the advisability or 
possibility of building pursuit machines similar to those using 
the Hispano-Suiza motor abroad. 171. 

File of correspondence relative to the Hispano-Suiza engine. 
175-228. 
Henry M. Crane (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, New Bruns- 
wick,^. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). 

Chief engineer and vice president of the Wright-Martin Air- 
craft Corporation. 228. 

Has been chief engineer since company was formed under pres- 
ent arrangement, and vice president for about three months. 
228. 

First interested in aeronautical motors in 1910 or 1911. 229. 

Gives business experience. 229. 

Was in Europe w T ith Mr. Lockhard when contract was made for 
Hispano-Suiza motor. 230. 

Explains why it took so long to complete French contract. 233. 

No plant can reach a production of 40 a day on an order for 
1,000. 238. 

No foundry in this country was then willing, even if capable of 
making aluminum castings such as were required to success- 
fully manufacture the motor. 240. 

Had solved all the important difficulties, and were actually pro- 
ducing motors, but not in large quantities, in June, 1917. 242. 

The Hispano-Suiza engine is adapted primarily to the Spad 
machine, designed by the French Government, and used in 
1916 in France, when it was first brought out. It was also 
adapted to the SE-5 plane, which was brought out in England 
in actual use last summer. 24. 

Mr. Houston has been giving 15 hours a day to this company. 
250. 

Makes statement regarding motor-design situation. 252. 

Have had in the work of developing the Hispano-Suiza motors 
the advantage of their own plans and their own engineering, 
without any direction from the Government. 258. 

Eegarded it as an advisable project to design and build the 
Liberty motor. 266. 

Government have under development at the present time a 
Bristol fighting machine. It is that general size and type of 
machine to take either the 300-horsepower Hispano or the 
8-cylincler Liberty. 269. 

Makes further statement in regard to Liberty motor. 271. 

Understands some of the early Liberty motors sent over with the 
old lubricating system proved to be defective. 276. 

The lubricating system, which was found to be defective, was 
installed as a result of a great many years of experience of 
Maj. Hall. 278. 

The use of a 21-cylinder Liberty in the English Bristol plane 
was impossible. 279. 

The Bristol machine was designed to take a motor of about 220- 
horsepower weighing slightly over 600 oounds, with a corre- 
sponding weight of gasoline, the flying weight being about 
2,750 pounds. 279. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 219 

Henry M. Crane — Continued. 

The 300-horsepower Hispano could have been used in'the single- 
place fighting machines successfully. I do not think the 12- 
cylinder Liberty can. They can both be used in the two-place 
fighting- machines. 280. 

" The Liberty motor to-day, in my opinion, is the best motor of 
its type in the world, all things considered, the reason being 
that we have a large production, and I do not think we could 
have gotten a large production on the Rolls-Koyce, the only 
other motor equal to it in quality." 282. 

One hundred and eighty horsepower Hispano-Suiza engine is 
used for fighting in single seaters exclusively. 290. 
James H. Anderson (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, New 
Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). 

Vice president in charge of finance and accounts of the Wright- 
Martin Aircraft Corporation. 292. 

Treasurer of the George W. Goethals Co., and is one of those 
assigned to the management of the Wright-Martin plant. 292. 

Took active charge on June 1, 1918. 292. 

Been connected with the plant since September 26 in a systema- 
tizing capacity in the factory. 293. 

Has a Mr. Isenberg connected with the plant as assistant factory 
manager. 295. 
Emmet S. Kyte (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, New Bruns- 
wick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). 

Has been employed at plant since May 16. 297. 

Formerly in the United States Treasury Department. 297. 

Came there to assume charge of the plant-protection phase of 
the plant on behalf of the company. 297. 

Five alien enemies now employed in plant. 299. 

About 125 Austrians and Hungarians employed in plant. 302. 

Does not know whether these five Germans have permission to 
remain in plant. 303. 

American Protective League not organized in plant to his knowl- 
edge. 305. 
Horace Melville Benstead (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; 
Book 14). 

Commissioned in the Army on January 11. Was a civilian em- 
ployee from November 1, 1917. 320. 

Prior to entering the Government service, was auditor and as- 
sistant secretary of the Edison Storage Battery and other 
Edison allied interests of West Orange. 320. . 

Upon entering Government employ was assigned to Detroit 
learning the cost-plus contracts. 320. 

Was there one month and then assigned to the Wright-Martin 
Aircraft Corporation as accounting officer at New Brunswick, 
and has been there since December 4, 1917. 321. 

Has charge of all the reimbursements to the Wright-Martin 
Corporation, to certify to their correctness. 321. 

Produces statement showing the total amount paid to this com- 
pany by the Government under the various heads under which 
these payments are divided which was marked Benstead Ex- 
hibit No. 1, July 29, 1918. 322. 

Washington office expenses disallowed by Government. 323. 



220 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Horace Melville Benstead — Continued. 

Paid executive salaries tentatively, subject to a ruling of the 
finance board of the Signal Corps. 324. 

List of salaries of Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation marked 
Benstead Exhibit 2, July 29, 1918. 325. 

Statement of payments made under contract 1867 produced by 
witness and marked " Benstead Exhibit 3, July 29, 1918." 331. 

His contention that the Government owns the investment at 
Long Island City, getting in from the Wright-Martin Co. for 
a certain figure. 335. 

Contractor claims that the labor increase made effective on 
March 18 was beyond its control and that it should be paid for 
by the Government and excluded from their cost in the com- 
putation of the bonus for savings effected. 337. 

Cost of producing the 150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza motor ap- 
proximately $2,900 in January and $2,600 in February. 342. 
William F. McGuire (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; 
Book 14). 

Vice president of Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation as one 
of the representatives of Goethals & Co. 34. 

Looks after the production and arrangement of machinery, 
tools, etc. At present time specially engaged in the work of 
the Long Island plant. 347. 

Supposed to deliver 50 engines of 300 horsepower in Long Island 
plant in September and he thinks they will do it. 349. 
James L. McCartney (New Brunswick,' N. J., July 29, 1919; 
Book 14). 

Holds position of draft clerk. Has charge of all draft matters 
connected with the employees of plant, 355. 

About 800 men in plant have industrial exemptions granted to 
them. 355. 

These men are motor assemblers and machinists, 358. 
Albert J. C. De Belleuse (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; 
Book 14). 

Employed by Duesenberg Motor Co., Elizabeth, N. J. 359. 

Previously employed in the Long Island plant of the Wright- 
Martin Corporation. 359. 

Had charge of the inspection of their tests for the Government. 
359.^ 

Born in France and came to America in 1910. 361. 

Knew the man who had charge of the French commission, who 
told him he would give him a job. Had never had anything 
to do with motors before. 361. 

Thinks production in Wright-Martin plant was stimulated by 
investigation of Mr. Borglum. 366. 

Company ordered overtime when it was unnecessaiy. 367. 

When they got into the heaviest production the Sunday work 
was discontinued. 370. 

Prince Poniatowski is the representative of the Hispano-Suiza 
Co. 370. 

States there was a wastage of $15,000 a week since January 1 in 
the foundry department, 375. 

Were putting young men in charge of departments after one or 
two months' apprenticeship. 378. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 221 

Albert J. C. De Belleuse — Continued. 

Louis Shuck, foreman in the connecting-rod department, was 
not a citizen. 387. 
Thomas H. Sedley (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1919; Book 14). 
Superintendent of foundry. 393. 
In business for 15 years in the aluminum line. 393. 
Has been no more wastage in foundry operations than was abso- 
lutely necessary. 394. 
Hans O. C. Isenberg (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 

14 )- 

Assistant factory manager of Wright-Martin Corporation. 395. 

Held that position since June 10. 395. 

Came with the Wright-Martin Co. on December 1, 1917. 393. 

Was formerly chief engineer and production manager of the 
Scripps-Booth Corporation in Detroit. 395. 

Went through a postgraduate course in Berlin on gas engines. 
397. 

In 1908 was chief engineer in production in Germany, in auto- 
mobile factories. 398. 

Left Germany in 1911 and went to Wilkes-Barre, Pa., as chief 
engineer of the Matheson Automobile Co. 398. 
Orland J. Ridenour (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 
14). 

For three years was general manager of the Star Suspension 
Pulley Co. 423. 

Came with Wright-Martin Aircraft Co. on March 5, 1918. 423. 

Received instructions from the Chief of the Military Intelli- 
gence Department in Washington that alien enemies were not 
to be employed at plant. 424. 

They are kept on because some of them were employed by this 
plant long before the war and were shop foremen and high- 
grade mechanics who are difficult to replace. 425. 
Charles R. Sarin (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). 

Has been in the service since February 4, 1918. 444. 

Prior to that was an accountant with Montgomery, Ward & Co., 
Chicago. 444. 

Upon entering the service was sent to the Packard Motor Co., 
Detroit, remaining there six weeks. 445. 

Came to New Brunswick on March 22. 445. 

Has been in charge of spare sales. 445. 

Makes audit of exemptions from draft of employees of Wright- 
Martin Corporation. 445. 
Jalma West (Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y., July 30, 
1918; Book 15). 

Agent in charge of the military intelligence plant production 
office in Buffalo. 1. 

Mr. Edmund Leigh, chief of the plant protection of the military 
intelligence. 1. 

His office is Col. Churchill's office in Washington, who is Chief 
of Military Intelligence. 

Was immigrant inspector for nine years. 3. 

Was sworn into the service on the 16th of October, 1917. 4. 

Investigating parties who had been accused of being connected 
with German propaganda. 5. 



222 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Jalma West — Continued. 

Goes to Buffalo to the Curtiss plant. 6. 

Found things in a demoralized state. 6. 

One could enter the Curtiss plant without being properly iden- 
tified. 7. 

Hundreds of employees that were idle, doing nothing. 7. 

Lack of system and interest in production. 8. 

Curtiss Co. had six plants in Buffalo. 8. 

Presents statement giving summary of conditions since he came 
to Buffalo. (" West Exhibit 1, July 30, 1918.") 10. 

Recommends better fire and police protection. 11. 

Hands over report on sabotage, marked "West Exhibit No. 2, 
July 30, 1918." 12. 

Bristol Fighter was found, on February 19, 1918, with radiator 
bracket tampered with; vital part of it bored and filled with 
lead. 12. 

Had never been reported to Col. Van Deaman. chief of military 
intelligence. 14. 

Takes damaged bracket to Senator Overman. 14. 

Leaves memo on his chief's desk telling him what he has 
done. 15. 

Produces five letters received through the Washington office 
from Senator Overman. 16-29. 

Various questions had been brought up and arguments regarding 
the poor material put into the Bristol Fighter, carelessness in 
construction of the same, which would go to make a faulty 
machine when it is finished. 32. 

Presents report of Mr. Manley Harrison, who did wiring on the 
machine, marked " West Exhibit 9, July 30, 1918." 32-33. 

Presents report by Victor O'Neill in relation to material, pur- 
chase and rejection of steels and steel tubing for the Bristol 
machine. 33. 

This report marked " West Exhibit No. 10, July 30, 1918." 33. 

Main facts in this report show that the manner of drawing steel 
from the steel depot made it possible for the United States 
Government to pay for the steel more than once. 34. 

Mr. O'Neill erased the former purchaser's name from the slip 
and substituted his own. 36. 

Things in such a demoralized condition from the standpoint of 
records it was impossible to verify anything. 37. 

Col. Woods in Buffalo making an investigation of the Curtiss 
plant. 38. 

Gave him a copy of all the reports he has just submitted. 39. 

States he was told that Lieut. Col. Arthur Woods was making 
this investigation at the instance of the Signal Corps. 39. 

Statement by Alex. H. Beggs, marked "West Exhibit No. 7," 
tells of the lack of effort to speed up production. Men sleep- 
ing under their desks in broad daylight. Could have gone to 
sleep on the general foreman's desk and no one would have 
said anything. 40. • 

Mr. Beggs refers in this statement to a letter to Mr. West in 
which he says he has not had three days' work during the 
three months he has been out there. 41. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 223 

Jalma West — Continued. 

States that on one occasion, accompanied by Mr. Sweeney, chief 
of police, they observed five men pushing one truck ; observed 
them for half an hour or more going from place to place and 
resting a while and then coming back. Nothing on the 
truck. 42. 

Found 9 or 10 men sitting on barrels in one end of this plant; 
when questioned, laugh at you and walk away to another 
spot. 42. 

Mr. Mueller, the chief engineer, parents German born. 44. 

Many reports to show his father strong pro-German. 44. 

Charles H. Webber, parents German born. 44. 

Mr. Hoffman, parents German born. 45. 

Mr. Schwebel, parents German born; assistant to Mr. Web- 
ber. 45. 

Mr. West is asked about Capt. Oakleaf, which is the equivalent 
of Eichenbaum, who is representing the Government in con- 
nection with wood matters. 47. 

Learns from his associates that his parents are German born; 
that he gloated over the sinking of the Lusitania, etc. 47. 

Turns his report in to his chief, Edmund Leigh, and is called 
before a board of officers to pass upon Oakleaf's application 
for a commission. 48. 

In spite of this he is commissioned first lieutenant and later a 
captain. 48. 

The two officers that interrogated him were in the uniform of 
majors. 48. 

Mr. Leigh was present. 49. 
Cyril R. Cobttrn (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., July 30, 1918; Book 15). 

Resides, Buffalo. 

Had charge or performed a part of the inspection of planes 
on the various models. 52. 

Was in charge of the North Elmwood plant and of the Churchill 
Street plant on the J. N. models and on the Bristol here. .52. 

Is then assigned to the production end. 52. 

Change from the Bristol machine on account of so many fall- 
ing. 54. 

Relates two accidents occasioned by the Bristol macrine. 54. 

After 120 changes supposed the machine was about where they 
wanted it. 55. 

Liberty motor too heavy for the wing area. 56. 

Shipped 25. 57. 

The 124 changes took place after the first 25 had been shipped. 
58. 

Company get the Bristol model along in August, and 25 planes 
only are produced in the next 4 months. 59. 

Due to " faulty workmanship." 59-61. 

A very good percentage of the wood was rejected because it 
was not well dried in the kilns, 62. 

Signal Corps allowed them a plus-and-minus of a thirty-second 
of an inch. 62. 

Explains this more fully. 63. 
130687—19 15 



224 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION'. 

Cyril E. Coburx — Continued. 

Never seemed to be able to get metal parts made right. 65.. 

Poor workmanship on them. 66. 

Drill double holes in the wood, splitting the wood. 68. 

Man that did this work makes no explanation. 68. 

Something of this sort all the time. 69. 

Finds difficulty with the wiring. 70. 

Defective installation. TO. 

Danger of igniting the fumes of the gasoline. 71. 

First machine destroyed had two fires on it within an hour of 
each other. 71. 

Battery in wrong position ; underneath the gas tank. 73. 

Mr. Coburn suggested to them to put a leather cover on the; 
battery in case of a drip of gasoline. 74. 

Did not do this, and also run the motor without the manifold on 
it, 74. 

The second fire was due to ignition from the wiring. 75. 

This happened on the 28th of March. 78. 

Had been working on the Bristol Fighter ever since he had been 
there down to this time. 78. 

It seemed to him that there was more idleness than was neces- 
sary. 78. 

Made training planes at the Churchill plant. 79. 

Charts supplied by Government from June, 1917, to June, 1918, 
show approximately 2,553 training planes as having been 
shipped by the Curtiss Co. 80. 

These were produced at Churchill Street largely. 80. 

Things went better over at the Churchill Street plant. 81. 

Go ahead on building plane No. 2. 91. 

First machine had six or seven flights, otherwise would have 
been sent abroad in this condition and the accident would have 
happened on the front. 92. 

Got out second machine in 10 days. 96. 

This machine fell at Dayton. 97. 

The third, up to the sixth, were shipped to Dayton. 97. 

Thinks remaining 19 were gotten out in 6 to 8 weeks. 98. 

Have had six falls at the North Elmwood plant since the 1st of 
June. (The first one, two men were killed in. This due to 
weakness of the fabric used in the first 25 machines.) 99. 

Eelates details of the other five falls. 100-103. 

One hundred and twenty-five changes on the second order for 
these planes and now finally discarded. 104. 

Contemplate building the S. E. Five machine. 104. 

Same organization to build this new plane as with the Bristol 
with chances of a similar result. 105. 

Gives as his observation at the Curtiss plant that the Curtiss 
people have been very prone to put things over and see just 
how near they could come to getting things right and still get 
them across, etc. 106. 

Used wood that they knew would produce defective plane, be- 
cause it had passed Army inspection, and that relieved them 
of the responsibility. 108. 

They did not seem to be able to work close to the blue print. 108. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 225 

Cyril E. Cobttrn — Continued. 

Mr. Kepperley and Mr. Guy in charge of this North Elmwood 
plant. 108. 

Mr. Mueller is chief engineer for the production of the Bristol 
machine, and is engineer also of the J. N. models. 109. 

Mr. Heatley Green was district manager for the Government. 
111. 

Maj. Moore in charge of production. 113. 

Mr. Cole is district manager, having general supervision. 113.. 

Capt. Eding is manager of production. 114. 

Capt. Weller is chief of inspection under the direction of Maj- 
Moore. 114. 

Should have been Government control in this plant. 114. 

Bristol fighter was adapted from the Bristol in England. 116. 

It practically lost its identity in this country. 116. 

Mr. Mueller was largely responsible for various changes of de- 
sign. 116. 

Imagines it was done at the request of the Government, as the 
Bristol plane could not possibly carry the Liberty motor. 116.. 

Mr. Butts and Mr. Green were in constant conference with Mi\ 
Mueller when it was under construction. 117. 

Defects of Bristol fighter due both to defects in design and 
manufacture. 117. 

Was abandoned on Mr. Landon's advice. 118. 

Thinks before it was abandoned it would have paid to go a little 
further into experimental work. 118. 

One hundred were ready for completion when it was abandoned. 
119. 

In the shape they were getting stock in, they would have been 
able to put out 100 of them within the next, say, six weeks. 
122. 

Here is where he thought the Government should have stepped 
in and stopped the defective work. 122. 

Could have been utilized at least on this side by the men learn- 
ing to fly instead of having to wait until they reached the other 
side to learn. 122. 

Enough material scrapped of some kinds to build 50 planes, of 
other material, enough has been scrapped to build 500 planes. 
123. 

This material can not be utilized entirely in other planes. 123. 

Means a loss running into millions of dollars. 123-124. 

He personally gave a stop order for certain work still going on 
and two weeks later in going through the metal shop found 
they were still making them and sending them through vari- 
ous operations and working overtime. 124. 

Order had never gone any further than the engineering depart- 
ment. 124. 

All the labor and material of these 10 days was lost. 125. 

This change in the bracket that holds the synchronizer, oil pump,, 
and air pump had been communicated to Mesner. 125. 

Lack of cooperation the plaint among the various departments. 
126. 



226 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Cyril E. Cobttrn — Continued. 

They would get an order for 500 parts and go on making them 
until somebody goes through and sees how many they have, 
when they would find 5,000 parts. 126. 

Mr. Brooks designed the Libertv Battler, or at other times called 
the Curtiss Battler. 130. 

Same situation now in connection with the production contem- 
plated here of a fighting plane that was present in connection 
with the Bristol. 132. 

States fully what was discovered in connection with the unneces- 
sary drilling of holes in the strut. 133. 

This man had built fully 16 fuselages in this way. 136. 
Charles Eohlfs (Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.", Buffalo. X. Y., 
July 20, 1918; Book 15). 

Been emplo} T ed in connection with the work of the Curtiss plant; 
since February 5, 1918. 

In the woodworking department ; senior inspector of wood parts. 
141. 

On behalf of the Army. 141. 

When he came to the Curtiss plant, being used to shops, it looked 
like things were running wild and loose. Lots of people with 
nothing to do but walk around and look out. 143. 

Has been nowhere but right at the North Elmwood plant. 143. 

One man remarked to him, who had formerly worked for him : 
" Mr. Bohlfe, if this thing was run for the Kaiser himself, he 
could not be running it to better advantage to himself than 
these people are." 143. 

Creeping paralysis over the place, but what the cause of it was 
could not tell. 144. 

Observed these conditions immediately, and same conditions still 
prevail, only they have more to do. 144. 

There was nothing inherent in the difficulty of manufacturing 
a new plane that accounted for these conditions, as any me- 
chanic knows all the old methods and processes. 146. 

States that there was a model produced in January of 1918. and 
that on this model 25 other machines were constructed. 148. 

His son, who came up to fly the machine, was told he need not 
look the machine over, 20 men had looked it over. 150. 

He found the wings wrong in the first place, the front struts 
were on behind, the control was wrong, which fact alone would 
have resulted in his death. 150, 151. 

Wings were defective in method of applying the canvas. Some- 
thing wrong with the stuff they had put on the ribs that hold 
these in place, and it soaked through and made it soft, so that 
when there was a terrific force by the propeller against these 
wings it loosened the stuff and they were torn off. 154. 

His son, with a fellow named Depew, discovered this. 155. 

Copy of the report of serious defects marked "Eohlfs Exhibit 
l/july 30, 1918." 156. 

Method of using the glue all wrong. 163. 

Their ability to make hydroplanes and their inability to make 
Bristol fighters was because the former was a tried thing. 167. 

And further explained that the personnel of the organization 
was afraid of the cars. 169. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 227 

Charles Rohlfs — Continued. 

Even the hydroplanes went slowly enough. What took 2,000 
hours to do then is now done in TOO. 169. 

The whole thing inexplicable. 170. 

Again asked why a plant that is the oldest in this line of work, 
successfully making planes before this country entered the 
war, and where you would suppose the best work could be 
done, has been the most lamentable failure. 171. 

What they made before was Curtiss output and the Curtiss 
outfit. The results to be seen at Churchill Street plant. 171. 

Mr. Glen Curtiss, a man named Coleman, an engineer, and Kirk- 
man, an engineer, are at Mineola. 172. 

Were not here long enough to get into this at all. 172. 

Bad results from kiln drying for a long time. 176. 

The kilns under Government control. 176. 

Did not cause much delay in production. 177. 

Were holding back work by the ignorance of methods of pro- 
duction. 177. 

He secured information from Capt. Eogers, English repre- 
sentative here, that the SE-5 was the very latest of that 
type of machine and that it had done wonderful service. 
178. 

Working on experimental stuff, and they are going desperately 
slow. 178. 

Thought the Bristol should have been discarded, as it was 
wrong, especially in connection with the Liberty motor. 179. 

Overproduction of parts. 184. 

Says the Government is not going to allow for any of the over- 
production of parts. 184. 

Cites an instance of an order being given to supply a shortage 
of 950 of certain things when there are already 600 in the 
storeroom. 186. 

Some of the men who were enthusiastic and interested to do 
something overreached, and the thing was delayed and de- 
layed and not one thing produced. 188. 

They have not seen anything good come out of Washington 
there. 191. 

Inefficient, and perhaps their argument would be to anything — 
" Well, I have not read up on that for several years." 191. 

Percentage of spruce lost, manufactured, has run from nothing 
once in a while to 50 and 60 per cent in manufactured prod- 
ucts. 193. 

Capt. Rogers, who represents the English Government, told 
him in February that he had washed his hands of the Bristol 
machine last November. 197. 

November, December, January they went on making this ma- 
chine that they should not have made. 197. 

The Signal Corps directed them to keep on with the work. 198. 

Maj. Moore was supervising things at the plant at that time 
for the Signal Corps. 198. 
Johx Hexry Wixterbottom (Curtiss Aeroplane Motor Co., Buffalo, 
N. Y., July 31, 1918; Book 15). 

Emploved at the Curtiss plant and working with the Navy on 
the Naw costs. 200. 



228 ABSTEACT OF AIECEAET INVESTIGATION. 

John Henky Winterbottom — Continued. 

First worked at the South Elwood plant in inspection depart- 
ment. 200. 

Came to the North Elmwood plant when it was first opened up 
for construction proper. 201. 

Had inspection of all metal parts. 201. 

One of the worst things he had to do with was the cases of 
waste material and the manner in which they did the work. 
202. 

Some material had been set at an angle of 45°, and it should 
have been only at 30°. Were going to put this piece of metal 
under the die to straighten it without treating it, which would 
injure the metal. These parts used. 202. 

States the effect of using this material. 204-205. 

His desk all cleaned out one night. 206. 

Had notes and data on this instance and other occurrences like 
it. 207. 

Mr. Herman, superintendent of production, takes him over and 
he has charge of drill-press and milling-machine department. 
209. 

In his department, when they were not busy, they would take 
sheet metal and drill holes in the sheet metal, but down in the 
punch press would work at all kinds of standard parts, and 
then an order would come for a change, and this would all 
have to be thrown in salvage. 209. 

This work undertaken without orders from the planning de- 
partment, but through an " S " order. 210. 

Mr. Rogers gave these " S " orders, because he did not want to 
wait. 211-212. 

Every time there was a change it affected the material some 
way or another. Either had to remachine the material on 
hand or had to scrap the material on hand or else to salvage 
it. 214. 

This steel or excess material would be scattered around on the 
floors, every once in a while be gathered up and put back in 
the steel stores, and the Government in this way would pay 
for it three or four times. 215. 

There was no blank form or slip of any kind to return the 
material on. 217. 

Mr. Stubbs was in charge of the steel stores. 218. 

This practice has been going on since plant was originated. 
223. 

Material was returned in this way to the steel stores once a 
month. 223. 

When any of this material was to be used again they would 
make out a new issue slip for so much of a certain kind of 
material, and the slip would not show it was material that 
had been returned. 225. 

Is asked how it happened that the Government paid twice for 
this material if the material it had passed was in the bins, 
and was simply returned and issued back under factory 
orders. 226. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 229 

John Henry Winterbottom — Continued. 

Thinks that the Government does not pa}- for these materials 

on the basis of inspection of the materials when it is put in 

stores, but on the basis of the issue slips, which are 

stamped when that material is issued to the different parts 

of the plant for production. 231. 
If there is a reissue of the same material there is a repayment 

by the Government for the same material. 231. 
The Government cost-notification slip comes through at the 

same time the special issue slip comes through. 232. 
This is a duplicate of the issue slip, is a notification to the Gov- 
ernment office, a carbon copy of the original issue slip. 232. 
Describes special issue slip. 232. 
Tells how double payment by the Government could be avoided. 

233. 
This practice only sto^^ed about two and a half months ago. 

233. 
Is asked to explain more fully how this special issue slip would 

correct this trouble. 235-239. 
In all the production departments there was excess material 

lying around. 246. 
-Although it would be used up it would not be charged to proper 

orders. Material was used for Army stuff and on Navy orders, 

and Curtiss would use it for tools, or to repair stuff for them- 
selves. 246. 
The Army and Navy are given separate order numbers, and if 

you issue it out on one and credit it to another you can not 

keep the records straight. 247. 
At one time there were 14 truck loads of excess material on the 

floor Avhich went back to the steel stores without a cent of 

credit, 248. 
Thinks this was about five months ago. 248. 
If this material is used while on the floor there is no record to 

show where it has gone. 249. 
Cites instances of material taken out for, say, Army work, and 

then being used for some other work causing great confusion. 

249-254. - 
Spoke to Mr. McCaul, his superior, about the papers being rifled 

in his desk, but could get no information. 255. 
Mr. Talbot t directed his transfer. 255. 
When material was bought specially for the Army and Navy 

it was entered oil the Army and Navy ledgers. 260. 
When material was not bought specially for the Army or Navy 

it was entered on the Curtiss ledgers. 260. 
Material bought specially for the Army or Navy would be paid 

for outright. 260. 
So the material that was bought for the Curtiss orders was the 

material that was paid for subsequently on requisition slips. 

261. 
Mr. Crawford was purchasing agent of all raw material. 262. 
Mr. Douglas is present purchasing agent, 262. 
States the raw material record would show what proportion was 



bought on general Curtiss orders. 264. 






230 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

John Henry Winterbottom — Continued. 

The metal parts, fabricated parts, that do not come up to speci- 
fications go into the salvage department. 266. 

No system is maintained by which a credit for salvage of dis- 
carded parts can be had, because they did not have a part 
cost of any particular part. 266. 

Is asked to explain how these special issue slips for shortages 
could be issued by anybody without any reference to the 
orders proceeding from the planning department. 274b. 

Is transferred because he is holding up production. 278. 

Relates instance of a man turning out 1,000 parts after he has 
been notified by the foreman that work on this production 
was to be stopped. 280. 

Common occurrence to hear a man remark " I am acquainted 
with the fact that this is not the proper way, but it is the 
way of the pro-German system." 287. 

Excess material left on the floor would be retained in the depart- 
ment for which it was ordered, the tag thrown away, so in 
case they scrapped some material this could be used to cover 
up their mistakes.. 291. 

One thousand two hundred stop orders in March on the Bristol 
fighter. 309. 

These changes were made about the time they were delivering 
the 25 finished according to the accepted model. 311. 

Made unnecessary changes because a sample part was not made 
to embody all the changes that would be needed in that part 
before it went to production. 312. 

This proved a good method of keeping the factorv emploved, 
313. 

The persons in control of the engineering department should 
have known that this system created work at the expense of 
the Government. 315. 

The whole matter can be reduced to a certainty by a study of 
the card index. 315. 

Mentions Mr. Essinger, who had charge of the control and 
power units of the card index, as a man who would be par- 
ticularly informing as a witness. 316. 

This matter was taken up with Mr. Mueller. 316. 

Enough parts have been produced and thrown away on account 
of this system to equip 600 planes. 317. 

This can be verified in the card records which were at that time 
in Mr. Golden's department. 319. 

The stock ledgers are intended to be a substantial inventory of 
the parts in stock. They have a credit and a debit. 322. 

Changes all suggested at Washington. 327. 

After interview with Mr. Mueller, improvements were not made 
to avoid the waste that has been described. 336. 

Instead, he gets a letter from Mr. McCall that he should not 
take matters of such importance over his head any more. 
336. 

System of timekeeping very lax. 340. 
William Ward Moss (Buffalo,' K Y., July 31, 1918; Book 15). 

Vice president and comptroller of the Curtiss Aeroplane and 
Motor Corporation. 369. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 231 

William Ward Moss — Continued. 

Recommended to the Curtiss Co. for appointment to this office 

by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Nav} 7 . 

371. 
War Credits Board loaned the Curtiss Co. $8,000,000 and the 

Navy Department loaned them $3,900,000. 371. 
Had been previous advance of $3,500,000, which was repaid 

out of this last loan. 372. 
This amount is secured by first mortgage on all of the fixed 

assets of the company. 375. 
The only cost plus contracts the Curtiss people have are at the 

North Elmwood plant, 379. 
JN planes are all at the Churchill Street group. 330. 
Fixed price for the JN-4D was $4,750. 382. 
Same price for the JN-4H. 382. 

Mr. John N. Willys, president of the company. 396. 
J. E. Kepperly, B. A. Guy, and Mr. Moss are on the finance 

committee. 397. 
Mr. Wilson (C. B.) was in charge of production of all plants. 

398. 
Under his direction Mr. Ericson is in charge of the North Elm- 
wood plant. 399. 
Mr. C. M. Keyes, a broker of New York, is vice president of 

the company. 401. 
Has not made an examination to ascertain whether estimate of 

cost was properly arrived at, because the accounting system 

was incomplete when he arrived at the plant. 403. 
In connection with the Bristol Fighter has only the total 

amount of labor and of material and what that amounts 

to and not the actual cost. 405. 
The Government has paid the Curtiss Co. to date on account of 

the Bristol Fighter, approximately a million dollars. 408. 
There is also probably a million and a half of unvouchered in- 
voices that will represent Bristol material. 408. 
Asked to get a record of the amount of estimated cost of work 

on the Bristol Fighter. 409. 
Bristol program unsatisfactory from the start to finish. 410. 
Order would come to build a certain number of planes which 

would immediately be followed bv orders to discontinue. 

410. 
Asked to produce cancellation order. 411. 
Order came from Mr. Landon. 412. 
Has not been asked yet, but will do so, to make a statement 

showing the amount which will be lost to the company by 

reason of this cancellation. 412. 
The principal loss to the company will be in holding up of pro- 
duction and loss in profit. 413. 
Loss to the company will be nothing in material and labor as 

that is all absorbed by the Government. 413. 
Have new contracts w T ith the Navy Department for $7,000,000. 

414. 
Amounts to be paid by the Government under each contract is 

on amount due for materials purchased and the actual labor. 

41(>. (The direct labor that goes into production.) 



232 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

William Ward Moss — Continued. 

Army and Navy accountants have agreed on an allowance of 
an arbitrary overhead, subject to adjustment. -116. (A cer- 
tain percentage of direct labor.) 

For January, February, March, and April, 200 per cent. 416. 

For May, 100 per cent 416. 

Have two overheads. An overhead that is confined to all the 
plants, and an overhead applying to particular plants. 417. 

Gives salaries. 418. 

In the agreement there is a provision that after $30,000,000 
worth of work has been completed at the North Elmwood 
plant an appraisement will be made of the property and the 
Government will allow the difference between its value then 
and its cost. 419. 

Volume of work at the plant has been about $5,000,000 a month 
recently. 419. 

Curtiss Co. has no experimental contract as distinguished from 
the contract for planes and engines, excepting the building 
known as the Liberty battler, which might be regarded as an 
experimental contract. 419. 

When the Curtiss Co. buys material that is to be used in any 
of the Government contracts on the cost-plus contract it is 
paid upon the delivery of the material to the plant and the 
checking up of the receiving slip and invoices. 421. 

Explains checking up of the receiving slips and the invoices. 422. 

Steel is bought in three different ways. 423. 

The Curtiss Co. in general bought its material and paid for it 
and then used it for the orders to which it was applicable. 
424. 

If the Curtiss Co. makes a general order for steel, they will be 
entitled to payment from the Government for the material 
when it is disbursed from the steel depot onto the production 
floor. 424. 

No billings have been made at the present time against the 
Government of any such materials. Now preparing a state- 
ment or claim against the Government from the issue slips. 424. 

States that the question of the course that is taken in connec- 
tion with the raw material, say, such as steel, is one of the 
biggest accounting problems now in the course of being 
solved. 425. 

States the nature of an agreement between the Army and the 
Navy and the Curtiss Co. which provided for materials that 
were purchased being kept in consolidated stores. 426. 

In the final accounting the requisition slip will determine what 
has been used and whatever has not been used of these pur- 
chases and the company will then have to account to the Gov- 
ernment for their material, or for whatever difference there 
is. 439. 

But if the whole amount is requisitioned then there is no ac- 
counting back by the company. 439. 

Company must still further account for it in production. 440. 

Accounts for it by issue slips. 440. 

Has had some labor thrown out on account of overwork after 
stop-production orders had been issued. 465. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 233 

William Ward Moss — Continued. 

Produces paper giving cancellation order for the Bristol ma- 
chine. Marked " Moss Exhibit 3, July 31, 1918." 481. (With 
letters and telegrams following.) 

Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation and Curtiss Aeroplane 
Co. are two companies of which a consolidation was effected 
on January 1, 1918. 491. 

The Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation held the sto^k of 
the Curtiss Aeroplane Co., and the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor 
Corporation was the operating company. 492. 

The company set up a total reserve for taxes of $538,646.97. 496. 

Haskins & Sells set up $1,700,000, approximately. 496. 

Haskins & Sells report under date of March 30, 1918, for the 
vear ending December 31, 1917, was marked " Moss Exhibit 
8, July 31, 1918." 500. 

Haskins & Sells report under date of July 18, 1918, for the 
three months ending March 31, 1918, was marked " Moss Ex- 
hibit 9, July 31, 1918." 501. 

Company's own financial statement was marked "Moss Exhibit 
11, July 31, 1918." 501. 

Company's last balance sheet produced by Mr. Moss under date 
of June 30, 1918, was marked "Moss Exhibit 12, July 31, 
1918." 501. 

Bogey cost of Bristol Fighter originally $6,750. Its cost is 
$6,000, and the profit is $750, with a provision as to slight in- 
crease in profit if they saved on the bogey. 507. 

Memorandum of conference held in the office of Maj. Brown, 
subject to a call by Col. Deeds to consider ways and means of 
consolidating the handling of raw stores (other than lum- 
ber). 507-511. "Moss Exhibit No. 13, July 31, 1918." 

Agreement arrived at by the Navy and War Departments at 
Buffalo cancel above agreement. 512-519. " Moss Exhibit 
No. 14, July 3, 1918." 

Paper sent by Mr. Kepperly with respect to the instructions 
sent in the agreement by the Navy and War Departments. 
521. 

Further correspondence relating to these agreements. 524—531. 

Understood that there were production orders issued, and that 
the requisitions were based on those production orders. 532. 

It took three ledgers, under the old plan, in order to balance 
one account. 535. 

None of the ledgers would balance. 537. 
W. W. Moss (August 1, 1918; Book 15). 

Produces contract, No. 2814, under date of January 19. 1918, 
relating to advances made by the War and Navy Departments 
on account of the current contracts. 540-544. Marked " Moss 
Exhibit 19, August 1, 1918." 

Also produces statement showing the disposition of Govern- 
ment advances, continuing up to April 4, 1918. 544. Marked 
" Moss Exhibit 20, August 1, 1918." 

Mortgage, securing the advance to the Curtiss Aeroplane & 
Motor Corporation was marked " Exhibit 21. Aug. 1, 1918." 
545. 



234 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

W. W. Moss— Continued. 

Reads into record letter addressed to Col. Thompson as president 
of the War Credits Board, under date of March 4, 1918, a 
similar letter being sent at the same time to the Secretary of 
War and the Secretary of the Navy. Marked " Moss Exhibit 
22, 1918." 545-551. 

In this letter of March 4, 1918, it states that " no physical inven- 
tory of stock has been taken since May, 1917." 552. 

As no inventory was taken which would enable Haskins & Sells 
to make out their statement for the year ending December 31, 

1917, they made up their statement by the book records. 552! 
On December 31, 1917, the funded debt of the company was a 

total of $7,441,000. 552. 

Inventory of March 31 by Coates & Bertrand, of Chicago, com- 
pared favorably with what was shown on the books, being 
within a few hundred thousand dollars. 555. 

Haskins & Sells's statement of March 31, 1918, on their general 
balance sheet, shows a cost of sales as $10,012,218.96, being the 
amount of outlays in January, February, and March. 555. 

Mr. Moss produces statement entitled " Number of machines 
shipped during the year 1917." "Number of machines shipped 
during the year 1918 to July 1," and on the second sheet — 
" Motor production during the year 1917 and motor production 
during the year 1918 to July 1." These were marked " Moss 
Exhibit 23, Aug. 1, 1918." 556. 

The JN-4A was a primary training plane for the Army. 557. 

Some of the JN-4 planes were for the British Government. 557. 

Out of the total of approximately 4,100 planes that have been 
shipped from January 1, 1917, to July 1, 1918, about 600 were 
for the Navy. 563. 

Two hundred and forty-eight were on a cost-plus basis. 563. 

Out of approximately 484 shipped in the first six months of 

1918, that would leave about 240 shipped in 1918 for the Navy 
or for the British Government upon a flat price basis. 563. 

Six hundred and forty-three planes were called for by the Navy 

on a cost-plus basis of the H. S. type. 564. 
Delivered 1 in January, 11 in March, 29 in April, 77 in May r 

and 135 in June. Up to July 31 a total of 344 shipped, so the 

difference will be 97. 564. 
The fact that they are up to Navy requirements in the deliveries 

is due to a substantial performance of their contract. 565. 
So that, so far as the Navy planes are concerned, which have been 

made in the North Eiwood plant on a cost-plus basis, they 

have been substantially up to contract. 565. 
Submits substance of the H. S. contract 33192 which is marked 

" Moss Exhibit 23, August 1, 1918." 565. 
According to the contract there is a provision that the Navy 

Department is to pay the Curtiss Co. a fixed profit of $1,625 

for each H. S.-l flying boat. 566. 
And further, that the estimated cost of the H. S.-l flying boat, 

f. o. b. contractor's works, crated for overseas shipment, etc., 

is $13,000. 566. 
From indications it would seem that there will be considerable 

saving under the bogy cost of $13,000. 567. 



ABSTKACT OF AIKCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 235 

W. W. Moss — Continued. 

Probably will exceed $2,000. 568. 

None of these planes have been returned and have not been ad- 
vised that any were defective. 568. 
Two-thirds of the North Elwood plant was active during the 

first six months of 1918 in the attempted production of the 

Bristol Fighter. 571. 
The failure of the company in performance of its contract has 

been in connection with the Bristol Fighter. 573. 
Have not got their cost accounting system in relation to the 

H. S.-l, the Navy plane, in good shape yet. 574. 
Makes statement as of July 31 of moneys received from the 

Navy Department which shows that they are behind in their 

accounting and that they have done a great deal better in 

production than they have in accounting for the product. 575. 
This is read into the record and marked " Moss Exhibit 25, 

August 1, 1918." 576. 
Explains method of keeping track of the labor that was done 

under this cost-plus work. 579 to 582-583. 
Produces sheet showing the amount rejected for the Navy from 

February 2 down to May 25, and for the Army from March 

16 to May 25. 583. 
Navy rejections seem to have been about three times as much 

for the period covered by the Navy report as to the Army 

during the period covered by the Army report. 583. 
Thinks the explanation is that there was possible twice or three 

times as much work done for the Navy than for the Army. 

583. 
Both the Army and the Navy had a complete staff of account- 
ants. 584. 
When these rejections are reported they check them up and the 

Navy accountants on further examination and proof change 

their rejections. 585. 
Clear, detailed statement of what happens in the checking up of 

time and labor. 586-589. 
Factory records contain an account known as No. 98, into 

which all discrepancies or undetermined labor are entered, 

pending further check-up. 589. 
Plant G, if the North Elmwood plant. 591. 
Produces some working papers, cumulative as to production, i. e., 

special orders charged against the Army and Navy, which 

covers from January 5 to June 15. 591. 
This statement shows the total pay roll for this period to have 

been $3,775,155.49. 592. 
This covers the entire labor cost in Plant G, the North Elmwood 

plant, for that period, with the exception of the "Treas- 
urers' roll." 592. 
This outline of the method of distribution of overhead expense 

by the Curtiss Aero & Motor Corporation produced by Mr. 

Moss is marked "Moss Exhibit No. 28, August 1, 1918." 595. 
Produces paper which was marked "Moss Exhibit 29, August 

1, 1918," being "memorandum in re method of paying for 

lumber furnished bv the Government, under date of January 

8,1918." 603. 



236 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

W. W. Moss — Continued. 

Produces paper of the releases of the Bristol. 604. 

This is read and marked "Moss Exhibit 30, August 1, 1918." 
604. 

The other release produced by Mr. Moss was marked "Moss 
Exhibit 31, August 1, 1918." ' 606. 

Produces copy of a letter of May 4 to the Navy Department, 
in connection with consolidated stores. This is read and 
marked " Moss Exhibit 32, August 1, 1918." 607. 

Produces statement showing the number of employees. This is 
just the Buffalo plants and does not include the Hammonds- 
port plant. Is read and marked "Moss Exhibit 33, August 
1, 1918." 610. (This is under date of July 31, 1918.) 

This is after a considerable reduction of the force. 610. 

Produces paper which shows the amount of purchases for orders 
for the Bristol, down to July 20, carrying forward everything 
from the very beginning, October 31, 1917. 611. 

Calls attention to the fact that this is a purchasing-department 
record and not an accounting record. 613. 

This record from the purchasing department will be subject 
to inaccuracies which ma} T be ascertained on audit. 614. 

This record is marked " Moss Exhibit 34, August 1, 1918." 614. 

Another exhibit is added showing material transferred to the 
Bristol's use from the material that had been purchased gen- 
erally by the Curtiss Co. and not speciallv for the Bristol. 614. 
" Moss Exhibit No. 35, August 1, 1918." 

The amount shown in Exhibit 35 should be added to the amount 
in Exhibit 34, which covers the entire material that has gone 
into the Bristol or has been bought for the Bristol down to 
July 20. 616. 

Adding a month and a half's additional labor and overhead, 
from June 15 down to the time of the cancellation of the 
order for the Bristol, would add half a million dollars more. 
619. 

In round figures the entire cost of the Bristol operations from 
January 1, 1918, to the cancellation of the order, would be 
approximately $3,000,000, less what would be salvaged on 
disposition of material. 620. 

Produces contract for Spad machines, marked "Moss Exhibit 
36, August 1, 1918." 621. 

Produces Bristol contract which is marked " Moss Exhibit 37, 
August 1, 1918." 622. 

The first contract was canceled upon execution of the Bristol 
contract. 622. 

Contents of the Bristol contract on page — . 622. 
A letter showing that the iss^e slips were the basis of credit 
for material was introduced in evidence and marked "Moss 
Exhibit 38, August 1, 1918." 624. 
Produces copy of the contract allowing for special depreciation 
in connection with the North Elmwood plant at the comple- 
tion of the contract. Marked "Moss Exhibit 30, August 
1,1918." 625. 
The contract — pages 626 to 631, inclusive. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 237 

W. W. Moss — Continued. 

Produces extract from an agreement, dated September 19, rela- 
tive to certain machinery that was purchased by the Govern- 
ment and is now owned by the Government and used by the 
company. 632. Marked " Moss Exhibit No. 40, August 1> 
1918." 

Under the contract the Government furnished something over 
$1,000,000 worth. _ 635. 

To this already estimated cost of the Bristol fighter from the 
beginning to the cancellation would have to be added an 
undetermined item for special tools and outlay for machinery > 
and also whatever would be added to it under the head of 
depreciation in connection with the North Elmwood plant. 
637. 

The outlay of over $1,000,000 for machinery for the Bristol 
would be largely recouped by the ability to use this machinery 
in connection with other orders. 638. 
Robert Daily (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y.> 
August 1, 1918; Book 15). 

General factory accountant. 655. 

The factory accountant under him, Frank A. Tooley (mentioned 
by Mr. Hughes on page 649), resigned through dissatisfac- 
tion. 656. 

Mr. Tooley had the accounting of the plant subdivided into a 
good many divisions, had a man in charge of those divisions 
who reported immediately to him, such as the head time- 
keeper and the storekeeper and bookkeeper and pay-roll de- 
partment, etc. 656-657. 

Mr. Tooley had charge of all the labor cards and all the workmen 
at this plant. 657. 

Quit because he did not feel that the effort "to come across " 
was worth while. 658. 

Curtiss Co. has paid men for six weeks' work without having 
had that work distributed to particular orders or contracts. 
659. 

It is not distributed and filed or compiled in such a way that 
they can invoice the Army or the Navy for the amount for 
which they ought to reimburse them. 659. 

Produces part of account known as No. 98 showing discrep- 
ancies between the labor on the attendance-card basis and the 
labor on the master-card basis. 660. 

Produces part of it as of the period up to Julv 15 showing a 
debitof $436,022. 660. 

According to this account, taking the debit items down to May 1 
to correspond to the different credit items to May 1, it shows 
$48,131 which had been expended by the Curtiss Co. for labor 
in the North Elmwood plant from January 1 to May 1 for 
which they had not been able to make a claim against the Gov- 
ernment under any contract. 663. 

Exclusive of the Treasurer's pay roll, the amount in total ex- 
pended by the Curtiss Co. at the North Elmwood plant for 
labor from Januarv 1 to May 1, 1918, Avas approximately 
$2,300,000. 665. 



238 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Eobert Daily — Continued. 

This was all charged to Government work with the exception 
of $48,131. 665. 

It might, of course, been charged to the Government on a flat- 
price contract, but that would only be on the basis of the 
master card, showing the work done on the flat-price con- 
tract. 665. 

Produces attendance card. 667. 

Outlines the meaning of this card. 668. 

So according to this system the}^ charged the total amount for 
which the employee was paid against something, unless there 
was some lapse in their accounting, which would explain this 
discrepancy for the four months of $48,000. 669-670. 

States they paid the employees entirely upon the attendance- 
card basis. 670. 

The way in which they were working during this time and 
•the way in which the work was distributed was shown on the 
various master cards. 670-671. 

Asked how he got the average of $25 a Aveek for employees. 
671. 

This would mean that from January 1 to May 1, 1918, the full 
time of 9 hours a day or 50 hours a week has been charged to 
some kind of work for all the 5,000 people with the exception 
of the 120. 672. 

States that no man could get out without a special pass. 672. 

There is a fixed pass book, so that if a man is excused prior to 
the regular quitting time it is supposed to be impossible for 
him to get by a guard without this pass. 673. 

Reports of Secret Service agents and by some of the people 
caused them to be acquainted with the fact that men were 
going out without a pass. 674. 

Dispatcher distributed the work on these master cards. 675. 

Around 70, some departments having more than 1. 675. 

Relied upon the appearance of the workman for a new job in 
distributing the hours of labor among different orders. 675. 

The dispatcher had nothing to show in order to establish that 
the workman had worked all the time that was charged to a 
particular order upon that card. 676. 

Reporting for a new job was voluntary on the part of the work- 
man. 676. 

Have an idleness account in the overhead account in the factory 
ledger. 677. 

" Idle time," " idle power," light, waiting for orders, etc. 678. 

Six idle accounts down to May 31 aggregate $31,450. 681. 

This is included in the overhead expense. 682. 

The $48,000, however, is entirely apart from this idle time and 
is an amount for which they can not account. 683. 

The attendance card goes to the pay-roll department ; then it is 
taken to the tabulating-machine department, holes punched 
in the card and compared with pay roll, and if it does not 
agree with the roll they compare each day's work. If the 
master card does not agree with that, it goes back on the job 
and they have to find out what happened. If they can not 
find out what happened it goes in " 98 " (which shows the 
balance of $48,000 down to May 31) . 686. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 239 

•Stuart L. Mujlholland ( Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., Aug. 1, 1918 ; Book 15) . 

In charge of the general factory accounts of the Curtiss Co. 

plant at North Elmwood. 689. 
Started with the company on March 30. 689. 
In charge of labor and material distribution and expense ac- 
counts. 689. 
Total pay roll is distributed by accounts and by departments. 

690. > 
Was with Mr. Tooley in the record division before coming into 

the factory accounting department. 690. 
This division kept a record of all employees and passes issued 

and a record of their applications, and all elates pertaining to 

the emploj^ees. 690. 
Was never complete half the time he was over there. 690. 
There was confusion in any respect you wanted to look at it. 690. 
A lot of the records were lost. Great many instances where it 

was impossible to trace a record of an employee. 692. 
Found that sometimes possibly 200 or 300 men would be without 

passes. 692. 
Did not believe that once a man was in he could get out without 

being observed. 693. 
'Could not state that the men who were shown to be in attendance 

by the attendance card were always in the factory. 693. 
This would come under the jurisdiction of the pay-roll depart- 
ment. 693. 
Pound that at the end of March there had been no distribution 

of labor among the various contracts with the Government 

from the 1st of January. 694. 
That was a part of his duties when he went in there in April to 

see that it was distributed. 694. 
The machines automatically ascertain the money spent by the 

Army or Navy. 696. 
When he took charge the cards showing the distribution had 

already been filled out. 696. 
Tells how the Labor Department distributed the time on these 

cards. 696. 
The timekeeper put the information on the card which told 

whether he had worked on that particular order or not. 697. 
The timekeeper gets his information as to what a man has done 

from the foreman in the particular department. 698. 
When on March 30 he entered this department to place this 

amount on the books he did not have all the cards from the 

distribution on the sheets. 698. 
Found that possibly 75 per cent of them were wrong. 699. 
Tf after comparing the sheet with card it did not balance, an 

instance which he states never occurred, it was thrown into 

undistributed labor, or account 98. 701. 
Inaccurate workmen in posting the cards to the sheets. 702. 
Explains wherein the system was inadequate. 702. 
Tnaccurate work caused material to be charged to the Army 

when it should have been charged to the Navv, and vice versa. 

703. 
The issue slip is the Government's basis of charge. 706. 
130687—19 — -16 



240 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Stuart L. Mulholland — Continued. 

With reference to the disappearance of records. 708. 

The ledger lost and found. 708. 

Cabinet or closet where a lot of issue slips were kept. These dis- 
appeared, and slips later found down in front of the station- 
ery stores. Does not know whether they were all there or not. 
708. 

Believed a little friction between the Army and the Curtiss peo- 
ple was the reason for Mr. Tooley leaving. 711. 

Had not been given enough authority to run his department 
properly, etc., and new system being put in which would not 
work reasons why Mr. Tooley left. 711. 

This system put in by Mr. Hilton, assistant to Mr. Moss, and Mr. 
Mulholland himself says it is impossible to work. 712. 

Knows of an item of $2,600 made up and in the cashier's office in 
one month, in envelopes for which no men called for. 713. 

This would indicate that the timekeeping was very irregular, be- 
cause the men were not working. 713-714. 

If this could happen, and they had attendance cards, this ap- 
parently was a case where the time was made up. 714. 

And if this were so, in cases where the men did not go up to 
claim the money, it might be so in cases where the men did go 
up and get the money. 714. 

Acknowledged that this put the whole time system under a very 
serious discredit, 714. 

The cashier went through the journal voucher and took that 
amount of money into his funds and had it credited where it 
had been previously charged. 715. 

Did not know whether that month was singular in that respect 
or whether they handled it in some other way in some other 
months. 715. 
William F. Darget (Curtiss Airplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 1, 1918; Book 15). 

Assistant general foreman in the sheet-metal department. 717. 

Had around 550 to 625 people prior to the stopping of work on 
the Bristol. 717. 

Too many shop changes held up production on the Bristol. 718. 
(Changes in blue prints.) 

Mistakes in blue prints. 719. 

Prior to the 1st of May, when they were not in full production 
there was a good deal of loafing. 720. 

Sometimes would have from 5 to 20 men in the department idle 
for six or seven hours in the day. 720-721. 

Then would come another spurt and another stop. 721. 

During February and March, when there was so much loafing, 
there were about 350 to 400 men in his division, one-third of • 
them loafing. 723. 

All this time was charged. 724. 

Has always been a difference in the timekeeping between the 
timekeeper and the pay-roll office. 724. 
C. H. Anderson (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo T 
N. Y., August 1, 1918; Book 15). 

Assistant timekeeper in direct charge of the time in the sheet- 
metal division. 726. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 241 

C. H. Anderson — Continued. 

Execute the chief timekeeper's orders entirely. 726. 

Explains how he keeps the time and how he checks it up with 

the men and how he distributes it. 726-728. 
States that he had many conversations with Mr. Tooley. He is 

a practical man and wanted to install a practical system, but 

the men above him would not allow it. 730. 
Frank J. Donovan (North Elmwood Plant, Buffalo, N. Y., August 
1, 1918; Book 15). 

Employed in the sheet-metal department. 733. 
All his work has been on the Bristol Fighter and the H. S. 733. 
When he first started to work in the tubes, the plant was un- 
completed. But after they got under way stuff was not really 

coming in fast enough to keep them busy. 734. 
But they were asked to come back and work overtime from time 

to time, and then did nothing. 734. 
This took place in the wintertime. Saw hundreds of girls come 

in in the morning, have their time cards O. K'd and then 

turn around and go home. 734. 
Six or eight furnaces burning all day long and nothing in them. 

734. 
Would get pay for a full day's work on the O. K. of the head of 

the department. 735. 
Had the attendance cards at this time. 735. 
Furnaces in his department burning day after day for six or 

eight weeks without being used. 737. 
Conditions of idleness all the time. 740. 
Seemed like half of the men could have done the work and done 

it easily. 740. 
Looked as if the company wanted to spend a lot of money, which 

on a cost-plus basis would do them a lot of good. 740. 
If this would not be so under the percentage given the company 

for saving under the bogy cost, there was something wrong 

otherwise. 741. 
Has stayed all Saturday and worked Saturday afternoons and 

it was considered overtime, and they were asked to come on 

Sunday, and simply sat at the bench and had absolutely noth- 
ing to do. 746. 
Paid time and a half for this coming back on Sunday. 746. 
Came back six or seven Sundays this way. 747. 
Gives names of other men whose time they can get to show this 

overtime. 748. 
When there is an O. K. on one of these cards it is O. K'd for 

the full time and no questions asked. 752. 
Knew of instance where one man's card was O. K'd for a week. 

752. 
The foreman evidently had an order from some one higher up 

in asking the men to come back to work at night and then 

having nothing for them to do. 754. 
Can not explain the possible motive for this when the increase 

in cost reduced the profit of the contractor. 755. 



242 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Frank J. Donovan — Continued. 

Looked to the men like the Government had amassed a lot of 
money and wanted to get rid of it, and they were in to get 
some of it. 756. 
Daniel W. Shull (Buffalo, N. Y., August 1. 1918 ; Book 16) . 

Engaged in sheet metal department of Curtiss plant. 1. 

Has been there since May 16. 1. 

Was in same department at Niagara plant previous to that 
date. 1. 

Observed a great deal of idleness in plant. 2. 

Was not the same condition at the Niagara plant. 4. 
Edward Robert Fable (Buffalo, N. Y., August 1, 1918 ; Book 16) . 

Chief yeoman in the Navy. 6. 

Was assigned to plant April 1, 1918, for the purpose of investi- 
gating labor. 6. 

Was looking after master cards to see that labor was properly 
entered thereon. 10. 

At the present time the Curtiss inspection is a joke. The men lie 
around, and this can be proven at any time, reading news- 
papers. 11. 

Hours were from 1 to 7, and he caught men going off at 5.30 and 6 
o'clock. 12. 

Have caught men punching other people's cards and their own 
cards. 12. 

Went into metal division and found a girl sitting back in the 
corner with a bcok down in front of her writing love letters. 
The girls sit back there and do not have enough to do. 14. 

Has noticed slack work all through the plant. 16. 

Things have improved around the plant wonderfully, but far 
from perfect yet. 23. 

Has seen many men come back to the plant on Sunday just to be 
able to charge extra time. 25. 

In the propeller division, the glue room, oftentimes that place has 
been shut down ; that division, say, two or three hours, or maybe 
four hours, and then in the evening a rush order comes through 
and they gets 25 or 30 propellers down there, and then they 
start in to glue those propellers up after quitting time. In 
other words, they work nine hours and then they come on and 
work until 8 or 9 o'clock at night and get time and a half for. 
26. 

Asked by Judge Hughes for his opinion as to the reason for these 
conditions that have existed, the witness stated, " I think it is a 
business proposition of getting all you can get while the getting 
is good. I believe it is a question of spending $5 to make 50 
cents for the organization." 30. 
Fred L. Dibble (Buffalo, N. Y., August 1, 1918; Book 16). 

Came to the Curtiss Co. in November or December. 31. 

Been on duty in the dispatching department, the duty of which is 
to see that work is properly passed along. 31. 

Waste of material in metal division due to poor management, in- 
competent help, and things of that sort. 32. 

Would do a bungling job without waiting for tools. 33. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 24 3 

Fred L. Dibble — Continued. 

Material would have to be scrapped for high-cost production, as 
Mr. Hendricks put it. He is superintendent of the metal divi- 
sion. 33. 

Thought allied inspection department Inspector Christiansen was 
pro-German. 35. 

Christiansen rejected 800 perfect metal parts out of a total of 
1,000. 36. 

Kefers to 27 truckloads of metal parts which were scrapped. 37. 

Lots of men brought back to work on Sundays when they had 
nothing to do. 38. 

Could not see any good reason for working on Sundays for what 
they accomplished. 40. 

Paid time and a half for all Sunday work. 41. 

There was plenty of idle time all the time in all the departments. 
41. 
Chester A. Harris (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, North 
Elmwood Street plant, Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been employed in the Curtiss plant a year the latter part of 
August. 45. 

Had been on the regular police force for one month, then was 
made assistant chief, and then chief of the company's police. 
45. 

Two months ago organization was divided into three divisions 
and he was put in charge of the Churchill group. 46. 

For two months has not had any official connection with North 
Elmwood plant. 46. 

When he came out to the North Elmwood plant during the time 
he had supervision of that plant, he found a desire to put 
on a lot of help. Should show from the records that 150 or 
200 and even better were being hired a day. At one time 
counted 32 men in one group doing nothing at all with their 
foreman entertaining them. 46-47. 

Did not know why it was they were not working because he 
became accustomed to it — batches of 10, 15, or 20 all the time. 
48. 

Condition had continued since opening of plant. 48. 

Had men come before them who were accused of making mis- 
takes in their work and found that instead of being* carpen- 
ters, assemblers, or mechanics, they had been barbers or bar- 
tenders, or something like that. 50. 

Churchill Street group seemed to be working pretty well al- 
though the system was very ragged. 54. 

Asked as to what advantage he thought it would be to the com- 
pany to employ labor recklessly, witness replied, "Well, I 
have my own opinion. I do not exactly know how the Gov- 
ernment is going on the purchases from the Curtiss Co., but 
I understand it is on a cost-plus basis, and my own honest 
idea, and nobody will ever be able to change it, is that they 
wanted to put on as much as possible, to make it look as ex- 
pensive as possible to start with until they got a set figure, 
and then they would possibly start reducing afterwards, when 
they got a set figure from the Government." 54. 

Drew his conclusions from the bonus svstem. 55. 



244 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Chester A. Harris — Continued. 

Cites Murphy case where a man punched two time cards and 
drew his pay twice for same period. 57. 

Tells of cases where time cards were punched for men not on 
duty. 57-60. 

This looseness with respect to the time cards continued until he 
left. 61. 

Understands there was a time when timekeepers were beating 
the bonus system over at the Churchill plant. 62. 

Letter from young Polish fellow relative to bad conditions 
existing at Niagara plant with respect to turning out work. 
64. 

Saw plenty of evidence that men were working on other than 
airplane work, work for themselves and others, including the 
foremen. 73. 

Complained about them making toy propellers for clocks. 74. 

They made big fancy clock stands, cigar outfits, outagon shape 
Cleopatra jewelry boxes, and everything of that kind. Nearly 
lost his job over the clean-up. 74. 

Found a man with eight or nine passes on him. He would give 
them out to anybody for a dollar and they would come in 
and ring in in the morning and go home or go wherever they 
pleased. 88. 

" They (referring to the girls) would tell me what was going 
on. They would say, ' It is a crime the way the Government 
was having it put over on them.' She said, c They must be a 
lot of dead ones in Washington, not to see and know what is 
going on.' I would say, 'What is the matter now?' She 
would tell me and I would go down and look it over. I found 
then for myself it was so." 96. 

Did not take up with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Hendricks the em- 
ployment of the girls to drill holes in scrap because it was 
generally understood that was done to keep them busy, so 
that nobody would see they were idle. 98. 

Some of the girls were sent home and were paid while they were 
home, while other girls were kept at work drilling holes in 
scrap and were paid for that. 98. 

Man in charge of allied inspection department was a German 
by name of Keeppen. 100. 

Allied inspection department was a joke, as far as he could see. 
101. 

Only a year ago Mr. Guy Talbert, the assistant production man- 
ager, was a $30 a week stock chaser. 103. 

Made an investigation in regard to the salvage department. Saw 
a load of wood going out and asked driver to show his door 
pass. It said, " One load of scrap wood, 50 cents." Looked at 
load and found 1,000 feet of 2 by 4, from 8 to 10 feet long, and 
realized there was something wrong — looseness somewhere. 
104. 

Mr. Tanner had laborers go to his house for a day or a day and a 
half or two days cutting wood and working around the house, 
and these fellows got their shop time for that. 109. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 245 

Chester A. Harris — Continued. 

Judge Hughes asked witness if he had ever heard of anyone from 
the North Elmwood plant by reason of his opportunities as an 
employee drawing material and using it in any business of his 
own. Witness replied, " Yes ; they have been caught with all 
kinds of supplies, such as electrical supplies, bolts and nuts, 
and practically anything that could be carried out." 110. 

Found there was a fellow acting as salesman selling the salvage 
wood at a salary of $25 a week, and the only man he was selling 
the wood to was himself. 113. 

Mr. Backhoff and Mr. Guy, of Curtiss Co., run restaurant at 
plant. 115. 

The book of the dispatcher who dispatches the automobile service 
would show that Curtiss Co. automobiles had been used to the 
extent of over $400 for the personal use of Mr. Guy and Mr. 
Backhoff in their restaurant proposition. 116. 

Men working in restaurant carried on pay roll of plant. 117. 

The Erie Service Co., controlled by Mr. Sere Wheeler, who is 
sales manager of the Curtiss Airplane & Motor Corporation, 
does the majority of trucking around the plant. 118. 

Has been plenty of looseness in the garage. 118. 
Frederick Augustus Brooks (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corpora- 
tion, Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918 ; Book 16) . 

Has been connected with the Curtiss Co. since May, 1917. 120. 

Graduate of the engineering department of the University of Illi- 
nois and specialized in the aerodynamic courses that were given. 
120. 

Came to the plant direct from the university. 121. 

Was assigned to the designing department in connection with the 
engineering division. 121. 

Was in complete charge of all the technical analysis of the Spads. 
121. 

Made a complete analysis of the Bristol, 122. 

Then went to work on the Liberty Battler. 122. 

Liberty Battler was originally intended to be a redesigned Bris- 
tol. 122. 

Had considerable difficulty in various details of the Spad. Was 
a bad production proposition, but the tools were practically all 
made when they were ordered to stop it and the drawings were 
practically finished. 123. 

Effect of concellation was to make useless all that work. 123. 

Spad was intended to be used with the geared Hispano-Suiza 
motor. 124. 

It was not necessary that there should be a geared motor. 125. 

Thinks it would have been advisable to have put Spad into pro- 
duction. 125. 

There were no difficulties created by American methods of manu- 
facture which would have been obstacles to production of the 
Spad so far as he had observed. 128. 

Signal Corps drawings of the Bristol machine were not accurate. 
130. 

Thinks Bristol plane discarded unnecessarily by the Government. 
136. 

Made 2,600 drawings for the Spad in 30 days. 138. 



246 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION.. 

Frederick Augustus Brooks — Continued. 

Have been on the Bristol drawings for eight months. 138. 
Worked for a couple of months very hard on the Spad and got 

complete drawings, and they were canceled; worked on the 

Bristol for several months and made a great many changes and 

had many delays in consequence, and then that was canceled; 

have been working for several weeks on the Liberty Battler,. 

and that is now stopped. 142. 
Liberty Battler was so designed that the pilot could not see the 

ground when he landed, except through mica windows. 143. 

Wellington E. McGlue (Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). 

Ceased to be an employee of the Curtiss Co. on July 26, having 

enlisted in the Navy. 146. 
Had been employed by the Curtiss Co. since April 18, 1917. 146. 
Employed in the Austin Street plant. 146. 
Had charge of inspection of panel covering, doping, and painting 

for the Navv entirely. 147. 
Victor Martin O'Neill (Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). 
Was employed in the Curtiss plant from December 20, 1917, to 

July 1, 1918. 151. 
Resigned to take position with the Wire Wheel Corporation, of 

Milwaukee. 151. 
First came to work with the Curtiss Co. as stenographer to the 

employment manager. 151. 
Enumerates different positions he had with company, the last 

of which was night shipping clerk in the steel depot. 152. 
Changed the specification from 175 to 176, and signed Mr. Men- 
» no's name to it, and got the material out, calling for 2.000 

feet. 153. 
Had known in his time that these changes had been made, chang- 
ing these specifications for all classes of material. 156. 
There were something like 75 employees and 63 allied inspection 

department inspectors in charge of the same department.. 

That is pretty close to one inspector to every employee. 159. 
Usually were allowed to work Saturday night, because they 

received time and a half for it, but there was hardly 1 Sat- 
urday night out of 10 that they ever had enough work to 

keep them going for the whole 12 hours. 160. 
Could not see any use of being there on Saturday night, because 

nobody worked in the shop. 165. 
Ensign Merle C. Reed, United States Naw (Curtiss Aeroplane & 

Motor Corporation, Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). 
Enlisted in the Navy as a first-class yeoman on July 12, 1917, 

and received a commission as assistant paymaster on February 

8, 1918. 182. 
Was in cost-inspection office, in the shipbuilding work, from 

July 15, 1917, until February 12, 1918. 182. 
Was ordered to Curtiss plant on March 18 and has been at the 

North Elmwood plant ever since. 182. 
In charge of labor distribution. 183. 
This witness testifies to work on Navy orders and method of 

checking labor costs on naval contracts. 183,-278. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 247 

Nelson W. Marshall- (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Inspecting machine operations at plant of Curtiss Aeroplane & 
Motor Corporation. 278. 

Has been so employed at the North Elmwood plant since May 
30. 279. 

Previous to that was with the Signal Corps for two months, and 
before that was salesman for the firm of Pallen & Burns, lum- 
ber dealers. 279. 

Was employed at the Curtiss plant from November until March 
inspecting wood parts for the company. 280. 

Came to the North Elmwood Street plant as inspector for Signal 
Corps. About May 30 there was a change in inspection and 
he was dismissed. 282. 

Notice went out that the Government inspection of wood parts 
in the shop would not be continued any longer, and notice was 
given that they would be discharged that day. 286. 

Mr. Rohlfs is supposed to be a Government inspector, but where 
the inspection goes on witness does not know. 287. 
Phillip N. Nutt (Buffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been employed at North Elmwood plant by the company 
since February 15 as a write-up clerk, transfer clerk, and a 
rate clerk. 289. 

At present time is interviewing applicants for different positions 
in the factory. 290. 

Is in the employment department. 290. 

Has employed men when there was no requisition for employ- 
ment. 294. 

Has employed men when there was no particular place for them, 
because some one in the management has requested that they 
be taken on. 295. 

These are known as special requests. 295. 

Did not dare protest. If Mr. Backhoff would sign a request, 
there was not any protest to it. 297. 

Hired Mr. Gowey, an electrician, brought to him by a Mr. 
Tooley, head of the electrical department. Wrote his rate as 
50 cents, but was sent back to him with his application marked 
. * Special work, $50," and O. K'd by Mr. Moss. 298. 

It is a fact that incompetent men have been hired at plant. 300. 

Mr. Fouhy was in charge of employment in February, when the 
factory was without sufficient work to keep them busy and 
additional men were hired in large numbers. 304. 

Have been requests from politicians in Buffalo to have men 
placed in the plant. 310. 
Ensign Merle C. Peed (Buffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Judge Hughes asked witness the reason for this company in- 
creasing the cost of production unnecessarily, in view of the 
fact that they had a percentage of the saving that might be 
effected under the bogy cost, in accordance with the terms of 
their contract, and witness stated : " * * * I remember a 
conversation I had with Mr. Todd, who used to have charge of 
the pay-roll and time-keeping department, who has since left 
the company, and he told me and Mr. Bruno, who was there, I 
think, as an efficiency man up until March, who is now at the 



248 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Ensign Merle C. Reed — Continued. 

head of the Wright-Martin Co., and Mr. Bruno told him that 
a certain bunch of men in New York who had capital invested 
in this company here and who were desirous, as far as he knew, 
of increasing the costs under the cost-plus contract with a view 
of the Government withdrawing the cost-plus contract because 
of the high costs, and then they would submit fixed-price con- 
tracts on the basis of cost-plus costs." 316. 

Witness then testifies regarding naval contracts. 328-356. 
Rudolph Juergesen (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been working for the Curtiss Co. since about September 1 
or October 1. 356. 

Witness is 26 years old; was born Schleswig-Holstein, Ger- 
many; took out first papers April 4, 1917. 358-359. 

Is assistant general foreman of machine shop at North Elmwood 
plant. 358. 

Parents living in Germany, where he was born. 359. 

Has an elderly brother over there, but does not know whether or 
not he is in German Army. 359. 
Matthew F. O'Connell (Buffalo, N. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Chief yeoman, United States Naval Reserve. 365. 

Representing the Navy in the handling of salvaged materials. 
365. 

Mr. Sessions represents the Army in the handling of salvage. 
Get together and divide it to the best of their knowledge. 
366. 

Privates R. Wood and C. C. Sessions have charge of salvage for 
the Army. 369. 

Mr. Woods is being sent down to the Pierce Arrow plant, and 
Mr. Sessions has taken back salvage. 369. 

Every morning, at the time the Germans were making their 
great drive around April or May, any number of Germans 
collected out in the plant and discussed it and cheered over 
it. 371. 

Witness told Mr. Backoff that by the small expenditure of 
$1,850 they could make a profit on the handling of shavings 
of $13,987~ If they burn them, they will lose $1,800. If they 
sell them, they will make something like $20,000 if they install 
a separator costing $1,800. 376. 
Ernst Oleman (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Went to work in the Curtiss plant in February, 1917, on acety- 
lene welding. Is now foreman of the welding department at 
North Elmwood plant. 380. 

Born in Magdeburg, Germany, on October 14, 1888. 380. 

Came to this country in July, 1910. 380. 

Is not naturalized, but took out first papers on August 4, 1915. 
380, 381. 

Father and mother live in Magdeburg, Germany. 381. 

Has two brothers, one of whom is in the German Army. 381. 

Registered in the draft and did not claim exemption as an alien, 
but his superior made him chance it. 382. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 249 

Eknst Oleman — Continued. 

Claimed exemption on the ground that he was a subject of 
Germany. 383. 
John E. Cole (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been directly connected with the Government since April 
1 ; indirectly since July, when he was representing the firm of 
Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery at the Curtiss plant. 384. 

Was sent to Curtiss plant to assist in making an estimate of 
costs which they had submitted on the JN 4 training plane 
and on the OX 4 engine. 384. 

Remained there from latter part of July to September 21 in 
that capacity. 385. 

Established an approximate cost of $4,000 on the JN 4 machine. 
385. 

Made a verification of the cost which they had submitted in 
January, 1918, which approximated something like $3,300 or 
$3,500. 386. 

Returned to Buffalo about the 10th of October as an employee 
of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, to look after the pre- 
liminaries for the start of the Spad contract. 387. 

Continued in that relation to the 1st of April, when he was taken 
over by the Government. 387. 

Government has never paid the company a penny on the Spad 
contract. 389. 

They have attempted to submit claims, but they have never 
been able to get them in satisfactory shape. 389. 

All of the contracts given the company were blanket orders on 
which to construct experimental machines to test out draw- 
ings, but that was part of the total order. 389. 

Never got into production on the Spads ; never made any. 389. 

A great deal of time subsequently rejected on Army work and 
Government has not paid them for it yet. 397. 

His labor audit department was working under instructions to 
to satisfy themselves, from the master cards, according to 
the order numbers and part numbers, that the times sub- 
mitted were a reasonable claim for time expended. 399. 

Cancellation of the Spad contract caused the company a great 
deal of embarrassment. 401. 

The company was expected to keep a cost record showing the 
cost of production, which they never did. 404. 

Company has from five hundred thousand to a million dollars 
owing to them by reason of their inefficient accounting. 405. 

Were up against a proposition that the thing in the mind of 
the Government right along in connection with airplanes 
has been production. Their one thought has always been 
production, and they were not going to allow anyone to in- 
terfere with that production along the line of account. That 
thought was gotten into the company's head, through the 
different officials right down the line, that they wanted to get 
production out. Would go in there and tell them : " Here, 
we have got to have certain records, if you are going to get 
paid." Thev would come along and say we were interfering 
with them. * 408. 



250 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

John E. Cole — Continued. 

" The condition has been known to Washington, not only by my 
going down there, but by the representatives coming up here 
and getting out into the plant. 410. 

" Col. Montgomery and Col. Deeds was there representing the 
Signal Corps. 410. 

" Col. Deeds has a conference with the company later in Janu- 
ary, and he said, "We must make a demonstration here; we 
must get out 25 Bristols in February. You must get them out 
at any cost and regardless of system." 412. 

"The company proceeded to do what he asked them to do. 
They hired a gang of 40 stock chasers, irresponsible indi- 
viduals, and the plan was that they would give them a list 
of the parts they wanted. Those men would go out into a 
manufacturing establishment, and if they found anything 
with that kind of a number on it, they would grab it right off. 
The result was a number of these parts had to be put through 
production two or three times, and there was a lot of material 
which was brought to the plant through the front door with- 
out any record in the receiving department, and the company 
could not prove that the material was ever received. * * * " 
413. 

Judge Hughes. " I can not understand how the chief engineer 
of the company should be the consulting engineer of the Gov- 
ernment." 

Witness. "I can not either. Maj. Shepler can answer that 
question for you. It struck me as being an anomolous situa- 
tion at the time, but I did not criticize it." 417. 

Mr. H. C. Thomas is his chief representative in the plant. 
(This refers to the chief representative of the witness). 420. 

Started an audit of the company's stock ledgers on the 1st of 
April and found a very rotten condition, to use the language 
of the day. 425-426. 

Relied upon the integrity of the company until it was found 
they had fallen down. 427. 

Sales Department, Finance Division, Bureau of Aircraft Pro- 
duction, furnishes supplies to Curtiss Co. on fixed price con- 
tracts. 433. 

Total payments to date approximate a little less than $1,300,000 
on account of the Bristol, which includes about $30,000 worth 
of profit on the 25 Bristols completed. 436. 
George A. Thomas (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been connected with the Government work at the North 
Elmwood plant of the Curtiss Co. since about the 10th of De- 
cember under Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, and since 
the 1st of April under the Signal Corps. 437. 

Supervises the auditing of vendors' invoices covering the pur- 
chase of materials by the Curtiss Co. for use on the Bristol 
contract, also supervises the preparation of public vouchers 
that are certified to be sent to Washington for reimbursement 
to the Curtiss Co. 437. 

States method of approving vendors' invoices. 438. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 251 

George A. Thomas — Continued. 

Thinks 100 per cent of materials purchased directly for Bristol 
contract were approved by the Government in advance. 446. 

Curtiss Co. allowed $95,316.48 by the Government for special 
tools for the Bristol". 456. 

Total paid Curtiss Co. on Bristol contract to date $1,489,520.63. 
457. 

Bulk of overhead allowed has been estimated. 458. 

Difference of close to $600,000 between what has been paid and 

what they say the total material claimed will be. That is in 

process of adjustment and he can not say what will be allowed. 

463. 

Demerle E. Hart (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 

N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been employed by the Curtiss Co. for about three years. 
476. 

Has charge of the checking of figures on invoices. 476. 

Questioned as to a statement prepared by Mr. Moss, of Curtiss 
Co., but did not know much about it. 
Charles A. Klady (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16.) 

Chief of labor auditing division for Government at North Elm- 
wood plant of Curtiss Co. 481. 

Audits pay rolls. 481. 

Have only had six floor checkers for entire factory. 484. 

In making a floor check they also had to cover the Army as 
well as the Navy. 485. 

Connected with the Government at Curtiss plant since March 6. 
485. 

If the company made any inaccurate representations of work, 
when men had not worked, the Government bore the loss. 
495. 

Had heard that there was a great deal of idleness in the factory, 
and yet men were receiving on their time cards a full day's 
pay; they were getting paid for overtime and for Sunday 
time when they were actually not doing any work or needed 
to do any work. All those payments made by the company dur- 
ing that period to men who did not actually work was charged 
by the company on the distribution cards against the Army 
work or the Bristol work, and were paid for by the Govern- 
ment. 495, 496. 

No way now of making an audit to determine how much work 
was done. 496. 

Substantially, the Government was paying just as though every- 
body was working on Government orders. 498. 

They would or were paying overtime to a man coming in at 1 
o'clock, who would work from 1 o'clock on and put in nine 
hours, getting overtime, getting more than the man putting in 
the legitimate number of factory hours from 9.30 in the morn- 
ing. 500. 

The Government, down to March 16, at least, did not have any 
way of determining whether or not that work was done. 509. 

The actual overhead has not been determined and allocated, but 
it has been allowed simply on an arbitrary percentage of pro- 
ductive labor. 513. 



252 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Charles A. Kladf — Continued. 

Eejected 20 per cent under direct labor for week of May 4. 515. 
Stuart L. Mulhollaxd (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). 

Was recalled and produced a copy of the journal entry showing 
the amount of $2,692.65, overpayments in pay roll ; that is the 
amount not called for by employees and returned. Entry re- 
ferred to was marked "Mulholland Exhibit 2. August 5, 
1918." 525. 
Paul Lovas (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo. 
N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been emploved at the Curtiss plant at North Elmwood 
since June 18, 1918. 526. 

Puts up machinery and building fixtures. Making safety guards 
around machinery. 527. 

Thinks there are quite a few men employed at plant who are 
not necessary. 527. 
Henry D. Dargert (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation. Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 6. 1918; Book 16). 

Has been employed by the Curtiss Co. since a year ago last 
April, about 16 months. 533. 

Enumerates different positions he has held with company. 533. 

Came to Xorth Elmwood plant as assistant mechanical super- 
intendent. 534. 

The 1st of December he was changed to assistant general super- 
intendent of the assembly department. 534. 

Was there until they tried to build so many boats in one week, 
and they could not do it, and he was discharged, which was on 
February 18. 534. 

Was then made general foreman of the salvage department. 535. 

There has been a big force of men out there working since De- 
cember trying to produce Bristol machines. They make parts 
and they are obsoleted before the} T are used; they get them in 
the salvage division and try to make something good out of 
them, and if they can not they sell them. 539. 

So far as material that goes to the salvage department is con- 
cerned, if it is not reclaimed, if it is not sold, there is no way 
of finding out how much that material which is finally 
scrapped has cost the Government. 550. 

About 50 per cent of wood parts and 30 per cent of metal parts 
that go to the salvage department are finally scrapped. 551. 
Julius Hoffmax (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N". Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). 

Born in Germany; been in this country 34 years; naturalized 
through his father who ran away from the German Army 
and came to this country about six months before he and his 
mother came over. 559. 

Lived in Buffalo practically all his life. 559. 

Been employed in the Curtiss plant for four years. 560. 

Organized the engineering department at North Elmwood plant. 
560. 

Asked to resign by Mr. Mueller on Saturday. 560. 

Told him Government had insisted upon his resignation due to 
his German name. 562. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 253 

Julius Hoffman — Continued. 

Had charge under Mr. Mueller of the work of designing the 
Bristol plane. 563. 

No reason given to him why Bristol was discarded. 564. 

Makes statement as to the difficulties encountered in producing 
the Bristol. 565. 

Introduces diary of the different changes and recommendations, 
etc., which was marked " Hoffman Exhibit 1, August 6, 1918." 
569. Diary of information received and changes recom- 
mended marked " Hoffman Exhibit 2, August 6, 1918." 570. 

A release for production first goes to the record division and 
from there to 51 departments. 581. 
Matthew F. O'Connel (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). 

Produces certain rejection reports taken for the week of July 
13, 1918. 589. 

Explains rejections due to faulty inspection. 590. 

Wood is not properly kiln dried before sending it to the manu- 
facturer and when worked it will shrink and be rejected. 593. 

Does not know why Government inspectors have not stopped it. 
It is up to the production department. 593. 

For week ending July 20 there were 1,962 logs rejected. 595. 

Steel stampings sold at $22 a net ton as salvage when it costs 3 
or 4 cents a pound. 597. 

Twenty-eight thousand and ten pounds of steel stampings sold 
in February at $16 a net ton. 599. 

Report of scrap disposed of or sold, with proceeds realized, 
covering period from February 1 to June 30, marked " O'Con- 
nel Exhibit No. 2." 600. 

Folder containing inventory of scrap from March 1 to June 30, 
marked " O'Connell Exhibit 3 August 6, 1918." 600. 

Found 2,000 parts sent to scrap which were actually all right. 
602. 

Forty-nine thousand seven hundred part No. 70430 rejected and 
scrapped on July 20; 6,000 repected same date of part No. 
71420; 1,000 rejected same date of part No. 104402, they being 
obsolete. 613. 

Scrapped means being sold for what you can get for it. 615. 

Reads other reports of material rejected and scrapped. 615. 
Ensign Mason I. Hawkins (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corpora- 
tion, Buffalo, N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16.) 

Testifies as to work on Navy contracts. 617-625. 
Chaeles A. Klady (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Au- 
gust 6, 1918 ; Book 16. 

Produces letter relative to overtime, signed by a Mr. Kepperley, 
which is inserted in record. 625. 

Quoting from a letter under date of March 14, 1918, addressed by 
Lieut. Underwood to Lieut. Berger, relative to overtime, 
" * * * this department alone, through either lack of sys- 
tem, or for some other cause, lost $4,680 in a single week." 
635. 

Recapitulation of labor charges to the account of Bristol con- 
tract No. 2463, from January 5 to July 20, marked " Klady 
Exhibit 12, August 6, 1918." 664. 



254 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Charles A. Klady — Continued. 

Have received distribution cards reading $90 which should be 
for 40 cents. Have also received duplicate distribution cards 
for the same master card. 678. 

Paid man according to the master card and charged the Govern- 
ment according to the distribution card. 680. 
Dale M. Sparks (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). 

Has been in the Army four months. 682. 

Before entering the Armv was a public accountant in Boston. 
682. 

Came to the North Elmwood plant of the Curtiss Co. on April 
12, 1918, two weeks after he entered the Army. 682. 

Has charge of the distribution of overhead. 683. 

Total pay rolls for May of North Elmwood plant were $1,- 
031,000. 685. 

The total productive labor being $50,000, there ought not to be 
as much as $18,000 for overtime on Curtiss work. 690. 
Henky D. Dargert (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). 

" We have had about eight plant engineers in the past year since 
we have been on this job." 703. 

" The Allied Inspection Department have not had a chance in 
this plant." 709. 

Thinks nine-tenths of the wood parts went into the kindling pile. 
714. 

The production superintendent is not an engineer, or even a 
mechanic or shop superintendent. 718. 
John E. Cole (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). 

Explains svstem of cost accounting established bv the Curtiss 
Co. 720] 

Mr. C. M. Keys, of New York, had a great deal to do with the 
financial history of Curtiss Co. 722. 

Mr. Keys opened negotiations with Mr. John M. Willys, and 
sold the control of the companv to the Willvs-Overland Co. 
726. 

Judge Hlghes. "Was there any inherent reason why, if you 
had had the cooperation of the Government officials in Wash- 
ington, you should not have been able to install a proper cost 
system here during those months of February and March, 
when there was relatively small production." 735. 

Mr. Frary was interfering with the carrying out of instructions 
which would have given the Government a better cost control. 
741. 

At the present time the Government is only making an inspec- 
tion of not more than 30 per cent of the material that goes into 
production. 751. 

Curtiss Co. not in a position at present time to make any claim 
in excess of what is actually due them. 753. 

Curtiss Co. have got a great deal of money coming to them they 
will never get, because they can not prove they are entitled 
to it. 755. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 255 

John E. Cole (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). 

Has a partial record of the audit which has proceeded since 
May, as to the extent of the overproduction. 762. 
Edward Atterby (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). 

Born in London, England, but is citizen of United States. 763. 

Been employed at North Elmwood plant of Curtiss Co. since 
March 4. 

Is investigator for Mr. Cawthra, assistant to Mr. Mueller. 764. 

Has been investigating the manufacturing end. 764. 

Does not know how it happens the engineering department is 
investigating the manufacturing part of the business. 764. 
Edward Atterby (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). 

Is a practical metal man. Has had experience in metal business 
ever since he was 14 years old. 765. 

Has made report on conditions in plant. 765. 

Called attention of Mr. Cawthra to the very large quantities of 
perfectly usable new bolts and washers ; millwright stock dis- 
posed of for no logical reason except to get rid of them. 773. 
Charles C. Sessions (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). 

Entered the Army February 2. 777. 

Prior occupation was a mechanical engineer. 777. 

Came to North Elmwood plant February 4, 1918. 778. 

First assigned as assistant property officer, having charge of 
segregating and listing the Government machinery, the ma- 
chinery that had been paid for by the Government. 779. 

While he was taking care of this machinery he was given charge 
of salvage. 779. 

Material goes to scrap that does not go to the salvage room. 782. 

Salvage department has no head on the Army side; it is run 
entirely by the Curtiss Co. 784. 

Entirely up to the Curtiss Co. to determine what is usable. 786. 

Since about six months ago the Government has had no way of 
telling whether any material in the salvage room was proper 
for other uses, or, at least, has not attempted to determine 
whether it is usable. 787. 

Government has not any check at all on material sent to scrap. 
801. 
Ernest H. Cawthra (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). 

Been in the Curtiss plant since April 15. 1. 

Came to the North Elmwood plant last October, when it was in 
the course of construction. 1. 

Assistant to the chief engineer, Mr. Mueller. 1. 

KneAv Mr. Mueller since the day they came to the Curtiss Co., 
about 20 months ago. 2. 

Has been Mr. Mueller's assistant on the production side. 2. 

Says he asked Mr. Atterbury to make investigations, as com- 
plaints had been coming from the factory to his office that the 
engineering department drawings did not accurately show 
the information, etc. 3. 
130687—19 17 



256 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Ernest H. Cawthra — Continued. 

This report marked " Cawthra Exhibit No. 1, August 7, 1918." 3. 
Other reports of Mr. Atterburv marked " Cawthra Exhibit No- 
3, August 7, 1918." 6. 

Orders for production went out from his department. 8. 

Mr. Mueller desired to concentrate on the Bristol. 13. 

Mr. Mueller, as chief, and Mr. Hoffman, as assistant, attended to 
the engineering work on the Bristol. 14. 

Particularly confined himself to production matters. 16. 
Ensign Hawkins (Book 17). 

Produces blue prints asked for. 19. 

Is shown wood part, No. 64760. and asked how it came to be 
found at the scrap platform. 19. 

Thinks these parts came direct from the mill and never went to 
salvage. 22. 

Accounting men on the platform are not expert in airplane parts. 
Would not know whether parts were good or bad. 23. 

All Army work is rejected by Curtiss, although Government has 
a man that goes in the salvage every day and makes the final 
disposition of the woodwork in there. 26. 

By the practice followed in this plant, at any time a careless or 
wrong-meaning foreman or any of his subordinates good ma- 
terial might be picked up and sent direct to the scrap plat- 
form. 26. 

Explains the running system. 29. 

Agrees as to overproduction. 29. 

If an order for 500 parts resulted in 1,500 instead and an order 

for 1,000 parts resulted in 2,500 parts, there was nothing to 

prevent the foreman from sending these extra parts to the 

scrap pile and scrap them. 31. 

Ensign Merle C. Reed (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7. 1918,; Book 17). 

Asked concerning the wood part. No. 64.760. 33. 

Bears No. 51 as the number of the inspector. 33. 

This inspector or number has been looked and there is no inspec- 
tor No. 51. 33. 

This marked " Hawkins Exhibit No. 1. August 7, 1918." S3. 

Later finds the name of the " 51 " man. His number is 59175 
and his name H. Cittel. Has been discharged. 34. 

Produces letter asked for before from Mr. Sanderson to Mr. 
Moss. 36. (Regarding labor). 

If distribution cards are checked with the master cards, would 
still have no knowledge as to whether the O. K. by the fore- 
man is right or not. 39. 

Letter as to treasurer's pay roll marked " Reed Exhibit 12. 
August 7, 1918." 40 ; 

Correspondence following marked. 40-41. 
Ensign John Sanderson (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co.. Buffalo. 
N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). 

In charge of accounts for the Navy at Curtiss plant at North 
Elmwood, under Paymaster Smith. 42. 

Paymaster Smith has jurisdiction of all the cost-plus contract- 
for the Navy on aircraft work. 42. 

Understood that the plant was 75 per cent ahead of the schedule 
on boats at this time. 43. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 257 

Ensign John Sanderson — Continued. 

Has made payments for overhead on an arbitrary basis up to 
April 27 ; basis of 200 per cent on direct labor. 45. 

April 28 to May 24 on basis of 100 per cent. 45. 

Theoretical allowance of material on the basis of the amounts 
supposed to be required for a part, with a factor of waste. 40. 

Down to 1st of July requisitions have not been in such shape 
th*at they could determine the amount of material issued. 47. 

Most of the material that goes into the H. S.-l boat is bought on 
requisitions which are approved within three days from the 
time they are submitted by the company, which is then re- 
ceived at the plant, etc., and the Government pays for it. 50, 

Overproduction. 53. 

Undoubtedly material could be sent to the scrap pile without 
their knowledge that had been overproduced. 56. 

If a fabricated part is rejected the Government gets no credit, 
as contractor is supposed to use reasonable care. 60. 

Company always had an excuse ready, in that there were so 
many changes and material was rendered obsolete by the 
changes. 64. 

Has never observed any interest on the part of the Curtiss Co. 
in keeping the cost of the boats as low as possible. 68. 

Have an indirect check through the records on labor, but have 
never had a direct check. 72. 

Instructions from Washington are contained in a manual known 
as Cost-Pius Regulations — Manufacturing. 73. 

The Government had to assume that the test reports made were 
sufficient. 76. 

Produces statement showing payments made to the Curtiss Co. 
on contract 37826 for the H. S.-l. 84. 

Thinks the estimated cost may be figured at approximately 
$8,000. 86. 

This contract has the usual provision for a 25 per cent saving 
under the bogy. 86. 

Produces statement of the A. I. D. inspectors who turned re- 
jections pads over to the Curtiss employees so they could pass 
material without anv inspection at all. Marked " Sanderson 
Exhibit 2, August 7,^1918." 87. 

Produces memorandum regarding payments for direct labor. 
89. 

Produces memorandum regarding rejected parts. 90. 
Harry V. Kexxersox (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). 

Came to work at the Curtiss plant on May 29. 

Came immediately to the North Elmwoocl plant. 93. 

States what he has ascertained with respect to the cost-account- 
ing methods of the Curtiss Aeroplane Co. 93. 

After the Government had approved an invoice and checked the 
material as delivered according to invoice it was then paid 
for. 95. 

Produces a ledger called direct material, in which is entered all 
material which the Government purchases and pays for direct 
from the vendor or any material which would be invoiced to 
them by the Curtiss people. 100. 



258 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Harry V. Kennerson — Continued. 

Material rejected because of its being made obsolete would show 

on the ledger as a credit to the Army on the Army salvage 

account. 102. 
If material is rendered obsolete for any reason or scrapped, then 

all the Government gets out of it is*what may be made on its 

sale as scrap. 105. 
Capt. Alfred B. Eogers (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). 
Captain in the British Army. 106. 
Arrived on second visit on December 21, 1916; inspection 

duty on aircraft work. 106. 
Represents what is called the allied inspection department. 106. 
Been at the Curtiss plant at North Elmwood ever since it was 

built. 106. 
Discontinued allied inspection department inspection early in 

May. 107. 
Been looking after British contracts alone. Curtiss Co. was 



making the H-16 boats for them. 10 



c & 



Conditions of efficiency, very, very poor. 108. 

No one wanted any information. 108. 

True of high officers, every one. 108. 

Relates instances of this. * 108-109. 

This early in the production of this plant. 109. 

No one had any interest whatever in their work. 110. 

Thought large quantities of material that was spoiled or ren- 
dered obsolete could have been reclaimed. 110. 

Mr. Kepperley practically said he did not want any informa- 
tion carried from the plant to the United States Government 
officers, but to give all the information to his men. 114. 

He predicted the downfall of the Bristol from what he saw. 116. 

There was a difficulty in adapting the motor to the plane, but 
the attitude adopted toward it was entirely wrong. 118. 

Should have made two or three to start with and have these 
thoroughly tested. 118. 

First machine has never been properly tested to this day. 118. 

Atmosphere created the impression that it was not intended that 
the Bristol should be successful. 119. 

Thought those who represented more directh T the interests of the 
stockholders of the company were incompetent to form a 
judgment, and those upon whom they relied to run the pro- 
duction were not desirous that it should be a success. 

Pro-German influences in plant. 120. 

Capabilities of the H. S.-l boat very inferior to those of the 
Bristol, as the Bristol would be a far more important factor 
as being used by Gen. Pershing on the western front. 123. 

The same engineers in charge of the Bristol are not in charge of 
the S. E.-5. 125. 

Asked as to the changes in the Bristol. 129. 

Mr. Rogers understood there was no written authority for the 
changes in the Bristol. 130. 

Even if instituted by the Signal Corps, was the point ex- 
plained to these representatives that if they put these on they 
were doing wrong. 131. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 259 

Capt. Alfred B. Rogers — Continued. 

No one but an expert would know what the effect would be on 
the machine. 132. 

Mr. Mueller was heard to express the opinion in Detroit that " I 
am a German to the word ' go.' " 132. 

Pro-German statement of Mr. Weber, who was in general charge 
of production. 131. 

Relates effects of Mr. Weber's method of buying cheap ma- 
terial. 136. 

Asked why if the Engineers were charged with the knowledge of 
knowing whether it would fly or not, the Signal Corps were not 
charged with that knowledge. 110. 

Those controlling the situation at that time were ignorant, but 
not so Mr. Mueller, the chief engineer. 110. 

If he had the disagreeable duty of determining whether he was 
ignorant — Mr. Mueller — or whether he did what he did will- 
fully, he would say the latter and not hesitate. 111. 

Mr. Rogers stated that the Curtiss people might say they had 
actually taken the machine and flown it in the air, but he ad- 
vised Mr. Rohlfs, the pilot, to keep out of the machine. 111. 

Produces a letter addressed to Mr. Kepperley in which he informs 
Mr. Kepperley that work having been done on the Bristol 
without notifying the inspection department they Avould not 
take any further responsibility for the machine. 117. 

Louis H. Chuegay (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). 
Boi'ii at Budapest, Hungary. 118, 
Came to this country 1890; naturalized. 118. 
Came to work at the Curtiss plant, North Elmwood plant, on 

29th day of January, 1918. 118. 
After three weeks at the plant was given the salvage division. 

150. 
Explains the records kept in this division. 150-151. 
Keeps a stock ledger of every act, and also weekly reports. 152. 
Weekly report would si ow how much had come into the salvage 

department and how much had been reclaimed. 152. 
Asked to bring in the stock ledger. 153, 
Joseph F. Weller (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). 
Entered the Army as a civilian August 20, 1917. 151. 
Has been chief of the inspection for about the last two months. 

151. 
Speaks of the showing of 19,700 obsolete parts, and explains 

why there are so many of them. 151. 
With only 2,000 Bristols in contemplation and wdth only 800 

released to production how could there be 77,000 of certain 

clips made, 12 being needed for a machine ? 156. 
Thinks they were swamped with work in that department at 

that time and they overran on them. 156. 
Frequest practice, putting into production a good deal more 

than was ordered. Took four or five days for a notice to get 

to the proper people in the factory. 161. 
Chester A. Harris (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). 

Relates incident of a visit made on March 15 by representative 

of the Military Intelligence Department on a tour of inspection 

of the plants. 163. 



260 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Chester A. Harris — Continued. 

Mr. Sweeney asked him to show this man through, but not to 

show him any of the defects, as he was tired of giving them 

information. 163. 
Mr. Sweeney tells him to stay from the Government offices. 165. 
Mr. Sweeney will attend to all these cases now himself and take 

it up with Mr. Davies before it is turned in to the Government. 

165. 
Mr. Davies was supposed to be chief special agent for the Curtiss 

Co., with offices at Toledo, Ohio. 165. 
Mr. Davies tells Mr. Harris that there would be times when he 

would have to do things that did not look right, but that they 

would have to do them just the same. 168. 
Produces letter from Mr. Davies to Mr. Grow, relative to keep- 
ing track of Government men. 169. 
Charles J. Simeon (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). 

Has been with the Curtiss Co. since the 1st of November of last 

year. 179. 
Is asked to state to what extent the entire system of cost account- 
ing was defective, what suggestions he made to avoid these 

defects, and why they were not adopted. 181. 
States further with respect to this plan and to what extent it 

fell down. 185. 
When Mr. Webber was in charge, shop discipline was poor. 191. 
Could not state why Mr. Kepperly never found out Mr. Webber 

was not maintaining shop discipline. 192. 
Mr. Talbert knew nothing of the A B C of modern methods 

of production; was incompetent for the job. 195. 
Was put in general control at end of February, then made assit- 

ant production manager. 196. 
Herr and Swift, two competent men, leave. 196. 
Louis H. Churgay (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). 

Produces weekly reports showing how much had come into the 

salvage department and how much has been reclaimed. 209. 
Proceeds to explain this, so that it will be easier to understand 

the procedure. 209. 
Is asked to produce a statement of the salvage sales, scrap sales, 

etc., of material from the North Elmwood plant. 227. 
Thomas Marchall Febery (Buffalo, N. Y.. August 8, 1918; Book 

lT )- 

Was one of two men selected by the British Government at the 

request of the United States Government that they should 

send two men across who were experienced on the Bristol 

plane — intelligent men and men who had had experience in 

assembling, etc. 229. 
Trouble with the Bristol was that there were too many people 

trying to justify their positions. 230. 
Everybody made alterations — some by the Signal Corps and 

some by the Curtiss people. Everything changed down to the 

smallest bolt. 230. 
All these changes not necessitated by the use of the Liberty 

motor at all. 231. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 261 

Thomas Marchall Febery — Continued. 

Speaks of the changes made which had nothing to do with the 
use of the Liberty motor. 233. 

First machine, the parts came through in such shocking manner 
the machine would not go together. 238. 

Showed both factory deficiency and engineering deficiency. 239. 

Was not allowed to pass to the flying field. 240. 

States discussion with Mr. Mueller about the difficulties with 
the tail parts of the Bristol. 245. 

Heard Mueller say, " There are too many Government men 
hanging around this machine altogether. We must get them 
cleared out." 246. 

Also had trouble in getting passes into the factory. 246. 
Charles E. Fotthy (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). 

Been employment manager in charge of the plant one year and 
four months. 247. 

Been at the North Elmwood during the entire existence of the 
plant. 248. 

Knows at a given time how many men are employed, how many 
new employees are being taken on, and how many are being 
discharged or relieved for other reasons. 248. 

Alien enemies employed. 249. 

Mr. Kepperly made a ruling on May 24 that no German, Hun- 
garian, or Austrian or the allies of Germany should be em- 
ployed. 254. 

In papers which purport to deal with this subject, giving names 
of enemy aliens, the name of a German who has been advanced 
to a position of importance does not appear. 266. 

Letter of October 10, 1917, submitting "list of aliens that Mr. 
John D. Lynn, United States marshal, Buffalo, has granted 
permission to continue in our employ upon the personal assur- 
ance of our factory foreman and superintendent." 273. 

Submits further letters and data concerning enemy aliens. 
276-288. 

Asked how it happens that a man who has disclosed that he is a 
German and has served in the German Army could come into 
a plant of this description. 293. 

Said this man was listed in the marshal's office and got permit 
to work in a barred zone. 293. 

Was asked if, when a permit was granted by the United States 
marshal, the employer had not requested it, and some one 
representing the employer vouched for the man. 294. 

No roster of the enemy-alien employees that can be relied on. 
297. 

Asked about ruling of the Secretary of War that no enemy alien 
should be employed in an aircraft plant. 297. 

States did not hire any subject of Germany, although he had a 
permit from the United States marshal after around January. 
302. 

Can not answer how they came to employ Henry Victorin, born 
in Germany, on March 18. 303. 

His attention again called to the case of Oleman. 305. 



232 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Charles E. Fouhy — Continued. 

A letter is produced showing that the Curtiss people asked for 

permits for foreigners to work for them. 311. 
Robert B. Mason (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). 

In charge of the pay-roll department of this plant. 313. 

Was asked with regard to the making up of a list of enemy aliens 

employed at the plant. 313. 
Says he can get a list with Oleman's and Jergeson's names on 

it. 320. 
Is asked then to see if he can produce a list that is reliable. 321. 
W. A. Slaght (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, 
N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). 

Connected with the boat-hull department in last four or five 

weeks, and before that in charge of the salvage of the boat 

work. 322. 
Would write up requisition for new material for the stock cases. 

322. 
A. I. D. inspectors entered their results upon little pads. 323. 
States he never had any inspection pads turned over to him by 

the A. I. D. inspectors. 323. 
Kept about 20 on his desk and when he got to within about 

five or six of the bottom would call in an inspector and have 

them signed up. 324. 
Great system to prevent delay. 324. 
Which amounted to the same thing as if he did the rejecting. 

325. 
Not necessary to have the inspector around. 330. 
William Boyle his superior. 335. 
Maj. Edward S. Moore (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). 
Permanent home, Chicago, 111. 338. 
Entered Army as civilian on January 25, 1918. 338. 
Came to the North Elmwood plant in April, 1918. 339. 
Represented the Signal Corps generally in the Buffalo district. 

339. 
District manager of production. 340. 
Conditions chaotic when he got there. 340. 
After the order for the Spads was recalled they gave the Curtiss 

Co. the order for the Bristol plane with a Liberty motor on it 

in order to help them out. 340. 
Signal Corps and the Curtiss Co. did not get along very well 

together. 341. 
Trouble about inspection. 341. 
Production engineering department of the Signal Corps had been 

given authority over the first 250 ships. 342. 
Did not get a complete inspection of the first 25 planes. 342. 
The remaining 225 out of the 250 were never flown. 342. 
Mr. Kellogg, of Washington, was responsible for releasing the 

400 planes, along about April, when the machine was still in the 

experimental stage. 345. 
Changes by the Curtiss Co. were not gone over by the Signal 

Corps for some time. 351. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 263 

Maj. Edward S. Moore — Continued. 

Until May the Curtiss people made changes of their own. At a 
meeting between Mr. Kellogg, Col. Hall, and Mr. Mueller in 
Mr. Moore's office it was decided that Mr. Mueller should act 
in a way as engineer for the Signal Corps. 352. 

Mr. Moore was to O. K. changes suggested by Mr. Mueller unless 
he did riot agree with him. 353. 

Never agreed on anything. 354. 

Could not understand the reason for making 25, and then before 
completing them and seeing whether the machine was satisfac- 
tory putting a total of 400 into actual production. 357. 

According to overy expert he talked with, the real trouble with 
the Bristol was trying to put a 450-horsepcwer motor into a 
plane built for a 200 or 225 horsepower motor. 358. 

Compares trying to put a Cadillac engine into a Ford and then 
making the Ford strong enough to hold the Cadillac engine. 
Makes an unbalanced machine. 358. 

Organization not even 50 per cent perfect. Orders for changes 
would come through, then an order to cancel it would come 
along which would not reach some of the departments for three 
or four days afterwards. 359. 

Mr. Webber responsible for everything more than anvone else. 
360. 

Overproduction. 363. 

Asked why, when there was the direct fashion of handling it, by 
letting the United States Government take it up with the Cur- 
tiss Co. and stopping these practices, it was not done. 368. 

When Mr. Wilson was put in authority this was immediately 
stopped. 369. 

Idleness of the men at the plant. 370. 
Miss Agxes Kierxan (Buffalo, X. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). 

Employed in the record division of the Curtiss Co. since February 
25. 402. 

Asked with regard to list of enemv aliens employed in the plant. 
•402. 
William M. Saveeney (Buffalo, X. Y., August 8. 1918 ; Book 17) . 

Will have been with the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation 
two years in November, 1918. 406. 

Captain of fire and police departments at plant " Gr." 407. 

Up until two months ago was fire and police commissioner, which 
gave him charge of all the Curtiss plants. 407. 

Place given to Mr. E. S. Davies. 407. 

If enemy alien got through their lines, they endeavored to keep a 
watch en his activities. 411. 

He had to defer to Mr. Harrington in those matters, as he was Mr. 
Sweeney's immediate superior. 411. 

Made an attempt to get rid of Ernest Oleman. 417. 

Mr. Ericcson said both Oleman and Jergeson were valuable men. 
418. 

Asked to explain how and through what system enemy aliens 
were employed at the plant contrary to the Secretary of War's 
ruling to the opposite. 426. 

Attention called to the case of Henry Yiktorin. 428. 



264 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

William M. Sweeney— Continued. 

Full report of the Jergenson matter obtained and marked 
" Sweeney Exhibit 3, August 8, 1918." 437. 
Charles Eohlfs (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918 ; Book 17) . 

His resignation from the North Elmwood plant. 438. 

Will bring in copy of letter he wrote to Weller regarding this. 
441. B 

Capt. Joseph Weller (Buffalo, X. Y., August 8. 1918; Book 17). 

Said he asked for the resignation of Mr. Charles Eohlfs because 
he talked too much on the floor. 443. 

Price, of the Curtiss Co., suggested getting rid of him 445. 

Mr. Eohlfs recognized as an expert in wood; yes. 446. 

Too particular about small matters. 447. 

Took it up with Maj. Moore, and he approved of this action. 
447. 

As the Curtiss people had been letting out people who did not co- 
operate with the United States Government officers, the3 T , in 
turn, wanted to reciprocate, and would put out Mr. Rohlfs, as 
he was too arbitrary. 448. 

Is reconsidering the matter. 449. 
Edward S Moore (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). 

Yes; he instructed Capt. Weller to request Mr. Bohlfs's resig- 
nation. 450. 

Was very " sassy " to Mr. Wilson. 450. 

Mr. Price never asked them to get rid of Mr. Eohlfs. but said 
he was unsatisfactory. 452. 

To have a smooth-running organization it is necessary to get rid 
of one of the few men who has been defending the United 
States from the start. 454. 

Had not heard of an understanding that if they would get rid 
of Eohlfs the company would get rid of Boyle. 455. 
Commander Holdex Chester Eichardson (Buffalo, X. Y., August 
8,1918; Book 17). 

Eeported for duty at the North Elmwood plant about the 7th of 
May. 459. 

Took him about 10 days to get into run of things, and then he 
discovered some trouble which seemed to emanate from a 
tendencv to want to substitute materials for those specified. 
461. 
•■■ Trouble with the kilns the most serious of anything that hap- 
pened while he was there. 461. 

Mentions Mr. Webber as hunting trouble. 463. 

Observed no tendency to inflate costs, but where minor changes 
occur, as a rule their bills come in quite high for changes. 467. 
George Henry Mueller (Curtiss Airplane & Motor Corporation, 
Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

Chief engineer at the Curtiss plants. 470. 

Parents born in Germany. 471. 

Is asked to give the whole history of the Bristol in his own way 
and his relation to it. 474. 

Produces report of April 10 as a complete diary, showing the 
changes which were made. 475. 

Could not make any changes on the drawings without the ap- 
proval of some officer of the Signal Corps. 476. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 265 

George Henry Mueller — Continued. 

Mr, Perrin was the first representative at Buffalo. 476. 

Around the 1st of March, Col. Hall came with his staff. 477. 

Thinks no changes were made by the Curtiss Co. during the 
course of production without the approval of the Signal Corps, 
478. 

They attempted to build one machine exactly in accordance with 
the Signal Corps, drawings, but it was impossible to get the 
machine together from the parts made from the details of the 
Signal Corps drawings. 480. 

Had to make their own assembly drawing, or drawing of a com- 
plete plane, as distinguished from the detailed drawing. 481. 

Is asked to produce correspondence in regard to the deficiencies 
of the blue prints and in regard to the assembly drawing. 482. 

Explains from his point of view the inaccuracies in the drawings 
and the reasons for them. 485. 

English machine furnished by England was not made in accord- 
ance with the English drawings. 486. 

The shopmen always get awav from the drawings somewhere. 

,. 487. 

Every time he sent instruction to the shop also sent a copy to the 
Signal Corps. 493. 

Knew that the Bristol would never be a success flown with tht> 
Liberty motor. 506. 

Could not possibly carry so large a weight without structural 
changes. 506. 

Never received any stress analysis from the Signal Corps at all. 
506. 

Company was not in a financial position to dictate to the Signal 
Corps what they should do regarding building or not building 
the models which they sent them to build. 510. 

Discussed with the Curtiss people, from January to May, his be- 
lief that this job would not be a success. 511. 

Asked i'f effective cooperation did not lie in his bringing this 
to the attention of those who had had but little experience and 
who were engaged in an endeavor to supply successful planes. 
512. 

States that the authority given him to deal with the engineering 
questions concerning the Bristol was never confirmed." 531. 

Mr. Perrin was not in accord with the suggestion of making the 
Curtiss engineer the last word on decisions regarding the Bris- 
tol motor. 532. 

At a conference on January 27 they went through and examined 
the machine and made a great many changes. 535. 

Mr. Mueller initiated these changes. 535. 

States he lost authority by not having that authority confirmed. 
538. 

Asked if he went on in authority without a confirmation to a 
certain length of time, what that lack of a confirmation had to 
do with subsequent events. 542. 

States he had the growing opposition of the Signal Corps, but 
this did not appear so from the fact that Mr. Green and Mr. 
Butts were overruled and he was put in control by Maj. Shep- 
ley. 542. 



266 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

George Henry Mueller — Continued. 

The very object of the conference was to decide who should con- 
trol. 543. 

No one suggested to him that Maj. Shepley did not have the 
power to confer this authority on him. 544. 

No one came to him and told him that this authority had been 
withdrawn. 544. 

Asked why if vested with this authority he did not take it and 
use it to the utmost limit. 544. 

Asked Avhat changes would have made this a satisfactory battle 
plane 548-550. 

Asked if after the changes were made on the first 25 machines 
which were released the machine was not found to be prac- 
tically in the same condition. 560. 

The machine was practically as it was from a flying standpoint 
right at the start. 563. 

He says at the outset that it is necessary to establish a model 
which is satisfactory before starting into production. 577. 

Then why did they go into active production on the 400 ma- 
chines ordered when they had a machine in which its flying 
infirmities were still uncorrected. 578. 

It was satisfactory to the Signal Corps. 578. 

Made no complaint to the Signal Corps, did not advise them 
that the matter should be held up for a while. 578-579. 

Did not think they would have paid any attention. 579. 

Has tried to stop the production on the SE-5 and substitute the 
Spad, but this was not done. 579. 

Still further explains the situation with regard to the withhold- 
ing of too much comment by the Curtiss people on the Bristol 
machine. 581. 

States he could have taken the Bristol and in a month turned 
out a machine that would have carried the Liberty motor if 
they had given him permission. 585. 

Says it was the understanding in writing that the ' Government 
was designing the Bristol machine. 586. 

Says battle-plane program was absolutely in the hands of the 
Signal Corps designers. 586. 

Was asked if he had ever heard that the Signal Corps takes a 
different position and says that he was in charge of the de- 
sign of the Bristol. 586. 

Was absolutely no reason for ordering 400 additional machines 
when it was not a satisfactory flying machine from every 
standpoint. 588. 

Took up the designing of the Liberty battler the latter part of 
March. 591. 

This was built with the general idea of having it come right in 
after the Bristol should that prove a failure. 591. 

The Curtiss people made this suggestion to Col. Hall and they 
were allowed to go ahead and design and build four machines 
against the Liberty contract. 592. 

The one finished fell. 594. 

Is asked to produce whatever correspondence he has had with 
officers of the Signal Corps which will show the plans or 
drawings that lie had of the Bristol, etc. 607. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 267 

James Edgar Kepperley (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

Vice president and general manager of Curtiss Aeroplane and 
Motor Corporation. 608. 

Began practice of law in Indianapolis. 609. 

Gives his impressions of the plant when he arrived. 610. 

Thought Mr. Webber was just incompetent. 618. 

Mr. Mueller was enthusiastic, but was inclined to be of a jealous 
disposition and had too much engineering and too much de- 
signing going on. 620. 

Had just got started on the first 25 when along came numerous 
attachments to be fitted to the machine, photographic, wire- 
less, heating apparatus, etc. 620. 

It was just one continuous change down to the cancellation, 
620. 

Authority had already been given to Mr. Mueller when he came 
that his word was to be the final word on any changes. 622. 

Mr. Kepperley took steps to have this changed, but it took some 
time. 622. 

Maj. Hall is later sent and from that time on either Maj. Hall 
or some of his representatives were on the job all the time. 
623. 

Company pressed for authority to proceed on the machine in 
considerable numbers in order to hold the organization to- 
gether. 625. 

Had heard Mr. Mueller criticize the machine. 625. 

One of the complaints was that they were trying to make this 
machine do everything. 626. 

Thinks the Aircraft Bureau members lost confidence in the 
Bristol on account of the serious accidents they had. 627. 

Whole organization lost confidence in the Bristol ; the men would 
say there was no use in going to work, as they were going to 
change it, as So-and-so said the whole design was rotten. 630. 

Enemy aliens. 643-659. 

Everything seemed an interminable tangle that could not be 
unraveled. 668. 

They would say they had the record division all fixed ; he would 
come down the next morning, and the cards would be all mixed 
up. 670. 

Is shown the poster which it was stated he refused to have put 
on the walls. 672. 

States he only wanted one secret service on the plant. 672. 

Was asked if he noticed that his secret-service men that he de- 
pended on had not advised him of a great number of things 
about which he was learning for the first time; production iu 
excess of orders, and production of orders after the order has 
been canceled. 676. 

States he never made a request that the representatives of the 
Military Intelligence Service should be taken out of the plant. 
693. 
Severino Disandro (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

Came to the Curtiss plant the 17th of last February. 696. 

Was put in the boat hull department, construction of boats. 696. 

Saw lots of wrong work done. 697. 



268 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Severino Disandro — Continued. 

Would put the ribs in, then split the ribs and put glue on and 
sawdust. 698. 

Would cut the metal parts, then drill holes in them and fill them 
with lead. 700. 

Screws were put in so loose you could pull them out with your 
hands. Inspector did not see it, because he did not know 
enough. 703. 

Foreman comes along and takes off the red mark, which shows a 
piece is rejected, and lets it pass. 706. 
Stephen T. Lockwood (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

United States district attorney. 709. 

Was asked if after being told by a man named Quinn that Webb 
was boring holes in parts of airplanes he came to make an in- 
vestigation. 709. 

Took the matter up with Mr. Quinn of the Military Intelligence. 
710. 

Considered the holes were bored by accident and lack of skill, 
and did not present the matter to the grand jury. 717. 
James A. Quinn (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

Agent of the Military Police. 718. 

Describes visit of Mr. Lockwood and demonstration following, 
in which it developed the men had to bore two or three times 
in order to hit the hole in the plate underneath the wood. 720. 
Cyril R. Cobirn (Buffalo, N. Y.. August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

Further testimony regarding the longeron. 722-729. 
Charles E. Wilson (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- 
falo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). 

Came to the plant about middle of April. 730. 

Assistant to the general manager, Mr. Kepperley. 730. 

His own statement of condition of affairs as he found them and 
what has been done to remedy them. 732. 

Fifty per cent of Mr. Kepperley 's time spent in receiving letters 
of complaints and criticisms, being interviewed by Govern- 
ment officials, etc. 732. 

States peculiar position he found Mr. Kepperley in. 733. 

Calls up Mr. Willys on the telephone and explains conditions, 
stating that he must start to remedy the thing at its source. 
734. 

Makes statement of the methods which were from that time car- 
ried out to the present. 735-741. 
Louis Mendlesohn (Washington, D. C, August 14, 1918; Book 18). 

Has been no change in progress of production, but of shipment. 
Some wires that extend from the Avings down on the fuselage, 
close to the gasoline tank. They were secured by twisting 
wires together at joint and then covered with solder. How 
it was discovered he does not know, but they discovered that 
in case of a fire in the gasoline tank it would melt the solder 
upon the joint, loosening the wings and lead to a catastrophe. 
They now insist upon a splice of about 4 or 5 inches and a 
regular cable splice is made. 1. 

Judge Hughes requests that company furnish him with a list 
of all enemy aliens employed in plant of Fisher Body Cor- 
poration, showing what positions the}^ hold, etc. 7. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 269 

Budd D. Gray (Washington, D. C, August 14, 1918; Book 18). 

Was president of the Hess-Bright Manufacturing Co., of Phil- 
adelphia, until June, when he disposed of holdings in com- 
pany and went in the Government service. 8. 

At present time has no occupation. 8. 

First position with Government was chief of the inspection 
of raw materials, instruments, etc., in the equipment divi- 
sion of the Signal Corps. 

In fall of 1917 the specification section of the equipment divi- 
sion was turned over to him. 11. 

Left Signal Corps because of interference, taking his authority 
away, and disrupting his organization, making it impossible 
for him to get results. 14. 

Function of production engineering department was to supply 
manufacturers of planes, engines, and accessories with engi- 
neering information, drawings, specifications, etc., from 
which they could produce in quantity what they were to 
manufacture. Also to specify materials, to decide upon de- 
tails of designs, etc, 14. 

Mr. Kellogg put Col. Hall in complete charge of work on De 
Haviland 4's. 18. 

Mr. Kellogg took production engineering matters on his own 
shoulders and disposed of them in some instances without 
saying anything to him about them and in some instances 
directly in opposition to an agreement he had with him. 18. 

Found in March in some tests conducted in Lake Charles that 
the radiator which had been designed for the De Haviland 4 
was not large enough to cool the engine, and Mr. Kellogg, in 
spite of the developments there, placed an order for some- 
thing like 1,300 with the Livingston Radiator Co. of the 
original dimensions. 19. 

Got hold of Livingston Radiator Co. and had order changed. 
27. 

Did not have very satisfactorv cooperation on the part of the 
Day ton- Wright ^Co. 46. 

Their attitude, presumably occasioned by delay on the part of 
the various branches of the Government in furnishing them 
information, was rather antagonistic. 47. 

Did not agree with Mr. Kellogg's decision to place the De Havi- 
land 4 work in the Fisher Body plant and in the Standard 
plant, also under Col. Hall. 50. 

Impossible to keep in touch with Col. Hall's work and check 
him up. 51. 

Did not know Dayton- Wright Co. wanted drawing of gun. 61. 

Responsibility lay with the Government inspectors in permit- 
ting the delivery of trigger motors which were not satis- 
factory. 85. 

McCook Field organization, under Col. Vincent, responsible for 
faulty synchronizing generator. 85. 

One of the representatives of the Trench Warfare Section had 
no difficulty in securing those parts from the New Haven con- 
cern, made to the same drawings, which to his mind is a 
further indication of lack of cooperation or inability on the 
part of the Dayton-Wright Co. 88. 



270 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Budd D. Gray — Continued. 

Never knew there was any misunderstanding as to who was to 
furnish the Holt flare lamps, because it was thoroughly un- 
derstood the Signal Corps was to furnish them. 90. 

Radiator is generally considered a part of the plane and the 
propeller a part of the engine. 91. 

Questioned as to his relation to the production of the De Havi- 
lancl 4's by the Fisher Body Corporation. 92. 

Department had to secure drawings for this machine from the 
Dayton-Wright Co. 92. 

The Fisher Body Corporation followed the practice of laying 
out every part full sized on alluminum sheets, and they fol- 
lowed that practice in connection with the DH 4, and nat- 
urally it took some time to do that. 94. 

It was felt by those in charge of the equipment division that the 
Dayton-Wright Co.. with its facilities, was in a better posi- 
tion to make drawings of the DH 4 than any department 
of the Government. 94. 

Signal Corps did not at that time have what he would call an 
efficient engineering organization. 95. 

Neither Mr. Kettering nor Mr. Wright, whose names lent luster 
to the Day ton- Wright Co., could be actually depended on in 
this work of drawings in order to proceed with production. 
97. 

Col. Clark handled the engineering work on aeroplanes for Sig- 
nal Corps in schoolboy fashion. 98. 

Important work of getting drawings, in order that work of pro- 
duction might begin, was practically left to Mr. Schoonmaker, 
of the Dayton-Wright Co., and Col. Clark, who were without 
capacity for the work. 98. 

From March 1, 1918, only knew in a general way of the changes 
ordered in connection with the production of the De Haviland 
4's at the Standard Aircraft Co. 109. 

Government did net have any contract or any obligation what 
ever imposed upon the Dayton-Wright Co. to furnish draw 
ings of the DH 4 to other manufacturers. 111. 

Signal Corps officers, who were charged with this particular 
function, simply relied on the good nature and friendliness 
of the Dayton-Wright Co. to furnish drawings for the Stand- 
ard Co. and the Fisher Body Co. 112. 

Judge Hughes : "Manufacturer after manufacturer has charged 
the Signal Corps with failure to supply it with working draw- 
ings, with proper plans, with instructions which could be fol- 
lowed by a manufacturer in building." 118. 

Department did not succeed in giving the Dayton- Wright Co. 
the information they required to make the DH 4 a complete 
machine. 120. 

Dees not think Col. Clark particularly energetic about going 
after information. 121. 

Never knew that the Government was to supply the drawings. 
143. 

Relative to specifications for Liberty motor, talked with Col. 
Deeds about it and asked him how he felt about specifying 
those accessories. 149. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 271 

Budd D. Gray — Continued. 

It was a little bit delicate for Col. Deeds to specify the Delco 
ignition and a little bit delicate for him to specify the Hess- 
Bright bearings. 149. 

CoL Vincent recommended these particular makes of accessor- 
ies. 150. 

Witness questioned as to Borglum Exhibits 23-A, 23-B, and 
23-D. 154. 23-C. 159. 23-E. 162. 

Question relative to the Bristol under contract with the Curtiss 
Aeroplane & Motor Corporation. 164. 

Mr. Kellogg felt Hall had made such a good job of the DH 4 
that he would turn the Bristol over to him also, and that was 
done in the latter part of April. 166. 

Mr. Mueller, chief engineer of the Curtiss plant, was appointed 
by Maj. Sheppler, on instructions issued by Mr. Potter and 
in consultation with Col. Deeds and Mr. Coffin, to take care 
of the design and engineering work on the Bristol. 167. 

Maj. Sheppler told him he appointed Mr. Mueller on his own 
responsibility. . 170. 

Always a grave doubt in his mind as to the ability of some of 
the men at the top of the Curtiss organization. 175. 

Bristol was discarded because it failed to measure up to require- 
ments in speed, climbing ability and structurally. 177. 

The arrangement for the responsibility of making these changes 
was made with the Curtiss Co. when Col. Clark turned the 
Bristol (British) over with drawings to that company. 184. 

Mr. Perrin and Mr. Butts, of his department, approved the 
chang:s made by Mr. Mueller. 187. 

If there was any faulty work in connection with the redesign- 
ing then it was the work which was approved bv Mr. Perrin. 
187. 

The lack of balance was an error of judgment on the part of 
Mr. Mueller, who inaugurated it and on the part of Mr. Per- 
rin, who thought it was all right. 188. 

The Production Engineering Department specified the materials 
to be used in the various parts of the planes and engines. 189. 

Witness gives his reasons as to why airplane program was de- 
layed. "190. 

When cablegrams arrived from Gen. Pershing they were dis- 
tributed not with great intelligence, and they frequently 
landed in the hands of men who were not at all familiar with 
the subject matter, and apparently remained there, and ridicu- 
lous answers were sent back to the other side. 192. 
Lieut. Harold H. Emmons (Washington, D. C, August 14, 1918; 
Book 18). 

Lieutenant in the Navy, National Naval Volunteers. 193. 

Prior to entering the service was a lawyer for a good many 
years, and a manufacturer for four years. 193. 

Was secretary and treasurer of the Regal Automobile Co. 194. 

For two years made ammunition for the Allies. 194. 

Reported for duty with the Equipment Division, Signal Corps, 
on the 15th of August, a year ago. 194. 
130687—19 18 



272 . ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Harold H. Emmons — Continued. 

Came to Washington as attorney for H. M. & W. C. Leland, 
who were going to take a contract to make Liberty engines. 
195. 

Thinks Col. Waldon was responsible for asking for his detail to 
the Equipment Division, Signal Corps. 195. 

Was with Messrs. Leland when he was so detailed. 195. 

DeA r oted his time principally to the Liberty engine. 195. 

Terms of contract for Liberty had been established, to a large 
extent, before he entered the service. 196. 

States how the sum of $6,000 was selected as to bogey price for 
the Liberty motor. 197. 

Col. Montgomery was responsible for reducing the bogey price 
on the Liberty motor. 202. 

Thinks advances were made bv the Government to everyone ex- 
cept the Ford Motor Co. 201. 

Questioned as to Bor^him Exhibits 23-A, 23-B, 23-C, 23-D. 
23-E. 207. 

Hall-Scott engine vibrated so furiously that it disarranged the 
connections for the gasoline, water, and oil, and made it a 
very hard and unsatisfactory plane to use in the air (referring 
to standard J.) 213. 

Have something like 1,800 Hall -Scott engines in storage and in 
use. 211. 

Explains reasons for delay in the production of Liberty motor. 
215. 

From the time he came until now there have been 15,780 engines 
made and delivered. 219. 
Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington. D. C, August 15, 1918; 
Book 18). 

Accounts with respect to Wilbur Wright Field kept in his de- 
partment. 223. 

Has reason to believe that Government has paid Dayton Lumber 
& Engineering Co. for labor which was not earned. 227. 

Mr. J. K. Graniss, now in charge there, caught a padded payrool 
involving a large number of thousands of dollars. 228. 

Has information that Mr. Talbott is interested in the Day- 
ton Lumber & Engineering Co. 229. 

Found Mr. Graniss not very well liked,. which was a good rec- 
ommendation to him, because he is trying to protect the Gov- 
ernment and get at the bottom of things. 231. 

Changes were being made on planes at Wilbur Wright Field 
to suit the flyers and recommended through proper channels 
that the factory follow out their suggestions, and this has 
not been done. 231. 

Spirit that existed around Dayton was anything but productive 
of good results. 240. 

" My principal point was, Why should these ships be turned 
out by a manufa turer and be paid for by the Government as 
being acceptable and all right, and then be taken to a field, 
placed in their repair shops, and days spent making repairs 
that should be made in the factory before they en me out." 
214. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 273 

Lieut Ol F T ^steb Tombs — Continued. 

Paying double prices for labor, fabric, and dope on Canadian- 
Curtiss machines. 246. 

Witness questioned people at Dayton as to why they had aban- 
doned Wilbur Wright Field as a flying school. It struck him 
as being a very unwise and unbusinesslike proposition. 246. 

Condition at acceptance park at Springwells, Detroit, with ref- 
erence to work of Fisher Body people was very bad. 255. 

Lapere, two-seater, combat plane unanimously commended by 
officers as one of the best types brought out. 259. 

Dope used on DH 4 not satisfactory. 265. 

Found 50 or 60 cases where one would find a rejected tag right 
underneath an accepted tag. 267. 
Lieut. H. H. Emmons (Washington, D. C Aug. 15, 1918, Book 18). 

Gives epitome of his business experience. 290. 

Explains more fully his connection with the engine-production 
department; also how the bogey cost of Liberty motor was 
arrived at. 293. 

Relates difficulty in procuring signatures of manufacturers to 
contract, 298-299. 

Gives dates on which contracts for Liberty motors were signed 
(manufacture of). 304. 

Not a single engine contractor on list wanted to go into busi- 
ness of manufacturing Liberty motors. 307. 

"A Government production agency could not tell these men 
how to run their business; thev knew more about it than we 
did." 312. 

Man with rotary engine wins fight every time because the en- 
gine is small and compact, etc. 330. 

On October 12 received cablegram from other side not to build 
5,000 Gnome engines. 334. 

Mr. Wagner, of General Vehicle Co., felt the Union Switch & 
Signal Co. had not been treated fairly. 335. 

Under coercion the Westinghouse Co. took the job of building 
2,500 LeRhone engines. 343. 

Not manufacturing any four-cylinder engines now. 352. 

Orders out covering what has already been delivered, 3,500 of 
150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza, 4,000 of the 180 Hispano- 
Suiza, and 10,000 of the 300 Hispano-Suiza; and on the 150- 
horsepower Hispano-Suiza 2,494 have been delivered. 354. 

Took away from Duzenberry Motor Corporation their contract 
for Liberty 12s and gave them a contract for 2,000 Bugattis— 
500-horsepower engine, 355. 

" France is full of patriots of that type." " When some of the 
executives tell you about their negotiations for patent rights 
and for royalties on anything that we wanted from France 
you will get some idea of what they had to do and what they 
had to contend with in dealing with that country." 356. 
Can not tell why Hispano-Suiza has come into favor. 357. 
Does not know why Spacl contract was abandoned last fall and 
the S. E. 5, a similar type of machine, put into production. 
358. 



274 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. H. H. Emmons — Continued. 

Has no information why. contemporaneously with the develop- 
ing of the Liberty motor, production of the Hispano-Suizas 
for pursuit machines was not encouraged. 358. 

Contract with Trego Co. for Liberty motors assigned to Ord- 
nance Department; motors to be used in tanks. 358. 

Trego Co. could not build an aviation engine that could pass 
muster. 359. 

Questioned as to why contract was given Trego Co. 360. 

Contract with Nordyke-Marmon Co. for 3,000 Liberty motors 
was dated August 15. 1917. Has delivered 24 motors to date. 
363. 

Total program of 50,000 Liberty motors, of which 25.000 have 
been contracted for. 363-364. 

Chart showing aviation engine shipments to and including Au- 
gust 13, 1918, marked " Emmons Exhibit 4." 367. 

Four pages of details about experimental engines which have 
been made and delivered down to May 31, 1918. marked " Em- 
mons Exhibit 5." 368. 

Cablegram from Maj. Brett, of the Department of Military 
Aeronautics, states there are three quadrons on the front lines 
equipped with the De Haviland 4 planes and Liberty engine. 
Consider them the best equipped squadrons on front. 370. 

Does not know of airy great change they would make if they 
had to do it over again. 371. 
Edmund Leigh (Washington. D. C. August 15, 1918: Book 18). 

In charge of plant protection section of military intelligence. 
373. 

Held that position about a year. 373. 

Prior to that was general superintendent of police of the Balti- 
more & Ohio Kailroad for five years. Previous to that 19 
years in the detective bureau of New York City. 372. 

Mr. McCarren, his agent at Buffalo, at the Curtiss plant, left 
because of a concerted attack and obstruction to all his en- 
deavors bv the agent in charge in the Department of Justice. 
374. 

Col. Van Demon, then in charge of Military Intelligence, di- 
rected him to remove Agent Jalma West from Buffalo, as West 
could not get along with the Curtiss people, 376. 

Col. Horner has requested that this be done. 376. 

Mr. Kepperly stated he had paid Mr. Sowers, of the Niagara 
Defense League, a good deal of money and he had never 
seen as much as a scrap of paper to show for anything Mr. 
Sowers had done for these bills he paid. 380. 

Reports relative to conditions existing in Buffalo plant were 
forwarded to Mr. Ryan, Aircraft Production Board, and 
previous to his appointment to Col. Deeds. 383. 

To his knowledge nothing was done on reports submitted rela- 
tive to Curtiss plant, 384. 

Questioned as to various reports received and forwarded in re 
conditions at Curtiss plant. 385-397. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 275 

Edmund Leigh — Continued. 

Mr. Ford became very much perturbed when Government agents 
went through his plant of 38,000 employees and found that 
18,000 of them were foreign born and 1,100 of them were Ger- 
man and Austrian enemy aliens. 409. 
Lieut. Col. Arthur Woods (Washington, D. C, August 16, 1918; 
Book 18). 

Formerly police commissioner of New York City. 412. 

Entered Army early in March of 1918. 412. 

Assigned to Aviation Section, Signal Corps. For several 
months up until about three weeks ago, did most inspection 
work in the fields and special work as called upon from time 
to time. 412. 

Spent about a week at Curtiss plant looking into the matter of 
German interference. 414. 

Conclusion was that every single thing that pointed to sabotage 
could be explained more easily in some other way than at- 
tributing it to the Germans. 415. 

There was no system of identification of employees; not proper 
protection against fire; perfectly possible for ill-disposed 
people to do anything they wanted to do. 416. 

There were several enemy aliens in important positions, and 
the conduct of these people was about the kind that would 
be carried out by enemy aliens. 416. 

Looked to him as though either a strong and capable manage- 
ment should be put in the Curtiss plant or the Government 
should take the plant over. 422. 

Judge Hughes questioned him as to why this information he 
collected was not placed at his (Mr. Hughes's) disposal. 423. 
John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, August 16, 1918; Book 18). 

Is a constructing engineer and a stockholder in the Liberty Iron 
Works. 426. 

General manager of Liberty Iron Works for approximately six 
months. 426. 

Had a contract for 300 JN-4 planes. 427. 

Took him three months to get the contract, as Mr. Deeds and 
Mr. Waldon opposed very strongly the letting of a contract 
to anybody on the Pacific coast. Had to fight it down through 
Senators and Congressmen. 427. 

Aircraft Board had already selected all the manufacturers of 
airplanes who would be given contracts, and Mr. Deeds stated 
to him that he did not purpose to enlarge the list. 428. 

Senator Phelan was making an appeal for him. 429. 

Did not get drawings until long after expiration of contract. 
434. 

Mr. B. W. Guv, secretary of the Curtiss Co., demanded $75,000 
■: for plans of JN-4. 436. 

Extract of minutes of Aircraft Board under date of January 31, 
1918 : " * * * three contracts for training planes had been 
placed on the Pacific coast solely upon the strong recommenda- 
tion of Senator Phelan and Representative Kalm, all three- 
having failed in their deliveries^" 438. 



276 ABSTEACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 

John A. Jordan — Continued. 

Deliveries delayed on planes due to disruption of the organiza- 
tion of Liberty Iron Works, and contract cut to 100 planes. 
446. 
More or less trouble with planes delivered. 446. 
Government sent his company a sample machine from which 

they were to check their machine. Sent them a JN 4-A when 

they were manufacturing a JN 4-D. 451. 
Capt. Patterson, the chief inspector, did not know anything in 

connection with an airplane. 453. 
The organization of the Liberty Iron Works was contingent 

upon getting this contract. 457. 
Planes were not produced because they could not get these small 

metal parts. 463. 
Thinks if he had paid the $75,000 everything would have been 

smooth sailing with the Liberty Iron Works. 464. 
Factory had been using parts in planes there that ought not to 

have gone in. 469. 
All of the planes from the Liberty Iron Works were overhauled 

at Mather Field and found defective, after they had passed 

inspection. 477. 
United States Aircraft Corporation was a joke. 479. 
Mr. HoAvell, the original chief inspector out there, was a heavy 

jtockholder in the Vogelsang concern, which made bolts and 

things of that kind. 481. 
Lieut. Col. Virgin ius Evans Clark (Washington, D. C, August 16, 

1918; Book 18). 
Has been in the Army since October, 1909. 488. 
A graduate of the Naval Academy. 488. 
Was transferred from the Navy to the Army 1909. 489. 
Six flyers in the LTnited States Army when he entered the Avia- 
tion Corps in 1913. 490. 
Learned to fly at North Island, San Diego, Calif., in 1914-1915. 

491. 
Took a course in aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology in the fall of 1914. 493. 
Met Alexander Klemin very soon after he went to Technology. 

493. 
Klemin enlisted as a private in the Army when he ceased to be 

an instructor in Boston Technology. 496. 
Is now a lieutenant, and is located at McCook Field, Davton, 

Ohio. 496. 
Army did not have any combat planes prior to our entering the 

war in April, 1917. 499. 
Army had, all told, about 300 planes when we entered the war, 

and these were either training or scouting planes. 500. 
Upon our entry into the war he was in charge of design of air- 
planes. Worked on design for a single-seater for the His- 

pano-Suiza until June, 1917, when he went to Europe with 

Maj. Boiling's commission. 500. 
Mr. Boiling had been a corporation lawyer, prior to that time, 

for the United States Steel Corporation. 502. 
Navy had not more than 40 planes when we entered the war. 

50*2. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 277 

Lieut. Col. Vibginitjs Evans Clark — Continued. 

Army had between 75 and 100 flyers and the Navy probably 35 
or 40 flyers in April, 1917. 503. 

Thinks they could logically have expected to expand even more 
rapidly than that, even though there had been no war. 504. 

Gives outline of duties performed by Boiling Commission in 
Europe. 506. 

Made recommendations, as a result of experiences abroad, at 
conferences with Col. Deeds, Col. Waldon, Col. Montgomery, 
Maj. Vincent, Maj. Horner, and Capt. Marmon and himself 
in attendance. 510. 

Thinks report made by Maj. Boiling to Gen. Squier under date 
of August 15, 1917, very accurate. 512. 

Gives outline of recommendations he made with regard to air- 
craft program. 513. 

De Haviland 9 was far better suited for bombing than the De 
Haviland 4. 514. 

Canceling orders for De Haviland 9 was done against his recom- 
mendation. 515. 

Does not consider that the abandonment of the De Haviland 9 
for the De Haviland 4 in any way a dereliction on the part of 
the authorities. 517. 

Thinks De Haviland 4 is better adapted to use as a bomber than 
a combat plane. 524. 

The Bristol was the machine known as the fighter on the British 
front. 527. 

Not so sure it is a wise policy to order so many machines when 
the development has not even been started with any particular 
factory. 529. 

Nothing about the De Haviland 9 which would make the adapta- 
tion of the Liberty engine more difficult than for the De Havi- 
land 4. 531. 

Was at McCook Field in fall of 1917 until January of 1918. 
531. 

Tried to get sample of De Haviland 9 over to McCook Field to 
work on it, but Col. Deeds's orders were to leave it at Wright 
factory. 532. 

Laid out a machine which was later called the U. 8. D-9. 533. 

Thought the machine was loaded too heavy per square foot- 
533. 

While in Italy arranged to have Mr. Caproni send over one of 
his triplanes, also a biplane, and those two machines arrived 
in September or October and were sent to Langley Field, but 
there was no attention paid to them. 534. 

Triplane was crashed in January of this year. 535. The only 
one we had in this country. 535. 

The Caproni biplane is now being put into production, and a tri- 
plane is what was wanted. 535. 

The triplane will carry about 3,500 pounds of bombs, with six 
hours' fuel, which is six times as much as the biplane will 
carry with the same fuel. 536. 

Does not consider Caproni biplane satisfactory machine to put 
into production. 539. 



278 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Virgin ius Evans Clark — Continued. 

Thinks it a fatal error to order two types of machines to accom- 
plish the same function. 540. 

Saw cable that arrived yesterday stating that no DH 4s had 
yet arrived at the front. 544. 

Reason DH 4's have not reacheel the front is because they are 
rebuilding* them to some extent on other side. 545. 

Did not have enough draftsmen to complete designs of the Bris- 
tol. 560. 

Thinks you could get away with 2,000 or 2,200 drawings for a 
Bristol fighter. 561. 

Reads extracts from diary of Mr. Perrin relative to work of 
Curtiss Co. on Bristol machine. 565-602. (20 pages in book 
skipped in numbering.) 

Against his urgent wishes the Bristol was taken out of the ex- 
perimental stage and put into the production stage. 606. 

Recommended the Spad for fighting. 611. 

Col. Deeds told him that he got a cablegram from Gen. Pershing 
recommending that no single seaters be built in this country. 
612. 

Paragraph from cablegram received from Gen. Pershing rela- 
tive to above. 614. 

Recommended production of Martinsyde, but British Mission 
did not favor it. Now planning to build them. 616. 

For the past six or seven months has been commanding officer 
of a concentration camp in Morrison, Va. 625. 

They go into production regardless of the approval or disap- 
proval of the technical section. 634. 

Alexander Klemin is as well qualified from a theoretical and 
mathematical standpoint as any man in the country as an 
engineer with aeronautical experience. 638. 

Col. Deeds went on his note for $1,000 at a Dayton bank. 641. 
Capt. Elmer J. Clarke (Washington, D. C, August 16, 1918; 
Book 18). 

Entered the Government service last September, and was com- 
missioned in January. 644. 

Prior to that was connected with the Portland Motor Car Co. y 
Portland, Oreg. 614. 

Was asked to get into the Army by Maj. Tourney. 644. 

Was told to get together an organization and office for the in- 
spection of lumber in the Northwest. 615. 

Recalled from that duty and assigned to Buffalo, relieving* 
Capt. Ferguson. 647. 

Noticed Curtiss Co. was getting the largest quantity of lumber 
of anv company in the East. 648. 

Noted that there were men at the Curtiss plant far in excess of 
requirements. 650. 

Was relieved from duty at Buffalo by Maj. Moore. 652. 

Put in new department at Washington called Plants and Fac- 
tories, 655. 
Edmlnd Leigh (Washington, D. C., August 19, 1918: Book 18). 

Produces letter addressed to him bv Col. Horner under date of 
April 6, 1918, relating to fire protection, which was marked 
"' Leigh Exhibit No. 17," August 19, 1918. 659. 









ABSTKACT OF AIKCEAFT INVESTIGATION. 279 

Edmund Leigh — Continued. 

Produces forwarding paper from agent in charge at Buffalo 

carrying with it certain statements of facts of work alleged 

to have been done upon a previous recommendation, which 

was marked "Leigh Exhibit No. 18," August 19, 1918. 659. 

Lieut. Col. Lester Jones (Washington, D. C, August 19, 1918; 

Book 18). 

Total paid by Government on account of Wilbur Wright Field 
to August 14 is $3,115,161.94. 663. 

Statement of all complete planes DH 4s shipped overseas to 
and including August 7, 1918, marked " Jones Exhibit No. 7," 
August 19, 1918. 666. ' 

Financial statement to June 30, 1917, showing the distribution 
of appropriations and an analysis of obligations, marked 
"Jones Exhibits No. 8-A and No. 8-B," August 19, 1918. 
667. 

Memorandum of acetate depot contracts for July, 1918. marked 
" Jones Exhibit No. 9," August 19, 1918. 667. _ 

Produces various cables with respect to corrections in defects 
of DH 4s on the other side, which were marked " Jones 
Exhibit No. 11," August 19, 1918. 669. 
Maj. John Armstrong Drexel (Washington, D. C, August 19, 
1918; Book 18). 

Entered the Army in October, 1917. 673. 

Has been in active service as a flyer with the French Flying 
Corps. 673. 

Returned from France on June 10. 673. 

Radiators on DH 4 plane were supposed to be a bad production 
job. 678. 

Have changed DH 4s on other side. 679. 

Consider Liberty engine very good on other side, except for 
carbureti on. 680. 

Thinks DH with Liberty is a wrong conception. It is too high- 
powered for that plane, but thinks they will have the finest 
plane on the front with the DH 9- A wings. 681. 
Lieut. Col. Leonard Sherman Horner (Department of Justice, 
Washington, D. C, August 19, 1918; Book 19). 

Thinks he entered the Armj^ in August, 1917. 1. 

Was asked by Col. Deeds to come to Washington. 4. 

Took up the work of the ordnance and instrument section in 
July, 1917. 5. 

When Col. Waldron was sent overseas to form an aircraft pro- 
duction over there, he was made executive officer under Col. 
Deeds and afterwards acted in same capacity under Col. Mont- 
gomery. 6. 

Asked if he knows anything about orders that were placed in 
France for delivery by the French Government of planes for 
our forces. 7. 

These were largely canceled. 8. 

Is asked for a statement of the planes and engines actually de- 
livered to elate by the French Government on contracts placed 
there by the United States Government. 9. 



280 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Leonard Sherman Korxer — Continued. 

Thinks reason why the French Government did not complete 
contract in accordan e with anticipations was that the French 
agreed to make certain deliveries to this country of planes, so 
many per month, provided the United States Government fur- 
nished them certain raw materials at a given time. This time 
had expired when contract received. 11. 

Is asked to furnish these contracts. 11. 

This country also in default in not being able to live up to 
promises made in this connection. 13. 

Gives statement of the whole matter relating to the various 
orders. 14-20. 

He had a distinct understanding, as did others, that when Col. 
Boiling made this contract with the French Government that 
the French Government actually expected to make these de- 
liveries to the United States Government, and that the ma- 
terial asked for was to fill up their depleted stocks more than 
anything else. 20. 

Had a clear idea also that the French Government was short on 
some materials, so some rush orders were gotten off in remark- 
able time. Is to furnish contracts which will show orders 
placed on a certain date and the date on which they started 
shipping. 21. 

Asked what has become of this stuff, as it did not come back in 
planes. 22. 

Have shipped at least $1,000,000 worth of material and only 
have 230 or 240 planes. 23. 

Substituted contract was made sometime in May, and states on 
account of not being able to meet deliveries that the contracts 
are reduced hereby a certain amount, etc. 24. 

Three hundred machines from the British. 24. 

Asked about the delays on the De Haviland 4s. 26-32. 

States that inability of Dayton-Wright people to get accurate 
information w T ith regard to equipment, changes, etc., did pro- 
duce a long and serious dela} T . 33. 

People on the other side knew what they were putting in a ma- 
chine, but their specifications and drawings could not be put 
together. 35. 

The sample planes that were sent over by the commission were 
equipped in most cases, not complete, which explains, he 
stated, why it was so difficult to get definite and accurate in- 
formation from the other side when the subject of the inquiry 
was something that was in actual use. 36. 

Drawings and specifications accompanied these sample planes, 
but they did not check up with the actual plane. 36. 

In addition to all this, cables and information were continually 
coming over to the various departments as to certain other 
pieces of apparatus to be added, which they in their ignorance 
took to be facts, and they made the changes accordingly, some- 
times coming out right and sometimes wrong. 37. 

Lack of airplane engineering knowledge was at the root of nil 
the trouble. 37. 

Did not know what a synchronizing dr-vice was in this country 
until some engineer came over here and told them. 30. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 281 

Lieut. Col. Leonard Sherman Horner — Continued. 

Started to use a synchronizer on the other side latter part of 1915 
or 1916. 39-42. 

Asked why Col. Clark of the engineering department, who had 
devoted a good deal of attention to airplane matters, was re- 
lieved of that work when the production engineering depart- 
ment was organized. 42. 

Matter was taken out of the hands of the airplane engineering 
department so as to expedite getting of information to the 
factories and the changes in the drawings and designs. 43. 

Is shown by the statement from the Dayton-Wright Co. which 
complained of the lack of these very things. 44. 

Lack of clearly placed responsibility. 49. 

He understood that in the case of the Bristol the designs origi- 
nally given to the Curtiss Co. did not permit of the pie es 
properly going together, and that therefore the Curtiss Co. 
were instructed to make such changes in the drawings as were 
necessary for a complete plane. 50. 

After that the matter at the Curtiss plant handled by the Curtiss 
Co. in conjunction with the local representatives of the pro- 
duction engineering department who had had no experience 
whatever in designing aeroplanes. 50. 

Again explains the displacing of Col. Clark. 54. 

Submits paper entitled "Cause of delav 1 '; is marked " Hcrner 
Exhibit 1." 56. 

Bristol motor redesigned for use of Liberty engine under direc- 
tion of Col. Clark, which proved to be a failure. 57. 

Asked why the Government did not do something to correct the 
condition of things existing at the Curtiss plant. 63. 

States Mr. Potter, Col. Montgomery, and Col. Deeds were all well 
acquainted with these conditions. 69. 

Asked Col. Van Deman to remove Mr. West from the Curtiss 
plant. 72. 

Admitted he was very prolific in obtaining information, but that 
this was not correct information. 75. 

States he didn't mean it was not correct, but that he was not dis- 
creet in obtaining this information. 76. 

Don't know who told him so. 76. 

Asked if he was more interested in his discretion than the infor- 
mation, than he was in correcting the conditions which the 
information disclosed. 76. 

Can not answer why they removed a man who was supplying the 
very information they were supposed to want. 78. 

The reason sifts down to Mr. Kepperly, of the Curtiss plant, who 
does not want Mr. West to carry an annual pass, which admits 
him to all parts of the plant at any and all times. " Wants this 
stopped." 79. 

Follows letters and telegrams from the Curtiss people regarding 
this " nuisance." 79 to 95. 

Is asked for all information that exists in letters that passed be- 
tween the department in Washington and Maj. Moore or Mr. 
Green which would show that these conditions disclosed in the 
reports were taken care of, an effort made to remedy them. 109. 

Makes statement on his own account. 110 to 115, inclusive. 



282 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION"; 

Forrest E. Cardullo (August 19, 1918 ; book 19). 

Has been employed at the plant of the Curtiss Airplane & Motor 

Corporation since the 1st of December. 1913. 116. 
Engineer of tests. 117. 
Knows nothing about the purchase by the Curtiss Co. of dope 

from the Celluloid Zapon Co. 119. 
Came to his attention by people from the Celluloid Zapon Co. 

appearing one day saying there was a lot of dope they wanted 

to correct. 119. 
Whole quantity was returned to Celluloid Zapon Co. to be fixed 

right, 121. 
Mr. Crossley had condemned a great deal of dope which they 

used subsequently with the full consent of the Signal Corps 

and the Government people. 122. 
States that he had never seen the report which showed it cracked 

with two weeks' exposure. 124. 
Asked how it happened that material condemned by the chief 

chemist should be accepted later and passed. 128. 
Gives a statement in regard to his individual relation to it. 132 

to 135. 
Mr. Guy Leonard (August 19, 1918; book 19). 

Supervising the construction of the acetate of lime and acetone 

plants and wood chemical plants. 136. 
Just recently built the acetone plant for the Standard Chemical 

Co. in Sault Ste. Marie, in Canada, and then came over to the 

Curtis Bav Chemical Plant. 137. 
Mr. O. W. Ott (August 19, 1918; book 19). 

In the chemical section of the Bureau of Aircraft Production. 

having charge of disposition of dope. 145. 
Asked to send in whatever their records show in regard to the 

Celluloid Zapon Co. 149. 
Edmund Leigh (August 20. 1918; book 19). 

Alien enemies. 150. 
Col. Marborough Churchill (August 20, 1918; book 19). 
Been in the Army since September, 1901. 152. 
Gives resume of the duties he has been assigned to since the be- 
ginning of the war until June 1. when he arrived in Washing- 
ton and was detailed as chief of the militarv intelligence 

branch. 152-155. 
Asked to state what he learned in respect to the delivery of 

planes in France by the French Government under contracts 

made by Col. Boiling. 155. 
Was told that one of the ostensible reasons for the failure of 

the French Government to produce the planes was the failure 

of this country to supply raw materials. 158. 
Knows it to be a fact that for a long period there were schools 

with a large number of American flyers who had no machines 

in which to be trained and were in virtual idleness. 160. 
Serious situation of affairs that reflected upon the military 

administration of the United States. 161. 
These conditions existed at Toul and Issouden, the two largest 

schools. 161. 
Situation began to be acute in October, and in January it began 

to be corrected. 162. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 283 

Col. Marborotjgh Churchill — Continued. 

Asked to turn in the reports of the Standard and of the Dayton- 
Wright, 166. 

Arrangements had been made with the British and French to 
receive a certain number of men for training, which went on 
satisfactorily, but in addition to that large numbers of Amer- 
ican aviation students were sent over who were not to be 
trained in those camps and for whom no provision had been 
made by the French or English. 168-170. 

Gen. Squier had to do with the sending over of men at that 
time. 171. 
Victor Lougheed (August 20, 1918; Book 19) . 

Resides in Chicago, 111. 172. 

Mechanical engineer and technical writer. 172. 

Been actively interested in aeronautics since 1903. 172. 

In connection with other work of this nature published in 1909 
a book entitled Vehicles of the Air, which sold within two 
years about 30,000 copies in three editions. 173. 

In 1912 wrote Airplane Designing, which, in 1915, half of 
it was published in an Austrian flying magazine. 173. 

This book for amateurs, is now in use in the German and Aus- 
trian flying corps as a text book. 173. 

Is also informed that half of it has been translated and published 
and is on file in the Chicago Library. 174. 

Also does technical writing for Popular Mechanics. 174. 

Testifies as to his ability in building airplanes and designing 
of large planes. 175. 

Describes machine built big as Caproni, and flying with two- 
thirds less power. When five hours old flew from Santa 
Barbara to San Diego, 211 miles in 281 minutes, without 
mishap with 1,600 pounds deadweight and enough gasoline 
left to have flown six times that far. 176. 

Was completed within six months' time of designing. 176. 

Built in a plant that had less than $5,000 worth of facilities 
in the way of machine tools. 177. 

Testifies as to the negotiations he has had with officers of the 
Government. 180. 

Application was canceled by the United States Civil Service 
Commission on November 19, 1915, because he was not a 
graduate in mechanical engineering. 181. 

Takes up case with Mr. Siclnev Waldon in Detroit. 181-183. 

Writes to Mr. Marmon, and produces the answer he received. 
185. 

Try to sell the machine to the Navy, 189. 

Brother gets an order for two Curtiss seaplanes to build. 191. 

Introduces this contract into the record. 191-193. 

His point is that the Curtiss Co. could better have built two 
more machines of that type for the Government than a 
little plant. On the other hand two boys with brains on the 
matter could better have been developing something better 
than making an arbitrary copy of that machine. 194. 

Pats a proposition to the Government, in which it would have 
cost the Government nothing, to demonstrate them the im- 



284 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Victor Lottgheed — Continued. 

provements that can be made in the wings of the machine 
as to get an increased efficiency with a lower-powered engine. 
196-199. 

Could not go ahead and build the machine first and then demon- 
strate to the Government, because you could not get materials 
and labor unless you were doing 'Government work. 199. 
Capt. W. Wickham Hoffman (August 20, 1918; Book 19). 

Been in the Air Service since August 21, 1917. 202. 

Was never interested in aviation except as a civilian might be. 
202. 

Explains how he entered the Army and the duty to which he was 
assigned. 202-204. 

Understood that developments later in regard to raw materials 
prevented the French from fulfilling their contract. 205. 

There were no actual training camps absolutely idle because of 
lack of planes. 207. 

One thousand two hundred cadets awaiting training at St. 

Maisent at one time, some having waited three months without 
any flying whatever. 208. 
John D. Ryan (August 20, 1918; Book 19). 

Asked to state conditions as he found them on a recent visit to 
the Pacific coast. 211-229. 

Has found no evidences of any irregularities in the way of 
influencing the contracts for consideration, etc. 229. 

Makes statement regarding efforts of the Government to correct 
conditions existing at the Curtiss plant. 235. 

Reports running back to March reveal these conditions. Reports 
to Signal Corps disclose these conditions, and along Avith 
them they found a disposition to accommodate the Curtiss Co. 
by getting rid of those who disclosed the conditions, and the 
disposition on the part of the Curtiss Co. to resent activity 
of Government representatives which tended to reveal these 
conditions. 243. 

Mentions the case of Mr. West, who made reports with detailed 
statements and was removed. 243. 

Found excess production, excess orders, padded pay rolls, idle 
time, etc. 245. 

Unable to understand what it was that give the Curtiss Co. 
authority apparently superior to the Government. No Gov- 
ernment officer with the slightest knowledge of the facts should 
have permitted it for a fortnight. 245. 
Edward L. Ryerson, Jr. (August 21, 1918; Book 19). 

Captain of the aircraft service production. 253. 

Since December 1, 1917, has had charge of the propeller work. 
256. 

In the requirements for propeller production African mahogany 
is put last. 270. 

Cable from department of aircraft production of Great Britain 
to Gen. Cormack, British War Mission, regarding African 
mahogany. 271. 

Another paper addressed to Chief Signal Office, Washington, 
D. C, giving comparisons of African mahogany with Central 
American species, saying it compared favorably. 274. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 285 

EdwAed L. Ry^bson, Jr. — Continued, 

Imagines that this letter was suggested by one from Capt. Oak- 
leaf, but could not say. 276. 

Letter from Henry Lockhard, jr., to Office of the Chief Signal 
Officer, asking whether African mahogany has been approved 
for use in the manufacture of propellers. 277. 

Telegram in reply from production engineering department say- 
ing department, not favorably disposed toward African ma- 
hogany. Much poor African mahogany on American market. 
279. 

Telegram from production engineering department stating 
African mahogany suitable for use for combat and bombing 
airplane propellers. 281. 

Was advised that the English did not use African mahogany 
except when it is reinforced with other more strong and re- 
liable wood. 282. 

Was aware that there were great quantities of quarter-sawed 
white oak in this country and that engineering department 
now states it is preferred to African mahogany for propellers. 
283. 

Produces memorandum referring to African mahogany. 284- 
294. 

African mahogany was put ahead of quarter-sawed white oak 
in report of March 16. 295. 

In report of August 7, quarter-sawed white oak was put ahead 
of African mahogany. 295. 

Asked why use of it was not discouraged earlier. 295. 

In addition to its inferiority, there were very serious shipping 
problems in connection with it. 299. 

Asked for any information he might have Avith respect to way 
in which it happened that large orders were given for African 
mahogany in view of the above difficulties. 301. 

Asked if he observed that the requirements were asserted far 
in excess of the actual requirements. 302. 

The estimates referred to as being excessive were given to him 
for the purpose of producing propellers and were in turn 
transmitted by him to the hardwoods section, etc. 310. 

Produces copy of report covering all other matters pertaining 
to the original negotiations for mahogany and his connection 
with it. Marked " Ryerson Exhibit 16." 310. 
Homer Hoyt (August 21, 1918; Book 19). 

Economist for the War Trade Board. 320. 

Makes his own statement with regard to investigation of African 
mahogany. 321. 

Requirements, after conference, were handed to him in memo- 
randum from Mr. Williams. (" Hoyt Exhibit l."j 323. . 

Could not find out in the conferences what the basis of the re- 
quirements was ; they refused to tell for military reasons. 324. 

Mr. Tower, of the Shipping Board, thought the requirements 
excessive since in order to require this large amount of pro- 
peller wood there would be something like 50,000 airplanes 
needed in the program. 325. 

Mr. Tower tried to get information on the subject but was 
unable to, so was not able to advise the restriction of this 
African mahogany. 325. 



286 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Homer Hoyt — Continued. 

About the latter part of May Mr. Hoyt is taken to Mr. Owen 
Thomas, who was at the General Staff. Mr. Owen declared 
that the airplane requirements as given out by Mr. Williams 
and Mr. Wickliffe were greatly overstated. 325. 

Mr. Thomas knew the engine production, and said the Shipping 
Board was right, that the African mahogany was not neces- 
sary, and produced letters from a captain in the British Army 
saying the African mahogany was an inferior wood. 326. 

Gives statement concerning concessions or a basis for operations 
in Africa of I. T. Williams & Sons. 332. 

Maj. Adriance tells him that the Bureau of Aircraft Produc- 
tion have admitted that quarter-sawed white oak was a satis- 
factory propeller wood, but that they could not secure suf- 
ficient of it to substitute for African mahogany. 335. 

Mr. Potter makes this statement. 336. 

Mr. Hoyt immediately has the Forestry Service prepare to make 
an estimate of the available supply of quarter-sawed white oak 
available for propellers. 337. 

Memorandum marked " Moss Exhibit 2, August 2, 1918." 337. 

Information was obtained in an hour's notice that 42,000,000 
feet of airplane material could be secured within the course 
of a year. 340. 

Lieut. Col. Botton and Maj. Adriance intimated that the Bureau 
of Aircraft Production had told them that only two or three 
million feet of quarter-sawed oak could be obtained, not 
enough to warrant cutting off African mahogany. 340. 

General Staff not satisfied until they were shown definite manu- 
facturers who would supply the wood. 341. 

Call up American Propeller Co. bv telephone and they state that 
they alone can furnish 2,000,000 feet. 341. 

General Staff about convinced there is no need to go to Africa 
for mahogany. 342. 

Gen. Potter now states in a letter than quarter-sawed white oak 
had not been tested under combat conditions, and thus they 
would not feel satisfied to use it. 343. 

Set about to find out (Mr. Hoyt) what had been the experience 
with this wood. 343. 

Ensign Monteith, of the Navy, tells them that the Navy has used 
oak propellers since 1909 with complete success. Mr. Heath, 
of the American Propeller Co., of Baltimore, stated that they 
had sold propellers to the Navy and none had ever been re- 
turned or rejected. 343. 

Navy would not use African mahogany unless they could not get 
anything else, and then always reenforced by other woods. 

. 344. 

Said they considered " Oak to African mahogany about four to 
one." 344. 

Company at Dayton makes 750 oak propellers for combat ma- 
chines which prove very satisfactory. 345. 

Facts laid before General Staff, but Bureau of Aircraft Pro- 
duction through Mr. Potter would not relinquish their claim 
for getting African mahogany. They only had about half 
of it through by this time. 346. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 287 

Homer Hoyt — Continued. 

Mr. Williams stated that the British Government had contracts 
for 7,000,000 feet of walnut to be satisfied in this country 
which greatly reduced the supply in this country. He was 
always told there was plenty more. 349. 

The British Government, Mr. Williams stated, had practically 
secured the output of Central American mahogany. 349. 

Mr. Williams always insisted upon the great necessity of making- 
sure that the airplane program should not fail, so he wanted 
to build up a reserve of 10,000,000 feet, so there would be no 
possibility of this happening, but he always found a way to 
not buy any domestic woods. 352. 

When there was no obstacle in their way to buying quarter- 
sawed white oak they did not buy it. 356. 

Understood from Mr. Weber that there had been an actual ap- 
proval of quarter-sawed oak for propellers in December, 1917. 
357. 
Maj. Gen. William B. Kenly (August 21, 1918; Book 19). 

Director of Military Aeronautics. 385. 

Submits copy of the contracts which were made in France for 
the supply by the French Government of planes. Marked 
"Kenly Exhibit 1." 386 to 394. 

Furnishes list of those actually delivered. " Kenly Exhibit 2." 
394. 

Cause for the second contract was that the French had a sudden 
and great need for more airplanes and that in view of the fact 
that the United States Government were not ready to use the 
planes as per contract, they wished to modify it. 396. 

Gen. Pershing did not at first approve of this plan, but later 
returns to it. 397. 

With reference to the cadets from the United States held at 
training camps with nothing to learn with, he stated that as 
per schedule of Gen. Pershing the men showed up in France 
but not the planes. 405. 

Considered the reason for discontinuing thj Standard J was 
that it was unsafe. 407. 
Lieut. Isadore Sack (August 21, 1918; Book 19). 

In the sales department of the finance division in the Bureau 
of Aircraft Production. 422. 

Produces statement of orders for African mahogany, marked 
" Sacks Exhibit 1." 423. 

Estimated cost of whole is $3,425,625. 424. 
William Hoyt Weber (Washington, D. C, August 21, 1918 ; Book 
19). 

Forester by occupation. 431. 

Asked by Mr. Owen Thomas to get all the information he could 
about mahogany and particularly to find out the amount of 
board feet of different kinds of woods that were used in pro- 
pellers. 432. 

Instead of 175 or 200 feet, which was being used at the esti- 
mate of the number of feet, 150 feet was an approximate basis. 
This concurred in by various factory managers of the plants 
visited. 435. 

Estimate for quarter oak would be possibly less. 440. 
130687—19 19 



288 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

William Hoyt Weber — Continued. 

The reason that the Dayton-Wright were going ahead and 

making their propellers out of oak was because they were one 

of the firms not getting their material from the Aircraft 

Board at all. 441. 
Asked for his observation with respect to African mahogany. 

447. * J 

Knows of no reason for getting African other than a shortage 

of wood in this country, which did not exist. 451-452. 
Submits reports on African mahogany which is marked " Weber 

Exhibit No. 5, August 22, 1918," then submits or substitutes 

another copy in its place as indicating sources of information 

on certain points. 454. 
In one of the paragraphs he inserts statement that C. C. Mengel 

and I. T. Williams owned some ships in which they could 

bring African mahogany over. 455. 
Found no shortage of mahogany in this country. Opposite 

was true. Out of Government orders, with stocks of mahog- 
any on hand. 
Mentions firms who had greater propeller capacity than was 

being used. 461-462. 
Price for mahogany fixed at $350 a thousand. Before the war 

the very highest price was around $150. 465. 
Highest Cuban mahogany was only $160. 466. 
Capt. E. L. Kyerson, Jr., (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; 
Book 19). 

States that when he places orders for contracts with companies 

for the production of propellers he specifies the kind of wood 

out of which the propellers are to be made. 471. 
Does not know of any cases in which one wood was specified in 

the contract and another wood actually used. 482. 
His information is that the propellers are built out of the wood 

specified in every case. 486. 
Produces memorandum, " Ryerson Exhibit No. 17, August 22, 

1918"; is a memorandum of a meeting for the discussion of 

airplane propellers, etc. (This meeting held February 19, 

1918.) 492-501. 
This meeting decided that there was to be no African mahogany. 

501. 
Could not say what changed all this, for within three weeks 

orders for African mahogany were authorized — about the 

middle of March. 501. 
Karl K. De Laittre (August 22, 1918; Book 19). 

Assistant to the director of planning and suggestions in the 

Shipping Board. 507. 
Takes up the position of getting definite information as to Army 
requirements from the Aircraft Production Department. 510. 
Submits summary of this conversation. " De Laittre Exhibit 

1." 510. 
Is later asked by Mr. Wickliffe to add something like one mil- 
lion and a half feet to the requirements. 510. 
Goes back on the seventh day to have some matters cleared up. 
511. 






ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 289 

Karl K. De Laittre — Continued. 

Is now asked to make some comments on extracts which are read 
to him before proceeding with his other conference. 511-521. 

Now proceeds with his report of the meeting on May 7. 525. 

This is marked " De Laittre Exhibit 3." 526. 

Is questioned regarding certain extracts in this report. 526 
to — . 

Mengel & Co., of which Mr. Wickliffe was secretary ; I. T. Wil- 
liams & Sons, of which Mr. Williams was formerly a member ; 
and the Astoria Co. were some of the firms who had African 
concessions or were interested in the African production. 534. 
Adolph Lodewik Deleeuw (Department of Justice, Washington, 
D. C, August 22, 1918; Book i9). 

Mechanical engineer, Singer Manufacturing Co. 547. 

Singer Co. of New York City, South Bend, etc. 547. 

First appointment with Mr. Deeds and Mr. Waldon was on Au- 
gust 14, 1917. 548. 

First asked to build 3,000 training planes, then this order 
changed to a thousand battle planes of the denomination 
DH-4, and then they were informed they would be asked to 
build something different from this. 548-549. 

This was the last heard from the Signal Corps. 549. 

States what the capacity of the Singer Manufacturing Co. was, 
its capital, equipment, and ability to construct planes. 549. 

Had told Mr. Deeds they would accept any kind of a contract 
the Government saw fit and were willing to give them. 556. 
Burchell Crocker Ikirk (August 22, 1918; Book 19). 

Is now inspector of the Osner Fare Register Co. at Dayton. 579. 

Was with the Aircraft Production Board up to August 6, 1918. 
579. 

Discharged by Mr. Fitzgerald, assistant district manager. 580. 

Wrote two letters to Mr. John H. Patterson, of the National 
Cash Register Co., relative to the shipment of certain instru- 
ments to the Wilbur Wright Field spare house that were 
under question for being defective without any question. 580. 

Was representing the Government in inspecting them. 580. 

Five hundred and twenty-five of these instruments. 580. 

At least 75 of these instruments contained springs that were off. 
581. 

Were awaiting report from the Bureau of Standards regarding 
them. 582. 

Twenty-five of them went direct to France. 583. 

States the effect of the use of the 75 tachometers that were 
wrong. 585. 
Lieut. Col. A. Woods (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; Book 20). 

Produced memorandum reports of his investigation at the Cur- 
tiss plant. 1. 

Woods Exhibit 1. 
Albert H. Flint (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; Book 20). 

Is an airplane manufacturer by occupation. 3. 

Vice president and general manager of the L. W. F. Engineering 
Co., College Point, Long Island. 3. 

Building all Navy work at the present time. 3. 



290 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Albert H. Flint — Continued. 

Built 150 of their own planes, the L. W. F., for Signal Corps 

previous to contract with Navy. 4. 

Company now known as Laminated Wood Fuselage. 4. 

Contract in October, 1917, for 18 L. W. F. planes on a fixed-price 
basis of $12,600 each. 19. 

Contract in January, 1918, for 36 L. W. F. reconnoissance ma- 
chines at a fixed price of $8,600 each. 

Was building planes before we entered the war. 20. 

Government furnished the engines for the last 36 planes, ac- 
counting for the difference in price. 21. 

Refused to take an order for 500 Bristol fighters in September, 

1917, because he did not consider it could be built with the 
Liberty engine. 22. 

Does no tthink DH-4 will make a successful battle plane. 25. 
Constructed a combat plane (L. W. F. model G) which carries a 

load of 2,208 pounds at speed of 134 miles an hour. 27. 
Has no contracts with Government for it. 29. 
Have an armor plate on machine of light helmet steel, covering 

two men and gas tank. 30. 
Machine is 500 pounds heavier with guns and everything than 

DH-4, but much faster. 31. 
Maj. Miller Harmon, Jr. (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; 
Book 20). 

Was in service overseas from March 26, 1917, until May 16, 

1918. 37. 

When he first went over was detailed to take a course of instruc- 
tion in French aviation schools at Pau and Alvord for a 
period of two months. 37. 

On completion of that duty was assistant with chief aviation 
officer, American Expeditionary Forces, stationed in Paris. 
38. 

Served as a pilot with a French squadron for about a month 
and a half. 38. 

Was then on board to recommend types of airplanes to be pur- 
chased in the United States in 1919, and on completion of that 
duty was ordered back to the United States. 38. 

Gives in a general way machines recommended. 39. 

Lieut. Col. T. F. Dodd was president of the board and members 
were Lieut. Col. Henry Harms, Maj. H. F. Martin, and Maj. 
M. F. Harmon. 40. 

Report was completed about 4th of May, 1918. 40. 

Lieut. Col. Carberry was in charge of training in France during 
all the time he was over there. 43. 

Report showing status of the aviation camps abroad, the num- 
ber of students there, the number of training planes available, 
etc., as of July 17, 1918, marked " Harmon Exhibit 1." 45. 

They have Breguets for bombardment instruction and are using 
Nieuports for aerial gunnery instruction. 46. 

Number of aviation students held in depots or aviation camps 
for two or three months without facilities for training. 48. 

Copy of cable dated August 7, 1917, relative to offer of Italy to 
train 500 pilots. 49. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 291 

Maj. Miller Harmon, Jr. — Continued. 

Cable from Gen. Pershing dated July 30 stated that after Sep- 
tember 15 French can not receive American pilots for train- 
ing. 50. 

Cable dated August 7, 1917, from Gen. Pershing stating, with 
reference to pilots, " Send them over and we will take care of 
them." 

About 1,000 aviators were at one time held for a period of two 
or three months because they could not get training facili- 
ties. 54. 

Brighter aviation students in this country, by reason of their ex- 
cellence, were given their choice of continuing their training 
in this country or going to France; supposing that they 
would have a better opportunity in France they went over 
there to find that those left behind got their tuition before they 
did. 56, 

At one time they were considering sending some of those men 
back to the United States for training. 56. 

They had to do guard duty and fatigue duty and things of that 
nature which they did not like and which really they were not 
expected to do. 57. 
W. W. Moss. (Washington, D. C. ( ? ) , Aug. 23, 1918 ; Book 20.) 

Questioned with regard to the method by which the restaurant 
of the Curtiss plant was established and conducted. 59. 

Company got no compensation whatever from restaurant. 60. 

Employees of Curtiss plant were not supposed to be used by 
restaurant. 61. 

Mr. Backoff operated both the North Elmwood and the Church- 
ill Street restaurants, but under the new arrangement it will 
be taken over and operated under the welfare department as 
of September 1. 62. 

Will be treated as part of the overhead, if there is any loss. 62. 

Depreciation on restaurant will be charged in as overhead ex- 
pense in connection with the Government contracts. 63. 
Capt. Edwaed L. Byerson, Jr. (Washington, D. C., August 23, 1918 ; 
Book 20.) 

Specifications describing the kinds of lumber used in propeller 
construction marked " Kyerson Exhibit 18." 72. 
Abraham T. Baldwin (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1918; Book 
20). 

General manager of the Precision Instrument Co. 79. 

Has contract dated December 3, 1917, for 2,500 air speed indi- 
cators, 1,000 at $60 and 1,500 at a price to be agreed upon. 80. 

Instead of completing contract in early part of April, did not 
begin quantity production until July. 81. 

Forboro Instrument Co. has contract with Government for air 
speed indicators. 85. 

Have been led to believe method of inspection between his com- 
pany and other companies are different. 94. 

Instrument of Foxboro Instrument Co. had an error of 1 hour 
in first flight of 45 minutes, when it was supposed to be per- 
fect. 95. 

Has never heard a commendatory report of the Foxboro indi- 
cator from a flying" field of the United States. 97. 



292 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Abraham T. Baldwin — Continued. 

Bristol Co. were granted certain things in April, and his com- 
pany were not granted a solitary thing until July, although 
thev asked for the same things. 104. 
Mrs. A. T. Baldwin (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1918; Book 20). 

Is wife of president of the Precision Instrument Co., vice presi- 
dent of same concern, and in charge of production. 136. 

The testimony of this woman, as well as her husband, is an 
effort to show that favoritism was shown other companies 
manufacturing air speed indicators, and that delay in produc- 
tion at Precision instrument plant was due to the inspector 
not allowing certain tolerances allowed other plants. 136- 
165. 
Eugene Meyer, Jr. (Washington, D. C August 23, 1918; Book 20). 

Director of the War Finance Corporation of the United States 
Government, 166. 

Enumerates various positions he has held with Government since 
April, 1917, when he first became associated with Government. 
166. 

Is a banker and broker by occupation. 167. 

Interested personally in the Fisher Body Corporation, of Detroit. 
168. 

Has an Orlando F. Webber in his employ, whose brother, Charles 
Webber, was interested in the Curtiss plant. 174. 

Has discussed conditions in Curtiss plant with Charles Webber. 
174. 

Had Mr. Webber make an examination of the Wright-Martin 
Co., and he made a very drastic report as to the management, 
which was unfavorable to the management. 177. 

Curtiss Co. put all their trouble at the door of incompetent man- 
agement in the aircraft situation. 182. 

Feeling was bitter on both sides between the Government de- 
partments and the manufacturing industries. 183. 

Thinks Signal Corps acted without consideration toward people 
who had gotten themselves into a very tight situation, largely* 
relying on the Signal Corps assurances. 185. 

The Secretary of War asked him to investigate and make a 
report on the aircraft situation. (Then follows a conversation 
witness had with Secretary of War relative to nature of in- 
vestigation.) 188. 

In letter of the President to the Secretary of War he asked the 
Secretary or suggested that the Secretary give Mr. Borglum's 
report to somebody " to get the impressions on a fresh mind." 
190. 

Report of witness to Secretary of War marked " Mever Exhibit 
No. 1, August 23, 1918." 191. 

Later report made under date of February 20, marked " Meyer 
Exhibit No. 2, August 23, 1918." 191. 

Gave his real reports to the Secretary verbally. 193. 

Relates what he told the Secretary verbally. 194. 

Told Secretary at one time he did not think he had a man in the 
whole organization (Government organization) who could be 
called a man. 195. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 293 

Eugene Meyer, Jr. — Continued. 

Felt that he sold the Secretary the idea of a production man 
against a lot of other men. 197. 

Did not seem to have much idea of public policy clown there. 
199. 

Told Mr. Stettinius he thought they ought to get rid of Col. 
Montgomery about as fast as it could be done. 200. 

He said, " Mr. Secretary, war and military operations are based 
on contact, and in the aircraft program we lack contact." 204. 

Making a product and entirely out of contact with the field of 
operations. 205. 

Saw very poor manufacturing at the Dayton- Wright plant. 211. 

Knows relationship of Secretary Baker's brother in regard to 
these contracts. 215. 
Lewis H. MacLaughlin (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1919; 
Book 20). 

Assistant to the vice president of E. F. Houghton Co., dealers 
and manufacturers of oils. 220. 

Been in business about a year and one-half; formerly a news- 
paper man, as associate city editor of the Philadelphia Even- 
ing Bulletin and the Evening Telegraph. 220. 

Familiar with operations of Standard Aircraft Co. in a general 
way. 220. 

All requisitions of Standard Aircraft Co. were sent to a jobbing 
concern. 222. 

Judge Hughes. Your inference that there was likely some 
dividing with the jobber's profit so that the order went to the 
jobber? 

Witness. Yes, sir. 226. 
Eber W. Finkbiner (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1918; Book 20). 

Has been connected with the Houghton Co. for two years and 
eight months. 228. 

Had dealings with the Standard Aircraft Co. at Elizabeth. 228. 

Prior to September or October of 1917 Houghton Co. sold 
Standard Aircraft practically all of the cutting oils. 228. 

About a month after they moved their plant to Elizabeth they 
ceased sending orders. 228. 

All orders for oils, etc., from the Standard plant were sent to 
Dingy, a jobber, first. 232. 
Lieut. J. Brooks B. Parkek Washington, D. C. August 23, 1918; 
Book 20) . 

Assigned to the office of the Chief of Staff, Purchase, Storage 
and Traffic Division, of the program section. 235. 

Produces correspondence between Lieut. Col. Colt on and hard- 
woods section of the Bureau of Aircraft Production and 
others including two cables from Gen. Pershing) relating to 
the purchase of woods for propellers. 235. 
Albert L. Wilcox (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20.) 

In the timber and lumber business since 1894. Deals in foreign 
hardwoods. Business is in Panama. Has been an importer 
of mahogany since 1903. 242. 

His logs all shipped to New York and his brokers, Isaac Branden 
& Bros., 17 Battery Place, New York City, do business 
directly with concerns here in the States. 243. 



294 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Albert L. Wilcox — Continued. 

Good percentage of his logs are straight-grained wood, which 
would be suitable for airplane stock. 245. 

Had about 270,000 feet altogether, 246. 

Mr. Wickliffe, who passed on mahogany for the Government, 
requested that he sell his logs to one of the " 11 " who were 
contractors with the Government. 247. 

Had a talk with one of the buyers of C. C. Willey, who was one 
of the Big Eleven, relative to the mahogany market. 250. 

Told him it did not look right for the Government to be paying 
$380 a thousand for first and seconds, and $280 for No. 1 com- 
mon. He said, " We have enough mahogany to last us for a 
couple of years. We covered that pretty well before the war. 
You can probably sell these logs to some of those boys in New 
York and probably get a little more, but I doubt if you can get 
over $100 or $120." 251. 

He was told he could not get a chance to sell outside of the Big 
Eleven. 252. 

Big Eleven seemed to have things pretty well fixed up. 254. 

Sold logs he had in New York to Willard, Hawes & Co. at $140 
a thousand. 258. 

Mr. Brown, of C. L. Willeys, of New York, and Mr. Dayton, of 
Montieth Co., told him Government was paying as high as 
$380 for mahogany lumber. 275. 

Is in a position to make a contract with the Government for 
Panama mahogany suitable for airplane purposes and is per- 
fectly satisfied to make $5 a thousand to the Government. 290. 
Dr. William Frederick Durakt (Washington, D. C, August 26, 
1918; Book 20). N 

Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. 
294. 

According to law, the committee exercises two functions, one of 
giving advice and one of carrying forward scientific investiga- 
tion and research. 294. 

Gives brief history of organization, personnel, etc., of com- 
mittee. 294-306. 

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics had absolutely 
nothing to do with the formulation of the aircraft program. 
306. 

Committee did not have anything to do with the Bristol machine 
and the adaptation of it to the Liberty motor ; with the design of 
the De Haviland 4; with the design of the Standard J plane, 
or the design of any plane that formed a part of the aircraft 
program. 307. 

The Advisory Committee on Aeronautics have had absolutely 
nothing to do with the formulation of a program regarding 
engines or decisions regarding types and forms to be built. 
307. 

Opinion of the National Advisory Committee was not requested 
with reference to the advisability of using any of the foreign 
types of engines nor in regard to the Liberty engine. 311. 

Relates what he observed in France with respect to engines. 316. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 295 

Dr. William Frederick Durant — Continued. 

Does not think 12- cylinder Liberty engine can be fitted into a 
successful type of battle plane, a pursuit or Gombat plane. 
It is too heavy. 318. 

Hispano- Suiza engine admirably adapted for pursuit or combat 
planes, especially the 300 horsepower. 319. 
Melville W. Mix (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). 

President of the Dodge Manufacturing Co. 321. 

Manufactures machinery and wood parts, ply-wood parts for 
airplanes and things of that kind. 321. 

Have orders through the Navy direct; others are indirect con- 
tracts such as with the Day ton- Wright Co. 321. 

Had a contract for a supply of wing beams. 322. 

Enumerates contractors he was supplying. 323. 

Furnishes goods in accordance with specifications furnished by 
Government. 323. 

Delayed through continual changes. 325. 

Not anyone at the Dayton-Wright who was an aeroplane en- 
gineer. 326. 

In the early part of the war offered the facilities of plant to the 
United States Government for manufacturing purposes. 328. 

The personnel of the ply- wood division of the Aircraft Produc- 
tion Board were not practical men and did not know anything 
about wood. 348. 

It was dangerous to use a nonwaterproof glue for an airplane. 
352. 

Orders were placed for nonwaterproof glue despite his protest. 
353. 
Kenyon Mix (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). 

Son of M. M. W. Mix. 354. 

Company developed a knocked-down wing slip at instance of 
Government, but never heard anything about it after submit- 
ting sample. 355. 

Seven or eight months later Government stated they had just 
heard of it, 356. 

When Signal Corps formed department 80, had to again go 
over the whole information that they had been giving the 
department for the last year, because they had none of it. 359. 

Drew up charts for them showing them how the veneer in- 
dustry in this country could be mobilized. 359. 

Department laughed at them when they first told them there 
was a waterproof glue in this country. 362. 

" In the ordinary De Haviland fuselage, * * * a shot goes 
through and collapses one of the braces — your machine col- 
lapses. You can take a Monocoque fuselage and shoot it full 
of holes, the strength being in the skin." 364. 

Told Col. Horner about 60 days ago they were about at the end 
of their subcontracts, and asked if there was anything they 
could do for them. Col. Horner told them there was nothing 
he could use their plant for. 366. 

It was through some agreement with the Allies that the pursuit 
machine was left out of the program of production on this side. 
369. 



296 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. George W. Mixter (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; 
Book 20). 

Asked as to his relations to the Curtiss Co. 371. 

When he first took up this work there were essentially no Gov- 
ernment specifications or drawings in existence. 373. 

Was head of the inspection department. 373. 

Doesn't recall whether he is a stockholder in the Curtiss Co. 
374. 

Believes he had 25 shares of preferred stock. 375. 

Has not disposed of any of his holdings since he became an 
officer of the Government. 375. 

Has gone up to the Curtiss plant on inspection matters 10 times 
in the last year. 376. 

There were instances where Curtiss inspection had rejected ma- 
terial that was perfectly safe and usable. 378. 

He appoints district managers of production. 379. 

First broad question referred to and determined by him was the 
multiplicity of inspection and difficulties relating to the four 
inspection forces at the Curtiss plant. 382. 

Eliminated the Curtiss, Navy, and British inspection. 383. 

Used Signal Corps inspection entirely at North Elmwood fac- 
tory until about six weeks ago. 384. 

Judge Hughes : " But an authority to dispose of the Signal Corps 
inspection and to take the Curtiss inspection in lieu of it would 
be an authority which a district inspection officer would hardly 
exercise, I should suppose." 385. 

The function of the Government inspection is supervisory, pro- 
viding 100 per cent inspection only for certain parts of the 
finished assemblies. 387. 
Harley W. Lake (Washington, D. C., August 26, 1918; Book 20). 

Secretarv of the Technical Joint Arm} 7 and Navy Aircraft 
Boards 412. 

Complete minutes of the board introduced and marked "Lake 
Exhibit 1." 412. 
Archer A. Landon (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). 

Chief of Production of Aircraft. 413. 

Has been in that position since latter part of May or 1st of June. 
413. 

Was assistant last fall until October, 1918, to Mr. Coffin. 413. 

Letter addressed to Mr. Coffin by the witness in which the lack 
of organization is pointed out and recommendations made. 
415-422. 

Curtiss plant was badly organized and a poorly conducted busi- 
ness concern. 436. 

Was president of the Niagara Frontier Defense League. 439. 
Judge Hughes. We found men not only employed but pro- 
moted, one or two men that were actually foremen, who were 
alien enemies, reported as such by the Military Intelligence 
Bureau, discharged by the management; the Government ap- 
parently paid no attention to the reports of the Military Intel- 
ligence and the men were still there. 442. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 297 

Archer A. Landon — Continued. 

Knows of one particular case where there was a $20,000 contract 
placed at 10 per cent, which gave a chance there for $2,000 
profit, and the minute that job went in the shop the Govern- 
ment ordered up a $10,000 fence that was not needed in their 
regular line, and ordered about $30,000 fire protection on a 
contract that was going to pay $2,000. 447. 
Dr. S. W. Stratton (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). 

Director of the Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce. 
451. 

Law establishing the National Advisory Committee on Aeronau- 
tics provides that the Director of the Bureau of Standards 
shall be one of the members of the committee. 451. 

Advisory Committee on Aeronautics did not have anything to 
do with the types of aeroplanes selected for production in the 
aircraft program. 451. 

Joined with Dr. Walcott in a letter to the President on the gen- 
eral subject of aircraft production the latter part of January; 
letter inserted in record. 453-459. 

Letter was sent pursuant to a resolution of the committee, in 
which it was stated a confidential memorandum containing 
figures to be prepared bv Col. Deeds would also be submitted. 
460. 

Judge Hughes. You were not purporting to state here of 
your own knowledge that any such thing as that w T as so ? 
Witness. No, sir. 464. 

Judge Hughes. Of course, I most cheerfully acquit you and 
them of any intention to state absolute falsehoods to the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 464. 

Committee was not asked to pass any judgment at all upon 
whether the Bristol was a good plane. 477. 

Judge Hughes. Did you attach seriousness to this statement 
to the President of the United States; did you intend he 
should take those statements at their face value, and if so, 
what information did you have warranting any such state- 
ment as this? (Referring to statement that six plants were 
in production on Liberty motor on January 24, 1918.) 480. 

All statistics used by committee came from either the Aircraft 
Production Board or the Signal Corps. 482. 

Judge Hughes. This letter, signed by the most distinguished 
experts in the country, was to ease the mind of the President 
in regard to our aircraft program at the very time when he 
should have been posted in regard to the actual conditions. 

Witness. It was intended to at least give some assurance at 
the time that things were not as black as they were painted. 
483. 

Draft of the letter was submitted to the members of the com- 
mittee and discussed, and Gen. Squier was present. 486. 
Prof. J. S. MacGregor (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; 
Book 20). 

A number of conferences held to determine what woods were 
satisfactory for propellers and the order of preference. 488. 



298 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATIOX. 

Dr. H. T. Beans (Washington, D. C, August 27, 1918; Book 20). 

Has been in the employ of the Government since August 29, 1917. 
490. 

Was formerly professor of chemistry, Columbia University. 
490. 

Came to Washington to organize the laboratory, the analytical 
and research chemical laboratory, for the Signal Corps. 490. 

Either tungsten steel or high chromium steel is used for the 
valves of Liberty motor. 494. 

Steel has not been used in the valves of the engines, as required 
by the specifications. 494. 

Analyzed the valve and found that it contained no tungsten and 
no chromium; that it was soft material, and had evidently 
given away badly in the service. The situation seemed ex- 
tremely serious to them. 495. 

These valves were made by the Rich Tool Co. for the Curtiss Co. 
The valve was constructed in violation of the specifications. 
Does not know whether it passed Government inspection. 497. 

The inspector for the Government at the plant is supposed to 
ascertain whether or not the proper steel has been used in the 
production of the particular article. 510. 

His impression that the most crude workman in the plant could 
at once detect the difference in working the material. 514. 

Celluloid Zapon Co. is on the approved list. Has heard the state- 
ment that a shipment of dope had been received from them 
and been found to be defective. 518. 

Curtiss Co. was absolutely incapable of making a correct anal- 
ysis. 519. 

In report of December 7, 1917, to Maj. Gray, tabulated the 
errors in a graphic way that the Curtiss laboratory had made 
for a period of a month on a few checked samples. 521. 

Report referred to marked " Beans's Exhibit Xo. 1." 523. 

Recommended that chemical results from the Curtiss laboratory 
no longer be used as the basis of judgment of aircraft mate- 
rials for the Signal Corps, but this recommendation was not 
adopted by the Signal Corps. 525. 

Curtiss Co. had their own way. 526. 

Bureau of Aircraft Production absolutely deceiving itself in re- 
gard to inspection at the Curtiss plant because of Mr. Car- 
dello's attitude. 527. 

Why Mr. Carclello should be such a powerful factor in the Cur- 
tiss organization is difficult to understand, except just for one 
reason, that he is a man who permits them to get away with 
the material. 533. 

Very little inspection in the dope room at the Curtiss plant. 
535. 

Has been compelled to finance the laboratory to the extent of 
over a thousand dollars. 563. 

The cylinders on the Liberty motor are subject to erosion just 
over the intake valve. The aluminum pistons are all being 
burned at just that point. 570. 

The attitude of the Detroit office and of the Aluminum Casting 
Co. is that impurities make no difference. 570. 






ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 299 

Dr. EL T. Bea^s— Continued. 

Gives his opinion of personnel of Army Commodity Commit- 
tees. 571. 
Col. Sidney D. Waldon (Washington, D. C, August 27, 1918; 
Book 20). 

One of the original members of the Aircraft Board. 577. 

Board organized May 17, 1917. 578. 

Went to France in October, 1917, and remained there until 
January 23, 1918. 

Arrangements were made for the purchase of a considerable 
number of planes from the French Government pending the 
manufacture of planes on this side. 578. 

Minister Luchere told Col. Boiling that the French Government 
would be unable to deliver planes in accordance with the agree- 
ment made, partly on account of the fact that our material 
had not arrived in time, but more largely on account of the 
fact that their program was going to be increased and the 
planes and engines would be needed for their own service. 
579. 

Contract with J. G. White Co. for the purchase and shipment of 
raw materials had been made before he left for France. 580. 

Judge Hughes reads part of contract dated August 30, 1917, 
with French Government. 582. 

Minutes of the Aircraft Production Board of September 7, 1917, 
relative to material to be supplied French Government, nam- 
ing the J. G. White Corporation as the firm to handle the pur- 
chase, etc. 584, 585. 

Thought agreement, as suggested by Mr. Luchere, to provide us 
with airplanes, engines, and equipment as fast as our squad- 
rons were ready to go over the front a much fairer one to the 
French. 588. - 

His duty in France was in connection with the laying out and 
planning for salvage and repair of American-made airplanes. 
591. 

Offered the resolution at the meeting of May 25 under which 
the contract for the building of Langley Field was awarded 
to the J. G. White Co. 596. 

Still retains his interest in the Packard Co., but has had no deal- 
ings with this company on behalf of the Government in any 
way. 600. 

Navy would freely discuss and oftentimes criticize recommenda- 
tions made by the Army. 602. 

Cable signed " Pershing," but unquestionably Col. Boiling's ca- 
ble, stated they would rather have more of the De Haviland 
and less of the Spad. 607. 

Cable from Gen. Pershing received about December 14 that the 
single seater or Spad should not be put into production in this 
countrv. 609. Another cable dated October 5 on same matter. 
610. 

Question of producing the Spad in this country was resumed 
about the middle of February. 611. 

SE-5 and Spad are both single seaters. 613. 



300 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. Sidney D. Waldon — Continued. 

Contracts for 3,000 Spads to be made by the Curtiss Co. was. 
made in September; question of advisability of production 
under that contract was questioned in October ; that in Decem- 
ber it was rescinded ; that in February the advisability of hav- 
ing Spads was again suggested from the other side ; was ques- 
tioned here; and that later, in May, the single seater known as 
the SE-5 was ordered to be produced in this country. 613. 
Col. Sidney D. Waldon (Washington, D. C, August 28, 1918; Book 
20). 

Cables to and from Gen. Pershing and copies of correspondence 
relative to production of single-seater pkne in this country. 
623-644. 

Five hundred and twenty-nine De Havilands and 24 Bristols 
completed by July 1, 1918. 648. 

Estimated there would be 1,300 De Havilands and 500 Bristols 
by July 1, 1918. 648. 

Estimates made by witness naturally relied upon by military 
authorities on other side. 650. 

Cables sent every month to Gen. Foulois by Chief Signal Officer 
forecasting deliveries. 650. 

Judge Hughes. We have found, both in regard to the com- 
mitments in France, in regard to the contracts made for en- 
gines in France, and the deliveries under those contracts, a 
most extraordinary lack of information which should have 
been immediately at the command of the authorities, and I 
want to knoAv what system there was for an exchange of infor- 
mation between the authorities on both sides of the water. 

Witness. The cable furnished the principal means of com- 
munication of information. Couriers were used, to some ex- 
tent, The situation in Paris when I arrived was little short of 
chaotic. 655. 

Col. Boiling was not an organizer and he has seen better organ- 
izers than Gen. Foulois. 657. 

Some contracts were placed under pressure. 659. 

Questioned as to why contracts were granted certain concerns 
and not to concerns like the Singer Sewing Machine Co. and 
the Pullman Co . who had had a great deal of experience in 
woodworking. 661-669. 

Col. Deeds influenced his judgment in the granting of a con- 
tract to the Day ton- Wright Co. ; that is, the recommendation 
of it as a member of the Aircraft Board. 670. 

Has no explanation as to why negotiations were not continued 
and definite proposals made to the Singer Co. for their build- 
ing of planes. 672. 

With reference to selecting a site for a flying field : 

Judge Hughes. Now, have you stated everything that is in 
your mind on that subject? Who suggested your going to 
Dayton ? 

Witness. I do not think Col. Deeds did, if that is in your 
mind. 

Judge Hughes. Decidedly in my mind. Is it not in yours? 
675. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 301 

Col. Sidney D. Waldon — Continued. 

Col. Deeds brought the site of what is now known as the Wilbur 
Wright flying field to his attention. 679. 

Does not know what military requirement there was for the 
acquisiton of over 2,000 acres of the Wilbur Wright field. 683. 

Had known Mr. Deeds probably since 1912. 686. 

Col. Deeds did not tell him he had already entered into the or- 
ganization of the Dayton-Fright Co. when he went to get 
him to take an interest in aircraft work. 688. 

Col. Deeds and he occupied the same office at one time. 690. 

Judge Hughes inserts in the record the cable from Gen. Pershing 
to The Adjutant General, of date of June 25, 1918, together 
with letter of June 28, 1918, of the Acting Secretary of War 
relating to the same. 692-701. 

Also places upon the record corrections to the testimony of Dr. 
Stratton. 701-706. 
Thomas A. Hill (Washington, D. C. ; Book 21). 

Practices law in New York City at 233 Broadway. 1. 

Asked to make a statement regarding the cross-license agree- 
ment to the Manufacturers' Aircraft Association. 1. 

This cross-license agreement contemplated an association of 
manufacturers who would pool their patent interests and ex- 
change licenses. 6. 

Government contracts to pay royalties of $4,000,000 without any 
investigation, and then cuts it to $2,000,000 without any reason 
at all. 8. 

Also recently signed a contract on behalf of the Jenin Co. and 
the Curtiss Co. a contract giving the Curtiss Co. an option to 
purchase this very Jenin patent for $70,000 in cash, etc., and 
$1,000 is paid down on that contract. 8. 

The Government to-day, then, is paying royalties to this asso- 
ciation on its cost-plus contracts. 10. 

Hundreds of inventors felt that the Government was not treat- 
ing them right and they were not therefore working for the 
interests of the war. 12. 

A man could not develop his own invention himself comr on ' J *':"' 
unless he went to the association and abided by the fining ot 
their arbitration committee. 13. 

The difficulty arises from the fact that in the existing state of 
the art almost any infringement would be in the nature of 
things an improvement, and in order to be able to use the 
basic invention he would have to be a member of the associa- 
tion. 15. 

Asked if during his study of the agreement anything has ever 
been brought to his notice showing that any of the parties to 
the agreement are required to get these materials from per- 
sons who are favored by the parties to the agreement. 17. 

Relates case of Wittemann Bros. 18. 

Asked for any information regarding a list, blacklisting, or 
anything done which hampers any party to that cross-license 
agreement in getting his materials where he pleases. 19. 



302 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Thomas A. Hill — Continued. 

Had a conversation with Mr. Potter, of the Signal Corps, in 
which he suggested hearing the inventors first and leaving the 
questions of damage and injury, etc., until after the war. 21. 

The Government will yet have to account in damages for these 
patents. 24. 

Government in same position as it would have been if it had 
accepted his suggestion, but in other words it is worse off be- 
cause of the establishment of a standard. 26. 

Explains looseness of plan of Federal Trade Commission as 
working in cooperation with the Patent Office with regard to 
patent applications which are believed to embody subject 
matter which might be of value to Germany or her allies. 

Gives illustration in the case of the Tork Creek Shipbuilding 
Co. 27. 

This practice held up work for several days. 30. 
Col. Melville W. Thompson (August 28, 1918; Book 21). 

Been in the Army since August 25, 1914. 32. 

Has practiced accountancy as a profession for some 15 years. 
33 

Firm of Thompson & Black. 33. 

At the close of February became president of the War Credits 
Board, which was formed on or about November 20, 1917. 38. 

States the circumstances under which the General Vehicle Co. 
was obtained by the Government. 39. 

This contract marked " Thompson's Exhibit No. — ," August 
28, 1918. 41-45. 

Beads extracts from minutes of meetings of the Aircraft Board 
of October 19, 1917, stating that the company was willing to 
sell its plant, etc., to the United States for $1,527,568. 45. 

Col. Thompson caused the appraisal and examination of the 
books to be made. 46. 

Beads further extracts from minutes of the meeting of the board 
of November 8, 1917, preceding the adoption of the resolu- 
tion already mentioned. 46-50. 

Besult being that the $1,527,000 paid by the Government would 
have gone to the General Vehicle Co. and that company would 
have that amount to discharge its notes of $1,405,408.55. 53. 

The company had assets amounting to approximately $461,000. 
54. 

General Electric Co. had made some considerable advances to 
the General Vehicle Co. arising out of losses the latter had 
sustained in business. 55. 

Got the idea some way that the General Vehicle Co. was an off- 
shoot of the General Electric Co. 56. 

Asked if he had ever heard of any offer of an option upon this 
property for any lower sum, or of any offer of the property 
at any lower sum. 59. 

Gives knowledge of such a fact, and thinks it was considerably 
lower — several hundred thousand dollars lower. 60. 

Thinks this other offer might have been made in the spring or 
winter of 1917. 62. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 303 

Col. Melville W. Thompson — Continued. 

A factor that would increase the difference still further is that 
in that other offer machinery was included in the offer which 
has since been sold. 62. 

Col. Thompson is shown what purports to be a statement of the 
condition of the General Vehicle Co. as of September 30, 1917. 
There is an item of notes payable P. T. M., $1,530,408. 63. 

He does not know what this has refence to. This paper marked 
" Thompson's Exhibit No. 7, August 23, 1918." 63. 

Asked if, in connection with his duties in the finance depart- 

r ment, he became advised of any irregularities relating to the 
operations of any of the contractors with the Government. 
67. 

Took up the question of the agreement between the Government 
and the aircraft manufacturers or the Aircraft Manufac- 
turers' Association on the subject of royalties. 67. 

Satisfied himself that there had been improper influences on 
the board that arrived at those figures. 68. 

Was later satisfied by a member of the Advisory Board on Aero- 
nautics, whose integrity he had absolute faith in, that, though 
the facts were damaging, they did not have a material effect 
upon the price to be paid. 68. 

The facts were, he stated, that a member of a legal committee 
on the advisory committee on recommendations was, in fact, 
a representative of the manufacturers — Mr. W. Benton Crips, 
of New York. 68. 

Asked if he knew of anything which would justify criticism in 
connection with the operations of the Government relating 
to aircraft. 70. 

Though he might have had somewhat different views as to the 
methods in which the business might have been conducted. 
71. 

Felt there had been a great deal of lost motion. 73. 

States, for the purposes of the record, the advantages of a cor- 
poration. 73-80. 

Asked if the corporation had not really been thought of as a 
means of evading the inhibition of the statute. 75. 

In this connection, it was seven months after the country went 
to war before the machinery was provided for advancing 
money to manufacturers. 75. 

In the Army a man is either a clerk or an officer. He had the 
most inordinate amount of trouble in getting a commissioned 
personnel suitable to handle his finance department. 78. 

Could have handled the civilian work without encountering 
military requirements through a corporation. 80. 

He attempted, in recommending men for commission, to classify 
them as to rank according to the ability of the men. 81. 

Asked why it was that the equipment division of the finance de- 
partment was not more successful in establishing in the various 
plants a suitable accounting system under the cost-plus con- 
tract. 81. 

Asked what was the trouble in compelling contractors to keep 
the records and provide a system which would be adequate. 83. 
130687—19 20 



304 ABSTRACT OF AIECHAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. Melville W. Thompson — Continued. 

Thinks it was a great mistake that his status was changed in con- 
nection with the finance division. 83. 

Instead of being able to report direct to the Chief of the Signal 
Corps he could not make any complaints beyond his superior 
officer. 84. 

Col. Deeds was for a while his superior officer, then Gen. Squier 
and Col. Montgomery, no matter what organization had been 
had. 84. 

Asked as to the confusion which existed at the Curtiss plant, in 
which you could not tell what is Curtiss 's, what is the Army's* 
and what is the Navy's. 85. 

Those who were interested in getting production were not the 
same outfit that had to do with holding the manufacturers 
down. His idea as to how many accountants he should have 
i did not agree with the manufacturer's idea, and the manufac- 
turer complained to the production people, and the production 
people looked upon him as a nuisance. 85-86. 

He needed some 600 men for the accounting work, and was given 
135. 86. 

He was embarrassed a great deal by this, but thought he was 
impeded more by the refusal of the authorities above him to 
give him the number of commissions that he required. 

No appropriations existed at the time he began to organize by 
which he could employ civilian accountants. 87. 

Took him several months before he could get the Civil Service 
Commission to give him ratings under which he could employ 
men for several thousand dollars without examinations, and 
so on. 88. 
Col. M. W. Thompson (resumed) (August 29). 

Produces statement or argument with respect to the financial and 
economic machinery for providing the Army with airplanes 
in August, 1917. 89. 

This paper marked " Thompson Exhibit No. 8, August 29, 
1918." 89. 

Does not think that this statement ever reached Gen. Squier. 90. 

This paper formed the basis of John D. Ryan's request to Con- 
gress for the creation of such a corporation as is there recom- 
mended. 91. 

Taking the cost-plus contract as it was, there was, of course, an 
extremely difficult auditing system required in the case of 
plants where different types of articles were in the course of 
production at the same time. 99. 

But this was self- foreseeable. 99. 

Production department feared the accounts section would tend 
to be too technical in their requirements and might thereby 
scare the manufacturers. 102. 

The whole thing could only have been done by the method of 
giving him carte blanche to go ahead and do it and get com- 
petent men, regardless of the pay he had to give them and 
regardless of the military rank he had to give them when they 
came into the office. 104. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 305 

Col. M. W. Thompson — Continued. 

Had the restrictions of the military requirements and the restric- 
tions of the civil-service requirements to consider in a degree 
almost impossible to make clear. 105. 
Says it is not a fact that the more advantageous the contract is 
to the Government the less chance the contractor has to get 
advances. 114. 
States the history of the advances given to Siems-Carey, H. S. 
Kerbaugh Co., the amount originally suggested, and the 
amount by which it was reduced when the contract was ar- 
ranged more favorably to the Government. 115 to 131. 
Col. Henry E. Arnold (Washington, D. C, August 29, 1918; Book 

21 )« 

On July 1, 1917, was made executive officer of the Air Division. 

132. 

In February, 1918, was placed on the control board of the Signal 
Corps. 132. 

Air Service reorganized in May, 1918, and he was made assistant 
to the Chief of the Department of Military Aeronautics. 133. 

Was also a member of the Joint Technical Board of the Army 
and Navy. 134. 

Reads on the record certain extracts from the minutes of the 
Joint Army and Navy Board proceedings. 135 to 154, inclu- 
sive. 

Reads also the report of the Joint Army and Navy Technical 
Aircraft Board to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of 
the Navy, under date of May 23, 1917, which appears to have 
been approved by both the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Navy. 155 to 161. 

Reads a report from the above board to the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy under date of May 25, 1917. 162 to 
164. 

Reads in evidence a memo from Assistant Naval Constructor 

Hunsaker to Brig. Gen. Foulois, with inclosures of two page 
proofs of general specifications for airplanes. 164 to 166. 
(Dated Sept. 18, 1917; see p. 167.) 

Asked what the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board was 
doing between the month of May and the month of September. 
169. 

The Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, having made its 
recommendations in May, was not called upon for further 
action until September. 170. 

Mr. Hughes places on record the recommendations of the Army 
and Navy technical members of the aeronautical mission sent 
to Europe to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the 
Navy dated September 4, 1917. "Arnold Exhibit 9, August 29,, 
1918." 172. 

At same time there was a report of Naval Constructor Wester- 
velt. United States Navy, and Lieut. Child to the Secretary of 
the Navy on seaplane types in use in Great Britain, France, and 
Italy, and recommendations bearing on the United States naval 
aircraft manufacturing program. "Arnold Exhibit No. 10 ? 
August 29, 1918." 173. 






306 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Col. Henry E. Arnold — Continued. 

Introduces report from the Joint Army and Navy Technical Air- 
craft Board to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy on the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation and pro- 
duction of E-6 seaplanes, dated August 30, 1917. "Arnold Ex- 
hibit No. 11, August 29, 1918.'- 173. 

Report from the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board 
to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War on the sub- 
ject of the Navy air program, dated September 18, 1917. 
"Arnold Exhibit No. 12, August 29, 1918." 

Memorandum of September 22, 1917, subject " Naval aircraft re- 
quired to carrv out program alreadv authorized." 173. ("Ar- 
nold Exhibit No. 13, August 29, 1918.") 

November 1, 1917, memorandum of the naval production program 
from Assistant Naval Constructor Hunsaker. "Arnold Ex- 
hibit No. 14, August 29, 1918." 174. 

Protested against the purchase of the General Vehicle Co. in 
order to keep alive an organization for the making of rotary 
engines. 179-180. 

Thought it would have been much better to build fields or in- 
crease the facilities for ^training men rather than get engines 
that they could not see any use for. 180. 

The plant never was used for the manufacture of rotary engines, 
only for a matter of 200, then remained idle and is now manu- 
facturing the Hispano-Suiza engine, 181. 

The Mono Avroe, a plane which is particularly adapted for train- 
ing, in that when a man has been trained on that machine, after 
he is through he is able to step into anv kind of a seiwice ma- 
chine. 189. 

Memorandum from Lieut. Col. Jones, dated December 9, 1917, on 
the subject of 100 Mono Avros. 190. ("Arnold Exhibit 19, 
August 29, 1918.") 

Telegram to Gen. Foulois, recommending adopting Avro. 193. 

Telegram from Foulois saying Col. Lee, Royal Flying Corps, has 
Avro airplane and all training books with him, etc. 193. 

Next minute of January 11, 1918, from Joint Army and Navy 
Technical Aircraft Board to Secretary of the Navy quoting 
telegram from Gen. Pershing recommending adoption of Avro 
for primary training, etc. 195. 

It was resolved at this meeting that one aviation school be 
equipped with this type of airplane exclusively. 195. 

Never went into production ; not anv contracts even let for them 
that he knew of. 195-196. 

Asked with reference to the difficulty in getting equipment infor- 
mation regarding the DH4, states that the machine was never 
tested with a military load between the 1st of December and 
the time it was turned over to the Department of Military 
Aeronautics in May, 1918. 209. 

When telling the Chief Signal Officer that nobody knew how many 
miles per hour or feet per minute or what its ceiling is he would 
say, " Well, it will fly, won't it? " etc. 210. 

Saw the machine in February and it looked like a Christmas tree. 
Anvbody could take an instrument and put it on the machine. 
21L 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 307 

Col. Robert L. Montgomery (August 29, 1918 ; Book 21) . 

States the reasons for the acquisition of the plant of the General 
Vehicle Co. 258. 

Did not consider the phase of making compensation for the use of 
the plant during the war. 262. 

Thinks that the Union Switch & Signal Co., who already had a 
contract for 2,500 rotary engines, were looking to the General 
Vehicle Co. for aid in making these engines. 265. 

Asks whose initials those are that appear on the item " Notes 
payable, P. T. M., $1,530,408." 266. 

Knew nothing in any way which would furnish information 
that there were any individuals who were concerned in secur- 
ing this purchase, to the end that the obligations of the Gen- 
eral Vehicle Co. might be paid. 268. 

Did not make any examination of the facilities possessed by the 
Dayton- Wright Aircraft Co. 276. 

Took the word of Mr. Talbott, that he had a certain amount of 
money invested in it. 276. 

Did not get a balance sheet from the firm. 278. 

Did not know whether they had any capital stock paid in at the 
time this contract was awarded, nor whether they had any 
working capital or how they got it. 278. 

Small concerns were subjected to a pretty rigid scrutiny because 
they did not have large and well-known organizations. 279. 

It was his business to know, but did not know whether the con- 
tract in this case was actually made before the company had a 
title to a building or had paid up their capital stock, or had 
acquired any resources of a substantial character. 280, 281. 

Knew Mr. Talbott two months ; did not know Mr. Kettering at 
all. Relied upon the statements of Col. Deeds, Col. Waldon, 
and Mr. Coffin. 282. 

Yes; thought the matter of capital and resources was a matter 
of serious importance. 287. 

Does not know why a contract was refused to the Southern Air- 
craft Corporation, of High Point, N. C. 288. 

Nor the Singer Co., the selection of plants being left to Col. 
Waldon, Col. Deeds, and Mr. Coffin. 289. 

Asked why it would not have been just as easy to have doubled 
the number of De Havilands, or of any other type of plane it 
was desired to build, as to get the number of planes that were 
actually built for shipment to the other side if the facilities 
of the Singer Co. had been availed of. 290. 

Can not answer this question. 299. 

Asked as to negotiations in connection with the forming of a 
Government corporation for the purpose of handling various 
matters that would be connected with the conduct of the cost- 
plus contract. 294. 

Remembers that he thought it impractical. 294. 

Does not know whether an effort was made with Congress, but 
states that he personally, with Col. House and several others, 
urged Mr. Coffin very strongly to do this. 295. 

Thinks Mr. Coffin simply could not get it through. 295. 



308 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. Robert L. Montgomery — Continued. 

Realized the difficulties which would be met in a military organ- 
ization with rank determined according to military methods, 
etc. 296. 

States that representations from Congress were against this 
method. 299. 

Says there was a construction by the Secretary of War and 
Secretary of the Navy supplemental to the statute which held 
the board clown to simply advisory functions. 300. 

Does not think anything was ever clone in the way of a recom- 
mendation to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy that the full scope of the statute should be permitted in 
operation. 300. 

Asked if it was not a fact that the limitations of which he and 
others had spoken in respect to the activities of the Aircraft 
Board were in a large measure due to the definition of the 
authority of that board as made by the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy and the authority reposed in them 
by the act of Congress. 302. 

When Col. Deeds was the head of the Equipment Division, 
which was down to some time in January, 1918, he was his 
aide in connection with financial matters, dealing with con- 
tractors for that side, but not his aide in connection with en- 
gineering and production matters. 311. 

Is shown exhibit called " Zacharias Exhibit 1," which shows the 
variations from day to dav almost of the program for the 
De Haviland 4s. 322. 

Asked who was responsible for getting up any such program as 
that, he replied he thought it was a guess of Col. Waldon, 
Col. Deeds, and Mr. Coffin. 324. 

Is shown Zacharias Exhibit 3 regarding the Handley-Paiges ex- 
pected. 324. 

States that it was certainly not intended by whoever did it to 
be used as a definite program of production. It was their 
guess of what could be done. 325. 

States he has never seen either of these programs. 329. 

Placed the resnonsibilitv in a way on Maj. Sheppler and Maj. 
Gray. 334. 

Yes; did remember a constant complaint from the Dayton 
Wright Co. that they did not give them full information to 
go ahead with production. 334. 

Thinks the statement is largely correct, but not entirely ; that the 
redesigning of these combat planes had been largely left to 
the manufacturers themselves. 339. 

The Government had not organized and established an engi- 
neering department which was adequate to the undertaking of 
the complete design and had to rely upon the engineering de- 
partments of manufacturing concerns which had never be- 
come familiar enough with the undertaking to achieve prompt 
results. 339. 

Asked if he could tell any reason why the Government did not 
establish in the very beginning of this a competent engineer- 
ing department, and leave to it the rapid designing of the 






ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 309 

Col. Robert L, Montgomery — Continued. 

planes so that the designs complete could be given to the 
manufacturers and quantity production accelerated. 340. 

Says the Government did not have the men, and the manufac- 
turers did not have the men, either. 340. 

Says there were very few men who were capable of designing 
an airplane in this country when the war started. 340. 
J. S. McGregor (August 29, 1918; Book 21). 

Asked to recall the statement he signed setting forth the woods 
that were satisfactory for the making of propellers for com- 
bat planes, and also stating the order of preference. 346. 

In that statement he placed African mahogany last, and put 
ahead of African mahogany quarter-sawed white oak. 346. 

Quarter sawn oak was first approved at a meeting of the Inter- 
national Aircraft Standards Board held some time during the 
summer of 1917. 348. 

The objections to African mahogany is that it varies consider- 
ably in quality, some of it being very weak, and inspection 
would be so far from the source that it would be very difficult 
to be sure vou were getting the species ordered. 349. 
Hon. Newton D. Baker (August 30, 1918; Book 21). 

Goes into resume of conditions prior to the entry of this country 
into the war. 351. 

Then takes up the question of what provision was made for the 
establishment of a program of aircraft production. 352. 

After a few preliminary arrangements did not concern himself 
further personallv with the organization of the aircraft activi- 
ties. 354. 

Gen. Squier reported to him through the Chief of Staff. 354. 

Had many discussions with Gen. Squier regarding aircraft 
problems which ultimately turned, imperceptibly, he thought, 
into Mr. Coffin, who was a member of the advisory committee 
of the Council of National Defense. 354. 

Mr. Coffin, then Mr. Deeds, and now Col. Deeds, and Col. Mont- 
gomery, then Mr. Montgomery, formed themselves into a 
group associated with the Chief Signal Office, Gen. Squier, 
and developed this large so-called $640,000,000 appropriation 
which as he recalled it was broached to a group of newspaper 
editors in New York Citv before it was broached to him. 
355. 

This group was approached with his general knowledge as a 
means to inspire the Congress in its ideas with regard to air 
craft, and the address to these men was intended as a pre- 
lude to presenting the matter to Congress. 355. 

Mr. Coffin had prior to the war made a survey of the industrial 
concerns of the United States. Had catalogued the manu- 
facturing facilities of the United States covering some 30,000 
factories. 355. 

Mr. Coffin was a manufacturing man and very expert in indus- 
trial matters, 356. 

Did not know who selected Col. Montgomery, but it was doubt- 
less done in conference with Mr. Coffin and Gen. Squier. 357. 

Never knew Mr. Deeds until he saw him in the aircraft work. 
357. 



310 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Hon. Newton D. Baker — Continued. 

Council of National Defense had no executive function. 357. 

Was purely an advisory body. Suggestions regarding every de- 
partment poured in there. 358. 

First says no, but later, yes, that the Aircraft Production Board 
originally was a mere committee or auxiliary of the Council 
of National Defense prior to the act of Congress establishing 
the Aircraft Board. 358. 

The Council of National Defense could constitute such bodies as 
might aid it in its work. 358. 

One of the bodies which was constituted was this organization 
called the Aircraft Production Board. 358-359. 

Gives his understanding of the function of the Aircraft Board 
established by act of Congress. 359. 

Aircraft Board when the act was passed, about the 1st of Octo- 
ber, was approved by him as it was then constituted, with 
designations of the Army members; 360. 

Had made no special inquiry outside the War Department with 
respect to qualifications of Mr. Deeds or Mr. Montgomery. 
Relied undoubtedly on Gen. Squier's recommendation, and 
Mr. Coffin's. 360. 

Section 4 of the act and section 5 of the act are read to him, and 
he is asked if the construction of the act and the function of 
the board under these general provisions and the extent of 
his own authority in conjunction with the Secretary of the 
Navy to establish the limits of the activities of the board 
have been brought to his attention. 362. 

Is read the opinion of Judge Ansell, etc., under date of February 
14, 1918, which after reviewing the terms of the act just read 
(sections 4 and 5) says: "This office concurs with the counsel 
for the Aircraft Board in the opinion that only advisory 
functions with reference to these matters may be conferred 
upon the Aircraft Board/' 362. 

No; this was not the opinion Mr. Baker entertained. 363. 

His idea was that subject to the awarding of contracts through 
regular channels they were permitted, with the consent and 
approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy, actually to supervise and direct, as the act reads, the 
activities of the board. 363. 

Judge Ansell 's opinion was given out at his request, in that he 
called for an interpretation of the act by the Judge Advocate 
General's office. 363. 

Is read order issued on February 25, 1918, signed by Gen. Squier, 
and approved by him and also by Secretary Daniels, defining 
the functions of the Aircraft Board. 364^-366. 

His attention is called to the difference between the act of Con- 
gress and the provision of this order. Is asked who proposed 
the provision of the order referred to. 367. 

Did not recall any discussion of the apparent limitation. 368. 

Is asked concerning another provision of the order stating that 
all programs shall be made by the board from information 
which shall be furnished by the proper Army and Navy mili- 
tary and naval branches on the one hand, etc. Is asked the 
origin of the limitations as to the source of procurement. 368. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 311 

Hon. Newton D. Baker — Continued. 

Can not answer this. 368. 

His understanding is that this order met with the approval of 
the Aircraft Board. 369. 

Does not know of any complaint made of the limitation of pow- 
ers of the Aircraft Board during the period of the board's 
activities prior to May. 369. 

His attention had never before been called to the provision that 
the members of the Aircraft Board should have no direct 
communication with the manufacturing plants, which, with 
his authority and that of the Secretary of the Navy, they were 
supposed to supervise. 370. 

The only explanation he can give is that they did not want to 
confuse the manufacturers as to who their bosses were. 370. 

Is asked with respect to the provisions that were made here for 
the organization of a competent engineering department to 
act in the matter of the settlement of designs for the planes 
which this country was to build. 372. 

Can not answer this. 372. 

The Secretary of the Navy writes to him on April 27, 1917, pro- 
posing a joint technical board on aircraft, etc., to standardize 
designs and general specifications for aircraft * * * the 
board to be composed of technical and expert men, * * * 
all of which has Mr. Baker's hearty approval. 373. 

The board being composed of technical and expert men, is asked 
if their recommendations were followed. 373. 

Mr. Baker thinks their recommendations were supplemented by 
recommendations from abroad. 373, 374. 

States why he thinks the lack of concentration of responsibilit}^ 
and the existence of various bodies with ill-defined functions 
was inevitable. 376. 

Is further reminded of the failure to prepare designs and a 
division of responsibility with regard to the preparation and 
settlement of designs for the manufacturers to follow, and 
asked to keep it apart from voluntary activities. 378, 379. 

Had never been brought to his attention when the contracts 
were let for the De Haviland 4s and for the production of 
the Bristol and it became apparent that it would be necessary 
to redesign these machines in order that they might be adapted 
to the Liberty motor, that the Government was largely de- 
pending upon the manufacturers themselves to aid in the re- 
designing, and that the Government had not provided com- 
petent and adequate engineering department to settle upon a 
design to be given to the manufacturers to produce. 380. 

He regarded Gen. Squier as the authoritative person to inform 
him of any difficulties that existed and to see that such or- 
ganizations were evolved as would accomplish the purpose. 
381. 

States he did, in the course of the winter, undertake to inquire 
Avhat the needs for delaying production were. 381, 382. 

Summarizes the results. 383. 

He asked Mr. Eugene Meyer, for one, to visit the airplane fac- 
tories, * * * consult with the members and find out if he 
could the difficulties they were having, etc. 382. 



312 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Hon. Newton D. Baker — Continued. 

He can not recall Mr. Meyer having told him that he did not re- 
gard Mr. Deeds or Mr. Montgomery or Gen. Squier as men 
who were adequate for the performance of the work. 383. 
(Mr. Meyer has testified to this in the course of the inquiry.) 

Is read extract from a letter signed by the chairman of the na- 
tional advisory committee on aeronautics and the chairman 
of the executive committee of that committee, addressed to the 
President, January 24, 1918, which is a very noteworthy 
statement. * * * Quantity production has been made in 
several large plants to such an extent that quantity produc- 
tion has begun and will be continued with satisfactory results. 
383, 384. 

Is also read extract concerning motors. * * * motors are 
now in production in six of the best equipped plants in the 
country. 385. 

This was never brought to his attention. 386. 

Gen. Squier was a member of the committee, and was present 
at the meeting at which this letter was adopted to be sent to 
the President. Col. Deeds also appeared before the board 
and gave the committee information on the matter. 386. 

Considering the conditions with respect to the Bristol, thinks 
this was a serious matter. 388. 

Further about Mr. Meyer's testimony. 388-391. 

He never had in mind that he should consider the possibility 
of establishing Mr. Deeds, or Col. Deeds, as an independent 
or superior agent in this enterprise. 391. 

Did not know that Col. Deeds, as the head of the equipment 
division, down to some time in January. 1918, was the actual 
executive in that matter to whom Gen. Squier delegated the 
authority relating to the production of aircraft. 391. 

Relates what information he had of Col. Deeds relative to the 
very large number of activities that related to aircraft centered 
in Dayton, Ohio. 393-395. 

Did not know that Col. Deeds had made transfers of his interests 
to his associates and had taken their personal notes without 
security, which notes remained unpaid. 395. 

Will ask Inspector General to get any reports he has affecting 
this Dayton matter, etc. 399. 

With regard to this general survey made of industrial facilities 
before the war, is asked with regard to the offer of the Singer 
factory with extensive facilities. 400. 

Did not undertake to inquire why certain large concerns were 
not used, or why certain small concerns were used, or why 
the Day ton- Wright Co. was used ahead of others. 401. 

Only kept in touch with matters relating to production to this 
extent, that a weekly report was made to him of the output 
of every war supply. 402. 

When it appeared that production was seriously delayed, took 
the measure spoken of; that is, he consulted Mr. Eugene 
Meyer, a production expert, and asked him to tell him what 
the trouble was. 402. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 313 

Hon. Newton D. Baker — Continued. 

Then he went abroad; when he came back Snowden Marshall 
report had been made in his absence, and the so-called Borg- 
lum report had been completely made and supplemental 
papers to it had been filed with the President. All of the 
things alleged by Mr. Borglum had been iuquired into by 
Mr. Meyer for Mr. Baker. 403. 

Came back from Europe at the time President Wilson had de- 
termined to make a revision of the development of the de- 
partment. 403. 

Sailed for Europe on 27th day of February; returned between 
the middle and last of April. 403. 

Is asked with regard to the various programs of the produc- 
tion of planes, with statements of the dates on which these 
programs were formulated, and the dates on which the de- 
liveries on the planes were expected, as received from the 
planning department of the equipment division. 403. 

Never saw them. 404. 

Is shown the remarkable sheet on De Haviland 4's. 404. 

Admits that the statements are striking, and says it was the 
most contagious disease that every struck any place. 404. 

Says that the men engaged in production took the manufac- 
turers' view. 405. 

Would not say whether this statement just shown to him was 
the manufacturers' view or not. 405. 

Is questioned about two statements by him, for release in the 
papers Friday, October 4, 1917, and one for release in the 
papers February 21, 1918. 405^07. 

Object was to stop loose and misleading statements made from 
many sources. 406. 

Second statement contained : " The first American-built battle 
planes are to-day en route to the front in France * * * 
marks the final overcoming of many difficulties," etc. 407. 

Afterwards learned that it was an absolutely misleading state- 
ment. 407. 

Mr. Baker relied entirely upon the facts as stated by Gen. 
Squier and Col. Deeds. 410. 

Did not learn of the inaccuracies of this statement until he 
returned from Europe. 411. 

Yes ; had been advised that Col. Boiling had placed orders with 
the French Government for a considerable number of planes 
that could be used by this country before they could get into 
production on this side. 414. 

States he knew that the French Government would be unable 
or were unwilling to fill these orders. 415. 

Gives his reasons for the inability of the French Government to 
fill these orders as those of one who has been over there and 
knew the actual conditions. 415-418. 

Asked for information as to failure to supplv raw materials 
wanted by France. 418-423. 

With reference to the De Haviland 4, representatives from the 
Signal Corps said that they could not get from the other 
side correct information as to what materials were needed for 
equipment or what the equipment was to be. 424. 



314 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Hon. Neavton D. Baker — Continued. 

Mr. Baker explains the difficulties to be encountered. 426. 

Mr. Baker is informed that those are not the difficulties pre- 
sented in the report. Could not get definite information from 
the other side as to just what it was that was desired. 428. 

Mr. Baker states this has never been called to his attention. 
428. 

Thinks if it had been brought to his attention he could have 
gotten the kind of information they wanted, but still he 
imagines that they, on the other side, not having seen the 
De Haviland 4 as it was being built on this side, and wanting 
as many guns on the machine as possible, might well have 
hesitated. 429. 

Admits that if one hesitates as to what one wants one never 
would get the planes. 429. 

Is asked regarding the large number of students sent over to 
France, and after they got there there being no facilities for 
training. 432-435. 

Explains with reference to the cancellation of a contract with 
the Engle Aircraft Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, with which his 
brother was associated. 435-439. 
Edward Norton Chilson (Washington, D. C, August 30; Book 21). 

Manager of purchases for the J. G. White Engineering Cor- 
poration. 441. 

Had a small contract with the Signal Corps for supply of 
materials in June, 1917. 441. (No. 1381.) 

Next contract, No. 1694, covered materials to be sent to France 
442. 

Produces other contract that covers materials. 442. 

Exhibit 4 or the main purchase contract, No. 1694, dated Sep- 
tember 13, 1917, was entered into for the purpose of providing 
raw materials required for the manufacture of planes and 
engines in France under a contract which had been made by 
the Government there. 445. 

Explains specifications for materials under that contract which 
it was impossible to comply with. 445-448. 

Not finally met until after the first of the year. 448. 

Explains one of the specifications hard to meet encountered bv 
the Summerill Tool Co. 449. 

The 1 per cent of the materials not yet supplied did not embrace 
anything required for the Hispano-Suizas. 452. 

Only relates to the 1,500 Renault. 453. 

They supplied everything required for the Breguet excepting 
the wood, and the Signal Corps contracts had to supply that. 
453. 

For the spads they only failed to have the tubing required, but 
they supplied enough tubing to have made 1,500 spads. 454. 

They were not let have any further information after they 
delivered the goods to the point of embarkation. 455. 

Reports show that these materials have been shipped far in 
excess of the amounts represented by the planes delivered. 
455-456. 



ABSTKACT OP AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 315 

Edward Nortox Chilsox — Continued. 

After giving figures relating to the percentages supplied states 
that there were sufficient raw materials in the 58 per cent 
furnished to the French manufacturers to have enabled the 
French Government to proceed at once had they received it 
promptly. 457. 

He reports that one of the receiving men at the embarkation 
point of Brunswick, Ga., reported over a million pounds of 
material that had been there over 300 days and still there. 
457. (500 tons.) 

Some of the raw materials could have been devoted to other 
purposes, but most of it was material in connection with 
engines and planes. 460. 

Their business upon completion of orders all transacted with 
the officer at the port of embarkation and had to notify the 
Signal Corps in Washington. 461. 

Notified Col. Sidney D. Walclon, and after he went to France 
notified Maj. Leonard L. Horner. 462. 

The Government has paid, to August 27, $8,938,825.43 for these 
materials. 463. 

Freight and miscellaneous charges amount to $170,624.52. 463. 

Did not put the Government to any added expense by using com- 
mercial bills of lading. 479. 

Submitted a memorandum to the Signal Corps outlining the 
methods they proposed following in connection with all ship- 
ments for which they were responsible. 479. 

Pages 480 to 507 contain copies of orders, total tonnage shipped, 
kinds of material used, etc. 
Earl Thomas Oakes (Washington, D. C, August 30, 1918; Book 21). 

Chemist by occupation. 508. 

Assistant to Dr. Beans in the general laboratory in the Bureau 
of Aircraft Production. 508. 

Held this position since October 1, 1917. 508. 

Was at the Curtiss plant, at Buffalo, from May 5 until Septem- 
ber 30, 1917. 510. 

Asked to state conditions, as he found them at the Curtiss plant 
during this stay, as regards tests and laboratory work. 510. 

Very little attention was paid to what the Government wanted 
or what they did not want in regard to that work. 510. 

Curtiss plant did not maintain a laboratory at all until the Brit- 
ish refused to accept any more planes. 511. 

Poorly operated and supervised when they did put it in ; results 
of tests often disregarded and the material accepted anyhow. 
511. 

Supposed to pass on all raw materials. 512. 

Poor chemical laboratory conditions not remedied. 512. 

He was supposed to pass on raw materials on the basis of the 
laboratory tests, but often laboratory tests were not reliable 
enough to form a basis for passing on materials ; and often, if 
rejected by him and the other Army of inspection, used any- 
way. 514. 

Eeports this condition June 8 or 10. The report. 515-518. 

Nothing followed this report. Fixes another report and states 
that none of these things have been remedied, and senior in- 
spector tells him his report can not go through. 518. 



316 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Earl Thomas Oakes — Continued. 

Tests at the Bureau of Standards showed the Curtiss's tests to 
be unreliable. 522. 

This was reported to the Signal Corps. 523. 

Nothing came from any of it at all. 524. 

These conditions existed at the Churchill Street plant, 527. 

Improper way of using the dope. Eecommended by Mr. Muel- 
ler in order to keep up production. 544. 

Produces report on the whole situation to Mr. Costello. 555-562. 

Rejected material put in and accepted. 562. 

Shipped material to Detroit before it had been tested. 562. 

On another occasion they made tie-rods, specified at 105,000 
pounds per square inch of tensile strength, which fell below 
95,000. Found out that instead of making them out of steel 
which specified 0.25 and 0.35 per cent of carbon, they were 
making them out of steel as low as 0.16 and 0.18 per cent car- 
bon. 563. 

Used silver solder, instead of tin which was just as good, which 
cost the Government $7,000 or $8,000 a year, and the tin 
would have cost $400. 579. 
Col. H. H. Arnold (Washington, D. C, August 31, 1918; Book 21). 

Explains the delay in testing the DeHaviland machine and the 
reason for it. 588. 

Col. B. Q. Jones asked permission to fly this first machine, but 
this was refused, on the ground that it was the only machine 
in existence, and if it got all broken up it would cause serious 
delay in the production. 589. 

No performance tests were made. 589. 

Told by Chief Signal Officer that tests were not necessary, that 
machine could fly, and that was all that was necessary. 590. 

Shipped some planes to Gerstner Field, La., for tests. 591. 

Eacliator problems to be solved by Maj. Gray. 591. 

Machine turned over to Air Division for test about April 7 for 
first time. 593. 

According to the charge approximately 70 machines were made 
without testing. 598. 

The De Haviland 4 finally tested, at first proved unsatisfactory. 
Two men killed in this" test. 600. 

The machine overloaded in pounds per square foot. 601. 

The tests continued, and finally machine is passed as an accept- 
able machine for use at the front, not as good as ought to be, 
but better than nothing. 602. 

This is the condition in which these machines had been shipped 
prior to this time. 602. 

Modifications suggested by them same as those suggested by 
Gen. Pershing in his telegram. 602. 

The Dayton-Wright plant took machines right off the floor and 
boxed them up to ship overseas without flving them at all. 
609. 

After May they were tested, but not before. They hurried them 
off so that they could say thev had shipped some machines. 
610. 

Explains the difference in flying a machine with a military load, 
to meet military requirements, and flying one that did not have 
a military load. 613-614, 615, 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 31 T 

Capt. E. J. Clark (Washington, D. C., August 31, 1918; Book 21). 
Submits the correspondence relating to negotiations with the 

Patterson Aeroplane Co., of Detroit. 667. 
Is asked concerning letter dated July 27, 1918, addressed to Mr. 

Fletcher. 667. 

(From the Patterson Aeroplane Co., of Detroit.) 
Pages 667 to 672 contain the letter. 
Produces report submitted by him on this subject and letter 

received in reply. 675. 
Other papers, pages 676 to 687. 
Col. R. L. Montgomery (Washington, D. C, September 30, 1918;. 

book 22). 
Additional statement correcting previous testimony. 1-10. 
Lieut. Col. Jesse Gtjrney Vincent (Washington, D. C., September 

30, 1918; Book 22). 
Was a mechanical engineer with Packard Motor Car Co., of 

Detroit, before entering the Army. 11. 
Held position of vice president in charge of engineering with 

that company for about two years; prior to that was chief 

engineer of the company. 11. 
Gives mechanical training. 11. 
First came to Washington in connection with the development 

of a standardized aircraft engine, since known as the Liberty 

motor, on May 27, 1917. 12. 
Received a commission in the Army on September 3, 1917. 13. 
Was loaned to the Government by the Packard Motor Car Co. 

up until August 15, 1917. 13. 
Has received no compensation from Packard Co. since August 

15 with exception of some dividends on some stock which he 

owns in company. 13. 
Owns about $60,000 worth of common stock, par value. 11. 
Salary with Packard Co. for year August, 1916, to August, 

1917, was $25,000. 19. 
Makes statement of his experience with airplane engines and 

their development. 24-33. 
Report made by Col. Hall and witness as to the advisability and 

what should be done to standardize an American airplane en- 
gine was marked " Vincent Exhibit 1, September 30, 1918." 

Inserted in record. 35-43. 
After report was received by Aircraft Board, Col. Hall and 

witness were requested by board to go back to work and sub- 
mit complete drawings of the standardized engine which was 

proposed. 43. 
On June 4 was advised by Mr. Deeds that $250,000 had been set 

aside and that he was to go back to Detroit and get the work 

started on sample of 8-cylinder engine. 45. 
Went back to Detroit with an order for five 8-cylinder engines 

to be built by the Packard Motor Co. 46. 
First engine was built by no less than 12 different concerns. 46. 
First engine was completed in 21 days from the time drawings. 

were started. 49. 
Reports from abroad in July, 1917, indicated that the 8-cylinder 

engine should not be made, but that a 12-cylinder engine was 

desirable. 55. 



318 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Jesse Gtjrney Vincent — Continued. 

Beport made by Inspector Lynn Reynolds to Government on test 
of 12 -cylinder engines was marked " Vincent Exhibit No. 2, 
September 30, 1918." and is inserted in the record. 61-88. 

Results of test were so conclusive that it was immediately de- 
cided to put the engine into production in large quantities. 89. 

Mr. Oily, of Rolls Royce interests, suggested a change in the oil 
pump, to make the motor what is called a dry crank case job. 
103. 

Mr. Oily also suggested that the propeller hub be made detach- 
able instead of shrunk on. Both of these changes were ap- 
proved. 103. 

An airplane engine developing 400 horsepower on the ground 
develops 200 horsepower at 20,000 feet. 105. 

Crank shaft was too light to be produced commercially and was 
made heavier. 107. 

In his opinion, production was not delayed more than two weeks 
by the changes referred to. 109. 

Knows of no other changes of an important character that were 
made in the Liberty motor. 109. 

Was not consulted at all about schedules placed in contracts of 
companies. 110. 

With reference to speed in production, thinks Ford Co. con- 
tracted to do something that was impossible. 112. 

Col. Clark nominally had charge of the Airplane Experimental 
Department until he took charge of it about February 6, 1918. 
133. 

This experimental department was to embrace both planes and 
engines. 134. 

Protested against the Airplane Experimental Department be- 
cause he did not think it gave them any authority or responsi- 
bility. 135. 

Argued for engineering department with the idea that it would 
take entire charge of engineering and definitely straighten 
out what he thought was an unsettled condition ; one of which 
was the putting of planes into production in this country with- 
out having complete drawings or a complete understanding as 
to just what equipment such planes were to carry. 136. 

First established his office in Dayton early in October, 1917. 
138. 

Up to February 6 he was known as executive officer of the Air- 
plane Experimental Department. 139. 

Did not have anything to do with the designing of planes as dis- 
tinguished from engines. 141. 

Supervised the construction of McCook Field. 144. 

Was instrumental in selecting the site of McCook Field. 145. 

Moraine Field is what is now known as South Field and is a part 
of Col. Deeds's old farm. 148. 

North Field was at the time they went out there a training field 
used by the Dayton- Wright Co. L T nderstood that at least a 
part of that field was owned jointly by Col. Deeds and Mr. 
Kettering. 

Went to Dayton with the idea of taking what was known as 
Moraine Flying Field. 149. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION". 319 

Lieut. Col. Jesse Gurnet Vincent — Continued. 

Col. Clark telegraphed from Dayton suggesting North Field. 
153. 

Mr. Talbott and Mr. Kettering suggested McCook Field. 154. 

No one on the part of the airplane experimental department was 
giving attention to the settlement of the design of the De 
Haviland 4. 154. 

Col. Clark did not agree it was up to us and upon investigation 
found the Dayton- Wright Co. did not consider we had any- 
thing to do with it. 154. That the airplane experimental de- 
partment had anything to do with the settling of the design 
of the De Haviland 4 plane. 155. 

Had many arguments with Col. Clark about the matter. 156. 

His position that the Government ought to determine what was 
to be made and then give it to the manufacturer to make. 156. 

Took up matter with Col. Deeds. 156. 

Col. Clark had several well qualified theoretical aerodynamic 
engineers with him. 159. 

With the exception of Col. Clark, who did the preliminary work 
on the design of the Bristol Fighter to adapt it to the Liberty 
12, none of these men who had had experience were having 
anything to do with settling the De Haviland 4 or the Bristols, 
or any problems related to the actual program. 160. 

Production engineering department did not have anybody that 
he knew of who had any experience in airplane designing. 161. 

As soon as he was given control of McCook Field he began to 
direct efforts toward getting some machines ready for produc- 
tion rather than doing purely experimental or research work. 
Obtained permission to take the De Haviland 9 away from the 
Dayton- Wright Co. at South Field and put it through McCook 
Field. 163. ■ 

This particular machine was a sample that had been built by 
Dayton-Wright from such meager information as they could 
obtain from abroad. 164. 

Was not until the latter part of March or April of this }^ear that 
they succeeded in obtaining a De Haviland 9 from Europe. 
Witnesses who have testified to the receipt of the De Haviland 
9 in October are mistaken. 164. 

The De Haviland 9 was completed up to the point of equipment 
of bombs before January 1. 168. 

The De Haviland 9 is being put out of production abroad. 171. 

De Haviland 9-A, equipped with Liberty 12, took its place. 171. 

On February 6, when at McCook Field, made efforts to get De 
Haviland 9, Lapere two-seater fighter, VE 7 advanced training 
machine ready for production, and a little later the U. S. B. 1 
and U. S. B. 2. 173. 

Mr. Nash put him in full charge of engineering department on 
July 23, 1918. 176. Department was called the Airplane En- 
gineering Division of the Bureau of Aircraft Production. 177. 

The testing and final say on new machines is still with the tech- 
nical section of the Department of Military Aeronautics. 178. 

Can not say why De Haviland 4 was permitted to go so far into 
production without test. 184. 

130687—19 21 



320 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. Jesse Gurnet Vincent — Continued. 

Mr. J. V. Martin is considered a pest, not only by the engineers 
of this country but also those of Europe. 192. 

Witness is shown Blakeley Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 relative to vouchers 

covering payments to the Packard Co. on development work of 

Liberty motor and questioned as to the amounts, etc. 193-240. 

James V. Martin (Washington, D. C, September 30, 1918 ; Book 22). 

Profession was a master mariner. Now a member of nav al auxil- 
iary on leave from overseas Avork to do work for the airplane 
engineering department of the Army and for the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair of the Navy. 240. 

Became a master mariner in November, 1912. 240. 

Has not had any experience in mechanics outside of navigation. 
241. 

First became interested in aeronautics in 1908 at Harvard Uni- 
versity through Mr. Herring, of the Herring- Curtiss Co. 242. 

Constructed the second airplane in the history of the War De- 
partment. 242. 

Was in Europe in latter part of summer of 1909 and met the 
pioneers in airplane work, such as Bleriot, Grahame- White, 
Mr. Handley-Paige, A. V. Eoe, of England, and others. 243. 

Organized the Harvard Aeronautical Society and built and flew 
the Harvard 1, an airplane for this society at Harvard Uni- 
versity. 243. 

In 1910 held first big international meet in the United States, the 
Harvard-Boston meet, and brought Grahame-White to the 
United States, etc. 243. 

Went to England and as an employee of Mr. Grahame-White 
became chief instructor of the London Aerodrome. 244. 

Gives list of men prominent in British air ministry whom he 
trained. 244. 

Returned to United States in May, 1911, and originated and 
demonstrated the type of machine which is used exclusively 
by the United States Army to-day, the tractor biplane. 245. 

De Haviland 4 is based on that macnine. 246. 

Left nothing undone to prepare himself in experience as the 
leading tractor biplane designer of America. 255. 

After war broke out made trips to Europe to acquaint himself 
with planes that were used in fighting. 255. 

From the inception of the European war he had endeavored to 
secure the attention of the Government aviation authorities to 
certain airplane efficiency features, etc. 257. 

British Government sent over with him the A B C motor. 258. 

Built plane called Kitten 3 in this country, which is the third 
modification of the British Kittens. 263. 

The ABC motor is used in the B. A. T. and Sop with ma- 
chines. 267. 

Showed design of two-place reconnaissance fighter to Col. Clark. 
268. _ 

Committee advised Col. Vincent to let him build two of them. 
269. 

Model was built and tested in the Washington Navy Yard wind 
tunnel more than two months ago. 271. 

Col. Vincent has been acquainted with result of test. 272. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 321 

James V. Martin — Continued. 

Offered services to Government to have it built, and offer is not 
receiving a bit of consideration. 273. 

Order for 10 planes was to keep him going while he was doing 
the bombing work. 

Always held his own services and those of his organization at 
the service of the Government without profit during the war. 
282. 

Motors have been decided on the night bomber which he built 
which are not fit to go into the plane. 283. 
Brig. Gen. Charles McKinley Saltzman (Washington, D. C, Oc- 
tober 1, 1918; Book 22). 

Brigadier general, Signal Corps. 293. 

Entered West Point on June 15, 1892, and became a commis- 
sioned officer on June 15, 1896. 293. 

At time of our entry into war was on duty in the office of the 
Chief Signal Officer of the Army. 293. 

When we entered war, aviation section was a small branch of the 
Signal Corps, consisting of less than 100 officers and probably 
about 1,000 men. 294. 

Col. J. B. Bennett was officer in charge of the air division at 
that time. 294. 

Did not have any combat planes at that time. 294. 

Had approximately 100 training planes. 294. 

Gives history of the development of the aviation section. 295, 

Had a number of conferences with Gen. Squier with a view 
toward having tighter executive control over all the divisions 
of his office. 299. . 

The policy Gen. Squier favored was to place an officer in charge 
of a division of his office, then look to him to go full speed 
ahead and accomplish results without coming to him. 299. 

Col. Deeds was put in charge of the equipment division and 
virtually left to carry out his own plans and purposes. 300. 

Aircraft board was purely advisory. 300. 

Other divisions of the office did not get prompt action ; they did 
not get prompt results from the equipment division. 300-A. 

In November was worried about equipment division and urged 
appointment of a strong executive who would be rather a 
central figure down there. Col. Deeds and Col. Montgomery 
appointed Col. Horner to meet this condition. 300-A. 

He strongly urged the appointment of Col. Edgar as executive 
officer. 302. 

Gen. Squier was absolutely satisfied with the work of Col. Deeds 
as the head of that division. 302. 

Knows of incidents where men who had been in various manu- 
facturing concerns were permitted to continue their activities 
in transactions of the Government relating to those concerns 
after thev had been brought into relation with the Signal 
Corps. 305. 

Enumerates and explains cases that he knows of. 305-315. 

Knows about the acquisition of the General Vehicle Co. 315. 

Asked Aircraft Board what object was in taking over plant to 
make rotary motors when the plan did not call for rotary 



322 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Brig. Gen. Charles McKinley Saltzman — Continued. 

motors. Was told that this industry must be kept up; that 
it was not known definitely but what we would want rotary 
motors next year. 316. 
Reference to the $250,000 set aside to carry on experimental 
work on Liberty motor at Packard Co., he is unable to state 
the occasion for the appointment of a special disbursing 
officer for that fund. 318. 
So far as he knows no special disbursing officer was appointed. 
The entire appropriation was disbursed under four vouchers — 
Blakely Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. 321. 
Any voucher certified to by Gen. Squire himself or anyone, 
civilian or officer, to whom he gave that authority to certify 
was sufficient for any payment within the appropriation. 323. 
Lieut. Col. Jesse Gurney Vincent (Washington, D. C, October 1, 
1918; Book 22). 
Makes supplementary statement with regard to vouchers for 
payment to Packard Motor Co. for experimental work on 
Liberty motors. 325. 
Talked with Col. Deeds about it a few minutes last evening. 

326. 
Stayed with Col. Deeds night before last and last evening at his 

residence. 326. 
Col. Deeds sent Maj. Souther out to see him. Maj. Souther 
made two trips to the Bureau of Standards and brought with 
him the second time an officer, a captain, whom he introduced 
to him as one of his assistants who had charge of the placing 
of orders and arranging payments. 325. 
Maj. Souther was one of the men who originally recommended 
going ahead with the development of the standardized engine, 
and he followed it very closely up to the time of his death. 
330. 
Asked if the captain to whom he referred was Capt. Elliott, but 

is unable to remember the name. 330. 
This captain was told about the work in connection with the 
vouchers and shown the equipment that had been delivered. 
331. 
Witness was asked " What was the purpose of bringing in a man 
who was a stranger to the transaction and showing him a lot 
of drawings?" 331. ^ : . 

Only knows what he was told by Maj. Souther as the job was 
put up to him to put the thing through the proper channels. 
332. 
Again questioned as to method used in arriving at amounts 
shown on vouchers paid Packard Co. in connection with ex- 
perimental work on Liberty motors. 334—353. 
Borglum Exhibit 23- A, a memorandum for Col. Waldon sent 
by Maj. Gray as chief of specification section with respect to 
accessories which should be used on Liberty motor; witness 
had interview or conversation with Maj. Gray with respect 
to the accessories which were to be used on the first 2.0,000 
Liberty motors. 353. 
Outlines talks he has had with Col. Deeds about the use of the 
Delco ignition on the Liberty motor. 355. 






ABSTRACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 323 

Lieut. Col. Jesse Gtjrney Vincent — Continued. 

Delco ignition costs approximately $150 a set. 357. 

When in Washington, Mr. Kettering stayed with him, or stayed 

with Col. Hall and him, who were occupying a suite of rooms 

which had been reserved by Mr. Deeds at the New Willard 

Hotel. 358. 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (Washington, D. C, October 1, 1918; 

Book 22). 

Witness asked to state a little more specifically how Wilbur 
Wright Field came to be selected. 359. 

Gen. Foulois had the sole responsibility of picking out fields. 
362. 

Col. Deeds and Mr. Orville Wright took Gen. Foulois and wit- 
ness out to this property in an automobile. 365. 

Can not state how it happened that 2,500 acres was selected. 
368. 

Rental was based on acreage. 369. 

In light of his present knowledge thinks 1,300 or 1,400 acres 
would have been enough. 369. 

Understood the property was in the ownership of the Miami 
Conservency Commission and that arrangement could be 
made with the Government through one ownership. 370. 

Marsh land was transferred back to the State in exchange for 
land at the side. 373. 

Thinks there is land down there rented by the Government 
that an airplane could not land on. 378. 

Had nothing to do with the selection of McCook Field. 379. 

McCook Field is one of the fields on which no option to pur- 
chase exists. 381. 

Col. Deeds told him there would be no option. 381. 

Asked as to why he took a lease on a field on which so much 
money was to be expended when he did not have an option 
to purchase, witness stated Col. Deeds directed him to do it. 
382. 
Horace B. Wild (Washington, D. C, October 1, 1918; Book 22). 

Aeronautical engineer. 385. 

Has been in that business about 15 years. 385. 

Has the third pilot license in the United States, issued by the 
Aero Club of America in September, 1910. 386. 

Made first flight over Chicago on January 3, 1906. 386. 

Chief engineer of Illinois Aircraft Corporation. 386. 

Spent $25,000 in training organization and building one plane 
for Government. 388. 

Capital stock of company $100,000. 388. 

Came to his notice that some of those chaps from Signal Corps 
were carrying on a system of graft. 390. 

Man's name was Donohue. He wears captain's chevrons now. 
390. 

Have made it very unpleasant for him because he tried tc* 
break up) work of grafting and padded pay rolls. 393. 

If Mr. Edison S. Williman, 29 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, 
of banking firm of Bowser & Williman, made statement be- 
fore committee, "he would make your hair stand on end." 
394. 



324 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Horace B. Wild — Continued. 

" They organized the Aircraft Manufacturers' Association, and 
the I. W. W., in my estimation, are angels alongside of those 
fellows." 400. 

Orville Wright told him a short time ago he had not even been 
consulted by the Dayton-Wright outfit, 400. 
Lester P. Barlow (Washington, D. C, October 1, 1918; Book 22). 

Went over to France to conduct tests of the Barlow heavy drop 
bombs in competition with bombs to be furnished by the 
allied government, 418. 

Did not see any De Haviland 4's over there. Understands 
there are some over there in storage at Bordeaux. 420. 

Bombing test was given up as far as dropping any bombs over 
the German lines was concerned for the simple reason there 
were no available planes for the work. 424. 

There are about 500,000 shells of the mark 1, 2, and 3 finished 
or being finished in this country, which will not be used, 
according to latest information from the United States Ord- 
nance Department. 427. 
Brig. Gen. Samuel Tildes Axsell (Washington, D. C. October 2, 
1918; Book 22). 

Assigned to duty in office of the Judge Advocate General. 430. 

Has no personal recollection of the case of Mr. E. A. Deeds, 
referred to his office for consideration, although an investi- 
gation might have been made in the office bv an assistant. 
431. 

Met Col. Deeds a week ago when he was invited to his home to 
meet a mutual friend visiting there. 431. 

Attention of witness directed to a letter written by Col. Deeds 
to the Aircraft Production Board, dated August 28, 1917, 
stating what he claimed to have been the disposition of certain 
interests that he had formerly held. 433. 

Testimony of Secretary of War before committee was read in 
which he stated Col. Deeds, then Mr. Deeds, came to his office 
with Judge McCann, his legal adviser, relative to straighten- 
ing out his business relations before accepting a commission. 
Secretary of War referred them to the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral and stated he had sent word to Judge Ansell. Some days 
later they (Mr. Deeds and his counsel) came back and said 
they had fixed up everything to Judge Ansell's satisfaction. 
433, 434. 

Does not refresh memory of witness. 434. 

"If there was anything written on the subject, and coming that 
pointedly to the office — I should have supposed something 
ordinarily would have been written — it is on the files." 435. 

Witness does not recall ever having heard of or having had to 
deal with any question of stock interest in the United Motors 
Corporation, Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co., Domestic 
Building Co., Dayton Metal Product Co., or Dayton- Wright 
Airplane Co. 436. 

Witness : " When I got your message this morning, when the 
chief clerk's search revealed nothing, I spoke to Gen. Crowder, 
and I found that some time in the spring of this year he had 
two officers of the department go over the Inspector General's 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 325 

Brig. Gen. Samuel Tilden Ansell — Continued. 

report, and all those officers coupled up that investigation 
with what palpably this investigating committee wanted to 
know, and he took charge of that. I was away at that time." 
438. 
Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (Washington, D. C, October 2, 1918; 
Book 22). 

Found in his files an order of April 28, 1917, ordering him to 
active duty. Was not in the position of a civilian employee 
but was a reserve officer on active duty at the time of the trans- 
action of the Wilbur Wright Field. 440. 

Copy of report of Maj. Foulois on the inspection of land for 
Aviation Service, with recommendations, dated May 11, marked 
" Edgar Exhibit 19, October 2, 1918." 441. 

Acted with the board but had no official status. 442. 

A little disturbed about his memory. 442. 

Authority or request for authority, signed by Gen. Squier, for 
the renting of site at Dayton — 2,500 acres — and the authority 
for building the camp with indorsements through channels 
marked/' Edgar Exhibit 20, October 2, 1918." 442. 

Received instructions to acquire the land in question, to take a 
lease for the Government of approximately 2,500 acres, known 
as the Wilbur Wright Field, at a rental of $17,500 per year 
with the privilege of renewal for three years and the option of 
purchase at $350,000, the cost of crop destruction being 
$75,000. 443. 

Judge Hughes: "And the statement in this letter that for the 
construction of cantonment buildings, etc., Dayton, Ohio, site 
for squadron, $1,300,000 ; for roadways, draining and water 
system, and the construction of cantonment buildings, was an 
underestimate ? " 444. 

Great question in mind of witness in regard to those estimates. 
They proved to be very much underestimated. Does not 
doubt but what those camps could have been built at the price 
fixed. 444. 

505.27 of these acres leased for Wilbur Wright Field later proved 
to be marshy land lying between Erie Railroad and the river. 
This was withdrawn and an equal value, amounting to 250.47 
acres, added. Of this amount the commanding officer ap- 
proved 74.94 acres and disapproved 175.53 acres, parts, if not 
all, of which were reported marshy. 447. 

These negotiations were handled by Maj. James S. Holden. 
448. 

In the rush of business turned the real estate matters over to 
Maj. Holden about August, 1917. 452. 

Judge Hughes: "And the rental is not $17,500, but $20,000 a 
vear. How do you explain that — that is, after the first year 1 " 
456. 

Witness has no memory on that subject at all. Thinks Maj. 
Holden can clear that up. 456. 

Has no further information about Wilbur Wright Field. 456. 

Letter from Chief Signal Officer to The Adjutant General rela- 
tive to increase in cost of site for aviation supply depot near 
Dayton, Ohio. 460. 



326 ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar — Continued. 

Judges Hughes takes up lease of McCook Field made by Dayton 

Metal Products Co. to the Government, in which there is no 

option to purchase. 464. 
Authority to lease for rental read into record. 467, 468. 
Col. Deeds had everything to do with the selection of the field, as 

far as he knows. There was no inspection of the field and 

no investigation of any sort done by his (witness) section. 

469. 
Col. E. A. Deeds (Washington, D. C, October 2, 1918; Book 22). 
Born on a farm near Granville, Ohio, March 12, 1874. 471. 
Family name has been Deeds for at least four generations; he 

thinks five. 472. 
Has no knowledge of its ever having been Dietz. 472. 
Gives briefly his career, including his business relations and ex- 
perience, down to time we entered the war. 472. 
Letter from Secretary of War, dated March 6, asking him to act 

on Munitions Standard Board, marked " Deeds Exhibit 1, 

October 2, 1918." 474. 
Letter of acceptance, dated March 10, marked " Deeds Exhibit 

2, October 2, 1918." 474. 
Telegram of April 4, sent by Mr. Coffin, asking him to come to 

Washington at once, bringing Kettering and Talbott, marked 

" Deeds Exhibit 6, October 2, 1918." 475. 
Telegram sent by Mr. Deeds to Mr. Coffin at Darien, Ga., tenta- 
tively declining appointment on an aviation committee, 

marked " Deeds Exhibit 8, October 2, 1918." 480. 
Never knew Mr. Coffin intimately until he came to Washington. 

Had had a general acquaintance with him for a number of 

years — perhaps five. 481. 
Witness was to have been vice president of the Dayton-Wright 

Airplane Co. 482. 
Mr. Kettering and he owned 120 acres in the field later known 

as the McCook Field. 487. 
Dayton Metal Products Co. owned remainder of field, approxi- 
mately 80 acres. 487. 
Mr. Coffin's telegram of May 10, referring to membership on 

the Aircraft Production Board, marked "Deeds Exhibit 9, 

October 2, 1918." 491. 
Mr. Deeds's reply, accepting membership and stating he would 

be on hand Tuesday or Wednesday, marked " Deeds Exhibit 

10, October 2, 1918:" 492. 
Was formally appointed on the Aircraft Production Board 

May 17. 492. 
Commission in Army was dated August 15. 494. 
On August 2 was made active chief of the Equipment Division, 

Aviation Section, Signal Corps. 495.^ 
Did not act in any way in connection with the Signal Corps as 

a representative of the Chief Signal Officer. 495. 
Has had no authority from Chief Signal Officer to do anything 

in connection with the obtaining or the settlement of terms 

of contracts. 496. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 327 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Equipment Division reorganized on August 29; Finance and 
Supply Division was consolidated with the Equipment Divi- 
sion. Witness continued in charge of division until January 
14. 499. 

On January 14 was assigned to duty in the executive division of 
the Signal Corps. 500. 

Relieved from duty in executive division on May 22. 501. 

Does not know how H. E. Talbott, jr., happened to be on the 
flying fields committee, a subcommittee of the National Ad- 
visory Committee for Aeronautics. Does not think him quali- 
fied for that. 503. 

Judge Hughes : " How was it you came to serve upon a commit- 
tee on fuses when you were contemplating contracts with the 
Government through your Dayton Metal Products Co. for the 
manufacture of fuses ? " 

Witness : " We were asked to come here and serve on that 
committee, and accepted the service, as a great many other 
men did." 512. 

Pages 512-522 are devoted to interrogations and replies relative 
to Col. Deed's connection with the Munitions Board and the 
minutes of the Aircraft Production Board under date of May 29, 
1917, in which the board goes on record as favoring a contract- 
wherein a maximum price is established. Witness unable to 
offer a satisfactory explanation of his action in the matter. 

Mr. Kettering first came to the Cash Register Co. when witness 
was vice president about 10 years ago. 522. 

Witness first, took up with Mr. Kettering a definite venture in 
which they were jointly interested in 1909, 1910, or 1911. 523. 

Were equal owners of the stock of the Dayton Engineering 
Laboratories Co., known as the Delco Co. 526. " 

There was a time when the control of this organization was sold 
to the United Motors Co. 525. 

Sale of this stock to the United Motors Co. gave both Mr. Ket- 
tering and witness several million dollars. 530. 

Has been associated with Mr. Kettering in various enterprises, 
borrowing money, advancing money, and making investments 
on equal shares and is so associated to-day. 530. 

Both have a common agent, Mr. George B. Smith, who signs 
checks for both. 530. 

Mr. Smith is a highly confidential and trusted agent for both of 
them in all their undertakings. 531. 

The Dayton Metal Products Co., Mr. Talbott, and Mr. Ketter- 
ing, and Mr. Smith have their offices in a remodeled-private 
house on the corner of First and Ludlow, Dayton, Ohio. Also 
Mr. Deeds. 531-532. 

First became associated with Mr. Talbott in a business way at 
the time of the organization of the Dayton Metal Products 
Co. in the fall of 1915. 532. 

Company was organized to build Russian detonators. 535. 

In latter part of March, 1917, company received contracts from 
United States Government for detonators. 536. 

Company accumulated a surplus in excess of $2,000,000. 536. 

Names some of the other enterprises in which he was associated 
with Mr. Kettering. 538. 



328 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Witness and Mr. Kettering still own equal shares of the Domes- 
tic Building Co. 540. 

Witness and Mr. Kettering in the Moraine Development Co. 
541. 

Own practically one-half of the company. 542. 

The Moraine Development owned the land on which the present 
plant of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. has been built. 542. 

Still holds his interest in the Moraine Development Co. 543. 

Gave his interest of 17,500 shares of the United Motors Co. to 
Mrs. Deeds. 544. 

Indorsed the certificates of transfer on October 13, 1917. 545. 

Asked Judge McCann to come to Washington to take up his 
legal status here as a member of the Aircraft Production 
Board and also of the Army and do whatever was necessary 
in connection therewith to make his status right. 550. 
^ Told Secretary of War he had had a relationship with the Day- 
ton-Wright Co., and might be subject to criticism on that 
account. 552. 

Has a hazy recollection that he did see Judge Ansell. 553. 

Does not remember going to Judge Ansell's office with Judge 
McCann. 558. 

Judge McCann did not have anything to do with the actual 
transfer of any of his interests. 560. 

Judge McCann drew letter sent to the Aircraft Production 
Board. 561. 

Statement of facts contained in that letter were based on state- 
ments made to Judge McCann by witness as he had no per- 
sonal knowledge of the transaction. 562. 

Told Judge McCann that Mr. Kettering has taken his interests 
in the Domestic Building Co. when he had not. 563. 

Judge Hughes : " The letter that you addressed and signed 
to the Aircraft Production Board said that you had made a 
bona fide transfer of that stock." 566. 

Puts responsibility for that statement upon Judge McCann. 566. 

Has never parted with stock of Domestic Building Co. 568. 
/ Judge Hughes : " In other words, you were willing to state, 
and did state, that an actual bona fide transfer had been made, 
when all that had been done was an arrangement that a trans- 
fer would be made if it was found to be necessary to make it? 
That is plain English, is it not? " 

Witness : " That is exactly what it was." 568. 

It may have been in September or October that it was decided 
the Dayton- Wright Co. should buy the Domestic Building 
Co.'s plant, 570. 

The transfer by which the Domestic Building Co. purported to 
transfer to the Talbotts and Mr. Kettering was closed up and 
notes given in November, 1917. 570. 

Salary of witness in Delco Co. was $60,000 a year. 574. 

Salary of witness in Dayton Metal Products Co. was $25,000 a 
year. 574. 

Drew salary from Delco Co. up until some time in August. 575, 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 329 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

The actual certificates for the transfer of 38 shares of preferred 
stock in the Delco Co. were transferred to Mr. Kettering on 
October 13, 1917. 575. 

Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. was incorporated in April, 1917, 
and witness was one of the incorporators. 578. 

Was not a subscriber for stock. 580. 

Was not aware until this last May that the entire capitol stock, 
with exception of five qualifying shares, of the Dayton- 
Wright Co. were subsequently acquired by the Dayton Metal 
Products Co. 580. 

This transaction took place at the end of November or the be- 
ginning of December, 1917. 581. 

Learned in the fall of 1917 that the Dayton Metal Products Co. 
had become the owner of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 
586. 

Witness question as to the finances of the Dayton-Wright Co., 
involving the Domestic Building Co. and the Moraine Devel- 
opment Co. 590, 605. 

The Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. was a new organization that 
had no financial backing whatever except that which the Tal- 
botts and Kettering gave it, either directly or through the 
Dayton Metal Products Co. 605. 

Witness: "That Munitions Board was the English board 
that I had in mind at that time." 606. 

First became interested in the acquisition of the Wilbur Wright 
Field by the Government as a flying field about April 24. 
607. 

About April 24 sent an engineer of the Miami conservancy dis- 
trict to confer with Mr. Waldon regarding the lands of the 
Miami conservancy district, the Wilbur Wright Field now 
occupying part of those lands. 607. 

On May 7 Maj. Foulois and Capt. Edgar came to Dayton to 
look over the conservancy lands. 608. 

Extract from telegram of Mr. Deeds to Mr. Kuhns, secretary 
of Miami conservancy district: "Subject of our trip yester- 
day moving very rapidly and very satisfactory. There is no 
doubt in my mind but what we will be successful." 611. 

Thought there was no doubt but what Government would make 
use of the fields. 611. 

Another extract from same telegram : " Avoidance of publicity 
very essential. Inspection will be made end of this week or 
first of next. You and Morgan must plan now as though it 
was decided." 612. 

Meant in matter of publicity because " we " had not yet ac- 
quired contracts of purchases and options on all the property. 
612. 

Judge Hughes : " You seem to have been quite busy tele- 
graphing on April 30, 1917, for there is another telegram to 
Ezra Kuhns on the same day, in the course of which you sav, 
"Publicity will follow these instructions, and no one outside 
of Signal Corps officers know of our plan for a larger school, 
and so far as everyone is concerned, the Dayton school is 
the Wright Field Civilian School.' " 618. 



330 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Judge Hughes : " On May 11, 1917. That is the same date as 
the date of Maj. Foulois's report. Mr. Talbott telegraphed 
as follows: 'Contracts remaining unsecured to cover 2.500 
acres will be closed by to-morrow evening. Will start Mon- 
day on immediate possession of land so the fields will be 
ready when buildings are finished.' " 625. 

On May 12, Mr. Deeds telegraphed Mr. Talbott as follows: 
" Suggest Kuhns, Emmett, Grant, and Brown be here Monday 
morning for conference on conservancy, bringing description 
of entire 2,500. Tax value and tax rate of property under dis- 
cussion will be helpful. Publicity can be delayed at this end 
without difficulty. Everything moving nicely." 626. 

Witness questioned as to how he knew 2,500 acres had been 
agreed upon. 627-628. 

Capt. Edgar asked him who would be a good contractor in Day- 
ton, and he recommended the Dayton Lumber & Manufactur- 
ing Co. 632. 

Mr. Talbott had not informed him of the arrangements that had 
been made for obtaining the control of the stock of the Day- 
ton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 634. 

Questioned as to his connection in securing contract for Mr. 
King, president of Davton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 
636-640. 

Never made any inquiry to find out who was the real party in- 
terested in that contract. 648. 

Knew Mr. Talbott had given financial assistance to the Dayton 
Lumber & Manufacturing Co. to the extent of $400,000. *650. 

Had never heard that the Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. T 
through Mr. Kind, proved to be an unsatisfactorv contractor. 
669. 

Col. Edgar told him it was an unsatisfactory contract. 669. 

Col. Vincent and Col. Clark recommended South Field. 670. 

Privilege of purchasing was left out of lease on South Field be- 
cause it was onlv looked upon as a temporary arrangement. 
673. 

Witness owns South Field individually. 673. 

Mr. Talbott and Mr. Kettering had shown what is now McCook 
Field to Col. Clark and Maj. Vincent, and they had decided, 
everything considered, that was a much better location. 676. 

The Wright Field, or McCook Field as it is now called, was a 
tract of 210 acres ; 120 belonging to Mr. Kettering and witness, 
the remaining belonging to the Dayton Metal Products Co. 
676. 

Lease on that field was recommended by Clark and Vincent. 
678. 

Does not know what part he played in determining the terms of 
the lease. 681. 

Had sold his interest to Mr. Kettering, who later sold it to the 
Dayton Metal Products Co. (681). 

Eemember Col. Edgar saying the Government did not want to 
buy it. 686. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 331 

€ol. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Judge Hughes : " Our information is just the contrary, that 
it was refused. Do you have a recollection definitely about 
about that, that you are prepared to testify to ?" 686. 

Did not want an option given. 688. 

Gave Col. Clark a letter to take to Mr. Kettering relative to 
Moraine (South) Field. 692. 

Moraine Field was abandoned because of the opposition to the 
Dayton Wright Co. 698. 

Witness : " It may seem a little strange, but I am not a great 
man on the financial end. I would a great deal rather work 
in the factory on the production engineering, which is my line 
of work, which I enjoy. I have left this other matter to Mr. 
Smith, who has really handled all those things; and I think 
he keeps them straight, and we abide by his decision." 708. 

Has never gone through the account relative to transfer of his 
interests in McCook Field to Mr. Kettering. 709. 

Kelied on Mr. Smart and George Smith for the facts. 710. 

Judge Hughes: "You have such confidence in them (Tal- 
botts and Kettering) and in your confidential representative, 
Mr. Smith, who also represents Mr. Kettering, that you are 
willing to have these statements made up and passed by Mr. 
Smith and adopted without a personal knowledge of the ac- 
curacy ? " 

Witness : " Yes, sir ; that is right." 710. 

Leased South field to Dayton- Wright Co. at rental of $1 per 
year. 712. 

Went over exhibits with Mr. Smith, which he submitted to com- 
mittee. 719. 

Not prepared to testify that he knew when his salary with the 
Dayton Metal Products Co. stopped. 724. 

Asked if there was any reason he wanted to get out of the Day- 
ton Metal Products besides the fact that there might be Gov- 
ernment contracts, witness replied, "Yes; there was a real, 
intimate reason, which I do not know as I would care to 
state on the record, but there was a whole change in our fam- 
ily affairs after the death of the younger boy, and I had a real 
desire to get out of a good many things at that time." 726. 

Wanted to get out of everything as far as possible, except the 
Domestic Engineering Co. 728. 

Does not think he has ever seen the notes given for his stock in 
the Dayton Metal Products Co. 731. 

Never recognized he had any Government connection of any 
consequence until he was brought into the aircraft situation. 
736. 

Witness would not swear that the minute book of the Dayton 
Metal Products Co. was accurate. 738. 

Has not observed the apparent changes and apparent removals 
of portions of minutes and substitutions of others in this book. 
738. 

Judge Hughes : " Now, if that is a correct copy of the minutes of 
May 21, 1917, of the board of directors of the Dayton Metal 
Products Co., which is now being shown you, will you testify 
whether you were in Dayton on May 21, 1917, and at such a 
meeting?" 740. 



332 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Witness : " No ; I will not." 741. 
Witness was in Washington from May 18 to 23. 749. 
Col. E. A. Deeds (Department of Justice, October 3, 1918; Book 23). 
Took steps to locate or procure proper sources of supply; this 

before he became chief of the Equipment Division. 1. 
Get what information they could get quickly on the existing 

plants that had built aircraft. 1. 
Contracts placed in a small way at the beginning of the forma- 
tion of the board. 2. 
The chief contracts for the production of the Curtiss type 
or the JN-4, and the Standard type or the SJ-1 were placed, 
the Curtiss type with the Curtiss Co. and the Standard type 
with the Standard Aircraft Corporation, and the Dayton- 
Wright Co. at Dayton, and the Fisher Body Corporation in 
Detroit. 2. 
Thinks, as a member of the board, he recommended that these 
orders for the Standard J be placed as mentioned on page 
3. 4. 
His attention called to a letter written by him to Mr. Kettering, 
June 13, 1917, in which he tells him that he will be interested 
in knowing that the Standard training machine is going to be 
called the U. S. primary training, and will not be called the 
Curtiss J'N, etc. 9. 
Asked what was the occasion of that statement to Mr. Ketter- 
ing at that time. 9. 
His attention called to the fact that further extracts from the 
letter would indicate that he was going to tell him what had 
been done, rather than to seek advice in an unsettled matter. 
The Hall- Scott engine had always been used in the 'Standard 
plane, but he is unable to say how many Standard planes had 
been built prior to June, 1917. Maybe 12 ; perhaps only 5. 13. 
Mr. Kettering advised the continued use of the Hall-Scott en- 
gine with the Standard plane. 14. 
States that the Wright-Martin Co., on the Pacific coast, had used 

the Hall-Scott engine. 15. 
Reminded that the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board gave 
their approval reluctantly to the use of the Hall- Scott, and 
then only for a temporary use. 17. 
He wanted the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to have the con- 
tract, because of the fact that they were a concern who would 
come through. 18. 
The first contract, under date of August 1, 1917, with the Day- 
ton-Wright Airplane Co., was for 400 Standard Js. 20. 
This contract merged into another with the Dayton-Wright Air- 
plane Co., under date of September 7, 1917, for 400 Standard 
Js, 1,500 Martynsides, and 2,000 De Haviland 9s. 21. 
Overcome their reluctance to take such a large contract by Sep- 
tember 7. 22. 
They were so reluctant in the matter that they were going 
ahead and working on the first model that arrived in this 
country. 22. 



ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 333 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

He was anxious to have the Fisher Body Corporation take a 
contract because he looked upon them as one of the best pro- 
ducing concerns of their kind in existence. 26. 

No, they had never built any airplanes, no airplane engineer on 
the staff, and had no experience whatever. 26. 

His idea was that if the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. could 
do the engineering and turn over a finished product to the 
Fisher Body Corporation, and then they could work to- 
gether afterwards. 27. 

Yes; admits that the Government in their contract specified 
that the drawings and specifications should be furnished to 
the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. by the Government. 28. 

Makes the statement that the drawings were produced by the 
Government in the experimental department of the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. and supplied both to the Day ton- Wright 
Airplane Co., and to the Fisher Body Corporation. 29. 

Has to take this statement back. 29 

The Government did not furnish complete drawings in either 
the case of the DH 4s or the Standard J planes; it was left 
to the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to work out itself. 30. 

The Government, it is supposed, with all its power and re- 
sources was unable to provide facilities which this new Day- 
ton-Wright Airplane Co., with no capital stock paid up and no 
money except that it could borrow from Mr. Talbott and Mr. 
Kettering, was able to provide those facilities. 31. 

The Government had to rely upon this little organization at 
Dayton to establish the drawings and designs. 32. 

Asked if that was his conception of his duty and power and re- 
sponsibilities as chief of the Equipment Division of the Sig- 
nal Corps. 32. 

States that the Fisher Body Corporation kept men at the ex- 
perimental plant of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co., and 
there was constant going back and forth between Dayton and 
Detroit so as to keep in touch. 34. 

Is reminded that the officials of the Fisher Body Corporation 
made the statement that the going to and fro from Dayton 
was in the vain endeavor to get drawings, without which 
they could not proceed to produce. 34. 

Asked why he didn't emplo}^ the resources of the Singer Man- 
ufacturing Co. 34. 

He states they, in the first place, did not want an order. 35. 

Asked to swear to this ; anyway he had questions in his mind (the 
president or vice president of the Singer Manufacturing Co.) 
and he did not want to take an order for an airplane unless 
it was absolutely necessary. 35. 

Asked if the Singer Manufacturing Co. did not offer in writing 
the facilities of this company to the Government and to build 
whatever the Government wanted them to build. 35. 

Mr. Deeds considered that the Singer Manufacturing Co. was 
an ideal place for a supply of pistols or something of that 
kind, but to get into airplanes they were not fitted for that* 
36. 

Asked as to the inconsistencv of his remarks. 36. 



334 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Did not think they were suited for the work, and yet lie wanted 
them to take the contract. 37. 

It was among the three or four in the country that were best 
equipped for this work. 38. 

The thought was to ultimately get around to the Singer Sew- 
ing Machine Co. and the Pullman Co. 39. 

Asked why they did not give a contract to the Pullman Co. 42. 

Thought they could be added sometime when there had been 
something specifically developed. 42. 

Asked if it was possible that the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 
was a monopolist of facilities for the production of draw- 
ings. 45. 

The Government had an airplane engineering department and 
the}^ made the drawings for the Bristol, and were not suc- 
cessful, therefore the Government did not have a department 
to do this kind of work. 45-4(1 

Confronted with the statement that he did not establish a de- 
partment that was competent to do it. 46. 

Yes; the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co.. organized in April, 1917, 
was left with the work of designing and completing the 
De Haviland 4. 47. 

And then the company in its turn charged the Signal Corps 
with failure to give it the drawings it needed and the informa- 
tion it needed to complete the work, and charged to that 
failure the delays in production. 47. 

Asked if he was aware of that. 47. 

Asked if it did not result in this : The Day ton- Wright Airplane 
Co. said to the Signal Corps, " You give us the drawings," 
and the Signal Corps said to the Dayton- Wright Airplane 
Co., " You are to make them,*' and the Dayton- Wright Air- 
plane Co. said, "We can not," and the Government said, 
" Neither can we," and production was at a standstill. 47-48. 

Asked why he drew a contract stipulating that the Government 
would furnish the drawings, when he knew that the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. was going to make them themselves. 48. 

Lays it onto Col. Montgomery. 

One reason for the preference given to the Dayton-Wright Air- 
plane Co. was that he depended upon Orville Wright and the 
men who had grown up with him — Jacobs and other men of 
that kind. 50. (As adding to the facilities of the plant.) 

Thought he was competent to design a De Haviland machine, but 
knew he was competent to rearrange the De Haviland machine 
for receiving the Liberty engine. 51. 

Asked why he did not hire him for the Government then. 52. 
It never occurred to him. 

Is told that the engineer of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 
testified, and this, is abundantly supported by facts, that 
Orville Wright had virtuallv nothing to do with the produc- 
tion of the DH-4. 53. 

Asked why he left him with the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 
for the purpose of doing something which that company had 
not contracted to undertake. 53. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 335 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Asked if he knew the salary of Mr. Talbott, sr., to which he 
replied, " No ; never knew." 78. 

Presumed they were charging their salaries to the Government 
expense as a part of their overhead. 79. 

But never thought of it. 80. 

Had no explanation to make of the situation that developed with 
regard to all these high salaries being charged to the Govern- 
ment, as he had never heard of their salaries. 83-84. 

Asked with regard to the " confidential telegrams." 86. 

Is given an illustration of one of these " confidential telegrams " 
which amounted to an inside " tip." 88-89. 

Asked for a full explanation of his conduct in the matter. 89 
to 93. 

His attention called to Blakeley Exhibit 1, to the Packard Motor 
Car Co. for $104,500, which appears to have been certified by 
him. 97. 

Finally has a recollection of the matter. 100. 

Helped put the voucher through. 100. 

As he understands his position now, does not suppose it was 
within his authority to sign vouchers. 101. 

Does not know how many vouchers he ma}^ have signed. 101. 

Asked about another voucher, Blakeley Exhibit 3. for $60,000 to 
the Packard Co. 104. 

As no per or any initials opposite; seems to have been a plain 
signature in his name. 104. 

Is read minutes of Aircraft Production Board of meeting on 
June 8, 1917, in which it recommended to the Chief Signal 
Officer of the Signal Corps that the sum of $250,000 be set aside 
to carry on this work, etc. 108. 

Placed this work with the Packard Motor Car Co. after this 
resolution. 108. 

Is shown letter attached to voucher, inclosing bills from the 
Packard Co. for the last 8-cylinder engines, etc., with recapitu- 
lation of the material, etc., direct expense and overhead, and 
with 12^ per cent profit added. 109. 

This amounted to $249,159.10. 110. 

He is the one upon whom they relied to certify that these figures 
were accurate and he in turn relied upon Maj. Vincent. 110. 

Did ,not understand at the time that the Government could only 
pay for specific things. 113. 

They did not have the items of the various work and services in- 
cluded in the voucher ; just made a general estimate. 113. 

Asked if, as a man of business, he did not know that the Govern- 
ment was not paying out money on a cost contract under a 
general estimate. 117. 

States if there had been any irregularity in that respect it would 
have been caught in the finance division. Asked if he was 
not the catcher on that nine. 117. 

Is confronted with the statement that he knows well enough that 
it never went to the finance division. 117. 

He did not show the voucher to anybody; just signed it and sent 
it to the paymaster and it was paid, he admits. 118. 

Is asked regarding the accessories for the Liberty motor. 120. 
130687—19 22 



336 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

With regard to the various programs gotten up specifying so 
many machines for this month and so many for the next, says 
there was a lot of prophecy about the dates, and they may have 
been expectations. 130. 

His attention called to McConaughy Exhibit 1 which was laid 
before the Secretary of War in the examination he underwent, 
and is told that Mr. Baker said they did not issue this state- 
ment until he understood it was verified by Col. Deeds and 
Gen. Squier. 135-136. 

Did not know that he was verifying this as for the Secretary of 
War. 137. 

Knew, though, that he was a representative of the Committee on 
Public Information. 137. 

Asked why, in testimony before the Senate committee on April 
2, 1918, he replied to Senator Wadsworth that he never saw 
it and did not know of anybody seeing it. 140. 

Further says to Senator Wadsworth that neither he nor any 
other officer of the department consulted with Secretary Baker 
before he made this statement. 141-142. 

Remembers some indefinite conversation with some one from the 
Bureau of Public Information, but he did not say a thing that 
would justify the statement that they were five months ahead 
of the program. 143. 

Said the first of it he knew was when he saw it in the papers. 
144. 

No effort made that he knew of to find the source of the informa- 
tion which the Secretary of War took as reliable and put his 
signature to. 144. 

Denies the conversation with Mr. Pew, who testified that Col. 
Deeds told him that there had been a shipment abroad, that 
they were now on the water en route to France. Maybe 10 — 
perhaps a dozen — also denies he said the same thing to Mr. 
McConaughy, who testified that he told him the same things 
as told to Mr. Pew. 147 to 149. 

Swears that he did not say that to either one of them. 149. 

At the time this statement was made — published in the papers 
on February 21, 1918 — he had been advised by Mr. Talbott 
that the first 100 De Havilands were to remain here, and he 
had been asked to recall the single one that had been shipped 
for foreign service. 153. 

Is asked to explain this. 153. 

Is given summary of the various points of destination for the 
first shipments, which shows that on April 3, 1918, was the 
date of the shipment of one uncompleted plane to France. 
155. 

Admits that on February 21, 1918, there were no planes on the 
water en route to France. 155. 

He said he did not mention that they were on the water — just 
that they were shipped. 156. 

After dodging the question from all sides, admits that a state- 
ment authorized by the Secretary of War is a statement with 
official authority, and if he had any place at all as an officer of 
the Army, and had judgment enough to fill any office in the 
Government he should have known it. 161. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 337 

Orville Wright (October 3, 1918; Book 23). 

Been interested in aviation matters since 1896. 175. 

States his experience. 175. 

Sold his stock in the Wright Co. in 1915 to New York capitalists. 
176. 

In the early part of 1917 Mr. Deeds organized a company with 
Mr. Kettering and the Messrs. Talbott to carry out some ex- 
periments of Mr. Wright's, this company at first called the 
Dayton Airplane Co. 180. 

Put up several buildings on what is known as the South Field? 
which was owned by Col. Deeds. 180. 

Built, he thinks, four hangars and a machine shop. 181. 

The principal work he did on the De Haviland 4s was in pre- 
venting changes being made, following closely as possible the 
original machine. 185. 

This all with reference to the model. After the model was com- 
pleted he had practically nothing to do with the plant. 185 

States this model was flown about the end of October, 1917. 186. 

Since the model was completed, he has given his time up to* 
the present to certain experimental engineering being con- 
ducted at South Field. 188. 

Had nothing to do with the redesigning of the Bristol, or with 
the Spad. 189. 

Was only consulted about the Bristol on propellers. 190. 

Col. Hall came to him about this matter. 190. 

Had nothing to do with the Standard J planes. 192. 

Was not employed by the Government or retained on behalf of 
the Government. 193. 

Was at Dayton all through the fall of 1917. 193. 
David Wood Sowers (October 3, 1918; Book 23). 

Residence, Buffalo. 

President, Sowers Manufacturing Co. 

Makes statement of his own accord regarding the Niagara 
Frontier Defense League. 195. 

Their organization had nothing to with the cost- accounting 
system at the North Elmwood plant. 223. 
John Creeps Wickliffe (October 4, 1918; Book 23). 

Production expert, Bureau of Aircraft Production. 341. 

Became associated with the Government February 25, 1918. 341. 

Prior to that, secretary of C. C. Mengel & Bros. Co. 341. 

Mengel & Bros. Co. manufactured mahogany and walnut lum- 
ber and veneers. 341. 

Been connected with that company 15 years. 342. 

Sold out their interests in the Mengel Co. when he came to 
Washington to take a place with the Government. 344. 

His firm dealt both in Central American and African mahog- 
any. 346. 

Had contracts with persons in Central America for getting out 
mahogany, and also had rights in Africa, or concessions. 346. 

States the firms who were represented at the meeting to form an 
association of mahogany manufacturers and importers. 349. 

Minutes from the different meetings gone over. 358 to — . 

Other minutes read. 370-375. 



338 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

John Creeps Wickliffe — Continued. 

Further minutes. 377-381. 

These minutes marked collectively " Wickliffe Exhibit 1, October 
4, 1918." 

Was a matter of negotiation with the Government for five or 
six weeks. 386. 

Is shown resolution presented on January 31, 1918, to the war 
committee, marked " Wickliffe Exhibit No. 2, October 4, 
1918,;' 386. 

Mr. Wickliffe states that in this resolution it will be noticed 
that they left the fixing of any price to the Government. 387. 

Up to this time African mahogany had not been involved in the 
proposition. 387. 

Mr. Wickliffe prepared a statement of costs at New Orleans, 
New York, and Louisville, respectively, on behalf of the as- 
sociation for submission to the Government. 388. 

This marked " Exhibit 5, October 4, 1918"." 389. 

This statement prepared early in February. 389. 

Down until the latter part of February he was in active associa- 
tion with the committee, the war committee of the mahogany 
association, and with the corporation C. C. Mengel Bros. Co., 
of which he was secretary then. 392. 

Resigned as secretary of the Mengel Co. on February 23. 393. 

Asked as to the matter which left the negotiations so long in 
abeyance. 396. 

Relates the incidents in connection with the proposition that he 
should become connected with the Government service in the 
hardwood section. 399-404. 

Asked how long the compensation at the rate of $4,000 per 
annum from the Government continued. 404. 

Letter is read from Bureau of Aircraft Production, which re- 
quests him to cease accepting a salary from the Mahogany & 
Importers' Association. 406. 

Letter is read in which he does as above requested. 407. 

He received through Mengel Bros. & Co. $500 per month. 409. 

Paid by the Mahogany Manufacturers & Importers' Associa- 
tion the rate of $350 per month from April 1, 1918, down to 
August 1. 412. 

Was asked if he knew that prior to the date of the letter of 
August 20 (p. 407) this subject had been the subject of in- 
quiry by the Federal authorities. 431. 

Relates conversation he had with Mr. Mengel regarding the 
continuance of his compensation in the company after he went 
into the service of the Government. 432. 

After he finds out what the Government is to pay him, he writes 
Mr. Mengel to cut down the allowance from $500 to $350, and 
he would remit the difference. 435. 

Is asked to produce copy of the letter to Mr. Mengel and also a 
little statement of the receipts of money and the return of the 
amounts he referred to. 436. 

States he was not connected with the negotiations of the meet- 
ings in any but a subordinate way. 437. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 339 

John Creeps Wickliffe — Continued. 

S. B. Vrooman, jr., son of S. B. Vrooman, at the head of S. B. 
Vrooman Co., one of the members of the association, is chief 
inspector of the wood section of the Bureau of Aircraft Pro- 
duction. 442. 

Then, with reference to the meeting of conference of the ma- 
hogany manufacturers, "Williams Exhibit 11" (see p. 438), 
the only persons representing the Government were Mr. Wil- 
liams, Mr. Vrooman, jr., and Mr. Wickliffe. 443. 

Mr. Vrooman was called in upon a matter of inspection. 443. 

First definite statement from the production engineering depart- 
ment that authorized quarter-sawed white oak that he ever 
found was under date of May 23. 470. 

Mr. Wickliffe produces letter from Mr. Day regarding the use 
of white-oak propellers and finding them unsatisfactory. 474. 

Produces letter showing the French were using African ma- 
hogany. 478, 

Walter C. Marmon (October 4, 1918; Book 23). 

President of the Nordyke & Marmon Co. 495. 

Received a contract for the Hall Scott engines, which was signed 
up some time in July. 496. 

Fixed-price contract at $2,366 an engine. 496. 

Original contract called for deliveries to be completed on Janu- 
ary 15. 497. 

Shipped the last one on May 3. 497. 

Gives copy of brief they received for a 90-day extension on ac- 
count of the reasons they gave for the delay. 497. 

This brief marked " W. C. Marmon Exhibit 1, October 4, 1918.' r 
498. 

The brief, pages 498 to 527. 

Now makes a verbal statement of the reasons for delay in the 
delivery of the engines. 527-531. 

The next contract is for 3,000 Liberty engines. 531. 

This contract dated September 28, 1917, order No. 10449. 531. 

Asked why they took such a contract of such importance to the 
country when they did not have the facilities to perform it, 
the acquiring of which took over a year. 543. 

States they were not seeking the Liberty contract. 544. 

The proposition was put up to them by Col. Waldon, Col. Deeds, 
and Col. Montgomery. 544. 

Their knowledge of how to make gasoline internal-combustion 
engines was considered of greater advantage than facilities. 
545. 

First advance was a war-credits advance and an agreement to 
buy certain of the machine-tool equipment. 547. 

States the agreement to install machinery and tools in his plant 
on the part of the Government to the extent of a million dol- 
lars is correct. 547. 

The Government up to August 28 had paid $963,323.33 for 
tools and machinery. 548. 

Payment of $64,878.71 for testing equipment. 548. 

One-half million was advanced on the Hall Scott, which has 
been paid back. 550. 



340 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Walter C. Marmon — Continued. 

Amount authorized for Liberty contract was $2,000,000. the 

contract calling for the fixed profit to be credited against 

that. 550. 
About $35,000 or $40,000 had been credited in this way. 551. 
The fixed-price contract was entered into on the 31st of August, 

1918, at $4,000. 552. 
The contract. Pages 553 to 559. 
Asked Avhy they changed the contract to one for a fixed profit 

at $4,000. 587. 
Pay the Government 5 per cent on the $2,000,000 advanced. 

594. 
On appraisement they are to get three-fifths of the depreciation 

on the cost of that part of the investment made for the Hall 

Scott. 594. 
Asked why real estate was included in the depreciation clause 

in paragraph B exclusive of buildings and land. 596. 
Did not know that was in there. 596. 
Produces statement showing payments that have been made to 

the Government. 598. 
This paper marked " W. C. Marmon Exhibit 3, October 3, 

1918." 598. 
Is asked to give a statement as to what he understood he was 

doing when he made the agreement with the Government for 

depreciation in the new contract which provided a fixed price. 

601. 
States their intention in regard to depreciation was to be paid 

the difference between the cost of the investment made in 

plant by their company for purposes of producing the Liberty 

motor, plus three-fifths of the cost of the plant erected for 

producing Hall Scott motors, and the fair market value of the 

above-described part of their plant at the end of the con- 
tract. 601. 
Submits letter to the Attorney General, being a statement of 

the list of the stockholders of their company, under date of 

June 11, 1918. 601-608. 
This also contains details of payment by the Government on 

Liberty motors, and details of payment by the Government 

on Hall Scott engines shipped. 60*5. 
Also causes contributing directly and materially to delays in 

the production of Liberty motors. 606. 
Also factory statement showing the shipment to Hall Scott and 

detailed pavment and amounts of advances also forwarded. 

628. 
Clarence E. Jeffers (October 4, 1918; Book 23). 

Chief engineer for the Nordyke & Marmon Co. 631. 

Been with the Marmon & Nordyke Co. since October 24 1912. 

631. 
So far behind in production from changes that none of the 

engines got ahead, and the latest changes with all the others 

were incorporated in the first engine. 633. 
Change in the propeller hub did not affect them at all. 634. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 341 

Clarence E. Jeefers — Continued. 

Thought the changes had delayed production from four to six 
months. 636. 

Relates the delay caused by the piston pin. 636. 

Gives outline of the connecting-rod change. 638-644. 

Pratt Whitney & Co., of Hartford, Conn., were behind on their 
deliveries of surface grinders to them of 60 days. Jig-boring 
machine was promised on March 15 and not received until 
May 10. When it was received, they could not use it on ac- 
count of the poor workmanship. 645. 

Their big trouble in delays has been due to the close limit on the 
drawings. 645. 

Other manufacturers started their production when the Detroit 
inspection office was not organized and were therefore using 
material which the Government inspector at their plant would 
not let them use. 648. 
Frederick E. Muskovics (October 3, 1918; Book 23). 

Vice president of the Nordyke & Marmon Co. 650. 

Knew of no transactions which Capt. Marmon as a representa- 
tive of the Government has had with the Nordyke & Marmon 
Co. beyond the communications as to blue prints. 650. 

No connection at all. 651. 

At one time he recommended an oil that the Packard Co. had 
turned out, as they were having trouble in cold weather. 651. 
Chester P. Siemms (October 4, 1918; Book 23). 

President and treasurer of the Siemms-Carey-Kerbaugh Cor- 
poration. 652. 

His company had a contract with the Government for getting 
out spruce from the Olympic Peninsula and also for building 
a railroad connecting the mill with the C. M. & St. P. Rail- 
road. 652. 

Relates interview with Mr. Hoadlev. 653. 

Mr. Hoadley appeared drunk. Wanted $500,000. 653. 

If he didn't get it Mr. Siemms's contract would be canceled. 654. 

Said Senator Chamberlain would cancel the contract. 654. 

At the last, urged him to call up Mr. Pliny Fiske, of New 
York. 655. 

Next morning, through advice from his counsel, calls up Mr. 
John D. — and told him about this. 657. 

Mr. Charles Brewer, from the Department of Justice, came to 
look into it. 657. 

Gives statement of what transpired over the telephone in con- 
versation with Mr. Hoadley. 661-663. 

His organization or combination with Mr. Kerbaugh had noth- 
ing to do with the spruce contract. 682. 

States how the spruce contract was brought to his attention. 683. 

The contract as finally worked out was not for delivering logs 
at all, as originally suggested by Mr. Fiske, but was for deliv- 
ering flitches, which is a slab of a spruce log. 686. 

Explains the basis of the final trade. 689. 

For the railroad contract Mr. Fiske signed a Fidelity bond for an 
advance of $500,000. For the spruce contract it was necessary 
to provide $6,000,000. 689. 



342 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Chester P. Siemms — Continued. 

Endeavor to satisfy the War Credits Board to get the $6,000,000 
for the work. '689. 

Mr. Fiske agreed finally that if he could not satisfy the War 
Credits Board in another week, then he could exchange a 
mutual release with them and they could seek financial aid 
elsewhere. 692. 

One contract had no risk in it; the other had. 693. 
Maj. James S. Holden (Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., 
October 5, 1918 ; Book 24) . 

Commissioned on January 11, 1918. 1. 

Worked as a civilian in the Army prior to that time. 1. 

Was in charge of real estate matters in the construction division 
of the Signal Corps, under Col. C. G. Edgar, Capt. Edgar at 
that time. 1. 

Produced true copy of the original lease by the Government of 
the field known as the Wilbur Wright Field, at Davton. 2. 

This lease marked " Holden Exhibit 1, October 5, 1918." 

Asked to send in data which will show why the lease was made 
for 2,075 acres. 3. 

Option price was $350,000, or $140 an acre for 2,500 acres. 4. 

Rental, 5 per cent per annum on the purchase price and $1 per 
acre for the taxes. 5. 

Statement in reference to the rental read upon the record. 5-13. 

The titles not searched on the leases for the tracts of land they 
have had to take for the Government. 21. 

In the hurry they would go ahead and start building thousands 
of dollars' worth of construction, without any shadow of title, 
lease, or anything else, because it would take six weeks or 
two months before you could get any transaction closed by 
the Government. 22. 

Condensed statement of the negotiations in connection with the 
leasing of McCook Field. 23. 

Cols. Deeds and Edgar did not want to put in an option to pur- 
chase on the McCook Field. 24. 

Said the Government would never want to buy the property any- 
way, as it would never amount to much. 24. 

Along in March, 1918, Col. Deeds and Mr. Craighead approach 
Mr. Holden and tell him they will put in an option to purchase, 
at a higher price, $300,000 or $350,000. 25. 
Lieut. Samuel Bell Vrooman, Jr. (Department of Justice, Washing- 
ton, D. C, October 5, 1918 ; Book 24) . 

Entered the Army on July 16, 1918. 31. 

Been in the employ of the Signal Corps since the 1st of Decem- 
ber, 1917. 31. 

Formerly with S. B, Vrooman Co., of Philadelphia. 32. 

Was not an officer of the company. 33. 

His father Avas president. 33. 

Stockholder to the extent of $10,000, par value, common stock. 
34. 

Did not make any disposition of this stock when he entered the 
Government. 34. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 343 

Lieut. Samuel Bell Yrooman, Jr. — Continued. 

His compensation from the Yrooman Co. prior to the time he 
entered Government service was $100 a week, counting interest 
on his stock. 35. 

Regular dividend paid of from 15 to 20 per cent on the stock. 35. 

Has run practically at 20 per cent all the time, only one year at 
15 per cent. 37. 

Received, therefore, a compensation of about $50 a week before 
he entered the Government service. 38. 

Received $1,800 compensation a year from the Government 
before he was commissioned. 39. 

When he was commissioned became $1,700, with an allowance 
for rooms. 40. 

Been receiving the $50 a week compensation from the S. P. 
Vrooman Co. ever since he entered the Government. 41. 

Duties with the Government consisted of inspecting mahogany 
lumber for propellers. 43. 

The Government was buying mahogany when he first started, 
December, 1917. 43. 

Inspected the mahogany bought from Lewis Thompson & Co. 44. 

Inspected personally from December 1 until the 10th of Febru- 
ary, then was given charge of all propeller lumber, but none of 
the inspecting himself. 45. 

Selected the inspectors and gave them instructions. 45. 

One of his duties to pass upon disputed questions. 46. 

Visited the plants of the airplane manufacturers or propeller 
manufacturers to gain knowledge of the proper kind of lumber 
to go into propellers, 47. 

All plants furnishing mahogany to the Government were under 
his jurisdiction. 47. 

Maintained his force by dividing it up into districts — New York, 
Dayton, and Chicago. The man in charge of each district re- 
sponsible for the personnel of the inspectors, 48. 

Dayton had charge of all or most of the walnut. No mahogany 
in the Dayton district. 48. 

Chicago had the Talge Mahogany Co., C. C. Mengel & Bros. Co., 
and C. L. Willey. 48. 

New York had I. T. Williams & Sons, the Astoria Yeneer Mills 
& Dock Co., etc. 48. 

In case of a disagreement regarding the mahogany his was the 
final decision. 33. 

The head of each district selected the inspectors, from six up 
at each of the three districts, who were selected from among 
the plants of the various mahogany manufacturers, 54. 

And those furnishing mahogany who are members of the Ma- 
hogany Manufacturers' and Importers' Association repre- 
sented 75 per cent or more of the entire mahogany trade of 
the country. 55. 

It was the policy never to have the men inspect mahogany for 
the firm from which they came. 35. 

His duty at present is just to see whether the mahogany comes 
to the specifications. 64. 



344 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Samuel Bell Yrooman, Jr. — Continued. 

His own plant had never furnished any mahogany under air- 
craft specifications. They had two British contracts taken 
over. 66. 

The American Government commandeered this lumber, and the 
British Government was paid 10 per cent of their profit. 67. 

Mr. McCullough, of the I. T. Williams & Sons, was in charge 
of the New York office. 69. 

Received $2,400 from the Government, and I. T. Williams & Sons 
made up the difference of $1,600, as he originally received 
from I. T. Williams & Sons $4,000. 71. 

Mr. McCullough had under his supervision the inspection of 
timber at the Astoria Mills, I. T. Williams & Sons, S. P. Vroo- 
man & Co., etc. 76. 
Col. E. A. Deeds (Book 24). 

Desires to make some corrections in his testimony. 90. 

Changes the name of the Smith Gas Engine Co. to the Smith 
Gas Engineering Co. 90. 

Mentions page 100 of a report marked " Deeds Exhibit 19, Oc- 
tober 5, 1918," which includes, as one of the subcommittees, 
a subcommittee on fuses and detonators, with E. A. Deeds, etc., 
chairman, and H. E. Tablott, Dayton Metal Products Co. 92. 

Would not change his testimony in regard to the fact that the 
fuse committee never functioned, and, so far as he knew, never 
had anything to do after that one meeting was held. 93. 

The only explanation he has of the continuance of the committee 
is the fact that probably a number of the printed lists of com- 
mittees continued long after the committee itself had ceased to 
function. 93. 

His appointment on the fuse committee came from Mr. Frank 
Scott, chairman of the General Munitions Board. 94. 

He and Mr. Talbott were the sole members of the committee. 94. 

States the munitions standard board did not function. 95. 

Knew he had been appointed on the munitions standard board. 
96. 

Resigned from it some time in June, July, or August, along 
there, of 1917. 97. 

The report of the function of the munitions standard board for 
the year June 30, 1917, is read to Mr. Deeds, who says he 
did not know a thing about what the board was doing. 97-101. 

Makes correction on page 66 of this report, or book, regarding 
the stock of the United Motors Corporation, which does not 
change it any but makes it a little more intelligible. 102. 

Refers to pages 81 to 90, where the questions are asked whether 
or not he had an interview with the Secretary of War and 
another interview with Gen. Ansell. 103. 

Went to see the Secretary of War with Judge McCann. 103. 

Went to see the Secretary of War in August, 1917, about the 
time of the letter of disclosure. 104. 

On page 132, when asked if he and Mr. Kettering received 
$250,000 apiece from the Dayton Metal Products Co., he said, 
" Yes, sir," and he now wants to add " as a loan." 104. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 345 

Col. E. A. Deeds — Continued. 

Makes a correction, on page 231, where asked, a You sent that 
telegram ? " and he said, " Yes, sir," and Mr. Deeds now wishes 
to add " at Mr. Craighead's suggestion." 112. 

On page 70 were given the names of engineers — Mr. Day, Mr. 
Loenning, etc. — and Mr. Deeds would like to have the records 
show that each of these men was given something to do, etc. 
116. 

Has received no money for any purpose whatever from Mr. Ket- 
tering or H. E. Talbott, or H. E. Talbott, jr., the last year. 
123. 

Has no agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any kind 
whatever with Mr. Kettering for delivery or surrender of his 
notes. 123. 

Various other questions asked about arrangements or agreements 
with Mr. Kettering or the Talbotts, to all of which he replies 
he has none. 123, 124. 

Submits the report of the Senate committee and refers to page 
11, where there is a statement regarding the Miami Field and 
the Dayton-Kantoul Flying Field. 124, 125. 

Then mentioned in the same report a reference regarding the 
acceptance of the field adjoining the plant of the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. 126. 

Submits a statement by Mr. W. W. Montgomery, attorney for 
the Bureau of Aircraft Production, which he says explains 
itself fully. 126. 

This paper marked " Deeds Exhibit 21, October 7, 1918." 128- 
134. 
Maj. Howard Elliott (Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., 
October 7, 1918; Book 24). 

In August, 1917, was in the Army, with rank of captain. 158. 

Was a disbursing officer in the then Signal Corps, Aviation 
Section. 158. 

Is shown a voucher, " Blakeley Exhibit 1," which was paid by 
check on August 11, 1917, for the sum of $104,500. 159. 

Can not recall anything about this, but it is sufficient evidence 
to a disbursing officer when he sees the signature of the proper 
competent officer of the Government certified over his signa- 
ture that he had received the material or the services. 160. 

He would see Col Deeds's signature there and put his name there, 
as Mr. Deeds, being in charge of the Equipment Division, a 
commission pending, he would take it that he was the re- 
sponsible party. 167. 

His was known as the Finance and Supply Division. 188. 

Asked why a matter of this sort did not take its normal course 
and go through the Finance Division. 169. 

Can not recall that the Chief Signal Office issued any orders as 
to who should have authority to pass vouchers for payment 
in the Aviation Section. 170. 

Nor any orders that he could pay vouchers on Mr. Deeds's cer- 
tification before he became a commissioned officer. 172. 

Army regulations require an officer to certify vouchers. 173. 

Is shown order 8526 with the initials " G. H. B." at the bottom 
of the order. 174. 



346 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Howard Elliott — Continued. 

These are the initials of Capt. Brett, who was in charge of the 
Finance Department. 174. 

This certificate came through the Finance and Supply Division,, 
but instead of the certificate having been given by Mr. Mont- 
gomery, who was in charge at that time, August 11, 1917, it 
was certified by Mr. Deeds. 174. 

On the back of the voucher reference is made to the less formal 
agreement, 08256. The order is addressed to the Aircraft 
Division, which says nothing about the Packard Motor Car 
Co. 175. 

Annexed are a series of blanks, the name of the Packard Motor 
Car Co., and copies of the vouchers. 175. 

Asked if that would be regarded as an order to the Packard 
Motor Car Co., or evidence of a contract with the Packard 
Motor Car Co., or what there was to show the terms and con- 
ditions on which anything should be paid to the Packard 
Motor Car Co. 176. 

Maj. Elliott states there is absolutely nothing. 176. 

This final settlement of $249,159.10 takes the total cost and the 
profit of 12J per cent. 176. 

Nothing in all those vouchers or in the order 8526 to show that 
any 12J per cent was ever agreed to be paid to the Packard 
Motor Car Co., nor what was the basis for the allowance of 
that amount. 176. 

Is asked to get all information possible on order 8526. 183. 

Is asked to bring in also the regulations which govern disburse- 
ments of this character. 184. 
Alfred Bettman (October 7, 1918; Book 24). 

Employed in the Department of Justice. 191. 

Special assistant to the Attorney General in the division that is 
referred to as the War Emergency Division. 191. 

States for the record what regulations have been issued or what 
instructions have been issued upon the subject of enemy aliens. 
191-196. 
Capt. Oscar E. Ewing (October 7, 1918; Book 24). 

In the Contract Section of the Bureau of Aircraft Production 
(of the Signal Corps). 197. 

Lieut. Col. Downey has been in charge of the Contract Section 
from the beginning. 197. 

States he went through all their files and that they have no 
record of the contract with the Packard Motor Car Co. for 
certain work in connection with the development of the Lib- 
erty motor engine. 198. 

And no record of the contract or order under which approxi- 
mately $250,000 for experimental work or work in the devel- 
opment of the first engines of these types was done. 

The photostat copy of the order which he sent and which was 
marked " Elliott Exhibit No. 3 " was merely a memorandum to 
the Air Division and is what is known as an allotment of 
funds. 198. 

Telling them that $250,000 is available for certain purposes, and 
nothing in the memorandum to show that the order was 
given to the Packard Motor Car Co. 198-199. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 347 

Capt. Oscar R. Ewing — Continued. 

Nothing in the files to show anything about this contract. 199. 

Produces the only file of correspondence he could find about 
about this matter. 202. 

One memorandum has a statement of "The increase of $11,- 
464.38 over present allowance on order No. 8526 is author- 
ized in order to permit the payment of bills now outstanding." 
204. 

Mr. Ewing thinks that this meant that the appropriation of 
$250,000 was sufficient to meet outstanding vouchers and that 
this was a memorandum to increase that allotment, $11,464.38. 
204. 

Asked if it did not look more like it was a voucher for $11,464.38 
and that it was made that amount in order that the total 
amount might come within the $250,000 appropriation. 205. 

In fact the two engines are figured at $5,732.19 each to make up 
that sum of $11,464.38, which is a very low figure as com- 
pared with the other engines. 205. 
Col. R. L. Montgomery (October 8, 1918; Book 24). 

Is asked to recall the fact that in the early part of 1918 a con- 
tract was concluded with the Curtiss Airplane & Motor 
Corporation for the making of advances by the Government 
to an amount not in excess of $8,000,000 on account of War 
Department contracts. 208. 

This contract contains a provision that there shall be retired at 
a price not in excess of par and accrued interest all the serial 
6 per cent first-mortgage gold bonds of a total of $1,400,000, 
dated October 1, 1917, etc. 208. 

Col. Montgomery is asked for information with respect to these 
gold notes of the Curtiss Co. that were outstanding. 209. 

Has no information at all with respect to the owners of those 
notes. 201. 

Asked why there should have been any provision made for the 
retiring of those gold notes. 210. 

The effect of the transaction was that a premium was paid at 
the expense of the Curtiss Co. upon those notes. 211. 

And that at a time when the Curtiss Co., instead of paying a 
premium, was seriously in need of money to carry on Govern- 
ment work. 212. 

Apparently the only purpose was to pay the notes to some peo- 
ple who held them, and Mr. Hughes told him he wanted to 
know who those people were. 213. 

States the National City Co. did not hold any of those notes. 
213. 

Thinks the idea originated in the minds of the Navy Depart- 
ment. 214. 

His firm had nothing to do with the bringing out of the Miami 
conservancy district, 5 per cent bonds, an issue of $10,000,000, 
dated December 1, 1917. 215. 

Relates conversation with Col. Deeds wherein Col. Montgomery 
is asked who he thought would take the bond issue of the 
Miami conservancy district. 215. 

Has no knowledge of the disposition of the funds. 217. 



348 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. R. L. Montgomery — Continued. 

His attention called to the General Vehicle Co. and the fact 
that at the time of the acquisition of its plant by the Govern- 
ment it had outstanding certain notes amounting to $1,530,- 
408, not far from the amount the Government paid for the 
plant. 217. 

Asked what the initials " P. T. & M. ? ' opposite this item stand 
for. 217. 

Takes it that those represent the Peerless Co. or a subsidiary of 
the Peerless Co. 217. 

Poor's Manual of Industrials for 1917 under the title of " Peer- 
less Truck & Motor Corporation " states that the Peerless 
Truck & Motor Corporation ■owned or had acquired the own- 
ership of the Peerless Motor Co. and the General Vehicle Co. 
218. 

Did not undestand at the time the proposition was made to buy 
the plant that the General Vehicle Co. stock was owned by 
the Peerless Truck & Motor Corporation or by any organi- 
zation of the Peerless. 220. 

If the National City Co. owned the Peerless, he did not know 
it. 221. 

Mr. Montgomery strongly advised the Aircraft Board to make 
the purchase. 225. 

The negotiations were carried on by Mr. W. W. Montgomery, jr. 
225. 

The General Motors Co. needed the General Vehicle Co. for its 
knowledge of rotary-engine building. 225. 

These engines to be built to fill an order or request from Gen. 
Pershing. They would have gone into the Nieuport plane- 
226. 

States that it is not exactly true that the reason the General 
Vehicle Co.'s plant was purchased was so that there would be 
a continuous manufacture of rotary engines in the country. 
226. 

The Union Switch & Signal Co. was starting to do that, 226. 

At any rate the price arrived at as the purchase price is substan- 
tially the same as the amount of the notes which the General 
Vehicle Co. had outstanding. 228. 
Maj. Gen. George Owen Sqtjier. (October 9, 1918; Book 24.) 

Chief Signal Officer of the Army. 234. 

In charge of the aviation section of the Signal Corps. 238. 
(Prior to his appointment as Chief Signal Officer.) 

Is asked how many airplanes were owned by the Government 
when he became Chief Signal Officer in February, 1917. 238. 

Approximately 150 training planes, no service planes, and no 
bombing or pursuit planes. 239. 

Proceeded from the day war was declared to outline an esti- 
mated program as a basis to proceed to Congress with for 
hearings, etc, 241. 

Only had a program in a vague way which stated the types of 
planes it was proposed to build. 242. 

When he returned to this country fully posted on the progress of 
aviation activities abroad and the types of planes in use, 
needed, etc. 243. 



ABSTRACT OE AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 349 

Maj. Gen. George Owen Squier — Continued. 

With this information in his possession he is asked why he was 
not in a position to order at once planes and engines that would 
be needed. 245. 

Perhaps $20,000,000 was available at the time this country en- 
tered war for making airplanes and engines. 247. 

Did start ordering training planes immediately for the work 
the country was entering in. 247. 

Did not order combat or bombing planes or pursuit planes be- 
cause they did not have the money and because there was not 
a settled judgment as to which types were the best. 248. 

As soon as the war broke out requested France and England to 
send the best experts they could spare. 249. 

Quite a few here bv the last of May from England, France, and 
Italy. 250. 

Caproni people were the first men sent from abroad to under- 
take the designing of planes for the American Government. 
253. 

The idea was to adapt the Caproni plane to the Liberty engine. 
254. 

With an expectation of 9,000 arranged for in August, by Feb- 
ruary it was reduced to a total of 50. 257. 

Continuously before the board, but also continuously postponed, 
he admits. 258. 

Is shown program of the Handley-Page, which program started 
in September, 1917, with an expectation that 1,500 Handley- 
Page's would be made, and again on February 19 it was re- 
duced to a program of a total of 50. 261. 

This program also postponed and suspended. 262. 

The information which he had received abroad and the informa- 
tion he received during the following year before this country 
entered the war was not adequate to enable him to formulate a 
plane program. 265. 

Sent a commission over in May to find out the whole situation 
and to bring back what to do. 266. 

Had no notion that the country was going into an air program 
of the size that later developed, but he had notions large 
enough to ask for an appropriation of $640,000,000 bv Con- 
gress. 266-267. 

Asked why the commission could not have been sent two months 
earlier. 269. 

Appropriation bill passed on July 24, 1917. 270. 

Established the Equipment Division of the Signal Corps in 
August or September. 271. 

Functions of this division to procure the material of the Signal 
Corps in contradistinction to personnel. 271. 

Appointed Mr. Deeds to be in charge of that division. 271. 

Prior to that time Mr. Deeds had been a member of the first 
Aircraft Board, appointed by the Council of National De- 
fense. 272. 

Had no duties with the Signal Corps of an executive character. 
272. 



350 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Gen. George Owen Squier — Continued. 

Was then not in the service of the United States, as a repre- 
sentative of the United States, prior to the time he was made 
Chief of the Equipment Division, outside of his duties as a 
member of the Aircraft Production Board. 272. 

Is reminded that the Aircraft Production Board had no execu- 
tive authority, could not place any contracts, which he ad- 
mits. 273. 

Board authorized by law October 1, 1917. 273. 

His attention again directed to August, 1917, when the Equip- 
ment Division was established, and to the fact that Mr. Deeds 
as a member of the Aircraft Production Board had no execu- 
tive or administrative authority. 274. 

Does not recall any order from him that would clothe him with 
this authority. 274. 

The Engineering and Supply Division, before the Equipment 
Division was established, corresponded to it in function. 275. 

Had a separate section called the Finance and Supply Depart- 
ment, with Col. Montgomery at the head. 276. 

Then about August 29 these two divisions were reorganized and 
amalgamated, the Equipment Division and the Finance and 
Supply Division. 276. 

Made one Equipment Division, of which the Finance Section 
would be a part, with Col. Montgomery under Col. Deeds. 
277. 

Admits that, as Chief Signal Officer dealing with the military 
program, before a board which was limited by the authority 
of the Secretary of War to obtaining of its information as to 
program from the Army and the Navv, he held an influential 
position. 283-284. 

This board was a regular clearing house for information, he 
states. 285. 

Goes over the first part of the contract situation. 286. 

Asked what information he got as to the resources of the Dayton- 
Wright Co. 289. 

States he knew Mr. Orville Wright, in reply. 290. 

Did not know whether he owned stock or was just employed 
by the company. 290. 

Did not know what the capital stock of the Dayton- Wright 
Airplane Co. was. 291. 

Did not know when the capital stock of the company was paid 
in. 291. 

Again states how much reliance he placed in the fact that Orville 
Wright was about in this plant. 292, 293. 

Asked if he understood that the contract with the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. made it the duty of the Government 
to furnish it with drawings, etc. 294. 

And that so far as the manufacturing end of it was concerned 
and the making of the planes, he understood that Mr. Orville 
Wright was not to have anything to do with that, to which 
he answers, yes. 295. 

Asked if he knew he was placing this contract with the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. at a time when it had no financial re- 
sources to carry it out with. 296. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 351 

Maj. Gen. George Owen Squier — Continued. 

He knew it could get all the money it wanted. 297. 

Did not know how much the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 
would be able to make out of this contract in one year. 300. 

Resume given him of the order for the 4,000 De Havilands, 
profits, bogy price, etc., etc., salaries of the Talbotts, and of 
Mr. Kettering, etc., and he is asked the theory on which this 
contract was made. 305. 

Says it would seem exorbitant, if true. 306. 

Says he did not know these conditions, he had too much to cope 
with, had to rely and trust the people who were doing the 
negotiating; in other words, the chief of the financial depart- 
ment and the Chief of the Equipment Division. 307. _ 

States on page 306 that these contracts were the subject of 
weeks, even months, of careful negotiations and consideration. 
306. 

Admits on page 308 that the contracts were let to the Dayton- 
Wright Airplane Co. very promptly. 308. 

Asked why they did not make a contract with the Singer Co. 
309. 

Asked about the Fisher Body Corporation. 312. 

Asked if he knew that Mitsui & Co. owned the Standard. 316. 

Here he is asked a leading question; i. e., had he noticed that the 
Standard Co. in some way got hold of a contract for nearly 
every type of plane that was being put into service by the 
American Government and that the representatives of this 
Japanese house are familiar with every detail, etc., etc. 316, 
317. 

Had heard that this firm was financed by Japanese funds. 317. 

He is asked how, as a " military " man, they got this series of 
little contracts covering the entire aviation field with the 
exception of the Bristol. 318. 

Thinks it may have been a mistake. 318. 

Thinks possibly that something was done here that should not 
ITave been done. 318. 

Asked with regard to Mr. Vincent who had been chief engineer 
of the Packard Co. 324. 

When the $250,000 was appropriated they started to design, to 
construct, the Liberty engine. 326. 

Does not know whether positively that a contract was ever 
given to the Packard Co. 327. 

Rules of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer are that verbal 
contracts are not to be made unless they are absolutely neces- 
sary — emergencies. 327. 

His attention called to the provision, chapter 418 of the act 
of Congress of August 29, 1916, providing * * * whenever 
contracts which are not to be performed within 60 days on be- 
half of the Government by the Chief Signal Officer * * * 
shall be reduced in writing * * *. In other cases contracts 
shall be entered into under certain regulations, as may be pre- 
scribed by the Chief Signal Officer. 328. 

Says he will send in a copy of any regulations he may have 
prescribed under that provision. 328. 
130687—19 23 



352 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

) 

Maj. Gen. George Owen Sqtjier — Continued. 

Says he never gave any authority to any officer of the Equipment 
Division or the Finance Division or otherwise in the Signal 
Corps to disburse the $250,000 without any written contract 
or written order. 330. 

Such a disbursement was not according to the rules and regula- 
tions of the department. 330. 

Is read Mr. Macauley 's statement, president of the Packard Co., 
in which he says they went ahead on verbal orders. 330. 

Got the verbal orders from Lieut. Col. J. G. Vincent. 331. 

Never gave anyone authority to violate any of the regulations. 
333. 

Asked to explain the fact that Lieut. Col. Vincent himself have 
these orders, a salaried officer of the Packard Co., and that 
when the vouchers were put in they were paid upon his cer- 
tificate. 325. 

His attention called to the voucher for $104,500, with Col. Deeds 
signature to it. 327. 

States Col. Deeds had no authority from him, and there was 
nobody else to give him that authority. 328. 

States the same about the voucher for $60,000, certified to by 
Col. Deeds. 328. 

Also makes the same negative statement with regard to the 
voucher for $73,194, which has a letter from Col. Deeds 
attached. 330. 

Gave no authority to anyone in the Signal Corps to certify for 
payment, or to make payments, under these conditions. 332. 

Did not know that Lieut. Col. Vincent was a stockholder in the 
Packard Motor Car Co. 333. 

States that none of these vouchers were brought to him for his 
consideration before they were paid. 333. 

None of these amounts were brought to his attention for ap- 
proval before they were paid. 334. 

Was not aware that Mr. Deeds, before he received a commission, 
or Col. Deeds thereafter, undertook to certify vouchers for 
payment. 335. 

States the first De Haviland 4 was received in this country in 
August, 1917. 338. 

Col. Vincent's testimony said that Col. Clark, during the period 
from October 1, 1917, to February 6, 1918, was devoting most 
of his time to the design of an airplane known as the TJ. S. A. 
C-l, and that no one on the part of the airplane experimental 
department was giving attention to the settlement of the de- 
sign of Che DH-4. 341. 

Relied upon Col. Deeds to see that the DH-4 was designed. 342. 

The matter of Orville Wright being brought up again, he finally 
states that Orville Wright was working on secret matter for 
the Government. 349. 

Asked why, if the delay was caused because they could not get 
information as to what equipment was desired, he did not 
advise the President or the Secretary of War that the air 
program was being held up month after month. 362. 

States he was a member of the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics. 364. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 3£3 

Maj. Gen. George Owen Squier — Continued. 

Asked regarding the misleading statement or letter which was 
addressed to the President of the United States by the secre- 
tary of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
under date of January 24, 1918.' 364. 

Understood that some sort of a report was being sent to reassure 
the President. 367. 

States they did not get the information from him, but admits 
he never took pains to tell them the exact position they were 
in. 369. ! 

Under the terms of the contract with the French Government, 
regarding the supplying of raw materials, it was contemplated 
that there would be 100 per cent of the deliveries by the middle 
of April. 374. 

Down to February 1, 1918, 58 per cent of the materials had been 
shipped. 374. 

His attention called to another inaccuracy in the letter under 
date of January 24 to the President by the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics. 380. 

Wherein it states that "The same types of machines are being 
put in quantity production in foreign countries under con- 
tracts with the United States." 381. 

Did nothing when he read the statement in the paper by the Sec- 
retary of War which stated " The first American-built battle 
planes are to-day en route to the front in France," etc. 383. 

Is told of Mr. Pew's testimony in which he stated that Maj. Gen. 
Squier called the Senate speeches, criticizing the inaccurate 
statements emanating from his department, " German propa- 
ganda." 390. 

Remembers nothing of this at all. 392. 
Maj. Howard Elliott (October 9, 1918; Book 24). 

Produces what correspondence he was able to find in the files 
relative to transactions with the Packard Motor Car Co. 422. 

Is satisfied that there was never a written contract. There is 
absolutely no evidence of a contract. 429. 

Reads from Army Regulations, page 138, portion of paragraph 
653, that " Every order issued by any military authority which 
may cause an expenditure of money in a staff department will 
be given in writing." 435. 

Verbal order is permissible in an emergency. 435. 

A matter that was in progress from the 1st of June until Novem- 
ber would seem to have been susceptible of a written state- 
ment. 436. 
Lieut. Col. M. W. Thompson (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; 
Book 24). 

War Credits Board made an advance in the nature of a loan to 
the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation. 442. 

The Curtiss Co. was advanced substantially $12,000,000, of which 
two-thirds came from the Army through the War Credits 
Board and the remaining third from the Navy. 443. 

Can not state from memory how much of this loan was devoted 
to the retirement of outstanding obligations of the Curtiss 
Co. 445. 



354 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. M. W. Thompson — Continued. 

Out of total advance of $12,000,000, nearly $7,500,000 was de- 
voted to the retirement of first lien bonds on the North Elm- 
wood plant and debenture notes. 447. 

" One day in comes a telegram saying that the New York Central 
agent of the Director General of Railroads had asked for 
authority to put an embargo on cars to the Curtiss plant, the 
reason being that they had a great number of cars that had 
been shipped in there against draft with bill of lading at- 
tached, and not getting their money they could not take up the 
draft, and the railroad yards were clogged up. If that em- 
bargo had been put on, it would have busted the Curtiss Co. 
and they would have been in the hands of receivers." 452. 

Copy of memorandum from War Credits Board to Acting Secre- 
tary of War relative to advances to Curtiss Co. 455. 

Letter from Navy Department to War Credits Board on same 
matter. 466. 

The moneys advanced by the Army were deposited in the Bank- 
ers' Trust Co. in New York, at the request of the Curtiss Co., 
and that part of those moneys required to pay off the deben- 
tures was transferred by the Bankers' Trust Co. to the Central 
Trust Co., at whose offices the debentures were payable. 473. 

It has been a part of policy of Government to endeavor to cause 
the Curtiss Co.'s general commercial credit to be built up so 
far as possible, in order that they might transfer the load of 
credit off the Government. 475. 

Generally understood the control of stock of the Peerless Truck 

& Motor Co. is in the General Electric Co. It appears the 

Peerless Truck & Motor Co. held the notes of approximated 

$1,500,000 of the General Vehicle Co. 476. 

Roderick S. Huddleston (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; 

Book 24). 

President of the Huddleston-Marsh Mahogany Co. since Janu- 
ary 1, 1909. 479. 

Had contracts with Government for mahogany lumber. 480. ^ 

Two contracts called for about 3,195,000 feet of Central Ameri- 
can and Mexican mahogany. 480. 

Firm is a member of the Mahogany Manufacturers' & Im- 
porters' Association. 480. 

First meeting of association was held January 21, 1918. In 
Washington. 481. 

War committee of association was formed with Mr. A. S. Wil- 
liams as chairman and Mr. Charles H. Thompson as secretary. 
483. 

List of firms desirous of becoming members of the association. 
485. 

Proposition submitted by committee to the Government. 487- 
500. 

Proposition was rejected by Lieut. Ryerson and members of as- 
sociation were told to submit a price on lumber only. 502. 

Thinks it was between $350 and $400 per thousand. 502. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 355 

Roderick S. Huddleston — Continued. 

Mr. John C. Wickliffe, representing C. R. Mengel Bro. & Co., 
was in Washington when these negotiations held. 504. 

The association made certain payments to Mr. Wickliffe. 505. 

List showing contributions made by each member of the associa- 
tion. 508. 

Did not like to feel that one mahogany manufacturer was paying 
all the expenses of an employee of the Government. 510. 

Would not pay Mr. Wickliffe until it was approved by the Sig- 
nal Corps. 514. 

Letter from office of Chief Signal Officer to C. C. Mengel & Bro. 
Co., approving their request to be allowed to pay Mr. J. C. 
Wickliffe a salary while he was in the employ of the Signal 
Corps. 518. 

Payment was discontinued at end of July at request of Mr. 
Wickliffe. 521. 

Judge Hughes: " — but there was not the slightest doubt 
but what Mr. Wickliffe went into that department and then 
dealt with those very manufacturers who constituted that as- 
sociation which was paying him this money." 523. 

Made payments to Mr. McCullough, an employee of the George 
D. Emery Co., who was identified with the Signal Corps. 
528. 

Mr. McCullough was an inspector under Mr. Yrooman. 529. 

Mr. McCullough was in charge of inspection in Philadelphia and 
New York. 539. 
John Edward McCullough (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; 
Book 24). 

At present time is superintendent at mill for the George D. 
Emery Co., manufacturing mahogany and Spanish cedar cigar 
boxes. 544. 

Became identified with the Signal Corps on March 4, 1918. 545. 

Resigned on August 3, 1918. 545. 

During that time he was district inspector in charge of New 
York district, which took a strip along the coast from Maine 
to Texas. 545. 

Mr. S. B. Yrooman, jr., chief inspector of lumber for the Signal 
Corps, asked him to take that work in charge. 546. _ 

Inspected plant of S. B. Yrooman & Co. in Philadelphia. 548. 

Received compensation at rate of $2,400 a year from Government. 
549. 

Received from George D. Emery Co. the difference between that 
and $3,500, which was his regular income. 550. 

That account was turned over to a committee and he got check 
monthly from that committee through the treasurer, Mr. Hud- 
dleston. 550. 

Lieut. Yrooman, as his superior officer, occasionally visited same 
plants that he did. 551. 

Went around with him to make rulings as to what should be ac- 
cepted and not accepted. 551. 



356 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

William Woodrow Montgomery, Jr. (Washington, D. C, October 10, 
1918; Book 24). 

Connected with the Bureau of Aircraft Production as chief of 
what is known as the advisory and consulting department, 
whose duty it is to look after miscellaneous matters which in- 
volve legal questions. 554. 

Is a brother of Col. Montgomery. 556. 

Conducted negotiations relating to the acquisition of the plant 
of the General Vehicle Co. 559. 

Gives history of negotiations. 560. 

Had been telling Genera] Vehicle Co. not to get tied up with other 
contracts; that they (Government) would need their facilities. 
566. 

When plan by which their (General Vehicle Co.) plane would 
be taken over by the General Motors people was dropped it left 
them in a very awkward situation. 566. 

Proposition was made by Mr. Wagoner that Government take 
over plant on the same terms as General Motors had contem- 
plated paying for it. 567. 

Arrangement was made that, subject to the approval of the Air- 
craft Board, we would purchase the plant of the General 
Vehicle Co. at its actual asset value, deducting, however, the 
appraised value or perhaps the inventory value of their elec- 
tric-truck business. 567. 

Understood Peerless Motor Co. had an interest in the General 
Vehicle Co. 569. 

Has no idea who the real persons were behind the Peerless Co. 
570. 

Does not know whether the National Citv Co. had any relation to 
it. 570. 

Contract was placed with Union Switch & Signal Co. on Decem- 
ber 6, 1917, for 2,500 La Rhone engines, but negotiations started 
considerably 

Cablegram signed Pershing, dated October 5, 1917, No. 204, para- 
graph 2, contains sentence reading, "Advise you build no rotary 
engines ; single-seater pursuit airplanes be sent to Europe ; ex- 
isting machines this type will be outclassed by date yours ar- 
rive. Build only what you need for use in United States train- 
ing purposes." 565, 574. 

Did not know whether the Union Switch & Signal Co. would 
make good on their contract, although for some reason he does 
not know why Government wanted both types of engines — the 
Gnome and the La Rhone. 576. 

Question arose as to what to do with the General Vehicle Co.'s 
plant, which Government had bought. 576. 

General Vehicle Co. plant was turned over to the Wright-Martin 
Co. for the manufacture of Hispano-Suiza engines. 577. 

Witness asked why it was deemed necessary or advisable to buy 
the plant of the General Vehicle Co. 578. 

Judge Hughes : " Have you ever looked up the question as to 
the inherent power of the Government to institute condemnation 
proceedings for lands that are needed for governmental use ? " 
580. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 357 

William Woodrow Montgomery, Jr. — Continued. 

Thinks this general rule would have resulted in a lawsuit in this 
case. 580. 

Government took plant of the General Vehicle Co. at a time when 
it did not contemplate business which would be adequate to 
utilize the plant. 581. 

Col. Thompson employed the firm of Black & Veitch, who* made 
an appraisal of the property, which seemed to justify the price 
Government was paying. 582. 

Memorandum of the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft 
Board relative to the rotary engine. 584. 

Supposes matters of purchasing plant around either with Col. 
Deeds or Col. Montgomery. 588. 

Thinks either Mr. Vanderlip or Mr. Rich, of National City 
Bank, were in some way connected with it. 590. 

Voucher for the payment of real estate — has in mind figure of 
$861,000 — was approved by Mr. Baker personally. 592. 

Practice required that the Secretary of War shall personally 
approve the voucher before any payment for real estate is 
made, and there is no such requirement in regard to person- 
ality or other things. 593. 
Edward Putnam Currier (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; 
Book 24). 

Was commissioned a major in the Signal Corps last October. 
597. 

Was sort of utility man. Was there for about two weeks and 
then detailed to the Treasury Department for a little over six 
weeks. 597. 

Came to Washington in April, 1917, and was sort of secretary or 
assistant to Mr. Coffin for a while. 598. 

Was there about three or four months and then went down to 
Col. Montgomery's office and helped there. 599. 

Before coming to Washington was member of firm of Mont- 
gomery, Clothier & Tyler, which later changed to Mont- 
gomery &, Co. 599. 

Entered the firm April 2, 1917. 600. 

Previous to that was with the National City Bank. 600. 

Does not recall the notation of securities of the Curtiss Aero* 
plane and Motor Corporation. 600. 
Albert Lariviere (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; Book 24). 

Is principal clerk of appropriations department in War Depart- 
ment. 605. 

Dealing with appropriations of Bureau of Aircraft Production, 
Finance Division. 605. 

Prior to organization of bureau was with the Signal Corps. 
606. 

Was relieved of Capt. Elliott's accounts and Maj. Gutensogn's 
accounts, his predecessor, about the 1st of August, 1917. 
607. 

Mr. Mehrlick checked Capt. Elliott's accounts. 607. 

Gives information as to how a voucher is checked. 608. 

It is up to disbursing officer to satisfy himself that party had 
a rignt to sign voucher. 610. 



358 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Albert Lariviere — Continued. 

Does not recall ever O. King voucher No. 7228 for $60,000, 
payable to Packard Motor Car Co., upon which his initials 
appear. 612. 

Does not remember ever signing a voucher in that way. 628. 
Maj. Earnest A. Coleman (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; 
Book 24). 

Commissioned a major August 3, 1918. 630. 

Commissioned a first lieutenant on August 18, 1917. 630. 

Employed in office of Auditor for the War Department before 
entering the Army. 630. 

Has seen original of voucher No. 458, paid August 11, 1917, for 
$104,500, to the Packard Motor Car Co., before. 631. 

Chief Signal Officer asked for these vouchers last winter or last 
fall. 634. 

The Aircraft Board, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, and 
the Department of Justice were inquiring about matter. 635. 

Furnished photostated copies of vouchers to Department of Jus- 
tice for the purpose of determining as to whether this investi- 
gation now being conducted was necessary. 636. 

There should be a written order covering voucher. 644. 

Has never met Maj. Vincent. 661. 
Lieut. Col. A. C. Downey (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; 
Book 24) . 

Judge Hughes. " Capt. Elliott is responsible for your coming 
here to-day, because he told us that you had some informa- 
tion with regard to these vouchers under which $249,159.10 
was paid to the Pack Co. for experimental work in develop- 
ing the Liberty motor." 663. 

Had no personal relation to it whatever. 664. 
Douglas Campbell (Washington, D. C, October 14, 1918; Book 24). 

Is a lawyer. His firm, Campbell, Harding & Pratt, represent 
the J. G. White Corporation. 672. 

Recently made a trip to France on behalf of the Bureau of Air- 
craft Production at the request of the J. G. White Corpora- 
tion. 672. 

Copy of his report on the subject of air motor and materials 
shipped to France under United States Government contract, 
No. 1694, with the J. G. White Corporation. 673-676. _ 

Immediate object of inquiry was to ascertain the disposition of 
materials which had been shipped and general condition in 
which the materials arrived in France, 676. 

Mr. Chilton's statement as to material shipped to France under 
this contract. 678. 

Lieut. Hiltz and Capt. Satterfield, of the American Air Serv- 
ice, and Maj. Guinard, of the French service, advised him 
with respect to the satisfaction as the quality of the materials 
delivered. 681. 



DIGEST OF HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS. SENATE. 



Col. C. G. Edgar (Washington, D. C, May 29, 1918; Volume I). 

A colonel, Signal Corps, United States Army, commissioned a 
reserve captain in Quartermaster Corps, December, 1916. Put 
in charge of construction division, Signal Corps, April, 1917. 

Organized construction division and began project to build 
aviation training plants, 54 buildings. Only three existing 
when he began this work. Sites selected by board of offi- 
cers. 5. 

Work required an architect to get out plans for buildings. 

Architect chosen, Mr. Kahn, Detroit. Completed 10 days. 

Training before Army service shows no airplane-construction 
knowledge. 6. 

Automobile connections. 7. 

Locating flying fields, repair depots. 9-11. 

Eeport of progress on all fields, May 27, 1918. 12. 

No connection with ground flying schools. Formation of same. 
14. 

Formation of the construction division, employees, some in uni- 
form, others not. The discipline prevailing. 16-17. 

Gen. Squier responsible for all moneys and things done in 
Signal Corps. 

Statement showing estimated cost of all projects constructed or 
under construction in the United States up to March 25, 1918, 
and actual cash disbursements. 19. 

Statement showing rentals of land to June 30, 1918. 21. 

Purchase of land. 22. 

List of construction work, showing estimated and actual cost of 
each project as of May 24, 1918. 22-23. 

Construction abroad. 23. 

Commitment for construction work, Langley Field, Hampton, 
Va. 

Allotments available for purchase of land and construction of 
buildings in the United States and abroad. 24. 

Cost of Belleville, 111., field. 27. 

Building of fields. 

Senator Reed, "Do you think there was any waste down there 
(referring to Fort Worth, Tex.), avoidable waste? " 

Col. Edgar, " Yes, sir ; I do. I think there has been avoidable 
waste on every one of these jobs." 28. 

Sanitary conditions at the fields. 29. 

Made first protest to these conditions in January; no action at 
that time. Protests made to Gen. Squier and Gen. Kinley. 
30-31. J 

359 



360 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Col. C. G. Edgar — Continued. 

The names of contractors who built the various fields and 

whether their work proved satisfactory. 31-35. 
Langley Field project gave much trouble. Senator Reed, " Did 

the Government lose any money, particularly on that ? " Col. 

Edgar, " I think more money was spent down there than was 

necessary; yes." 
J. G. White, New York, contractor. Also contracted for other 

jobs. Selected by Aircraft Production Board. 36. 
Testimony showing Col. Deed's connection with Mr. Talbott, of 

the Dayton Lumber Co. 37. 
Night flying route, Dayton to Rantoul, 111. 38. 
Yery expensive project. One or two flights made each night. 

Lack of cooperation and system in Signal Corps. 39. 
List of airplane manufacturers. 40. 
Name of Construction Division changed to Supply Division. 

Experienced trouble with Equipment Division to secure parts 

for damaged planes. Col Deeds head of Equipment Division. 

42-46. 
Improvement in Equipment Division when Col. Deeds replaced 

by Mr. Potter. Now materials being received. Thinks delays 

due to interior friction in Equipment Division. 49. 
Lack of fighting planes now. One hundred and thirteen fighting 

planes, De Haviland, shipped overseas. 
Miami Field built without his authority. Approximately $40,000 

spent. Col. Deeds assumes responsibility for its construction. 

" I never knew anything about it until I heard from Carl 

Fisher that additional work ought to be done. I wired him. 

He said, ' I am building you a field.' " 50. 
Equipment Division built acetone plants. Million-dollar job. 

Could have been done by Supply Division for $60,000. 51. 
Unauthorized construction assumed by commanding officers of 

fields without advice from his office. Paid for out of post 

funds, designed for other purposes. 52. 
Memo showing present housing capacity and quarters for en- 
listed men and officers at all fields. 56. 
Tables showing housing capacity Signal Corps camps, fields, 

depots, etc. 54-55. 
Representatives of Supply Division sent to fields. Ignored by 

commanding officers there. 56-57. 
Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (May 29, 1918; Volume I). 

A lieutenant colonel, Supply Section, Division of Military Aero- 
nautics, chief assistant to Col. Edgar. 
Construction of the unauthorized Miami Field and night-flying 

field, Dayton to Eantoul, 111. 58£59. 
Col. Deeds : " I am to blame for this situation, and I am the 

cause of the trouble." Miami Field now used successfully as 

experimental station. 
J. G. White & Co. bought materials and paid freight charges for 

Government. Used commercial bills of lading in lieu of Gov- 
ernment bills of lading. 60-61. 



ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 361 

Mr. B. A. Guy (Buffalo, N. Y., June 3, 1918; Volume I). 

Secretary and. general manager Curtiss Aeroplane Corporation. 
Six plants. North Elmwood plant built for Government. 
Size of plant. Started August 1, 1917. Operating within 30 
days and manufacturing by following October. 

Engaged in making planes before United States entered war. 
Five of six plants built after war in Europe began. 

First Government order was for 600 JN-4B machines, June 27, 
1917. Price $8,000. 65-66. All delivered by November 21. 
This type used by England. Delivery not hampered by 
Government in any way. 67. Prepared to fill this con- 
tract even before Government placed order. 68. 

Second order September 19, 1917, before other completed. 69. 
Included 3,000 Spad machines. Had no plans for building 
this type, but on October 20, 1917, ready to build them; but 
order canceled on October 20 by Government. 71. Failed to 
build 500 Caproni's; also in second order, due to failure of 
Government to furnish blue prints and specifications. 72. 

If Government had placed orders promptly, it would have 
stimulated production in Curtiss plant. Much loss of time 
pflu^pcl thpT^pb^ 74- 

Third order for 1,400 JN-4D, September 19, 1917. Produced 
by May, 1918. Delays caused by Government due to its 
request to build machines so they could be stored ; also manu- 
facture of certain spare parts given to other concerns and 
when order given for certain type of machine Government 
desired various changes from time to time. 76-81. 

Cancellation of contract for spare parts. 82-83. 

Effort of Government to have Liberty engine installed in Spad 
machines. 85. 
William A. Morgan (production manager, June 3, 1918; Volume I). 

Curtiss Corporation brought in at this point to show cancella- 
tion of Spad contract. 86-91. 

Col. Deeds claimed Spad obsolete, but returning officer from 
Europe said, " Well, the Spad machine is not obsolete, because 
it is one of the best types -we have over there to-day." 91. 

Reasons for selling stock and leaving Curtiss Corporation: In- 
sinuations made he was profiteering, so sold his stock at a 
sacrifice. 93—96 
Mr. B. A. Guy (Buffalo, N. Y., June 3, 1918; Volume I). 

Difficulties experienced in manufacturing Bristol Fighter planes 
for Government. 98. 

Failed to receive proper specifications from Engineer Corps of 
Government. Much loss of time in production caused. 98-99. 

To stimulate production in plant large orders should have been 
placed from time to time. 101-102. 

Navy contracts for planes. 103. 

Senator Reed sums up, " You mean when they gave you the 
blue prints for this machine, and there are necessarily parts 
of a machine that have to be fitted to each other, that in some 
instance the parts would not fit if made according to the 
plans and you could not assemble the machines." Mr. Guy, 
" That is true." 105. 



362 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. B. A. Gut — Continued. 

Curtiss Co. developed high-horsepower machine. Not offered 
to Government for fear of competing with Liberty motor. 
106. 

Loss of eight months' production due to Government's insistence 
for certain motor in one type of plane. 107. 

Cancellation of contract for Caproni's machines. 107-108. 

Mr. Morgan's statement as to finances of Curtiss plant and his 
activities to secure Government orders. 110. 

Assurances made by Secretary of War that Government would 
finance extension of Curtiss plant. All arrangements made, 
but officials refused to sign contract. 112-116. 

Correspondence between Curtiss and Government officials. 
George H. Mueller (June 4, 1918; Volume I). 

Chief engineer Curtiss Corporation. Of German parentage. 
Previous training before entering employ of Curtiss Co. 

Testimony showing reverses made by the Government in decid- 
ing what motor and what guns should be used with the manu- 
facture of Spad plane. Much time lost. 124^128. 

All of his testimony related to the technical construction of 
motors and types of airplanes. 128-146. 
Mr. C. Weber (Buffalo, N. Y., June 4, 1918; Volume I). 

Production manager, Curtiss Corporation. 

Keduction in production due to failure of Signal Corps to fur- 
nish spare parts which were manufactured elsewhere and 
shipped to Curtiss Co. to put on machines. 147. 

Loss of production due to Government caused employees to be 
idle, but received wages. Probably paid by Government. 149. 
Mr. Charles M. Manly (Buffalo, N. Y., June 4, 1918; Volume I). 

Consulting engineer and chief inspection engineer, Curtiss Aero- 
plane & Motor Corporation ; 20 years' experience with airplane 
development. 

Made trip to England and France to cooperate for airplane pro- 
duction. 150. 

A plane should be designed to suit the motor. Liberty engine. 
152-153. 

Technical discussion of engines follows. 
Mr. James E. Kepperly (Buffalo, N. Y., June 4, 1918; Volume I). 

Vice president, general manager, director, and member of voting 
trust. 

Not a stockholder. Connected formerly with Willys- Overland. 

Annoyance by Secret Service in Buffalo. Military Intelligence. 
158. 
Francis Lyster Jandron (Detroit, Mich., June 5, 1918; Volume I). 

Assistant secretary Packard Motor Co. 

War work of this company. J. G. Vincent, later colonel of Sig- 
nal Corps, had charge of development of Liberty motor. 

Statement of O. E. Hunt, chief engineer of Packard Co., giving 
technical discussion of various motors and company's activity 
in airplane development. 

Correspondence of president Packard Co. and Col. Deeds show- 
ing development of Liberty motor. 169-170. 

Difference between Packard and Liberty motors. 173. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 363 

Francis Lyster Jandron — Continued. 

Criticism of Liberty motor. Senator Frelinghuysen's statement. 
178-179. Technical criticism follows. 

Problem of radiation in Liberty motor. Packard Co. had noth- 
ing to do with it and was never asked. 

Senator Frelinghttysen. Who is to blame for that? 186. 

Lack of coordination. 186-187. 

Mr. Hunt. Contracts were let when there has been no tests 
of the engine in combination with the radiators in the planes. 
187. 

Change in system of oiling. 189. 

Contracts for production given before experiments completed. 
196. 

Lack of tool makers. Enlisted in Army. " We have 50 men de- 
tailed to us from Camp Custer, and they are drawing the pay 
of soldiers and working alongside of our men who are draw- 
ing twice as much." 203. 

Changes for the betterment of airplane production. 203. 

Changes in Liberty motor directed by the Government. 205. 

Question of patent rights and royalties turned over to the Gov- 
ernment. 205. 

Col. Waldron's connections with Packard Co. Correspondence 
showing relationship. 

General description of Packard plant. 209. 
Mr. Henry Ford (Detroit, Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). 

Government work by his company. 

Installation of special machinery caused delays. 
Mr. Ford. And too many experts. 213. 

Suggestions to expedite production. 214r-2l7. 

Building of ships. 220-221. 
Mr. R, H. Collins (Detroit, Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). 

President and general manager Cadillac Motor Car Co. 

Engaged in making Liberty motors. Thinks Government at- 
tracted expert toolmakers to leave factories. Many officers en- 
tered factories and induced men by promises to enlist. 224. 

Suggestions for betterment of the production. 226. 

Labor conditions in Detroit. 226. 

Various faults in Liberty motor. 

Handling of I. W. W. activity in his plant. 229. 
Mr. W. C. Leland (Detroit Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). 

Lincoln Co. formed to take up Government work. Building Lib- 
erty motors. 

Statement of why his plant unable to keep up with schedule in 
production. 231-235. 

Opinion of Liberty motor. 236. 

Sabotage activity in his plant. 238. 

Technical discussion of motors. 
Mr. Charles Fisher (Detroit, Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). 

Of the Fisher Body Corporation, Detroit. 

Contracted to build De Haviland airplane. Drawings submitted 
in driblets and held up production. Promised specifications 
and drawings within two weeks. 244. 

Cols. Montgomery, Deeds, and Waldon made promises. 246. 



364 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. C. F. Kettering (Dayton, Ohio, June 7, 1918; Volume I). 

Dayton- Wright Airplane Corporation. Succeeded the Domestic 
Building Co., of which he was vice president and Col. Deeds, 
with 40 per cent holdings, was president. 

Business of the Domestic Building Co. 260. 

His various business connection with Col. Deeds. 261-265. 

Incidents leading up to the formation of the Dayton- Wright Cor- 
poration by Deeds, Wright, Talbott, and Kettering. 270-271. 

Corporation formed to take up promised Government contracts. 
272. 

Government sent accountants to check up values in taking over 
corporation. Method of arriving at realty values. 274. 

Contract with the Miami Conservancy District for land to build 
the Wilbur Wright Flying Field. 278-279. 

Sabotage activity. 280. 

Contracts to build planes. 282-283. 

Cause of delays. 283-290. 

Compelled to sign the cross-licensing agreement, and the royalty 
which was paid included in cost of production. 291. 

His opinion of the Liberty motor. 

Twenty-six million dollars of contracts done by this company. 
295. 
Mr. John Grier Hibben (Princeton, N. J., June 18, 1918 ; Volume I) . 

President of Princeton University. 

United States School of Military Aeronautics. Five such 
schools. Seven hundred students taking seven courses offered. 
University gives instructions to men sent by Government, who 
has charge of the military instructions. Graduates sent to 
flying schools in United States. Expenses of school, $136,248. 
Mr. J. H. Anderson (New Brunswick, N. J., June 18, 1918; Vol- 
ume I) . 

Of the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation. Manufacturing 
Hispano-Suiza motors. Operates also a Government-owned 
plant at Long Island. Its financial organization. This com- 
pany a beneficiary of the cross-license agreement. 302. List 
of the company's officers. 
Mr. William Hand (New Brunswick, N. J., June 18, 1918; Vol- 
ume I). 

Assistant to the sales manager, Wright-Martin Corporation. 
Came to company immediately after letting of first contract. 
List of contracts taken from the Government. 305, 306. 

All contracts let on cost plus basis. Contract states construction 
must commence 90 days after all details completed. Govern- 
ment failed to send all details. Does not know how much time 
was lost thereby. 307. 

Connections of Mr. Houston, formerly of the Curtiss plant. 

Employed only male help. No labor difficulties. 

Operated a plant protection department to guard against sabo- 
tage. 310. 
Mr. George H. Houston (Somerville, N. J., June 19, 1918; Vol- 
ume I). 

Of the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation. 

Detailed account of the contracts let by the Government. 314, 
315. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 365 

Mr. George H. Houston — Continued. 

Delivering 500 motors each month. Part of plant forced to close 
down because of receiving no more orders. Contracts nego- 
tiated by a Mr. Fletcher, Bureau of Aircraft Production. Let 
on the cost plus and bogy price basis. 316. 

Secured right to manufacture this Hispano- Suiza motor from 
France and Spain. 

His letter of July 25, 1917, to S. D. Waldon, Aircraft Produc- 
tion Board offering a year's output covering contract already 
to supply French with planes and what could be done for 
United States Government. 317. Letter in reply. 318. No 
contract let until October. 

French representatives of company advises change from geared 
motors to direct drive. This told to United States officials, but 
order given for geared motors. Months later order changed 
to direct drive. Much time lost thereby. 318, 319. 

Their Los Angeles factory made 50 planes for Government, but 
it proved a bad undertaking due to miserable drawings and 
specifications submitted by Government. 320. 

Offer to form organization to build planes but nothing done. 
320. 

Formation of secret service to combat sabotage. 322. 

Gen. George W. Goethals president of this company before enter- 
ing Army. 323. 
Mr. L. G. Randall (Plainfield, K J., June 19, 1918; Volume I). 

Of the Standard Aircraft Corporation. Built machines and 
spare parts for Government. Only doing Government work. 

Many employees discharged because of not receiving more con- 
tracts. 

Factory not suitable to build fighting planes. Used most for as- 
sembling. Plant at Elizabeth and at Plainfield both could be 
used in emergency. 

Statement of Mr. Thomas Henri Huff giving a discussion of a 
machine he designed for company with Gnome and Le Rhone 
motors. 332-337. 
Mr. Harry B. Mingle (Elizabeth, N. J., June 19, 1918; Volume I). 

President, Standard Aircraft Corporation. Capitalization and 
formation of the company. 

Plant enlarged for the United States Signal Corps. 

Financed by Japanese concern, Mitsui & Co. Stock owned by 
Mingle, given as collateral in favor of Mitsui & Co. 340-347. 

Plant making planes for Japanese Government. 347. 

List of contracts. 347, 348. 

Contract for assembling Handley-Page plane. 349. 

Signal Corps sent drawings and parts and desire his corpora- 
tion to build plane suitable for Liberty motor and ship same 
to fields and overseas without testing. 351. 
"We canned the idea," Dealings with Mr. Kellogg, Signal 

Corps. 

Senator Reed. Did you have any previous experience that 
led you to believe that the drawings and blue prints sent by 
the Government were inaccurate? 

Mr. Mingle. Oh, yes, sir. It was continual. 



366 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 

Mr. Harry B. Mingle — Continued. 

Senator Reed. I want to know if the United States officers 
proposed to have you make a machine from parts that had 
been assembled from drawings which were sent to you, the 
machine when completed to be equipped with a Liberty motor, 
and yet that kind of machine had never been tested with a 
Liberty motor in it. 
Mr. Mingle. Yes. 

After this thing was done I made a trip through the Handley- 
Paige plants to which these parts had been assigned, and the 
condition which I found in those plants was the greatest in- 
dictment against the Signal Corps that I ever saw in my life. 
There was not anyone who had the least conception, so far as 
I could find out, of what the entire program was. 355. 
Would have saved five or six months if drawings had been 
completed. 

De Haviland contract uncomplete. Only one produced. " When 
do you expect quantity production." "There is not a man 
that can tell until somebody puts his foot down and says 
' produce it as it stands to-day and get it out.' " 357. 

Red tape in getting drawings and plans for De Haviland 
changes. 357. Production entirely prevented. 358. 

Applied for sanction to go ahead. No reply. 359. 

More or less freedom in producing Handley-Paige. 362. 

Necessary for plant to close down unless more contracts are let 
to them. 362. Orders received; later rescinded. 363. 

Company developed a sample plane under supervision of Italian 
representative of Caproni machine and plans were taken to 
begin to build them. Given out to another company. 364^-365. 

Officials of company sent to Dayton, found prints for parts of 
De Haviland 9's not ready for production. This told to 
officials in Washington. Chairman, " Did they seem to be sur- 
prised at your story." " I think they were shocked." 365. 

Much material bought, but contract canceled. Authorized to 
sell material and make claim for difference bewteen cost price 
and price obtained. 367. Authorization given by finance 
section, who were told that this material could be used by 
other manufacturers in building other types of planes. 367- 

368. "That to me is absolutely outrageous." Senator Reed, 
"Have you had other trouble with sabotage besides that." 
[Laughter.] His intention to finally dispose of the material. 

369. ; 

Feels his company discriminated against. 370. Mr. Ryan visit- 
ed other plants but not this one. Col. Deeds only came re- 
cently. Built and tested a " J " machine, but received contract 
for only 100, while contract for a 1,000 of his company's own 
inventive machine given to Fisher Body Co., and 1,000 to 
the Dayton-Wright Co. 372-376. " Did they, however, state 
a reason for not giving these particular contracts that there 
was any objection on account of the way you were financed." 

Progress his company made with Standard " J " plane with 
Hispano-Suiza motors. 379-380. 

Experience with the Navy has been satisfactory. 381. 

No trouble from sabotage. 381. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 367 

Mr. Harry B. Mingle — Continued. 
, Liberty motor as good as any. 382. 

Suggestion as to placing of responsibility somewhere. 383. 

Correspondence showing condition of airplane production. 384- 
389. 
Maj. Boy S. Brown (Mineola, Long Island, June 20, 1918; Vol- 
ume I). 

Of Regular Army, Aviation Section. Much experience in fly- 
ing with Liberty motor. Engaged in teaching. 

Testimony mostly technical, giving- his experience with various 
planes and motors. Thinks Mercedes (German), Rolls-Royce 
(English), and Liberty (American) best of the motors. His- 
pano-Suiza an excellent motor. Spad and German Albatross 
best planes. 
Capt. Ugo D'Annunzio (Mineola, Long Island, June 20, 1918; 
Volume I). 

Captain of Italian Army, charge of technical direction of avi- 
ation. Chief engineer of the Caproni plant, Milan, Italy. 
Connected with Italian Army since 1910. 

His story of how Caproni became connected with United States 
in building Caproni machines. 406. Came to America con- 
ference with Mr. Coffin and Col. Deeds. Sent to Standard 
Aircraft Corporation. Plant not adequate to build Caproni. 
Assurances by Mr. Mingle his plant could be enlarged. Gov- 
ernment not certain in program to build this machine. Many 
conferences with Col. Deeds, but no decisions. 408. 

Necessary to build motor to go with Caproni which used a 
Fiat. Impossible to build fast enough in Italy and ship to 
America. 409. 

Technical discussion of Liberty motor. A good one. 

Curtiss plant a wonderful one but badly organized. Fisher 
Body plant efficiency superior, but equipment not so large as 
Curtiss. Standard Aircraft Corporation an excellent one but 
small. 413-415. 
Mr. W. F. Bennett (Long Island City, June 21, 1918; Volume I). 

Treasurer Lewis Vought Corporation, Long Island City. His 
plant expects to enlarge and receive some Government con- 
tracts. 419-422. 
Mr. George A. Morrison (Farmingdale, Long Island, June 21, 1918; 
Volume I). 

Production manager of Breese Aircraft Co. 

Government contract for 300 Penquin planes. Production 
trouble with Lawrence Motor furnished them by the Govern- 
ment. 425. 

Motor made by the Excelsior Co., of Chicago. 

Correspondence of the company to show defective workmanship 
of Lawrence motor. 426-436. 

" We received them from the Excelsior Motor Co., with the 
stamp of approval of the United States Signal Corps on them. 
We are not supposed to do anything with the motors. 437. 

One-third of the deliveries defective; could be seen with naked 
eye, yet they bore Government stamp of approval on them. 438. 
130687—19 24 



368 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. George A. Morrison — Continued. 

Bogey price basis. 
Mr. Carl Hendrickson (Farmingdale, Long Island, June 21, 1918; 
Volume I). 

Of the Excelsior Co. ? Chicago. Sent to Breese plant to look 
after defects in engines which his company sent to Breese Co. 
Testifies trouble with engines due to bad workmanship. 
Should never have passed Government inspector. 441. 
Second Lieut. Felice Testoni (Mineola, Long Island, June 21, 1918; 
volume 1). 

Of Italian Army. Special duty to test Liberty engines. Bound 
by agreement not to discuss Liberty motor. 443. 

Technical discussion of motors and planes. 444. 
Mr. W. H. Workman (Washington, D. C, June 25, 1918; Volume I). 

Statement of airplane production in England and France. 452. 

Returned to this country feeling that something was really 
being done. " I regret to say that I can not feel we are any 
better off than we were six months ago." 452. 

Production of Handley-Page plane and motor. 453. 

Proposal to Bureau of Aircraft Production on behalf of Mr. 
Handley Page, of England. His interest with Mr. Page. 
454-468. 
Maj. A. C. Downey (Washington, D. C., June 26, 1918; Volume I). 

Bureau of Aircraft Production. His duties. 469. 

Connection with conference on legislation relative to the Air- 
craft Board. Board desired authority without responsibility. 
Desired Signal Corps to execute contracts and the board to 
have simply advisory capacity. 

His information regarding letting of contracts. Senator New, 
" Did you agree with all matters relating to the letting of those 
contracts, either for the planes or the motors? " Incident 
showing his disapproval. 

Contract drawn up with Willys-Overland Co. whereby com- 
pany was to receive $2,100 per motor if delivered by certain 
time. If not delivered then, company was to receive $1,950. 
Company did not make deliveries on time, but Aircraft Board 
passed resolutions to pay them $2,100 because some machinery 
costing about $25,000 had been installed by them. " The 
Government has not any right, and there is not any considera- 
tion for amending a contract where we are to receive $25,000 
worth of machinery and stand to pay out three-quarters of a 
million dollars." 471. 

Explanation of basis of letting contracts. Cost plus, etc. 
472-473. 

The contractor receives a fixed profit equal to either 12J per 
cent or 15 per cent of an estimated cost. If manufactured for 
less than estimated cost contractor receives 25 per cent of 
savings, Government 75 per cent. Dayton- Wright Co. re- 
ceived 12J per cent, Fisher Body Co., 15 per cent. 473. 

He approved of supplemental contracts. 

Government had to amortize North Elmwood plant of Curtiss 
people. 474. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 369 

Maj. A. C. Downey — Continued. 

The original cross license agreement costing the Government 
$4,500,000. 475. Supplemental agreement cut this amount to 
$2,300,000. 476. Wright-Martin Co. and Curtiss Co. bene- 
ficiaries under this agreement. 

Aircraft Board did not attempt to force corporations to join the 
Manufacturers' Aircraft Association. 477. 

Fisher Body Co. and Standard people stated they signed cross 
license agreement almost under duress. " I did not want to see 
them join the Manufacturers' Aircraft Association." "I did 
not think it was an arrangement which was fair to the Gov- 
ernment." 477. 

So far as everything has been brought to his attention, he ap- 
proves of everything in connection with the McCook Field 
proposition. 479. 

How contractors coming to Washington to secure contracts to 
manufacture airplanes for the Government were dealt with. 
482. 

Contract with Engle Aircraft Co. for spare parts on the Curtiss 

training plane. Secretary of War Baker's brother connected 

with Engle Co. He resigned because of criticism. Contract 

canceled but renewed upon his resignation. 

Mr. Frank H. Adams (Washington, D. C, June 26, 1918; Volume I). 

Of the New York Times relative to production of Liberty motors 
in the Trego Iron Works. He visited plant because his brother 
was connected with this company. Production impossible 
there because of so many changes, 5 to 30 per day, coming in. 
485-487. 

Correspondence showing cancellation and reinstatement. 488. 
Maj. H. S. Beown (Washington, D. C, June 26, 1918; Volume I). 

Chief of Finance Division, Bureau of Aircraft Production. 

His business activities in civil life, Wall Street. 

Story of the organization of the Finance Division. 493. General 
memorandum No. 30 gives general function of his section. 
Number of personnel employed. 495. 

Complaints of Standard Aircraft Corporation gone into. Sum- 
marizes Standard Corporation's condition (a) as being result 
of lack of management, (b) lack of accounting system, (c) 
lack of money. 496-498. 

Dealings of Finance Section with Curtiss people. Lack of ac- 
counting in this company. 499. 

Dealings with the Day ton- Wright Corporation. 500. 

Advanced $11,900,000 to the Curtiss people to relieve their finan- 
cial difficulties. 501. 

Government took a mortgage secured by notes, also furnished 
$2,000,000 worth of materials to them. 502 ; 

Government placed a controller in the Curtiss office. Found a 
misstatement as to liabilities. 502. 

Dailv statement, Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., of June 19, 
1918. 503. 

Kelation between Finance Division and the Spruce Production 
Division. 504. 



370 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. H. S. Brown — Continued. 

Correspondence relative to the litigation between Wright Co. 
against the Curtiss Airplane Co. with reference to cross 
license agreement. 505-506. 
Maj. Frank E. Smith (June 26, 1918; Volume I). 

Charge of approvals and appraisals section, also chief executive 
officer in charge of field forces of the Finance Division. His 
business activities before entering Army. Connected with 
automobile industry. 507. 

His duties with the approvals and appraisals sections. 508-509. 

Trouble in securing sufficient personnel to do the work at hand. 
Commissions held up from two to five months. 510. 

Divisions of the approvals department and functions of each. 
511. 

The procedure adopted of letting contracts, thinks Government 
interests are fully protected. 

Finance section pays salaries to civilians, quartermaster pays 
officers. Salaries of some contractors too high and only part 
of salary is being paid until a proper salary return can be 
determined. Examples, Mr. Mingle, $62,000; Mr. Talbott, sr., 
and Mr. Kettering, $35,000 each; Mr. Talbott, jr., $30,000. 
Many of these men do not give full time to government work. 
514-516. 

Contractors have failed to give full details of cost of spare 
parts because it would enable the Government to fix future 
contracts. 516. 

Letter prepared for Department of Justice showing a record of 
costs and changes in the Liberty motor. 517-518. 

Method of arriving at cost of producing De Haviland. 519. 
Agreed upon $3,525.21, but contract contained original 
bogey price of $7,000. 

Cost of Le Ehone motor. Found estimated cost to Government, 
$3,375.81. Bogey price placed at $5,500. 520. 

Statement showing savings effected by Finance Division in their 
contracts. 523. 

Friction between Finance Division and contractors, confined 
mostly to manufacturers of planes, not motors. Concerted 
action of plane manufacturers through agency of Manufac- 
turers Aircraft Association caused friction. 524. 

Thinks because of labor difficulties and because none of the prod- 
ucts are standardized that cost-plus contract is best form to 
adopt in lieu of fixed price which the manufacturers desire. 
525. 

How enlisted men detailed as toolmakers in Detroit were paid 
extra. 526. 

Advances by the War Credits Board to the Lincoln Motor 
Co., amounting to $6,500,000. 
Maj. Charles B. Rose (June 26, 1918; Volume I). 

Reserve Corps officer detailed to aid and help in production 
at the Standard Aircraft Corporation at Elizabeth, K J. 

His judgment as to chief cause of the failure of production. 
Standard plant has six different types of planes varying widely 
in design. Causes inefficiency in plant, Another cause is failure 
of smaller company to develop an organization to carry on 
quantity production. 529-530. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 371 

Maj, Charles B. Rose — Continued. 

Thinks personnel of Signal Corps not efficient to handle work. 
Vascillation og Government engineers in making changes 
makes organization in plants difficult. 530. 

Four agencies in Washington in control of production causing 
duplication of work. 531. 

English or Italian methods of producing could not be used 
in American plants. 
Richard Henry Depew, Jr. (Washington, D. C, June 29, 1918; 
Volume I). 

An aviator received license certificate to fly from a French 
school, 1911. Devoted much time to studying airplanes and 
flying. Connected with Curtiss people at Buffalo plant. 

Technical discussion of Bristol planes. Thinks Liberty 
motor too heavy to be installed in this plane. 

Weaknesses found in Bristol. 538. 

Suggestions for improvement of this plane, but "tendency was 
to take suggestions only from Dayton and to give very little 
consideration to the suggestions from the Curtiss test pilots." 
This was the main reason that I resigned from the company. 
544. 

Does not like the Bristol machine. 545. 

A plane should be designed for the motor. 547. 

Liberty motor can not be used except in two-seater machine. 
John H. Davis (Washington, D. C, June 29, 1918; Volume I). 

An aviator holds license, but had no instructions. Took it up for 
fun of it. 548. 

Employed by Government as civilian instructor. 

Conditions prevailing at Kelly Field, San Antonio. No tools 
with which to work. Men discouraged. " The few tools that 
were in the hangars appeared to be of no better quality than 
those purchased at a 10-cent store." 549. 

His handling of the men. 548. 

Incompetency of officers: Speaking of Maj. Ferron, Col. Chitty, 
commanding officer at the field, said, " he would not have the 
major in his office at $10 per week." Engineer officer also in- 
competent. 

Phoned to Washington to Gen. Saltzman of conditions there. 
He was surprised. Later Col. Chitty relieved. 550. 

Recommendations. 551-555. 

Failure to receive spare parts. 557. 

Accidents at Kelly Field. 

Later transferred to Gerstner Field. Found conditions there 
worse than at Kelly. Made suggestions about things which 
were inexcusable. Officer in charge of field, Kirby, said : " Do 
you think vou can come over here now and run this field ? " 
560. 

Incidents leading up to his discharge. 560-562. 

Senator Thomas : " Mr. Davis, you have given us some very 
valuable information, and we are very much obliged to you 
for it." 



372 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. William F. Parish (Washington, D. C, July 5, 1918; 
Volume I). 

Chief of the oil lubrication branch, supply section, Bureau of 
Military Aeronautics. Mechanical engineer specializing in 
lubrication for 23 years. His connections in civil life. 563. 

Work for Government to conduct tests and write specifications 
of the oil to be used on the aeronautics engines of the Signal 
Corps. 564. 

Use of castor oil as lubricant for airplane engines. 564. 

Picking of expert men at various fields to look after lubricant 
work on the planes. Satisfactory reports received from these 
men as to progress of the work. 566. 

The fields lack good mechanical engineers. " There does not seem 
to be a single practical experienced engineer in a position of 
authority among the officers operating these flying fields." 
567. " Due to fundamental weakness in the organization of 
the War Department." 

Many of our flyers not mechanically inclined, yet can operate 
machines. 

Many fields so disorganized that the work of maintenance and 
care of machinery could not be systematized. Matter of lubri- 
cation has been systematized now in all but seven fields. 569. 
"At Kelly Field, San Antonio, there were a number of new 
planes of a value of nearly a half million of dollars ruined 
in a very short space of time due to a lack of care." 569. " I 
have records covering a lack of maintenance of equipment 
from a great majority of the fields." 570. 

Why mineral oil was used in place of castor oil. 570, 571. 

Letters showing ability of Mr. Parish. 573. 

Correspondence to Senator Thomas showing misunderstanding 
between Mr. Parish and Mr. Acheson as to lubrication of air- 
plane engines. 574, 579. 

Letter from Engineer officer, Aviation School, Fairfield, Ohio, 
indorsed by C. O. and then sent to Chief Signal Officer at 
Washington, complaining of troubles at the fields. Followed 
up by telegrams. 580, 582. 

Difficulties experienced at Wilbur Wright Field, Dayton. 583, 
589. 

Official test of De Haviland. 592, 595. Most technical. 

Testimony of Lieut Tabuteau, inserted here for the record. 
Taken at Fairfield, Ohio. A technical discussion of planes 
and motors. 596, 598. 
Correspondence about purchasing auxiliary flying field at Fair- 
field, Ohio. 598,601. 

Letters to the Fisher Body Corporation from Government offi- 
cials asking them to sign the supplementary cross-license 
agreement. Inserted here for the record. 604, 608. 
James S. Douglas (Washington, D. C, July 8, 1918 ; Volume I) . 
Connected with Red Cross work in France. Returned to United 
States June 11, 1918, and at that time only the Liberty motors 
were beginning to arrive in France without American planes. 
Only the motors. 609, 611. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 373 

Maj. Cushman A. Rice (Washington, D. C, July 9, 1918 ; Volume I). 

Enlisted in Aviation Corps. Later commissioned after taking 
course in flying. Took and commanded four American squad- 
rons to England and then to France. 

Squadrons attached to British flying squadrons on the front. 

Used entirely British equipment. 616, 617. " The Americans 
that were operating in my sector were all equipped with Brit- 
ish machines. Of course, as I say, that was under a contract 
with the Royal Air Force." 617. Our men had been trained 
with British equipment. 

His story of incidents of the war. 618, 619. 

Discussion of various types of British airplanes and how they 
are used on the front, 619, 623. " English very cautious in 
manufacture. They take their war pilots over and do all 
their experimenting under war conditions, as far as possible, 
and they do it very thoroughly. They send one set of pilots 
after another over. Usually when the British service passes 
a machine, it is a pretty serviceable machine when it comes 
out to the front," very few changes necessary. 

His opinion of Bristol and Spad: a I do not think the building 
of the actual frame for carrying an engine is any wonderful 
engineering feat." 626. 
Mr. Leo J. Perrette (Washington, D. C, July 9, 1918; Volume I). 

Employed as Army inspector at the Willys-Morrow Co., Elmira, 
N. Y., which were making spare parts for the Government. 

Noticed practices which were detrimental to the interest of the 
Government. Incident given where inspectors of the company 
were not permitted to report defects to the inspectors repre- 
senting the United States Government, 630. Other incidents 
of bad practices. 631. When he went to this company for 
employment before entering Government service, the company 
were about to remove the man who had the job, I found out 
later that the company held he was holding up production. I 
inquired into it and found out that in one certain ■ instance, 
even after the Army inspector on duty had passed a case, this 
fellow at one time had gone around and even after the Army 
inspector and held that case. 632. 

Senator New. Do you think that there is at the Willys motor 
plant something of a systematic effort to get those defective 
pieces passed by the inspectors ? Let me cite you this : K-211 
magneto brake stud, 3,000 were rejected for the first two or 
three threads being stripped. The same pair was returned 
to the Army inspection room three times on three separate 
days. 634. 
Maj. Cushman A. Rice (Washington, D. C, June 9, 1918; Volume I). 

Technical discussion of the testing of motors for certain planes. 
637-641. 

Story of how machines on the front now operating in the matter 
of bombing. 641-645. 

Suggestions as to improving aviation service on the front. 646. 
Has never flown in any American combat planes and never 
saw any on the front. Not likely to have seen any in his sec- 
tor on the front. 647. Never saw Liberty motor operated. 



374 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Cushman A. Rice — Continued. 

Rather have opinion of flyer who has fought on the front than 
one from a technical engineer. 648. 

His story of accidents at fields. 648-649. 
Mr. Henry Woodhouse (Washington, D. C, July 11, 1918; Vol- 
ume I). 

Member of board of governors, Aero Club of America. Activity 
of the club to promote aviation before the war. The club's de- 
sire to secure speed in airplanes was criticized by many Army 
officers. 652-653. 

First suggestion is to have 40 per cent replacements per month 
to the aviators on the front. Army has not kept up this pro- 
gram. 653-655. 

Next, proportion of destruction per month is 100 per cent. 656. 

Editor of two magazines. 657. Photographs bought from the 
Committee on Public Information attempting to show Amer- 
ican planes on the front revealed they were not American 
planes, but French. 658. 

Cablegram to the Aero Club of America from American training 
fields in France complaining of idleness among American avi- 
ators due to lack of machines and equipment. 660. 

Statement prepared by Mr. Woodhouse for the Senate committee 
to show his connections with the aeronautic movement and his 
opinions and conclusions regarding the future. 661-663. 

At the suggestion of Mr. Eugene Meyer, jr., War Industries 
Board, wrote an article giving the most important aspects of 
the present Allied aeronautic situation. 664^693). 

(a) What the Allies expect to get from United States in air- 

craft. 

(b) What United States promises to do aeronautically. 

(c) Sending of untrained aviators to France caused criti- 

cism that United States taxing Allied manufacturing 
facilities. 

(d) What United States must send to Allies to prevent criti- 

cism in case of Allied reverses. 

(e) Our present aeronautic plans. 

(/) What Germany is planning to do to meet our program. 
(g) Mr. Coffin's report regarding status of aircraft build- 
ing program. 661—668, these seven items. 

Number of aircraft and motors to train 10,000 aviators needed 
for one year's fighting. 671-674. 

Partial list of airplane and parts manufacturers. 674. 

Motors being manufactured in United States. 675. 

Suggests best results obtained by giving orders for completed 
airplanes and motors to firms already engaged in manufac- 
turing them and let them contract for parts. 677. 

Large amount of machinery now idle could be used. 677-678. 

Sufficient material in United States to complete program in 12 
months. 678-680. 

Suggestions of solving problems that may arise to retard carry- 
ing out of program. 684-691. 

Shipping facilities to ship planes. 694-695. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 375 

Henry Woodhottse — Continued. 

Care of the aviators. 698-699. Many aviators equipped from 
private funds. So many of them could not supply all. Com- 
plaint made to Washington, letters from Gen. Squiers's office 
saying they would receive equipment on other side, but letters 
from officers on other side shows they were not getting them 
over there. 701-708. 
Maj. Rice (Washington, D. C, July 12, 1918; Volume II). 

Table showing more or less number of planes that have been 
operated and used successfully by the British during four 
years of war, in order to give committee an idea as to what 
machines have given the best results. 709-710. 
Thomas A. Hill (July 12, 1918; Volume II). 

A patent attorney. Testimony shows how Government may be- 
come involved by cross-license agreement. 710-715. 
Mr. John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, July 15, 1918; Volume II). 

Engaged in constructing airplanes for Government. Engaged 
in this work before entrance of United States in war. 

Connected with Andermat Aeroplane Co., of California. He 
and president of this company came to Washington to solicit 
contracts with Government. Cols. Deeds and Waldron told 
us flatly we could not get a contract. All companies had been 
chosen. 718. 

His reasons why Government should place contracts with Pacific 
coast concerns. Finally secured contract. Wright-Martin 
Co. were being paid $1,000 additional for building planes in 
their Los Angeles plant. Should not have been done. 718- 
719. 

Necessary for his company to secure certain supplies from the 
East. Waldron and Deeds said " You can not depend upon 
us; we have all we can do ourselves." 

Lieut. Farwell, Deeds's confidential man, " You will have to join 
the association, the Aircraft Association." Reference to the 
cross-license agreement. 720. 

Sent to Buffalo to secure plans and specifications from Curtiss 
people. Were told you have to pay $240 and also 1 per cent 
additionl to Curtiss people for use of plans and specifications. 
720. 

" Waldron gave Curtiss Co. all the information as to price, etc., 
of my contract, which was supposed to be confidential." 721. 

Receiving of bad prints and drawings from the Curtiss Co. 
722-723. 

Conference with Col. Montgomery about cross-license agree- 
ment. Refused to pay Curtiss $75,000 royalties. 723. 

Refused to sign cross-license agreement and were unable to se- 
cure small parts from Curtiss people while other manufac- 
turers were getting them. Appealed to Washington, as shown 
in correspondence. 729. 

Later I resigned from company because of lack of internal har- 
mony. Superintendent of our factory, who took my place, 
immediately " swayed the Government inspector boys so that 
they passed everything and went out to the scrap pile and 
brought in everything." Reported this to Washington. 730. 



376 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Edouard de Billy, acting French high commissioner, and Col. 
Tulasne and Lieut. Henri Marqttisan, of the French high com- 
mission (July 15, 1918; Volume II). 

Their commission cooperating with United States to relieve air- 
plane construction in France by stimulating production in 
the United States. Technical discussion of planes and mo- 
tors. Thinks very highly of Liberty motor. Regarded so by 
the French. 730-739. 
Col. H. H. Arnold (Washington, D. C., July 16, 1918; Volume II). 

Assistant Director Bureau of Military Aeronautics. 

Only acted as " step-in " at the conference. Hearsay. Experi- 
menting and testing was transferred from Langley Field to 
McCook Field, Ohio, because of lack of transportation of 
machines, etc., " Personally, I think that could be done down 
there (reference to Langley Field, Va.). 743. 

Eailroad runs into Langley Field, and possible to fly from 
there to Washington and not from Washington to McCook 
Field. 744. 

McCook Field too small for safe testing, not an ideal place 
for flying. "I do not see why they selected such a small 
field." 745. 

Has seen water over the McCook Field. 746. 

Cost of Wilbur Wright Field, $2,804,632. Cost $700,000 for 
grading. Table showing cost of fields and buildings, etc., on 
different flying fields. 748. 

Shipment of 425 airplanes up to July 12. 750. Up to June 1 
no American planes used on the front. Up to July 1 200 
had been sent to front, but practically no use made of them. 
752. 

Thinks De Haviland and Bristol machines as made in this coun- 
try not satisfactory to fly in. 753. Compass used is worth- 
less. " Our production people improved on it to such au 
extent that they made it worthless." 753. 

Delay in receiving reports of testing machines. Asked pro- 
duction department for them in December, 1917, but first 
test in April, 1918, yet production of De Haviland went on. 
755-756. Gen. Pershing's report by cable as to efficiency of 
De Haviland 4. Motion passed by Senate Committee asking 
War Department for copy of this report. 757. 

Machines more carefully tested before shipped overseas after 
this cable. Gen. Kenly's orders. 758. 

Defects of design in putting cloth. Col. Semple's recommenda- 
tions. Not carried out. 759. 

Asked production board for tests on Bristol. Never completed. 
Cloth failed and machine demolished. Mueller's report of 
test for Curtiss plant different to Government's test. 761. 
Mueller's only estimated tests. Submitted to Government 
and asked for their opinion. No reply. 761. 

Test of Hispano-Suize. 761-762. Varied in their tests. We 
reported not satisfactory for use at front. 762. " Well, we 
are not getting anywhere." 

" An automobile engineer can not design aeroplanes." Col. Vin- 
cent charge of all production. An engine builder and he 
passes on both planes and engines. 763. Production can not 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 377 

Col. H. H. Arnold — Continued. 

start until tests approved by Gen. Kenly of Bureau of Aero- 
nautics. Thinks this system detrimental to aviation program. 
This program started by Deeds and Montgomery. 763. 

Request of Bureau of Aeronautics for braces on De Haviland. 
Never put on any machine by production people. 764. His 
suggestion for remedy is to put one man at head of all avia- 
tion, both military and production side. 764. There is a 
lack of authority. " There is no authority." 

Reason for discarding Hall-Scott engine: In hot weather ma- 
chine burns before plane can reach ground. 766-767. 

Investigation of causes of accidents. Studied from many 
angles. Average one fatality for every 2,900 hours flying. 
768. French and British averages show higher rate. 

Collisions in the air. Precautions taken at Park Field, Mem- 
phis, Tenn., yet collisions occurred. 769-770. Due to eager- 
ness of new students to look around in the air without look- 
ing where they are going. Very few accidents due to de- 
fects in machines. 770. 

Statement regarding inspections at the fields. Facilities for 
repair work and quality of workmen at the fields. 771. 

Telegrams showing cancellation of Spad contract with the Cur- 
tis plant. 772. 
Lieut. Col. V. E. Clark (Washington, D. C, July 16, 1918 ; Vol. II.). 

With the technical section in the office of the Director of Mil- 
itary Aeronautics, Gen. Kenly. 773. 

Went to Europe on a commission to negotiate with foreign 
Governments as to production of airplanes in United States. 
Also to secure available data concerning development of air- 
plane designs in England, France, and Italy. Made report 
to Gen. Squier's office. Recommended three types of British 
planes, two of French, and one of Italy. 

Types of machines recommended. Technical discussion of 
motors follows. 775. 

Designed a Bristol of the English models and his design turned 
over to Curtiss people. 779. 

Failure to produce due to lack of coordination between heads 
of various departments. Necessitated changes in drawings, 
etc. 780. 

His recommendations not carried out. After year, War De- 
partment thinking of making a type of machine, Martinsyde, 
which he recommended. "Lack of confidence in me." 780. 

We have no two-seater fighter in production now. I recom- 
mended Caproni triplane for night bombing work. A year 
has passed and nothing done. 781. Either Handley-Page or 
Caproni could be used. Latter better, but not enough to 
warrant any delay in production. Both should not be made 
because of spare part difficulties. 781. 

Attempted to do development work while in command at 
McCook Field. 782. Ordered away. Heard indirectly his 
work there unsatisfactory. Col. Deeds appointed him and 
also removed him. 784. Had come to Washington and sit 
athis right hand to advise him on basic policies. " I have 
done no useful work since January." 784. 



378 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. V. E. Clark — Continued. 

Our failure to produce more successful service machines. "I 
think it was a matter of vacillation on the part of those in 
authority about what to build." " They seem to have confi- 
dence in no one present, or they did not appoint a board whose 
decisions they were willing to abide by * * *." Secured 
services of many successful business men and when they came 
"no one man knew what his job was and no one could find 
out what his job was." 785. 

Cancellation of Spad contract. 787. 

Suggestions for the bettering airplane production system. 788, 
789. Creation of a board constituting permanent president 
and secretary and three actual flyers every four months who 
have seen service at the front. 

Removal from command at McCook Field came one month after 
some criticism he made on the De Haviland 4, built by Day- 
ton-Wright Co. 790. 

Notes from Mr. J. D. Perrhrs diary concerning contraction of 
Bristol Fighter redesigned by him for the Liberty motor. 
791-795. 

Features of delays in Curtiss Co. in not getting results out of 
M. Ellwood factory. 795. 

McCook and Langley Fields controversy. 795. 

Copy of Col. Clark's memorandum to chief signal officer about 
his recommendations from Europe relative to airplane pro- 
duction. 799-808. 
Mr. Glenn M. Tait (Washington, D. C, July 16, 1918; Volume II). 

Inspector for the Government at Thomas Morse Aircraft Cor- 
poration, Ithaca, N. Y. 

Many parts passed that he had rejected. Made complaint to 
chief inspector. Inspection sacrificed for production. 810. 
Mr. Hamm stated " that he could not hold them too close or 
he would not have production." 811. 

He was asked to resign, which he did. Incidents to show his 
request for transfer and which resulted in his resignation. 
812-814. 
Mr. John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, July 17,1918; Volume II). 

Statement reaffirms his testimony taken previously about the 
trouble he experienced in securing blue prints and small parts 
from the Curtiss people, dealing with Mr. Morgan, particu- 
larly Mr. Guy, because he would not sign the Cross license 
agreement to pay Curtiss people $75,000 royalties on his con- 
tract with the Government. 

Before he refused to sign agreement everything was lovely. 
Mr. Curtiss himself told him he could have anything. Later 
Mr. Curtiss was not in authority and Mr. Guy refused to give 
him anything. Came to Washington and complained. Mr. 
Coffin said, " That is too bad. I do not see any necessity for 
paying those fellows anything. I will see that you get the 
blue prints." 818. 

Returned to Curtiss plant at Buffalo with Mr. Montgomery, 
attorney for the board, but did not secure original prints, 
which were given him before he told them he would not sign 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 379 

John A. Jordan — Continued. 

agreement, but was given old prints, which he could not pro- 
duce with. 819. 

Maj. Emmons, commander at Mather Field, complained of re- 
ceiving machines with bad defects. 822, 823. 
Mr. A. A. D. Lano, of Great Britain (Washington, D. C, July 17, 
1918; Volume II). 

Came to United States. A manufacture of propellers for air- 
planes. 

Had letter of introduction and offered services to United States 
Government in May. Not accepted, so went to Canada, 
where he received a contract. His plant to make propellers 
at Long Island, N. Y. 

In August sent for by Maj. Charles E. Sligh, charge of pro- 
peller purchasing and production. Asked if he could pro- 
duce propellers and inquired how he was financed. Told to 
go to Grand Rapids, Mich., to meet some bankers. These 
bankers turned out later to be the Sligh Furniture Co. 
Refused to go as he had made arrangements with New York 
connections about finance. Nothing then heard from Maj. 
Sligh. 829. 

Contract with Navy to make propellers and was experiencing 
trouble in having carload of lumber come through from the 
West; appealed to Maj. Sligh; received no assistance; corre- 
spondence. 830-834. 

Only one complaint about character of the work for the Navy, 
which was an experimental propeller and did not amount to 
much. 835, 836. 

Discussion of kinds of wood to be used in propeller. " The in- 
spection in this country at the moment is extremely lax * * ■ ** 
All sorts of people are making propellers, and are making 
them cheaply, and they would not stand inspection." Signal 
Corps would say, " Yes ; but the Lang Co.'s prices are too 
high." Propeller must stand enormous strain and can not be 
made too cheaply. Thomas Morse Co. buy their propellers 
from his company. 

History of the wood used in making propellers. Black Ameri- 
can walnut used, but as supply became short used Honduras 
mahogany, but drain on this became enormous; necessary to 
look for another type of wood. Only recently the tanguile 
mahogany from the Philippines was tested and found O. K. 
837. 

Mr. Williams, representing Army as lumber expert, refused to 
listen to him in recommending this type, but Navy said, " We 
are delighted to hear of it." Williams connected with a firm 
before entering Army which controlled mahogany, Honduras. 
839, 840. 
Lieut Col. T. H. Bane (Washington, D. C, July 17, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

Signal Corps. His reasons for present situation in aircraft pro- 
duction. Lack of organization and lack of proper aeronauti- 
cal engineering ability. 842. 



380 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Lieut. Col. T. H. Bane — Continued. 

Men who fly should be the designers ; now being done by the Bu- 
reau of Production, which has done nothing but copy de- 
signs. Has allowed latitude in making changes. Incidents 
of overloading which caused many fatalities. 843, 844. 

Investigation into Bristol Fighter. Many accidents. Kecom- 
mended as a member of board to stop production on this ma- 
chine. 845. 

Weights of engines given and possibilities of carrying the mili- 
tary load. 846-848. 

De Haviland 4 not entirely satisfactory as the British De Havi- 
land 4, because of different motor used. 850. 

No prospects for improvement in aircraft production. 853. 

" A great deal of time is being devoted to testing freak models 
of airplanes and producing such machines without consulting 
people who could almost at a glance state that such a machine 
has no part in the military program." 

" You can eliminate two- thirds of them on paper by standards 
that everyone knows about except the Production Division." 
853. 

Suggestions for improvement of the situation. One head of the 
Air Service. 

Follow the British system of making changes. Wrote a memo- 
randum to the Production Division telling them of the British 
system. The reply was it was interesting. 854. 

Incidents to show how United States system works. 855. 

" I think we are worse off than we were six months ago;" refer- 
ence to the production situation. 855, 856. 
Maj. B. Q. Jones (Washington, D. C, July 17, 1918; Volume II). 

A practical flyer, connected with the Department of Military 
Aeronautics. Loaned to Production Division; as he was do- 
ing nothing asked Gen. Kenly to transfer him back. Types 
of training machines ordered against wishes of flyers. 857. 

In the arrangement between production department and Bureau 
of Military Aeronautics no one to decide on technical engi- 
neering matters. 859. 

Trouble in production ; no responsibility given or allowed young 
flyers, only because they are too young. No competent men 
in charge of production. 859. 

Leave questions to men who have been in the air, and not those 
who know nothing about it except as they have picked up 
from books and from a study on the ground. 859, 860. 

Should follow the British system, which leaves entire engineer- 
ing under the control of the actual flyers, and production 
people build what they are told. 860. 

Accident to Bristol Fighter on last Monday due to overloading. 
860, 861. 

Sent to France and found Americans using antiquated machines 
purchased from the French, that were discarded by them a 
year and a half ago. 862. 

Technical discussion of planes and motors for various uses. His 
opinion as to what machines should be used. 862-865. 



ABSTBACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 381 

Maj. Harold S. Martin (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

Department of Military Aeronautics. Sent to France to look 
into designing of aeroplanes upon request of chief of Air 
Service, American Expeditionary Forces. 867. 

Went with a board and made recommendations which were ap- 
proved in principle by cable from Gen. Pershing. 868. 

Recommended nine types of machines for production in 1919. 
Only steps to carry out his recommendations sent a commission 
abroad to get the drawings and sample of these machines. 868. 

Types of planes being built in this country. 869. 

As member of board recommended production of Bristol fighter 
to be stopped. 

De Haviland built in this country not equal to British De Havi- 
land. 

Regards reports made on testing of machines with suspicion. 
Finds variance in the testing from Col. Vincent's report. 
Their tests not as good as the colonel's. 870-871. 

One thousand two hundred Standard J-I machines cost $6,500 
for plane and $2,500 for engine being stored away and further 
training in them abandoned. 871. Trouble with the engine 
cause for abandonment. Hall-Scott motor used. 

Functions of Department of Military Aeronautics. 872. 

Advises the Bureau of Production what is desired for different 
types of machines. Production Department builds samples of 
machines and submits them to Department of Aeronautics, 
which then determines whether they are satisfactory. Thinks 
Production Department should have men who can definitely 
decide whether or not a machine should be made. At present 
can not do this. There should be one head of the Air Service. 
873. 

Little organization in Production Department. No mistake 
made if we follow the British system. 
Maj. Frank E. Smith (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918; Volume 

Recalled to give information about Government's plan to pur- 
chase fields for testing. 

Day ton- Wright Field used by Day ton- Wright Co., but Govern- 
ment pays expenses by way of rental for that field. 

Lease executed whereby Dayton-Wright Co. secured property 
belonging to Morain Developing Co., of which Col. Deeds is 
25 per cent stockholder. 875. 

Lease made in name of Dayton- Wright Co. so it could be entered- 
into the cost in the cost-plus contract with the Government. 
Received 15 per cent on the cost. 

Prepared memo to Mr. Potter protesting against this policy and 
urged that all such contracts for leasing property should be 
made in the name of the Government. 876-877. 

This memo prepared because Mr. Talbott wrote in to go ahead 
with the field. Matter now under consideration by the Gen- 
eral Staff. 879. 

Amount of money spent on various fields. 880. 



382 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Sergt. Alexander Klemin (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918 ; Vol- 
ume II). 

M. S. E., 807 Aero Squadron, McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. Is 
in charge of aeronautical research department." Previous ex- 
perience. 881. 

Eelation of airplane engineering to production. Main work at 
the fields is getting the English design and turning it into an 
American proposition; we get English drawings and adapt 
them to Liberty 12. 881. 

Thinks technical engineers who understand stress on the machines 
and balance of parts ought to be given a very large part in the 
production. 884. 

Testimony as to his birth, etc. 

Insertions made here for the completion of the record. Testi- 
mony of Mr. Mois H. Avram in behalf of the Wittemann-Lewis 
Aircraft Corporation, of Newark, N. J. Letter to Senator 
Thomas inclosing letter from the secretary of this corporation 
to Mr. Evan, chairman Aircraft Production Board. 887-895. 

Copy of Mr. Avranrs letter to the New York Times, May 2, 1918. 
895-898. 
Mr. Mois H. Avram (Washington. D. C, July 18, 1918; Volume II). 

Connected with the Slocum, Avram & Slocum Industrial Engi- 
neers, of New York. Their business being to investigate and 
report to financial men on production and otherwise. 

Investigated the Wittemann-Lewis Corporation and found them 
to have engaged in aircraft business for 12 years. Made elabo- 
rate report for the Production Board about this corporation. 

Wittemann-Lewis people could not deliver this report to the Gov- 
ernment. Officials, so asked Mr. Avram. 

Came to Washington and secretary insisted that Col. Deeds in 
conference and could not see him. I waited in the hall for 
three days until I recognized Col. Deeds, and this was the only 
way I delivered this report. Said he would look into it and 
deliver it to Mr. Shepler. 900-901. 

But nothing came of it, no work being given to this corporation. 
Later saw Lieut. Farwell, Shepler's assistant. " The minute 
I mentioned the name of Wittemann, Farwell said, ■ That is a 
lemon.' " 901. 

Finally agreed to send an inspector to this plant. He came and 
made a report and still nothing came of it. 

Financing of Wittemann-Lewis Corporation. Mr. Avram did 
not feel at liberty to divulge how corporation was financed. 
902, 903. 

Insertion for the record. Mr. Wittemann's testimony. 903-906. 
Mr. Paul W. Wittemann (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

Treasurer of Witteman & Lewis Aircraft Corporation, Newark, 
N. J. Corporation engaged in making aircraft since 1906. 
Its activities. * 

Just after war was declared, this company completed a training 
machine as a result of a request made by the Signal Corps 
October 16, 1916. " They requested us to develop a machine 
after which they promised to give us business." 907. 

Would order 20 if we would build a machine which would fly 
successfully from our factory to Mineola. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 38& 

Mr. Paul W. Wittemann — Continued. 

This was built and Government notified that the machine was 
being flown by Mr. Alan Adams. The flight was O. K. and 
our plane remained at Mineola subjected to bad weather with- 
out shelter for 30 days. Government refused to give them a 
test. 908. 

Mr. Scott of our company went to Washington to try to secure a 
test of the machine. Promise given that orders would be 
issued to the commanding officer at Mineola to make test, but 
nothing ever done. Curtiss people and experts came there 
and made photographs and inspected it. 909. 

Our machine transferred to camp, now known as Camp Mills, 
where it received a severe and thorough test. 

Mr. Scott spent all summer in Washington trying to secure Gov- 
ernment contract. 910. Since this machine had made 300 
flights we asked if it would be better to wait and test one of the 
new machines which were then being built. Government re- 
plied it would. Then they notified us that no new types would' 
be considered; that they had decided on the Curtiss and: 
Standard. 

Later they said they would not consider any plant unless it' 
could produce 500 to 1,000 planes per year. We made progress 
to take over Stevenson plant on strength of this statement, and 
nothing came of it, so we asked assistance of Senator Freling- 
huysen. Copy of letter to Senator Frelinghuysen. 912-914.. 

Contract for 300 spare parts given us. 9,14. Letter to Senator 
Frelinghuysen. Were to receive blue prints for spare parts 
from Curtiss people. Same trouble of the cross license agree- 
ment arose that other corporations had had. Correspondence 
inserted into record showing this. 915-919. 

Promised they would be given work when further appropria- 
tions made. Never received any. 

We inquired if Government was allowing or letting contracts 
concerns other than those who were not producing the program 
500 planes per year. " They answered that they did not wish 
to discuss these things with us." 920. 

Letters to Senator Thomas showing dealings with Mr. Potter. 
921. 

There was a feeling that we had a prejudice against the Air- 
craft Board. Matter thrashed out ; Capt. White said it was a 
misunderstanding on the part of the Aircraft Board and that 
there was absolutely no reason or plausible excuse why we 
should not get contracts. 923. Copy of Mr. Avram's letter to 
Mr. Coffin. 924, 925. 

His company on the list to become a member of the Aircraft 

Manufacturing Association relative to cross license agreement, 

but since our last year's business or present contracts did not 

amount to $100,000, we were excluded. 925. 

Maj. Gen. William L. Kenley (Washington, D. C, July 20, 1918; 

Volume II). 

Chief of Military Aeronautic Department. Keasons for being 
called as a witness. 927. 

130687—19 25 



384 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Maj. Gen. William L. Kenley — Continued. 

" Found organization when turned over to me rather messed up." 
Made changes in the heads of departments. Took a trip 
around the preliminary schools to get idea of how things were 
going on. Impressed with both training and advanced schools, 
yet there was a lack of coordination, one school accentuating 
on one thing, another another thing. Attempted to stand- 
ardize. 928. 

Reasons for stopping training with Hall- Scott motor. Loss 
about $6,000,000 to Government and knew there would be 
criticism, yet many accidents and deaths were due to the im- 
perfection of this motor. It was unreliable. 

There was also a slowing down of production and thus justified 
in stopping this training. Cause of accidents due to careless- 
ness among the flyers. 

Slowing down of production due to cancellation of French con- 
tracts due to our failure to ship raw materials to France and 
our lack of advanced trained pilots. 931. 

American method of inspection at fields before planes are 
flown. 932. 

His statement of Gen. Pershing's cable report to not ship any 
more De Havilands overseas until they had been inspected in 
this country. 933. 

Abandonment of the program to build Bristol Fighters. Will 
secure data regarding the cost of this program and what 
Government lost -by its abandonment. 934-935. 

Spad a very good machine. Ordered to be built, but canceled 
because Gen. Pershing cabled that this program be cut out. 
His reasons why this program was abandoned. 936. 

Relative to American machines on the front, " We have not any 
advice that they are flying any." 937. Have not produced 
a single two-seater fighter that is upon the battle front at 
this time. 938. 

One billion dollars expended or obligated, and only small num- 
ber of machines sent over. 939. 

Believes at the outset we should have adopted one or two of 
the more advanced planes of Italy, France, and England, and 
gone ahead and produced them with so much experimenting 
with new motors, etc. 939. This was done by Italy. 

Cause of delays was that Gen. Pershing's cable reports would 
be referred to production departments before Gen. Kenly 
would see them, causing much confusion. 941. 

How the work is carried on between Mr. Ryan's department 
and his department. 942-943. Thinks there should be estab- 
lished a separate department of aeronautics. 943. 

Friction between the Navy and War Departments. 494. 

Program now is to approve anything requested by Gen. Per- 
shing. Cables in my office show that one day one thing is 
asked for, next day cable comes in canceling that, and a 
week later another cable comes in asking for the thing re- 
quested in first cable. Entirely a jumbled affair. 945. 

Has nothing to do with the inspections at the plants, but Mr. 
Ryan has assured me that every inspector will be an expert. 
947. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 385 

Maj. Gen. William L. Kenley — Continued. 

Method of producing and testing the Liberty motor. 947. 

Choice of Fields. Why Wilbur Wright Field was chosen and 
McCook Field given to production testing. If selection had 
been left to me I would not have chosen Wilbur Wright Field. 
Plan to do in case of a flood. 949. 

Letter to Senator Thomas from Department of Military Aero- 
nautics showing equipment of American air squadrons at the 
front. 950. 

Insertions for the completion of the record. 

Report of Senator Frelinghuysen on the Aero-Marine Plane 
& Motor Co., Keyport, N. J. 951. 

Memo prepared by Bureau of Aircraft Production containing 
information as to the general causes of delay and the specific 
causes of delay. 951-956. 

Open letter of Mr. W. H. Fauber, Brooklyn, N. Y., to Mr. John 
D. Ryan, Chief Aeroplane Production. 95-966. 
Mr. John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, July 23, 1918; Volume II). 

Recalled. His former statement was that there was much cor- 
respondence between Liberty Iron Works, of Sacramento, 
Calif., and Aircraft Production Board. Shown telegram 
from Mr. Henderson, of this company, saying there were no 
letters or correspondence concerning the contract for 300 
aeroplanes awarded them. " There is voluminous correspon- 
dence." Does not know why Henderson sent such a tele- 
gram. 967. 

Presentation of written statement prepared giving fuller in- 
formation relating to this contract. 968-974. 

How he came to Washington, finally secured a contract with 
the Government for his company, the Liberty Iron Works, 
his difficulty with the Curtiss people in securing blue prints 
and small parts because of the Cross license agreement; how 
he was given bad prints, etc. ; trouble experienced in getting 
small parts, and when they did arrive he was compelled to send 
them back, etc. ; how friction arose in his own company which 
resulted in his resignation ; how the new manager carried on the 
contract, using parts that had been rejected on inspection; 
contract finally canceled. 
Mr. Walter D. Sayle (Washington, D. C, July 23, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

President and general manager Engle Aircraft Co., Mies, Ohio, 
which company was organized from the partnership of En- 
gel, Patterson & Baker, the Baker being a brother to Secre- 
tary of War Baker, about January, 1917, and was incorporated 
in August, 1917. 974. 

Capitalization of the company. 975. 

Company was given contracts for spare parts, but public criti- 
cism both in Washington and throughout the country in the 
press caused Mr. Baker to resign as president of the corpora- 
tion. 976. Sold completely out for $15,000, part being for 
cash put into company and for services. 



386 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. Walter D. Sayle — Continued. 

How corporation bought out Engel who was making a flying 
boat. Baker and Patterson furnished money, Engel furnish 
the technical brains, his machinery, and flying boat. 977. 

After resigning, Mr. Baker's only interest in the company was 
to come to Washington with Mr. Sayle to advise Mr. Sayle 
in matters with the Government. 

His company never signed cross-license agreement, but placed 
$2,500 with Curtiss people to secure blue prints, etc., of which 
$2,000 was refunded. 983. 
Capt. Riley Scott (Washington, D. C, July 26, 1918; Volume II). 

Originally in the Regular Army, a graduate of West Point, 
and through friendship of Lieut. Selfridge and the Wright 
brothers became interested in airplanes and resigned from 
Army and specialized on the airplane, particularly the role 
as a bombing plane. 

Went to Europe in 1911 and 1912 to compete for Michelo prize. 
986. 

Offered services to France and England when war declared. 
Entered United States Army, and as such was employed 
as an aeronautical mechanical engineer with especial concern 
with bombing. 986. 

Technical reasons why he made report on De Haviland that it 
was unsuited for bombing and combat fighting. 987. 

Technical discussion of the American De Haviland in comparison 
with English De Haviland follows. 987-996. 
Naval Constructor J. C. Hunsaker (Washington, D. C, July 27, 
1918; Volume II). 

Regular Navy Service. American-made aircraft delivered to 
the Navy so far has been satisfactorily operated on our coasts, 
but has not been in operation long enough in France and 
England to know what changes should be made. 997. 

Because of request from the Marine Corps for ground flying 
machines, we secured from Signal Corps of the Army part of 
their first delivery of De Havilands. All but four shipped to 
France, the four being sent to Miami, Fla., training school 
for testing. Testing there showed defects in workmanship, 
minor defects which developed while flying them. Can be 
corrected, not fundamental defects. 998. 

Nature of the defects. 999. 

Uncertain what to do with the 100 crated machines for France. 
1000. 

Shown a photograph and technical discussion follows of various 
parts of airplanes. 1001, 1002. 
Maj. H. C. K. Muhlenberg (Washington, D. C, July 30, 1918; 
Volume II). 

Commanding officer testing department, Wilbur Wright Field. 

Discussion of the De Haviland 4. Giving changes made in the 
British De Haviland, producing photographs, etc., carrying 
weights, etc. 1006-1014. 

The American-built Bristol machine. Approves of its rejection 
and does not think it is a fit machine as made in this country. 
Assembling shows grossest kind of carelessness. Defects cov- 
ered up. Built by the Curtiss plant. 1015. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 387 

Maj. H. C. K. Muhlenberg — Continued. 

Inspection at Dayton-Wright plant. Their inspectors and Gov- 
ment inspectors have opportunity to see each step that is 
taken in the machine from the time it is laid out until it is 
completed. Failure to see these defects indicates grossest 
kind of carelessness or conspiracy. 1017. 

Records showing criticism of the De Haviland 4. 1022-1026. 
(a) Criticisms of his office. 1022. 

(h) Letter from testing department, Wilbur Wright Field. 
(c) Gen. Pershing's cable report. 1024-1026. 

Even other changes than those suggested by Pershing must be 
made before the plane is satisfactory. 1027. 

Thinks there should be created a division of aeronautics. 1028- 
1029. 
Capt. R. W. Schroeder (Washington, D. C, July 30, 1918; Vol-, 
ume II). 

Entered Army because of previous experience in aviation. Em- 
ployed as aeroplane mechanic in Franco-American Aviation 
Co., Chicago, 111. 1030-1031. 

Was present during testimony of Maj. Muhlenberg and agrees 
with everything said by him. 1031. 

Shows from photograph an incident to substantiate Gen. Persh- 
ing's report of a defect. 1031. 

Does not think De Haviland machine fit to send to the boys at 
the front. 1033. 

Notices poor workmanship in work turned out by Dayton- 
Wright factory and the woodwork turned out by Curtiss plant 
unsatisfactory. 1033. Lieut. Foote says, "I think I would 
be very safe in saying that every pilot at our field, without 
exception, is very leery of these machines." 
Lieut. John M. Foote (Washington, D. C, July 30, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

Formerly an automobile mechanic ; entered Army ; and graduate 
flyer of the school at Memphis. 

List of machines he has flown. 1035. 

Entertains the same distrust as expressed by flyers at Dayton- 
Wright Field about the De Haviland 4. Heard testimony of 
Maj. Muhlenberg and Capt. Schroeder, and agrees with them. 
1035. Thinks the machine is wrong in design as well as pro- 
duction. 

Criticism of the plane for bombing purposes. Not suitable also 
as a fighting machine. Mounting of guns on the De Haviland 
4 would make absolutely useless. Thinks machine should be 
relegated for all purposes that he knows of. Can not say 
about reconnoissance purposes. 1037, 1038. 
Maj. C. K. Reinhart (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

Commanding officer, First Provisional Squadron, Hazelhurst 
Field, Long Island, N. Y. A practical flyer. List of machines 
that he has flown. 1039. 

Received eight De Haviland 4's at his field for defense of city 
of New York. Before testing they were mounted with guns 
and bombing devices. Tested it for speed and climbing, and 
found structural defects. 1040. 



388 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT IISITESTIGATION. 

Maj. C. K. Reinhart — Continued. 

Enumeration of defects which developed in the testing. 1040- 
1042. Another shipment of De Havilands came to his field 
and many defects developed after two or three hours of flying. 
1042, 1043. 

Does not think, as an expert flyer, that this machine will stand 
the severe service tests. Made reports to Washington; does 
not know what happened to his reports. Only 8 of 20 of his 
officers will take a chance to fly. 1044^1045. 

Thinks one who goes up in De Haviland and had to do battle 
with a German machine would be at a disadvantage. 1045. 
Capt. J. H. Kelley (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; Volume II). 

Charge of the fighter flight, including the De Haviland, at 
Wilbur Wright Field, Fairfield, Ohio. Saw service at the 
front. List of machines he has had experience with. 1046. 

Enters into discussion of the technical side of machines, particu- 
larly the American and English De Havilands. 

Left France June 27, 1918, and to his knowledge knew of no 
American planes in France. 1052. 
Capt. Charles C. Johnson (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; 
Volume II). 

Charge of scout flight at testing department, Wilbur Wright 
Field, Ohio. 

Transferred from the French Army to the United States Army 
in France. Entered French Army in 1915. 1053. His service 
at the front, 1054. 

Never flown the De Haviland, but from a little inspection of it 
on the ground thinks it has weak points. Confirms defects 
that others have testified to. Outline of the defect. 1054r- 
1057. Thinks defects can be remedied, but the machine never 
can be made a combat machine. 1057. 

Thinks it can be used for reconnoissance and photo work. 

Previous to leaving France saw no American combat planes in 
use at the front. 1058. 
Lieut. Frank W. Wells (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; Vol- 
ume II). 

A pilot in scout flight at Wilbur Wright Field. Was with the 
French Army at the front and was transferred to American 
Arnry January, 1918. Came to the United States July 1, 1918. 
1059-1060. 

Never flown at the field. " There have not been any machines to 
fly in the scout flight, with the exception of one, and I did not 
think that was fit to fly, so I did not fly that one." 1060. 

Eeference made to Standard M Defense. Defects. 

No experience with the De Haviland except to observe it. Saw 
one American De Haviland in France. At first flyers liked it, 
but now they will not do any stunts with it. 1061-1062. Does 
not think De Haviland can ever be made a combat plane. 
May be used for photo work and possibly directing artillery 
fire. 1064. 

Has never seen an American-built plane used on the front. 1064. 



ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 389 

Naval Constructor J. C. Hunsaker (Washington, D. C, August 2 r 
1918; Volume II). 

Recalled to testify about 100 De Havilands which the Navy had 
crated for shipment to France and were being held up because 
of the defective workmanship on four of the same lot which 
were tested at Miami, Fla. Decided to refuse to accept them 
and returned them to the Aircraft Production Board of the 
Army, who agreed to give them other later models, which they 
would guarantee. 1067-1068. Fifty of them did go to France. 

Discussion of the defects. 1068-1070. 

Steps taken to patch up the 50 sent to France. Men sent to 
France for this purpose. 1071-1072. 

Marines in France need airplanes. Does not know how steps 
will be taken to prevent the use of these 50 machines, but 
thinks full information as to the defects will be sent. 1072. 

No trouble -with other contracts with the Army for other types 

of planes. Most of their airplane work done separately from 

the Army either by contract with other concerns or in the 

naval shops themselves. 1073. 

Capt. N. E. Irwin, United States Navy (Washington, D. C, August 

2,1918; Volume II). 

Director of Naval Aviation. Program of the United States 
Navy in building aircraft, etc. All satisfactory except the 
Hall- Scott motor, which they stopped using. 1076. Ones 
already secured patched up, but abandoned all production of 
further Hall-Scott motors. 1076-1077. 

Testimony about the De Haviland which the Navy received from 
the Army confirms Naval Constructor Hunsaker's testimony 
concerning the defects in the 4 tested at Miami, the 50 sent to 
France, and the taking back by the Army of the 100. 1078- 
1079. Letter to Senator Thomas from Secretary Daniels in- 
closing report of the defects discovered in testing the 4 De 
Havilands at Miami, Fla. 1079-1080. 

Insertions for the record: Letter to Senator Thomas from Maj. 
H. S. Brown, Chief of Finance Division, showing the loss in 
the cancellation of Bristol contracts. Loss, $6,482,000, with 
deduction for salvage. 1081-1082. 
Mr. Wm. C. Potter, Assistant Director, Bureau of Aircraft Produc- 
tion (Washington, D. C, August 6, 1918 ; Volume II) . 

Statement of Gen. Pershing's request for 25,000 planes, with 
accessories, spare parts, guns, etc, by July 1, 1919. 

His request included planes for various purposes. He did not 
recommend a particular type of plane for its particular pur- 
pose, but he desired us to develop the planes intended for a 
certain purpose. 1083-1085. 

With exception of two foreigners who have come to America, " I 
personally do not know of an airplane designer in this country 
that I think has had the experience close to the front and in 
contact with the military necessities who is capable of design- 
ing by himself a successful battle plane." 1085. 

How Mr. Pomelio, of Italy, one of the above exceptions, came 
to this country. 1085-1086. 

His statement as to the responsibility for the failure of the 
Bristol Fighter machine. 1087. 

Technical discussion of engines for this machine. 



390 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. Wm. C. Potter — Continued. 

Effort to induce Aircraft Board to adopt the " Sunbeam," was 
before his connection, but he investigated a little of it. His 
statement regarding it. Found it not powerful enough to put 
into the Bristol plane, 1088-1089. 

Sums up to say, " the faulty design and construction of the 
Bristol Fighter was due entirely to a lack of detailed knowledge 
of aeronautical design on the part of the men who had the 
matter in hand." 1090. 

Many changes made in the original design, but thinks failure 
would have been greater if original design had been used. 
Also bad workmanship. 1090. 

Program now for observation planes. The planes being used. 
1091-1093. 

Program for day bomber. 1093. 

Program for night bomber. 1093-1091. 

Taking up discussion of the De Haviland 4. Program for 1,000. 
About tOO on the way to France. Cable a week ago says that 
none had reached the front, no reason being given. 1095. 

Previous report of defects in the De Havilands shipped over, but 
these latter planes sent over with the same defects. 1096. 

His testimony confirms other testimony about the tests of the 4 
De Havilands which the navy officials made at Miami, Fla. 
1097. 

No favorable report ever made on the testing of the De Havi- 
land. 1097. 

No more De Havilands similar to those turned over to the Navy 
or those already shipped abroad will be turned out until all 
the defects reported have been made. 1098. 

Sending of Col. Hall over on July 16 to look after the defective 
De Havilands which had already been sent over. His state- 
ment concerning Mr. Hall. 

Can not answer when we are able to put an acceptable machine 
of American manufacture in actual combat on the front. 1099. 

" The machine that is to be satisfactory to the Department of 
Military Aeronautics has yet to be built." 1100. 

Statement of obligations and net expenditures of aircraft pro- 
duction and Signal Corps appropriations as of May 31, 1918, 
and July 31, 1918. 1101. 

Incident of Capt. de Annunzio coming to America. " Mr. de 
Annunzio has not been marooned anywhere." " I take excep- 
tion to it. He has been given every facility that the United 
States Government offers to develop his machines." 1102. 

Impossible to get the services of the right kind of aeronautical 
engineers to come, because of salaries. 1103. 

Congress has not denied to grant a single power but one relating 
to the press, and why not get these men? 1103. 

Men coming from France and Italy now upon invitation. 

Criticism of the work made by Senator Reed in his questions 
put to Mr. Potter. " These gentlemen who have been pro- 
ducing this work will fare just as well in dollars and cents as 
if they had produced first-class work." Mr. Potter, "They 
will." 1106. 

Not satisfied with the inspections. Men not competent. 1106. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 391 

C. W. Nash (Washington, D. C, August 8, 1918; Volume II). 

Assistant to the director in charge of engineering and produc- 
tion Aircraft Production Board. President Nash Motors Co., 
and entered into present service at request of Mr. Ryan. 

Statement of the efforts which were made to have him come. 
Upon invitation, made investigation, and found that the sit- 
uation was so badly handled that I declined conference with 
Col. Mixter in Chicago and meeting Mr. Ryan in Detroit. 
Finally, put up to me that I could not retain my self-respect 
without doing something. 1108. 

After receiving assurance from Mr. Ryan that I could set or- 
ganization up as I saw fit, I accepted the proposition. 
1108-1109. 

Found that the organization was in an impossible shape. His 
proposition to have technical section, engineering section, and 
production department under one head. 1109. 

New engineering department to be formed. Does not know if 
the men responsible for past blunders will be discharged. 
Col. Vincent will be retained under his direction. 1110. 

De Haviland 4 only machine to be on front in short time. De- 
liveries on them suspended, however, for 10 days. 

Confirms statement about deliveries to France and to the Navy 
of the defective De Havilands even after receipt of Gen. Persh- 
ing's cable report of defects. 1111. 

Corrections of these defects now being considered. 1113. 

No production of a 300 horsepower or thereabouts going on 
now. Not until January 1. 1113-1114. 

Thinks De Haviland an average machine for bombing, but not 
a fighter machine. 1114. 

Thinks that all talks to newspapers about the Liberty motor be- 
ing a cure-all for everything should be stopped. Liberty mo- 
tor has not been tested and no plane should be pronounced a 
success until it has been tried in every conceivable situation. 
1115. 

Mr. Ryan's speech, " Fifty thousand motors have been ordered 
for them (meaning the boys on the front) and that the new 
motor (referring to the Liberty motor) was worthy of the 
highest praise." This impossible. 1116. 

Thinks if 10,000 planes sent over by July 1, 1919, it will be a 
miracle. Only De Havilands sent over until January 1, 1919. 

Mr. Ryan, Mr. Landon, nor Mr. Nash had previous experience 
in airplanes. A new profession in this country. HIT. 

He must have authority. Expert men coming from Europe to 
advise. 1118. 

Statement concerning the Caproni incident the coming over 
of De Annunzio to assist in production of Caproni. 1120- 
1121. 

" The policy is going to be to no longer try to plug round holes 
with square plugs, but to put round plugs into round holes." 
1122. 



392 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

C. W. Nash — Continued. 

Incidents brought out in testimony about the Witteman-Lewis 
Co., and Mr. Lang, who offered to make propellers, etc., 
directed to Mr. Nash. 1123-1124. 

Not throughly acquainted with Cross License Agreement, but 
says, "We are at war, and I think aircraft licensing or any- 
thing else that you may call it should be waived, and we should 
go out and build the best planes at the best places, and get 
them to France at the quickest possible moment." 1125. 

Thinks it would be suicidal for Government to take over plants 
and operate them. 1125. 

Discussion as to contracts and what should be done about the 
Standard plant with its Japanese financial backing. 1126. 

Question of installing fire protection in the plants. 1127. 
Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War (Washington, D. C, August 9, 
1918; Volume II). 

Does not know if there is any combat planes on the front at this 
time. 1129. 

Does not know that airplanes with defects were sent across after 
receiving Gen. Pershing's cable reporting defects. 1130. 

Does not agree with others that it will be January 1, 1919, before 
we have a combat plane on the front. 1130. 

Gen. Pershing's cable says : " Planes sent here must be inspected 
and thoroughly tested before being shipped." Does not think 
it a grave error not to comply with this request. 1131. 
His statement regarding this follows. 

Discussion of the War Department's declination to give the 
committee the reports from Gen. Pershing. These highly con- 
fidential, says Baker. 1134. 

Reading of Official Bulletin conveying wrong information as to 
progress being made in aircraft production. Is it not time to 
have Mr. Creel stop this? 1137-1140. 
John D. Ryax, Director of the Bureau of Aircraft Production 
(Washington, D. C, August 13, 1918; Volume II). 

Previous business activity. Nothing to do with aircraft. 

Is in dual capacity. Chairman of Aircraft Board and director 
of the bureau. 1143. 

Members of the Aircraft Board. Col. Deeds and Col. Montgom- 
ery have been detached and are not now serving on the board. 
1144. 

Takes up the personnel of Bureau of Aircraft Production and 
their previous training, the work of this bureau, etc. 1145- 
1149. 

Relation of the Equipment Division of the Signal Corps. 1149, 
1150. 

Expenses. $350,000,000 already expended. Commitments outly- 
ing will absorb rest of $640,000,000 appropriation. Now ask 
Congress for additional $1,032,000,000 to carry them until 
June 30. 1152-1155. 

When he took charge, thinks advancement on elementary-train- 
ing planes were entirely satisfactory. Backward, however, on 
advanced-training planes. 1155. 



ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 393 

John D. Ryan — Continued. 

His statement about the progress on the production of the Bris- 
tol Fighter. 1156-1159. 

Technical discussion of motors and planes follows. 1160, 1161. 

Senator Reed : "As a matter of fact, we have not a single Ameri- 
can-made fighting machine anywhere, have we ? " "I think 
that is true," replied Mr. Ryan. 1162. 

Cancellation of the Spad contract. Can not criticize, since he 
came in months afterwards. 1162, 1163. 

Statement concerning the De Haviland 4 contract. 1165, 1169. 

Lieut. Farwell sent to France, and he made tests of the De Havi- 
lands, and it was his findings that Gen. Pershing's cabled re- 
port was based. 1166. 

Production not canceled, but orders given that changes must 
be incorporated before any more sent out from factory. 

Intends to continue producing De Haviland 4 until the De 
Haviland 9 can be produced. Does not consider the weight of 
opinion is that this is a dangerous machine. 1170. 

Deeds, Montgomery, and Waldon have nothing to do with Air- 
craft Production Board. Col. Vincent has nothing to do with 
money expenditures or making of contracts, but is retained for 
his technical advice. 1171, 1172. 

Men connected with factories having contracts with Govern- 
ment may be called in for advice, but they have no connection 
with the board. 1173. 

His statement relative to the conditions he found in the West 
relative to spruce situation. 1174. 

Prevention of fire at factories. 1175. 

Received information last three days that De Havilands were 
flying satisfactorily ; that three squadrons had gone up to the 
front. This information brought back by Maj. Brett. He 
returned from production department overseas to secure parts 
and accessories. 1177, 1178. 

Production after 1st day of September, 30 machines a day; 
after October 1, 50 machines each day. Production of other 
planes. 

Capabilities for climbing, etc., given by Mr. Ryan, relative to 
the De Haviland. Senator Reed. " I can not understand those 
figures in connection with the ones that we have been given. 
They are utterly irreconcilable." 1179. 

Informal discussion of secret documents. " I can not put those 
in the record." 

Difference between a combat and fighter plane brought out. 
1180. 

Handley-Page plane. Inference from a request by the British 
for us to send them Liberty motors is that we could not build 
a plane around the Liberty motor. 1182. 

Production on this plane. 1182-1183. 

Caproni has not been tested sufficiently to go into production. 
1184-1185. 



394 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 

Mr. Ryan — Continued. 

Senator New takes up the record of the testimony of Capt. Kelly 
concerning the De Haviland 4 with Mr. Ryan. Takes up the 
statements also of Maj. Muhlenberg. Mr. Ryan's comments. 
1186-1188. 

Record of expenses. Expenditures amount to $334,236,363.50. 
Commitments amount to $764,115,582.09. 
Maj. G. H. Brett (Washington, D. C., August 16, 1918; Volume II). 

Came into Army through Philippine Scouts. In cavalry branch 
placed in aviation temporarily from October, 1915. Sailed 
for France October 29, 1917, after taking course in flying. 
Continuous overseas' service until last Sunday. 

Duties over there, chief of the materiel division of the supply 
section of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

His flying of machines, the types, etc. 1192-1193. 

Understood before leaving three squadrons fully equipped ready 
to go to the front. 1193. 

Changes that were made in these planes. 1194. 

How the Liberty motor was received in France. Officer who 
had tested English airplanes said, " It was the sweetest and 
most responsive motor we have for training and it was one of 
the easiest handled machines that he had ever driven." Criti- 
cized by the French. 1191^-1195. 

Many knockers on the other side. Accidents in this plane. Not 
as numerous in proportion to the other planes. 1196. 

What he has picked up from hearsay and observation of the 
De Haviland. Taking up the testimony and record. Per- 
shing's cablegram, etc., with Maj. Brett. His comments. 
Mostly technical discussion of the defects. 1198-1208. 

In reply to Senator Reed's question that we were using the De 
Haviland 4 for want of a better machine, he answered in the 
affirmative. 1209. 

Taking up with Maj. Brett the record of the testimony of Maj. 
Muhlenberg and Capt. Kelly. Maj. Brett's comments. 1210- 
1216. 

Memorandum showing the approximate number of airplanes 
received from European sources to July 31, 1918, by the Air 
Service, Supply Division, American Expeditionary Forces. 
1218-1219. 

Memorandum showing the number of squadrons in operation 
on the front. 1220-1221. 

Says the French have not lived up to their part of the contract 
when asked about Gen. Kenly's testimony that production had 
slowed down with our contracts with the French because of 
our inability to send them raw materials. 1221-1222. 

Senator Frelinghuysen presented statement showing the status 
of program contracts. 1224—1226. 



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